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ABSTRACT 
Between the Local and the National: the Free Territory 
of Trieste, "Italianità," and the Politics of Identity from 
the Second World War to the Osimo Treaty 
 
Fabio Capano 
This dissertation examines the politicized use of the city of Trieste and its surrounding territory, a 
cosmopolitan municipality that became the theatre of one of the most heated disputes of the early 
Cold War years. Scholars have extensively studied the diplomatic dimension of the confrontation 
between Italy and former Yugoslavia, yet many have largely neglected the significance of the 
broader political process that led to the Osimo Treaty of 1975, the final settlement of Italy’s eastern 
border. This dissertation reaffirms the importance of the Triestine territory as a contested socio-
political space that experienced the logic of both Cold War containment and détente. It studies this 
issue through a pericentric interpretative framework and demonstrates that the intertwining effect of 
local, national, and international politics significantly impacted the strategy of the Italian 
government which both extended and moderated the confrontational rhetoric of the Cold War 
against Tito’s regime.  
 
I argue that political leaders, parties, and associations used a wide range of political, economic, and 
social activities, which I later refer to as the politics of identity, to claim Italian sovereignty over the 
contested Adriatic border and reassert the Italian identity or “Italianità” of the Triestine territory. 
Above all, these activities were instrumentally used by the central government to reinforce popular 
support and project the image of the Triestine territory as a stronghold of Western democracy and 
barrier to Slav-Communism. Thus, ideas that had previously underscored the Italian identity of the 
disputed border now took a more dynamic as well as political and economic meaning that 
increasingly detached from former notions of an “imagined community” which shared a common 
language, culture, and past. As a result, Cold War Trieste gradually transformed into a factory of 
ideas of nationhood in post-war Italy.  
 
While this dissertation initially traces the fluctuating meaning of “Italianità” from nineteenth-
century irredentism to twentieth-century Fascism, it later explores government support of nationalist 
ambitions that survived the Second World War and only gradually adjusted to the dynamic logic of 
the Cold War. After Trieste’s return to Italy in 1954, however, the new Center-left Christian 
Democratic coalition government reframed its politics of identity toward the city and its territory by 
upholding a policy of Adriatic friendship that promoted political and economic cooperation across 
the border. While these policies mirrored the new logic of Adriatic détente, they also met political 
and popular opposition inside Trieste, ultimately weakening local loyalty toward the nation-state 
and facilitating the re-emergence of both political localism and autonomist aspirations. The political 
process that accompanied the definition of Italy’s northeastern frontier also reshaped the image of 
the Triestine border that, located at the Southern point of the Iron Curtain, transformed from a wall 
into a bridge toward the Communist world. Thus, this work sheds light on the politics of identity in 
Cold War regions, the dynamic relationship between capital and frontier cities and the fluidity of 
nationhood in post-war Italy. 
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Introduction 
In November 1968, Italian President Giuseppe Saragat visited Trieste to celebrate the fiftieth 
anniversary of the armistice ending World War One. This event was locally celebrated with a 55-
page edition of the Triestine newspaper Il Piccolo and the mass participation of 80,000 veterans.
1
 In 
his public speech, Saragat portrayed World War One as “the last war of national Risorgimento.” 
Saragat stressed that, in 1918, the image of the Italian soldiers entering Trieste became "the symbol 
of Italian national unification."
2
 Saragat’s speech catered to the endurance of patriotic arguments 
which traditionally depicted Trieste as the hallmark of Italian irredentist ambitions in the Adriatic.  
By 1968, however, these ambitions had been deeply challenged by the events that followed 
1945. After the Second World War, indeed, Trieste and northern Istria became symbols of a 
shattered nation and objects of an international dispute known as the "Trieste Question."
3
 In 1954, 
the London Memorandum ended the provisional Allied and Yugoslav military occupation of zones 
A and B of the "Territorio Libero di Trieste" (Free Territory of Trieste, FTT), a planned entity 
which was never established. At this time, zone A and the city of Trieste returned to Italian 
administration while Zone B of the FTT (northern Istria) remained under Yugoslav administration. 
Due to the provisional nature of the agreement, the Italian eastern border remained an unsettled 
issue for two decades until a solution was finally found with the Osimo Treaty in 1975.
4
 This 
bilateral treaty established the definitive state border between Italy and Yugoslavia and ended the 
“Trieste question” almost thirty years after the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.5  
                                                 
1“Manifestazione a Trieste per il cinquantenario della Vittoria,” Il Secolo d’Italia (November 2, 1968).  
2Sandro Caputo, “Una solenne e significativa commemorazione: il cinquantenario della Vittoria celebrato da Saragat a 
Trieste,” Il Popolo (November 5, 1968).  
3
See Diego De Castro, La questione di Trieste: l'azione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 1943 al 1954 (2 vols), 
(Trieste: Lint, 1981). 
4
See Massimo Bucarelli, La “Questione jugoslava” nella politica estera dell’Italia Repubblicana,1945-1999  
(Roma: Aracne, 2008). 
5Trieste’s experience is not unique in its genre, yet no other cities of a comparable strategic, political, and economic 
value came to find themselves entangled  in such a context of  prolonged ideological and ethnic rivalry. For a study of 
the post-1947 partition of the Italian city of Gorizia between Italy and Yugoslavia see Chiara Sartori, “Strong Identities: 
Localism and Nationalism in Gorizia” (PhD diss., Brown University, 2012). For studies of other European cities that 
became objects of dispute between bordering states especially after WWII, see Bartosz Nabradalik, “South-Eastern 
Poland between 1939 and the Final Soviet Frontier Demarcation in 1951-The Destruction of an Ethnic Mosaic.”Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies 21(2008): 17-37 and Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts:Christians, Muslims, and Jews 
1430-1950 (New York: Random House, 2006).   
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Nonetheless, within the context of the Cold War political leaders, parties and associations 
continued to claim the Italian identity or "Italianità" of Trieste and its Istrian region to reassert 
territorial sovereignty over Italy's northeastern border and, especially, maximize popular support for 
their different causes. These multiple political actors at both the national and local level pursued a 
wide range of political, economic, and social activities that, later referred to as the politics of 
identity, utilized national identity as a "political resource which could be modified, manipulated, 
and functionalized."
6
 Thus, ideas of “Italianità” as a “subjective dimension of self-projection by the 
local and national community,” also took on malleable meanings which reinforced, challenged, or 
disrupted twentieth-century nationalist rhetoric.
7
 In drawing on Sabina Donati's interpretation of 
“Italianità" as "the collective phenomenon of national belonging, sometimes distinguishable from, 
more often blurred with, other identities of the self,” this dissertation suggests that “Italianità" can 
be best understood as a dynamic rather than static territorial or cultural expression of national 
identity and investigates its political use in post-war Italy through the lenses of the border dispute 
over Trieste and its territory.
8
 
In studying the Free Territory of Trieste, this work contributes to scholarly debates on three 
main issues. First, it investigates the politics of identity in border zones during the Cold War. In 
drawing on recent approaches which have shifted the focus from the diplomatic towards the social, 
political, and cultural dimension of the conflict, it highlights the influential role that Cold War 
ideology played in shaping both local and national views of the Yugoslav neighbor.
9
 Although 
scholars have extensively studied the “Trieste Question” as an issue of Cold War diplomacy, only a 
                                                 
6
Gian Enrico Rusconi (ed.), Nazione, etnia,cittadinanza in Italia e in Europa. Per un discorso storico-culturale 
(Brescia: Editrice La Scuola, 1993), 26. For a similar approach which investigates the ephemeral essence of idea of 
nationhood in modern Italy see Gino Bedani and Haddock, B.A. (ed.), The Politics of Italian National Identity: a 
Multidisciplinary Perspective (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2001).   
7
See Silvana Patriarca, Italian Vices: Nation and Character from the Risorgimento to the Republic (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2010). 
8
See Sabina Donati, A Political History of National Citizenship and Identity in Italy 1861-1950 (Stanford: University 
Press, 2013). 
9
See Tobias Hochscherf, Christoph Laucht, and Andrew Plowman (ed.), Divided but not Disconnected: German 
Experiences of the Cold War (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010).  
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few have examined its long-term significance and political implications for Italy, especially after 
1954.  
As Sabina Mihelj demonstrates, Italians in Trieste effectively thought of those living across 
the demarcation line as uncivilized, atheist, and “Slavo-Communists.”10 This stereotype, which 
recalled past views of a “civilized” Western Europe and barbaric Eastern Europe, strongly affected 
the representation of the “Slav” in and outside the border city of Trieste. Above all, I argue that this 
Cold War mapping reinforced both nationalist claims of “Italianità” and the symbolic representation 
of Italy’s northeastern border as a bulwark against Yugoslav Communism. As a result, it fueled 
political antagonism towards Tito’s Yugoslavia and hindered the process of Adriatic friendship.  
Thus, my work ultimately challenges the idea that after 1954 the Adriatic border 
transformed into a source of mutual cooperation and understanding and instead emphasizes the 
prolonged tension that marked political relationships between the Adriatic neighbors and their 
border communities. At the same time, it also stresses that after 1954 the new Italian Republic 
gradually adjusted its former Cold War rhetoric to a new strategy of peaceful co-existence with 
Tito’s Yugoslavia. Consequently, symbolic representations of the northeastern Adriatic border 
vacillated between those of a wall and a bridge, ultimately reframing meanings of national identity. 
Second, in studying the complex political relationship between Rome and Trieste, this work 
contributes to both the study of Italy’s northeastern border and, more broadly, to new approaches 
that emphasize the relationship between center and periphery. In her study of Trieste under Allied 
Military occupation, Anna Millo investigated the persistent tension between Roman and Triestine 
political elites during the immediate post-war years.
11
 Although Millo shows that conflicts and 
misunderstandings effectively debilitated the defense of the city's "Italianità" and facilitated the rise 
of local political extremism and pro-independence sentiments, her work only partially sheds light on 
the socio-political dynamics of "Italianità" along the contested Adriatic border.  Indeed, its narrow 
                                                 
10Sabina Mihelj, “Drawing the East-West Border:Narratives of Modernity and Identity in the Northeastern Adriatic 
(1947-1954),” in Cold War Cultures: Perspective on Eastern and Western European Societies,  ed. Annette Vowinckel, 
Marcus M.Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 276-296.  
11
See Anna Millo, La Difficile intesa. Roma e Trieste nella questione giuliana 1945-1954 (Trieste: Italo Svevo, 2011). 
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focus on the interaction between national and local political elites minimizes the pivotal role that 
the local public spheres played to support, oppose, and ultimately challenge politicized 
representations of national identity. This dissertation aims to fill this scholarly lacuna by 
investigating why and how the interaction between political elite and agents of the Triestine public 
sphere ultimately re-shaped the twentieth-century territorial meaning of Italian identity between 
1945 and 1975.  
Finally, this dissertation revises former influential historiographical interpretations of Italian 
nationalism as a political and cultural movement.
12
 Indeed, much of the current scholarship on this 
topic suggests that nationalist ideas of Italian identity disappeared in post-war Italy and political 
actors turned to the European myth of unity.
13
 Contrary to this interpretation, I argue that nationalist 
understandings of "Italianess" survived after 1945 and were strongly tied to the values of national 
patriotism and anti-Communism.
14
 Because of its location on the edge of the Adriatic iron curtain, 
various political actors imbued Italian rule over Trieste and its territory with an irredentist meaning 
of “Italianità.” As Maura Hametz has demonstrated, national and local politicians strove to extend 
Italian statehood to Trieste and then to preserve it, yet their strategies were challenged by Trieste's 
cosmopolitan past and ambivalent political identity.
15
 
 At the same time, however, the new Republic’s political elites forged an innovative 
understanding of national identity which, especially in frontier cities like Trieste, became connected 
to the values of Western democracy, anti-Communism, and modernization. Although nationalist 
expressions of Italian identity sporadically re-emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, nationalist 
definitions of “Italianità” decisively weakened after the city's return to Italian sovereignty in1954. 
From that moment, "Italianess" from the perspective of Trieste gradually transformed into a 
complex social, political, and economic concept that measured the state’s ability to fulfill promises 
                                                 
12
See Emilio Gentile, La Grande Italia: ascesa e declino del mito della nazione nel ventesimo secolo (Milano: 
Mondadori, 1997).  
13
See Nicholas Doumanis, Inventing the Nation: Italy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
14
See Ariella Verrocchio, Trieste tra ricostruzione e ritorno all’Italia (1945-1954) (Trieste: Irsml, 2004).  
15
See Maura Hametz, Making Trieste Italian, 1918-1954 (New York: Royal Historical Society, 2005).   
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of economic prosperity and protect the cultural and linguistic Italian identity of the border.
16
 Over 
time, the failing strategies of the central government facilitated the re-emergence of Trieste's past 
cosmopolitanism and political autonomy. Thus, Trieste, which was the first Italian city to 
experience both the ideological confrontation of the Cold War and the process of international 
detente, offers an invaluable window into popular and political understandings of post-war 
"Italianità." 
This study strongly relies on a variety of primary sources from Italian and American 
archives, in particular the rich documentation of the Border Office in Rome which has only recently 
been made available. In closely investigating the Italian government’s economic contribution to the 
Triestine economy, its financial support to the local neo-irredentist network and its defense of the 
rights of Italian émigrés from the region, this dissertation disputes common arguments regarding the 
government’s indifference to Trieste and instead emphasizes the role that the elastic meaning of 
“Italianità” played in shaping governmental policies. 
This work methodologically approaches the Triestine case by stressing its specificities yet is 
aware of the danger of over-estimating the significance of the local.
17
 As a study of identity politics 
and their negotiation between center and periphery, this dissertation explains the relationship 
between public opinion and political action.
18
 Therefore, it explores popular responses to state 
policies by means of governmental records, the daily press, official documents of political parties, 
and the records of émigré and patriotic associations, as well as private papers of leading political 
figures in order to assess the historical trajectory of Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” 
in Trieste.
19
  
                                                 
16
For a similar approach to this issue see Roberto Dedenaro, “Postfazione: potersi sentire italiani: un percorso 
nell’identità italiana di Trieste,” in Gli italiani dell’Adriatico orientale: esperienze politiche e cultura civile, ed. 
Lorenzo Nuovo e Stelio Spadaro (Gorizia: Libreria Editrice Goriziana, 2012), 329.
 
17
Luigi Ganapini,  Anche l’uomo doveva essere di ferro: classe e movimento operaio a Trieste nel secondo dopoguerra 
(Roma: Franco Angeli, 1986), 1. 
18
Geoff  Eley and Ronald Suny, Becoming National (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24. 
19
See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).  
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The examination of this abstract and constructed public space in which people recognized 
each other as members of the same community were firmly related to notions of common language, 
culture, and historical past.
20
 These values underscored local irredentist ambitions to first extend 
and later preserve “Italianità” in Trieste and the Istrian territory. Over time, liberal, fascist, and 
Republican elites, indeed, promoted a set of images, symbols, and values to demonstrate the 
voluntary and natural participation of the Italian border community in the life of the nation. 
Although ideas of membership and loyalty to the same national community remained central to 
post-war neo-irredentist propaganda, they also became blended with the cosmopolitan and local 
identity of Trieste after 1954.  
 In Chapter One I define Adriatic irredentism as a complex politically and socially 
constructed phenomenon that asserted the region’s historical rights to cultural and linguistic 
autonomy. These views shaped local ideas of “Italianità” that advocated municipal rule rather than 
territorial separation from the Habsburg Empire. In the early twentieth century, however, loyalty to 
the Habsburgs was compromised and eventually contradicted by the rise of modern nationalism.
21
 
Therefore, on the eve of the Great War, irredentist thinkers decisively re-conceptualized Italianess 
in ethno-territorial terms and decisively changed the cosmopolitan attitude of fractions of the 
Italian- speaking population in Trieste. The historical experience of national Fascism conferred a 
chauvinist and aggressive meaning to “Italianità,” ultimately producing phenomena of south Slavic 
ethno-political retribution after Mussolini’s fall in 1943. In such a context, however, ideas of 
democratic patriotism were rescued by the Triestine Committee of National Liberation which 
embodied Risorgimental ideas of “Italianità.” 
                                                 
20
Alberto Banti, La nazione del Risorgimento: parentela, sanità, e onore alle origini dell’Italia unita (Torino: Giulio 
Einaudi, 2000), 150. 
21
For a comprehensive historiographic study of the nationalist views of Attilio Tamaro and municipal views of Fabio 
Cusin, see Silvano Cavazza e Giuseppe Trebbi, Attilio Tamaro e Fabio Cusin nella storiografia triestina: atti del 
convegno in ricordo di Arduino Agnelli, Trieste, 15-16 Ottobre 2005 (Trieste: Deputazione di Storia Patria per la 
Venezia Giulia, 2007).  
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The second chapter investigates the effect of the Cold War on local understanding of 
national identity.
22
 It studies the ethno-ideological dimensions of the border dispute that 
materialized on the southeastern edge of the Iron Curtain, which was depicted within the national 
public sphere as a moment of confrontation between Italian and Slav civilizations and between 
democracy and Communism. Throughout the chapter, I show that nationalist rhetoric still 
significantly affected the views of the Republic’s new governing elite which consistently attempted 
to reassert Italian rule over the pre-war Adriatic borders. The views of the immediate postwar 
Italian government largely mirrored those of the Italian community in and outside Trieste yet were 
confronted by both the Communist and Triestine independence political movements. After years of 
diplomatic negotiations, Allied military government, and socio-political violence, the Italian 
government ultimately complied with the terms of the London Memorandum of 1954, a solution 
dictated by the imperative of international Cold War politics.  
In the third chapter, I examine post-1954 "Italianità" through the lenses of the local 
economic crisis, the phenomenon of the émigrés, and the activities and propaganda of the neo-
irredentist network. Although neo-irredentist understandings of “Italianità” had effectively 
weakened within national public discourse, they continued to dominate in Trieste. At the same time, 
neo-irredentist associations of democratic rather than nationalist inspiration continued to benefit 
from the economic and political support of the central government. Nevertheless, the failure of the 
new Italian administration to respond to the deep economic and social crisis that gripped the city 
undermined the strength of its patriotic rhetoric and ultimately aroused local animosity toward 
Rome. 
Chapter Four investigates the complex relationship between local interpretations of 
“Italianità” and the political experiment of the Center-Left coalition governments at the national 
level between 1963 and 1968. At this time, the central government definitively abandoned any 
                                                 
22For a new approach that studies the dynamics of the Cold War and its effects on people’s daily lives see Frank Tallet, 
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residual irredentist ambitions in favor of a more progressive and conciliatory policy and embraced 
the idea of international negotiations to resolve the border dispute with Yugoslavia. Trieste, for its 
part, opposed the political and economic policies of the Italian government because they were 
perceived as threats to both its Italian identity and economic interests. What became known as the 
Hrescak case exposed the continuing strength of anti-Slovene political sentiment within the Italian 
Triestine community. Likewise, the city's opposition to the government’s plan to restore the 
competitiveness of Trieste’s port demonstrated growing popular animosity toward Rome. Searching 
for a definitive settlement of the eastern border, the central government underestimated the long-
term consequences of the Triestine protests which gave further evidence of the weakness of the 
patriotic rhetoric of "Italianità." 
Finally, the last chapter looks at Trieste’s response to the Osimo Treaty. Within the context 
of political relaxation in East-West relations following the Prague Spring, I emphasize the 
increasing discrepancy between the views of the Christian Democratic led-coalition government 
and those of significant segments of the Triestine community who strenuously resisted Adriatic 
detente. Although the border dispute had become a marginal issue within national public opinion, 
the political costs of renouncing Italy’s formal sovereignty over the former Zone B remained 
significant inside Trieste. Thus, the central government carried out secret negotiations which were 
facilitated by a set of international and domestic political factors that accelerated the resolution of 
the border dispute. The deceptive behavior of the Italian government and the economic terms of the 
Osimo Treaty, however, provoked an unpredictable socio-political backlash at the local level, which 
led to the victory of the local protest movement “Lista per Trieste” (List for Trieste, LPT) in 
municipal elections and ultimately exposed the fluid nature of Trieste's Italian and cosmopolitan 
identity. 
This study of the politics of identity over the eastern border in postwar Italy concludes by 
discussing its long-term legacy in and outside of Trieste. The Julian city, a historical crossing point 
of Italian, German, and Slav civilizations, effectively maintained an ambivalent national and 
14 
 
commercial identity that concurrently reinforced patriotic and cosmopolitan sentiments. Thus, 
centralized representations of “Italianità” became subjects of continuous negotiations that, within 
public discourse, paralleled the transformation of Trieste from a nineteenth-century outpost of 
Adriatic irredentism into a twentieth- century center of nationalism first and political regionalism 
later. Within the broader context of the Cold War, especially, the external projection of the Triestine 
territory as a source of Western democracy and well-being starkly contrasted with the dictatorial 
nature of Tito's regime. Thus, Trieste and its territory became symbols of both the policy of 
containment and détente, ultimately proving the ideological and geographical fluidity of Italy's 
eastern border. While this political process revealed the intertwining effects of international, 
national, and local politics, it also shed light on both the resilience of nationalist rhetoric and the 
new political relationships between frontier cities and their capitals in an age of Cold War. In 
postwar Italy, it produced a sense of "composed decadence" among Triestines which exposed the 
complexity, strident contradictions, and legacy of European modernity "from the birth of 
nationalisms to the profound crisis of the European subject."
23
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Chapter One 
“Italianità” on the Border: Trieste and Italian Irredentism from National Unification to the 
Republic 
During the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, Trieste transformed from a 
Hapsburg to an Italian domain and, together with Trento, became focal points in the myth of an 
Italian national manifest destiny.
1
 This myth, rooted within the historical experience of the Italian 
“Risorgimento,” was strongly informed by Giuseppe Mazzini’s idea of the nation as a voluntary 
association of people based on the principle of nationality.
2
 Therefore, in “language frontiers”3 such 
as Trieste and its hinterland, the principle of nationality underscored ideas of self-determination as 
well as membership and mutual loyalty toward Italy’s new imagined community.  
Adriatic irredentism, a complex cultural, political, and social phenomenon that emerged on 
the shores of the Adriatic Sea during the nineteenth-century, became the harbinger of a local version 
of nationhood whose myths, symbols, and images shaped specific notions of Italian identity or 
“Italianità.” Over time, irredentism transformed from the intellectual property of a tiny minority 
into “a shared experience for people who were conscious of their own identity.”4 At first, irredentist 
thinkers conceptualized “Italianità” as an expression of cultural and linguistic autonomy within the 
broader intellectual framework of Adriatic multi-nationalism. “Italianità,” however, gradually 
changed and became a valuable political means to justify the territorial reincorporation of the 
“unredeemed” land within the borders of the new Italian state. Indeed, during the twentieth century, 
national identity was increasingly understood in “exclusionary and sometimes xenophobic terms.”5  
                                                 
1
Ara Angelo e Eberhard Kolb, Regioni di frontiera nell’epoca dei nazionalismi: Alsazia e Lorena / Trento e Trieste 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995), 13. 
2
For a historical examination of the role and values of individualism within Mazzini’s thought, see Vetter Cesare e 
Andrea Stefanel, "Giuseppe Mazzini: felicità, reincarnazionismo e sacralizzazione della politica" Contemporanea: 
Rivista di Storia dell’800 e del ‘900 14 (2011) (1): 5-32.  
3
Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 11. 
4
Diego Redivo, Le trincee della nazione: cultura e politica della Lega Nazionale (1891-2004) (Trieste: LN,  2004), 21. 
5
Dominique Reill, Nationalists who Feared the Nation: Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and 
Venice (Standford: University Press, 2012), 1.  
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What scholar Alberto Banti defined as the “nationalizing cosmopolitanism” of Europe’s 
nineteenth-century ideas of nation, inexorably faded on the eve of the Great War.
6
 During the inter-
war years, the fascist regime ultimately undermined any residual and conciliatory notion of 
“Italianità” and revealed its most aggressive and chauvinist features. Consequently, Italian language 
and culture became instruments as well as symbols of repression and imperialism for the Slavic 
population living along the Adriatic border. It was only in 1943, amidst Mussolini’s fall, that a 
small group of local intellectuals desperately attempted to re-launch Mazzini’s idea of national 
patriotism. Although their efforts remained largely ignored and were overshadowed by the 
prominent Communist-led movement of local resistance, their legacy contributed to the post-war 
revival of “Italianità” on the Adriatic border.  
 
Risorgimento and the Dawn of Adriatic Irredentism 
“Carso is the part of the Adriatic region between the eastern side of the Julian Alps (Italy’s 
natural border) and the mountain range that runs through the Triestine gulf, cuts Istria in two 
distinct halves and reaches the Quarnero.”7 With these words, the nineteenth century Triestine 
writer, Scipio Slapater, described the territory surrounding Trieste and imagined the geographical 
extension of the Italian Adriatic border. In his biographical narrative, “Il Mio Carso,” Slapater 
equated Italy to culture, liberty, and economic prosperity. This idea echoed the views of Adriatic 
irredentists who advocated for Italian territorial rule over Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia which they 
believed were Italian in language and culture.
8
  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the Italian-speaking bourgeoisie of 
Trieste promoted a version of Italian nationhood which recognized the multicultural nature of the 
city and its indissoluble association to the Austrian empire.
9
 In order to guarantee the opulence of 
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the city, irredentist thinkers advocated the defense of Trieste’s Italian cultural autonomy within the 
imperial public sphere rather than political or territorial separation for the Adriatic city.
10
 Pacifico 
Valussi, for instance, claimed that “distinct nations formed on the borderlands in conjunction with 
others nations would secure peace” and would favor socio-political harmonization among 
neighboring communities.
11
  
This specific conceptualization of Trieste's Italian identity underscored ideas of the city as 
the “Hamburg of the Adriatic,” a notion which highlighted its pivotal role within the multicultural, 
religious, and linguistic network of the maritime region.
12
 It also revealed the prominence of 
economic over political factors in shaping Italian group identity within the Habsburg framework. 
Indeed, commercial interests further reinforced cosmopolitanism among the Triestine elites and 
within the local public sphere for the years that anticipated the “springtime of nations” in 1848.13  
At this time, a complex set of underground nationalist movements vigorously emerged and 
contested the multicultural nature of the Adriatic region. While undermining the peaceful 
coexistence of different national cultures, their propaganda also revealed the urgency of the 
nationality question within a multi-ethnic Empire such as Austria-Hungary.
14
 Moreover, popular 
disapproval of extensive taxation, conscription and the ongoing financial crisis, fomented 
revolutionary upheaval in Trieste.
15
 Anti-Habsburg sentiment, however, was not a clear expression 
of political separatism;
 16
 it was rather a reaction to changes in the nature and scale of international 
commerce as well as the unequal language policies imposed by Vienna for secondary and higher 
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education, viewed by the Habsburg state as a valuable means to achieve greater economic and 
social integration.
17
   
After 1848 and within the context of "Risorgimento," the Italian struggle for national 
independence, not only elites but also common people were attracted by the promises and activism 
of nationalist agitators and responded by mobilizing on a local level in expectation of potential 
material benefits.
18
 In urban centers such as Trieste, the local Italian bourgeoisie attempted to 
protect its economic privileges and to respond to rising Slav nationalism by negotiating for local 
administrative autonomy with the Habsburg authorities.
19
 This strategy responded both to Hapsburg 
paternalistic policies and the gradual rise of pan-Slavism, yet it only partially succeeded. Based on 
the promotion of nation-building for historically disadvantaged ethnic groups, pan-Slavism 
“reinforced the national Croatian and Slovenian linguistic and cultural ties, thus limiting the 
capacities of national integration of the Italian dominant group.”20 As a result, competing 
nationalisms arose, especially in areas inhabited by a Slavic-speaking majority, such as the rural 
areas of the Istrian region.
21
  
Thus, when the Hapsburg administration refused to accept Italian as the official language of 
Istria, the Italian Liberal Party produced a memorandum that supported federalism in Trieste, Istria, 
and Dalmatia.
22 
Such initiatives were supported by local irredentist organizations such as the 
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Triestine Council and the Triestine Society. More importantly, they confirmed the process of 
gradual politicization of Triestine society whose "municipal myth" had worked as an antidote to 
Italian nationalism and made Trieste "a city that does not think of itself in territorial terms but as a 
maritime city, as an Adriatic and Mediterranean cosmopolitan capital."
23
 At the same time, the most 
intransigent fringes of these organizations gradually began to develop separatist ambitions that took 
either a specifically liberal or socialist outlook. In claiming the Italian identity of Trieste, segments 
of the local Triestine bourgeoisie ultimately promoted exclusive solutions to the problem of 
nationality within the broader Adriatic space.
24
  
The majority of the local Italian bourgeoisie, however, remained generally loyal to the 
Habsburg crown and bargained for political compensations.
25
 In particular, they pursued the defense 
of Italian commercial interests not only from the centralist policies of the Vienna administration but 
also from the economic competition of other local minorities.
26
 The city, indeed, attracted a large 
number of Slovenian peasant migrants from neighboring villages.
27
 In addition, local Slovenes 
developed their own associational network of banks and cooperatives while seeking political 
recognition from the Hapsburg administration. These demographic and economic changes 
significantly affected group identities and were accompanied by increasing ethno-political rivalry in 
Trieste.
28
     
After 1861, the creation of the Italian state strengthened the aspirations of national 
unification of local irredentist groups, yet the Triestine bourgeoisie still continued to rely on a 
strategy of political accommodation which better served its commercial interests. Niccolò 
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Tommaseo, the most prominent intellectual of Adriatic multi-nationalism, best exemplified the 
views of the Triestine bourgeoisie. Firmly believing that “variety helps us feel unity” Tommaseo 
stressed the importance of regional over national identity in ethnically heterogeneous areas such as 
the Adriatic region.
29
 The Dalmatian intellectual championed the “anational” nature of the Adriatic 
Littoral and the desirability of federal or confederate solutions, such as a Danubian Confederation, 
to maximize linguistic and cultural autonomy for its Italian community.
30
    
Tommaseo’s notions of regional cosmopolitan identity were partially reinforced by the 
Habsburg Empire’s accommodative policies toward the Italian language, which remained 
unchanged until 1864 when German became compulsory in public schools. Afterwards, the third 
Italian war of Independence of 1866 drastically changed the ethnic and political configuration of the 
Venetian region and compounded the Austrian administration’s distrust of the Italian community in 
Trieste and Dalmatia.
31
 In addition, the preservation of Italian, Croatian or Slovenian languages 
within a segregated school system and Vienna’s decision to block local students from attending 
Italian universities aroused local animosity toward the Hapsburg administration.
32
  
In such a context, Trieste increasingly became a micro-cosmic entity that embodied the 
conflict between Imperial sovereignty and nationalist ambitions.
33
 Consequently, factions of the 
local Italian bourgeoisie increasingly opposed the dominant role of local German speakers inside 
the state bureaucracy and embraced separatist strategies.
34
 Not simply political but especially 
economic changes to the privileged position of Trieste undermined the cosmopolitan attitudes of the 
Italian local bourgeoisie.
35
 Following the 1860s crisis in exports to Italian markets, and especially 
after the 1869 opening of the Suez Canal and the construction of the Trieste-Vienna railway, the  
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Map I: the Changing Configuration of Italy’s Eastern Border between 1866 and 1947 
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Triestine bourgeoisie claimed that Trieste’s role was minimized to that of an obsolete and  
intermediary port; however, according to Italian scholar Claudio Minca, the Triestine bourgeoisie 
criticized Vienna's economic policy to obtain further concessions that later allowed "Triestine 
shipping and insurance companies to expand internationally."
36
 Nonetheless, the transformation of 
the Triestine port exacerbated the resentment of the Triestine commercial elites who, also 
responding to the rise of a politically and economically organized Slovenian minority, fatally 
undermined perspectives of socio-political accommodation.   
Despite this, the lack of credibility of the Italian state undermined the local confidence of the 
Triestine bourgeoisie for the city's territorial incorporation into the new Italian Kingdom. Local 
Italian communities on the eastern border, indeed, negatively judged the new and amicable Italian 
foreign policy toward Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Andrassy report of 1874 effectively 
confirms that the Italian Kingdom intended to accommodate the German interests in the Adriatic in 
order to pursue expansionist goals in the Mediterranean.
37
 This pro-Austrian policy, hostile to 
irredentist organizations such as the Committee for Irredentist Italy in Naples formed in 1877, 
weakened the irredentist movement both inside and outside the Italian borders. In 1882, the 
formation of the “Triple Alliance” formalized the military alliance between Austria-Hungary, Italy, 
and Germany and led to the widespread repression of irredentist associations inside Italy. This 
process culminated in the arrest of Bottera Raimondo, a patriot and founder of the irredentist journal 
Italia Irredenta. 
In response, Millo argues, some Italians in Trieste interpreted these events as a proof that 
their ambitions for national unification had been “sold out” by Rome, a feeling that survived into 
the twentieth century.
38
 Above all, the Triestine liberal newspaper of the Italian bourgeoisie, 
L’Indipendente, openly criticized the Italian government and its rising repression of irredentism as 
well as the ban on public discourse about the separation of Trento and Trieste from the Habsburg 
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Empire.
39
 Although this local newspaper proved critical of Italy's policy toward the eastern border, 
the new Italian nation was portrayed as the opponent of pan-Slavism and a “symbol of the material 
and moral civilizing of humanity.” 40 More important, these nationalist arguments threatened 
Trieste's economic prosperity which strongly depended on its geo-political status within the 
Habsburg Empire.
 
 
 
Trieste's Turn to the Nation-State 
In Trieste, large segments of the commercial bourgeoisie promoted Italian language and 
culture without encouraging local political separatism until the late 1800s.
41
 At this time, however, 
the city experienced a strong economic crisis that decisively strengthened popular hostility toward 
Habsburg rule. In a city of 145,000 people of which 136,000 were Italians, fears of Slovene 
penetration of social state institutions and commercial sectors as well as governmental repression of 
expressions of self-determination boosted Italian popular nationalism.
42
 As a result, the propaganda 
of Adriatic irredentists, who had previously advocated Italian cultural autonomy within the Empire, 
aligned to that of Italian nationalists who were determined to incorporate Trieste within Italy’s 
national borders.  
Editions of L’Indipendente of the late 1880s confirmed that a widespread segment of the 
local population increasingly supported expression of political irredentism. In response to the 
Austrian ban on the Italian associational network in the Adriatic region and Austrian hostility 
toward the rights of the Italian students, the latter provoked mass protests inside Hapsburg 
universities which were promptly suppressed by the Imperial authorities. In addition, popular 
support for the initiatives of the local branch of the cultural association “Dante Alighieri,” revealed 
the rising momentum of local expressions of Italian identity.
43
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L’Indipendente not only highlighted issues of linguistic discrimination but it also 
emphasized the damage that unfavorable Habsburg policies, such as, the abolition of Trieste’s status 
as a free port and an increase in imports to other urban centers had caused to the economic interests 
of the local Italian commercial bourgeoisie.
44
 According to Adriatic intellectual Angelo Vivante, the 
reduced strength of trade, which had been the traditional vehicle of “Italianità” throughout the 
region, effectively weakened the cosmopolitanism of moderate irredentist factions within the local 
Triestine bourgeoisie.
45
 Thus, economic complaints compounded with irredentist propaganda 
against the educational privileges of the local Slav population, and ultimately aroused ethnic tension 
between the Slavic and Italian communities as well as hostility to Habsburg rule.
46
 Consequently, 
associations such as “Pro Patria” and especially the “Lega Nazionale” (National League),  the 
leading voice in support of Trieste’s Italian identity, gained popular support.47 Its impressive growth 
to 10,000 members symbolized the increasing strength of nationalist orientations among the Italian-
speaking population.
48
  
Over time, social, political, and economic factors decisively facilitated popular expressions 
of Adriatic irredentism. In this fashion, the Pirano revolt of 1894 became one of the most celebrated 
events in the narrative of popular irredentism. Pirano, an Istrian town populated by a small Italian 
population, was represented in the Diet of the Austrian Littoral.
49
 In response to the compulsory 
imposition of Italian and German bilinguism, the town’s Italians violently revolted against the 
Habsburg local administration. Despite the nationalist and rhetorical depiction of the revolt, it 
appears that territorial unification to Italy did not represent the dominant goal among the rebels; 
rather, support of a Balkan Confederation or a group of independent nations received greater 
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popular support.
50
 Local Italian associations such as the Istrian Political Society, for example, 
advocated administrative autonomy for the Italian population living in Istria.
51
  
Indeed, arguments of Italy’s everlasting cultural attractiveness, were still central to 
irredentist rhetoric. In claiming that “for each educated person Rome is the mother, for each pious 
soul Rome is the genesis,” irredentists attempted to both relate Trieste’s Italian identity and 
legitimize its inclusion within Italy’s borders by means of the cultural heritage of Imperial Rome.52  
Although some factions of the Triestine elite were still committed to the protection of commercial 
interests within the Hapsburg imperial framework, their perspective of “Italianità” had indeed 
deeply changed by the late nineteenth century.
53
  
In addition, the inability of the Triestine Liberal Party to respond to the needs of the popular 
and underprivileged mass of Italians living in the city "made Trieste" one of the unhealthiest towns 
of the Hapsburg monarchy in pre-1914 period” and gradually weakened popular support for the 
moderates of this party.
54
 As a consequence, strongly separatist political views inside the city 
gradually attracted not only larger segments of the local commercial bourgeoisie but also other 
groups among the local population.
55
 Aware of the rising extremism within the irredentist 
movement, Italian politicians in Rome also grew increasingly sympathetic to Adriatic irredentism.
56
  
In the early twentieth century especially, secessionist ambitions gained further momentum. 
In a December entry of 1904, L’Indipendente depicted attempts to mobilize student and civil society 
organizations at Innsbruck University as acts of “efficient and civil vigor” that paralleled the heroic 
resistance of the “Giovine Trieste” (Young Triestine Association) against German oppression.57 
Nationalist rhetoric and separatist ambitions also proved particularly strong within local and 
                                                 
50
Apollonio,159.  
51L’Indipendente (April 1, 1895).  
52L’Indipendente (November 1, 1895). 
53
Marina Cattaruzza, L’Italia e il confine Orientale, 1866-2006 (Bologna: Mulino, 2007), 62. 
54
Cattaruzza (2002), 207.  
55
This argument that relates to the crisis of democratic stances within the irredentist movement and the rise of political 
nationalism finds further evidence in Elsa Damien, “The Reversal of the Myths: Venetian Historiography and Adriatic 
Nationalism (1897-1922),” Italy and its Pasts, ASMI annual conference, (19-20 November 2010), 6. 
56
Hametz (2012), 29. 
57L’Indipendente (December 15, 1904). 
26 
 
national irredentist associations. Among them, the “Associazione Nazionale Trento Trieste” 
(National Association Trento Trieste, ANTT) became one of the main promoters of Italian 
territorial rule over both Trento and Trieste.  
In 1905, a letter from a member of the association emphasized the strong commitment of the 
ANTT toward the Italian population living in border regions. It stated that “whereas the association 
Dante Alighieri embraces the entire world, we modestly pay attention only to our brothers under 
Austria.” 58 Moreover, the 1908 report highlighted the independence and autonomy of the ANTT 
from any political affiliation and strongly criticized the clerical tendencies (in Trieste usually 
perceived as supportive of pan-Slavism) within the association.
59
 In referring to the Venetian local 
branch of the ANTT and the repressive measures of the Austrian authorities against manifestations 
of “Italianità” in the school system, the ANTT stressed the necessity to financially support the 
activism of young monarchists and their press network on the eastern border.
60
 
This radical turn inside the Adriatic irredentist movement provoked both resistance and 
support among traditional irredentist thinkers. For example, in 1909, Slapater argued that the local 
Italian bourgeoisie in Trieste was unable to overcome the issue of the primacy of economic over 
political and cultural interests of the Italian speaking population. In exchanges of correspondence 
published in the newspaper La Voce, Slapater defined irredentism as a cultural phenomenon located 
within the multicultural soul of Trieste which “was not irredentist.”61 Numerous letters in response 
to Slapater criticized the irredentist thinker for his support of Trieste’s ambivalent nationhood 
which strictly contrasted with the claims of aggressive irredentists who vouched for the extension of 
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Italian rule from Trieste to Dalmatia.
62
 These two irreconcilable views of Trieste’s national or 
multinational identity would later polarize future debates about the city’s “Italianità.”63 
By this time, however, uncompromising views increasingly pervaded the irredentist 
movement. In 1910, in an article entitled “Il Secondo Irredentismo” published within the March 
edition of the liberal newspaper La Grande Italia, Gualtiero Castellini compared the 
accomplishments of irredentism in the northeastern and southern regions. Castellini highlighted the 
necessity of an intellectual and moral regeneration of the nation as a whole which, together with the 
cultural activity of the “Dante Alighieri,” would have achieved the final goal of political 
irredentism: territorial unification.
64
 Also, in its commentary on the national Congress of the ANTT 
in Mantua between May 31 and June 1, 1913, La Voce della Patria reported increasingly hostile 
national public opinion toward Austria-Hungary due to its violation and repression of the rights of 
the Italian minority and its cultural identity. The Congress recalled the glorious past of Rome and 
Venice and invoked the political and territorial redemption of the Adriatic lands “for Trento, for 
Trieste, for a greater Italy inside its own sacred borders.”65 The rising hostility toward the Habsburg 
Empire found even more resonance in succeeding editions of the journal in 1913 and 1914. The 
journal fomented anti-Austrian feelings among local and national public opinion and highlighted the 
mistreatment of the Italian minority within educational institutions, the unfavorable terms of the 
Italian-Austrian alliance, and the necessity to “take up the sword” against the daily oppressive 
attitude of German civilization.
66
 
In drawing a direct relationship between the cultural heritage of former “Italian” Empires 
and Trieste’s Italian identity, irredentists aimed to foment public hostility toward the repressive rule 
of Austria-Hungary and strengthen political support for Italy. In a city whose urban population was 
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overwhelmingly Italian, the growing presence of Slovenian workers within the local industry as 
well as the Habsburg curtailment of the traditional commercial privileges of the Triestine 
bourgeoisie strengthened popular consensus toward the separatist strategy of the Italian local 
bourgeoisie.
67
 At the same time, however, its prospective solution to the nationality question in the 
Adriatic clashed with the socialist movement, producing tension on both ethnic and political lines.
68
  
During the months anticipating Italy’s entry into the First World War the intense propaganda 
campaign conducted by the new "Associazione Nazionalista Italiana" (Italian Nationalist 
Association) of 1910 and the ANTT was centered upon the idea of a struggle for survival against 
hostile German and Slav civilizations. For the ANTT the war was the maximum expression of 
Italian patriotism and popular ambitions of national unification. Its final goal was “to make Dante’s 
dream possible and to assure that our flag rules over the sea and the shores in which our only 
language is and always has been spoken.”69 This statement effectively mirrored the general 
orientations of the local Triestine bourgeoisie. In sharp contrast to earlier years, the larger part of 
this class identified its main interests with the imperialist ambitions of the Italian Kingdom.
70
 
Although it responded to the growth of the Italian and Slovene working population by promoting 
bold views of Trieste’s Italian identity, segments of the Italian speaking population retained a 
traditional cosmopolitanism that after the war re-emerged in the form of local municipalism.    
Thus, in drawing a general picture of Adriatic irredentism in Trieste before the outbreak of 
the Great War, what emerges is the image of an urban center in an agricultural area in which the 
Italian commercial bourgeoisie gradually gravitated from compromise to open conflict with the 
German and Slav populations. The ambivalent nature of Trieste’s identity was best exemplified by 
the concurrent myth of cultural Risorgimental independence and the reality of economic 
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dependence on Austria. This contradiction between economic interests and national consciousness 
put “irredentists against irredentism.”71 Until the 1890s, sentiment toward self-determination among 
the Italian speaking- population was still in a formative stage and did not yet create a deep breach 
between the Italian population and Habsburg rulers. By the turn of the century, however, nationalist 
factions of the Triestine bourgeoisie attacked the Hapsburg bureaucracy and arrogated to 
themselves the right to ostracize or absorb the local Slav population. Due to the allegedly 
indisputable “Italianità” of those lands, these local elite rejected traditional Triestine 
cosmopolitanism and invoked the extension of Italian sovereignty over the Adriatic border.  
 
World War One and Fascism: making Trieste the “Italianissima” City  
It was only on the eve of the Great War that Adriatic irredentism indisputably became “a 
movement to incorporate irredenta, that is, lands or people represented as unredeemed because 
stranded under alien rule,” and a classic example of homeland nationalism.72 It is also during this 
period that Trieste’s disputed identity became object of a prolonged debate between supporters of 
nationalist notions of “Italianità” and those who advocated Trieste’s traditional municipalism within 
the broader context of a multi-national Adriatic region. 
These two conflicting views were best exemplified by the writings of Attilio Tamaro and 
Fabio Cusin. Tamaro, the most representative irredentist and fascist thinker of twentieth-century 
Trieste, was a fervent nationalist who championed the “indisputable” Italian identity of the city and 
drew support for his argument on a biased reading of Trieste’s historical past.73 Tamaro greatly 
stressed manifestations of “Italianità” in Trieste in the form of its patriotic associations, press, and 
Masonic lodges and attributed the failure of patriotic uprisings to strong governmental censorship 
and repression. These uprisings were explained as the outcome of combined actions of patriots and 
local liberal elites whose defense of traditional municipal autonomy was connected to the Italian 
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identity of Trieste. Even though Tamaro minimized the complex interconnection between economic 
interests and cultural identity and never changed his beliefs about the historic "Italianità" of Trieste, 
he later recognized that “Triestine irredentism had lost most of its romanticism” and had moved 
dramatically toward more aggressive and nationalist positions since the early 1900s.
74
 
Already in 1915, Tamaro regarded “Italianità” as a natural trait of the city population and 
dismissed historical rivalry and competition between Venice and Trieste. In line with the 
overwhelmingly imperialist orientations of national and local irredentism, Tamaro presented the 
inclusion of Trieste within Italian state borders both as the best means to provide continuity to 
Venetian past and as a platform for the city’s national rebirth.75 Tamaro, while highlighting the 
“anti-patriotic” positions of social democratic segments of the irredentist movement and stressing 
the problematic ethnic polarization of the city, also celebrated the contribution that high and middle 
layers of the Triestine society provided to the affirmation of the indisputable Italian identity of the 
city.  
In contrast, Fabio Cusin proclaimed the benefits of Trieste’s traditional municipalism. This 
anti-fascist intellectual of Italian-Jewish origin was born in Trieste during the Habsburg era and 
wrote extensively during both the inter-war and post-war years, becoming the leading voice of the 
local Independence Movement. Cusin, in a traditional nineteenth-century Adriatic multi-nationalist 
outlook, based the historic rights of a nation on cultural and linguistic principles. Moreover, he 
explained Italian national unification as the outcome of the will of a centralist and despotic 
entrepreneurial elite who manipulated irredentism for expansionist goals. According to Cusin, given 
a context such as that of Trieste in which the artificial character of “Italianità” was particularly 
visible, the myth of national unification greatly relied on the political opportunism of the Triestine 
bourgeoisie.
76
 
 At the dawn of the Great War, the ongoing crisis that accompanied the re-conceptualization 
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of “Italianità” on the border was best represented by the bitter diatribes between “Vociani” and the 
Futurists. While the former highlighted the multicultural nature of Trieste and the strength of its 
local identity or “Triestinità,” the latter stressed that Trieste's geographical location gradually 
transformed the city into a bulwark of Italian national identity.
77
 In this context, nationalist rhetoric 
also affected the views of local Triestines and shaped negative perceptions toward the neighbors 
across the frontier.
78
 The fear of pan-Slavism and the commercial interests of the Italian political 
establishment in Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia ultimately played an important role in shaping 
ambivalent local attitudes toward the war which, at the popular level, were mediated by the 
traditions of Triestine cosmopolitanism.
79
  
Although these traditions were weakened and gradually overshadowed by the resonance of 
nationalist arguments, a significant portion of the Triestine population still supported Austrian rule 
of Trieste and remained loyal to the Habsburg crown.
80
 Indeed, about 50,000 men of the Italian 
Adriatic Littoral, served in the Austrian-Hungarian Army while only 1,000 defected in order to 
serve in the Italian Army.
81
 As these estimates suggest, inside the Venetian Julian region, which 
was inhabited by approximately 350,000 Italians and 470,000 Slavs, who were unevenly distributed 
in urban and rural centers, royal loyalty, deep-rooted regional identities, and economic interests 
reduced the attractiveness of political separatist views among the local Italian population. It also 
exemplified the problematic overlapping of cultural and newly politicized notions of national 
identity. Nationalist propaganda and ethno-territorial conceptualizations of “Italianità” in Trieste 
failed to account for the city’s traditional cosmopolitanism and had to compete with its past 
municipal identity. In addition, nationalist arguments were further challenged by local socialists 
whose views of Trieste's identity mirrored those of nineteenth-century irredentists. 
                                                 
77
John McCourt, The Years of Bloom: James Joyce in Trieste, 1904-1920 (Wisconsin: Wisconsin Press, 2000), 171. 
78Katia Pizzi, “City of Paper, City of Light,” in Bele Antiche Storie: Writing, Borders, and the Instability of Identity 
Trieste, 1719-2007, ed. Charles Klopp (New York: Bordighera Press, 2009), 53.  
79
Centro Italo-Romeno di Studi Storici, La Stampa italiana e la "polveriera" d'Europa" (1905-1919) (Verona: Edizione, 
Unicopli, 1988), 13.
 
  
80
Elio Apih, Trieste (Bari: Laterza, 1988), 88. 
81
Hametz (2005), 15.  
32 
 
These views were best exemplified by the political movement “Democrazia Sociale 
Irredenta" (Unredeemed Social Democracy) which attributed a specific meaning to the upcoming 
war for national liberation.
82
 In a traditionally Mazzinian outlook, this political group conceived the 
natural borders of the nation in Carso and Brennero and, in contrast to the most radical nationalist 
groups, did not support the inclusion of Dalmatia within the national territory. These movements, 
both of which were heirs of Risorgimental nationalism, proved the existence of two conflicting 
faces of Adriatic irredentism: romantic and tolerant versus violent and authoritarian. 
During the war, nationalist views dominated the ANTT and the irredentist associational 
network more generally. War was portrayed as an invaluable means for defense against future 
German or Teutonic aggression as well as the instrument to reassert the “Italianità” of the 
unredeemed lands which naturally stretched from Trento to Dalmatia.
83
 To attain these goals the 
internal structure and organization of the association gradually became more centralized and 
efficient in its war-time propaganda. The Association strove to give a single voice to the panoply of 
irredentist organizations (i.e. Pro Fiume, Alto Adige, Pro Dalmazia, Latina Gens, etc.) and to 
propagate the long-term goal of unconditional liberation from Austrian rule. The ANTT also called 
for the creation of a Committee of Internal Resistance in Trieste and specific national and local 
branches whose duty was to provide food and assistance to the local Italian population as well as 
soldiers and veterans once the conflict was over.
84
    
Interestingly, the activity of the Association was not solely limited to the national territory in 
which it counted seventy different sections, but it also found support in branches located abroad.
85
 
These branches of the ANTT profited from the favorable attitude of foreign allied governments and 
lobbied for support of the Italian struggle for self-determination in countries such as France and 
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Great Britain.
86
 The ANTT steadily pursued the idea of Italian annexation for Austrian territories by 
competing with German propaganda, emphasizing the political and territorial rights of the Italian 
minority in the Habsburg Empire, and raising financial support through private and governmental 
contributions. In particular, the Association strongly advocated the resolution of border disputes 
with the prospective Yugoslav neighbor and, confronting the uncertainties of diplomatic 
negotiations, threatened the use of mass demonstrations and popular agitation, claiming that “So far 
I have been quiet but if necessary I will bring them on the square.”87 These threatening statements 
and strategies provide useful insight into the main views of the Association and its indisputable 
departure from the previously moderate views of nineteenth-century irredentists who had called for 
the peaceful coexistence of Slav and German minorities. 
After the war, these hopes were swept away by the hubris of nationalist rhetoric and the rise 
of Italian Fascism which led to what scholars have called "Trieste's darkest hour." As scholar Maura 
Hametz clearly points out, in 1918, the presence of the warship Audace in the port of the city 
exemplified the symbolic passage of territorial sovereignty to Italy. In Italian public discourse, 
Trieste became the guardian of the eastern border as well as the ideal platform to spread the past 
vestige of Italian influence across the Adriatic. These claims were amplified by the ANTT which 
did not cease its activities with the conclusion of the war; rather, during the peace talks it sought to 
exert pressure on Prime Minister Orlando in order to achieve the restitution of territories necessary 
to “reaffirm the entire Italianità of the Adriatic.”88 After recalling the past experience and successes 
of Italian irredentism, the central Committee of the Association outlined the new goal of post-war 
irredentism at its National Congress of June 1and 2, 1919: the conquest of Fiume, Spalato, Malta, 
Corsica, and Nice. These goals demonstrated the rising imperialist and colonial inclination of the 
movement’s strategies, best exemplified in the slogan “we will not put away our sword as long as a 
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corner of Italy will be enslaved.”89 Indeed, within the post-World War I irredentist narrative and 
despite its human costs, war was perceived as the best means to accomplish national unification and 
the wartime experience became one of the leading themes of nationalist propaganda.   
 In particular, the vacuum of power in the Julian region that accompanied the development 
of the Versailles Treaty left behind a legacy of social disorder, poor administrative organization, 
and political instability. Italian claims at Versailles, especially in regard to the Dalmatian region, 
clashed with renewed French interest in the Balkans and the territory was also divided along  
ambiguous Wilsonian lines of national self-determination.
90
 Ian Grainger has shown the 
inefficiency of such a criterion by stressing that, despite Italian claims of ethnic and territorial 
homogenization, the number of Slovene-speaking Slavs within the new postwar Italian borders was 
substantial.
91
 Moreover, Yugoslav committees for Slav self-determination proved the presence of a 
Slovene and Croatian ethnic majority inside the population living in Istria.
92
 Even though the 
expectations of the 1915 London Pact were not fully satisfied, Italy made substantial territorial 
gains: Trento, Trieste, South Tyrol.   
During the post-war period, the presence of Italian troops in Trieste, the rising feeling of 
insecurity among the Slovenian minority, and the tension between reformist and radical fringes of 
the Italian Socialist Party favored the emergence of the local “Fascio.” Due to its location on the 
border, Trieste became one of the most fascist cities with about 18% of the party's national 
members. The majority of the party's members in Trieste consisted of Worl War One veterans and 
irredentists who were easily attracted by both fascist propaganda and idealized continuities between 
the rhetoric of nineteenth-century patriotism and twentieth-century nationalism. In particular, the 
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nationalist discourse emphasized the superiority of the Latin over the Slav civilization and 
metaphorically portrayed Italy as a mother who was unconditionally tied to her daughter, Trieste.
93
 
After the war, the Triestine bourgeoisie, confronting the rising requests of the workers’ 
movement, gradually shifted toward an alliance with the Fascist Party. The unwillingness of the 
socialist and communist forces to ally with the conservative coalition resulted in their electoral 
defeat and ultimately facilitated the rise of the local Fascist Party. In order to further weaken the 
leftist and democratic parties, the Fascist Party exploited the question of Fiume, ethnic tensions, 
pre-war irredentist rhetoric, the connivance of the military government, and political violence.
94
  
The new territorial configuration of the Eastern border was definitively established with the 
Rapallo Treaty, which was ratified on February 2, 1921.
95
 The treaty established the border at 
Monte Nevoso following the main lines drawn in the London Pact, yet left out Fiume which became 
a free city.
96
 In this regard, as Massimo de Leonardis argues, the Rapallo Treaty moved the Italian 
eastern border further east and made greater territorial concessions to Italy as compared to the 
London agreements and the Wilsonian line.
97
 As this case clearly demonstrates, the principle of 
nationality became a powerful means to promote an expansionist foreign policy, cloaked in 
previous irredentist arguments about the “Italianità” of these disputed lands.  
In a multi-ethnic context like Trieste, these issues were used to legitimize the regime’s 
policies, mobilize national and local public opinion, and shape national identity in opposition to the 
“other” border neighbor. Between 1919 and 1921, the eruption of workers' struggles throughout the 
country, also known as "the Red Two Years," further alienated moderate support for parliamentary 
liberalism, favored phenomena of political violence, and, especially in Trieste, anti-Slav feelings. 
Thus, the city became the ideal platform for the fascist expansionist campaign in the Adriatic as  
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Map II: Italy’s Eastern Border after the 1921 Rapallo Treaty  
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best exemplified by Mussolini’s words, “When ethnicity does not agree with geography…it is 
ethnicity that must move.”98 
World War One also abruptly ended the special long-term relationship between Trieste and 
the Danubian-Habsburg hinterland. This traditional source of Trieste’s prosperity never fully 
recovered from the wounds of the war and its aftermath. Despite the rhetoric that surrounded the 
acquisition of the Julian city, the national government failed to comprehend the detrimental effects 
of the Great War on the local economy. Consequently, trade of coffee, wood, and lumber strongly 
declined. Due to the lack of infrastructure and marginalization of the port within international trade, 
foreign firms withdrew investments from the local economy. The disruption of trade and the 
resulting endemic economic crisis contributed to the erosion of the cosmopolitan sources of 
Triestine identity. Fractions of the Triestine commercial bourgeoisie, however, still partially 
anchored to municipal traditions and hoping to protect its economic interests, showed “ambivalent 
loyalties” toward Mussolini's regime.99   
In his work on Trieste between 1918 and 1922, Claudio Silvestri analyzes the transition 
from prewar irredentism to fascism and underscores the complex context in which the Triestine 
Socialist Party became the heir of nineteenth-century irredentism and actively supported the defense 
of minority rights and the political inclusion of minorities within the postwar Italian state. It became 
not just the strongest party of Trieste, but also the main promoter of political and administrative 
autonomy for the Julian city.
100
 The Socialists placed themselves between Mazzini and Tommaseo. 
While the former had envisioned the creation of a rationalized, centralist, and homogenized Italian 
nation by means of insurrection, the latter had proposed a gradual geo-political reformation that 
would ultimately establish a multi-national federation inside the Adriatic region.
101
 Socialist 
                                                 
98
Arrigo Petacco, A Tragedy Revealed: the Story of the Italian Population of Istria, Dalmatia, and Venezia Giulia, 
1943-1956 (Toronto: University Press, 2005), 14. 
99
Hametz (2005), 5. 
100
Silvestri, 9. 
101
Reill (2012), 57. 
38 
 
irredentists, while advocating Trieste’s territorial incorporation inside the Italian state borders, also 
vouched for a political configuration that responded to its multi-cultural and heterogeneous reality. 
In Trieste, especially, these ideas were largely shared by members of the combatants’ 
movement who politically referred to the Republican Irredentist Front. In a study which strongly 
relied on the associational and national press as well as state documents, Giovanni Sabbatucci 
showed that the “Associazione Nazionale Combattenti” (National War Veteran Association, ANC), 
whose core was made of veterans from World War One, issued a programmatic manifesto declaring 
the pacifist, internationalist, and democratic orientations of this movement on November 4, 1918.
102
 
In addition, the manifesto stressed the cult of homeland, the glorification of World War One 
martyrs, the independence from any political party, and the members’ duty to follow a precise 
ethical and behavioral code. The movement also strongly criticized the Italian Liberal Party and 
condemned Italian adventurism in Fiume.  
Luigi Gasparotto, one of the most representative figures of the ANC, expressed the 
movement's opposition to D’Annnunzio’s adventurism and appealed to peace and political 
normalization of relations with the Yugoslav Kingdom.
103
 The ANC, however, failed to present 
itself as a viable alternative to competing liberal, fascist, and socialist political parties.
104
 Sabbatucci 
argues that the ranks of the movement showed considerable diffidence toward the Fascist Party until 
1923; thereafter, political collaboration between the Fascist Party and the ANC significantly 
increased.
105
 Although an analysis of Gasparotto’s papers partially contradicts Sabbatucci’s findings 
and stresses that members of the ANC significantly supported fascism from 1919, it is hardly 
disputable that fascist rhetoric increasingly dominated the post-war nationalist network.
106
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Despite this, a study based on a set of letters, pamphlets, oral memories, and press 
associated with the figure of irredentist Gabriele Foschiatti highlights continuation of a democratic 
strain of “Italianità” within fringes of the Triestine post-war combatant movement which remained 
loyal to Republican irredentism. Although its prestige was locally undermined by the alliance 
between the local bourgeoisie and the rising Fascist Party, some Republican irredentists firmly 
condemned Fascism for its exploitation of national patriotism and broad use of violence.
107
   
The competing views of various expressions of the post-war nationalist movement were 
outlined by the inter-war intellectual, Roberto Mirabelli. What emerges from Mirabelli’s work is 
that irredentist propaganda diverged from the broader nationalist intellectual mainstream. In “Dalla 
Libia a Vittorio Veneto et ultra" (From Libya to Vittorio Veneto and Beyond), written in 1932, 
Mirabelli examined the main features of irredentism and emphasized the close connection between 
Italian rights in the Mediterranean and the Roman past. Mirabelli interpreted the Italian invasion of 
Libya as an “unavoidable duty” which pre-dated the conquest of Trieste.108 Indeed, expansion in the 
Mediterranean was portrayed as one of the imperative steps to complete the process of national 
unification and was used to depict irredentism as an internal force to break the external constraints 
imposed by the Triple Alliance.  
Even though Mirabelli’s arguments were full of nationalist rhetoric, he also called for the 
creation of a Republic to lead the new nation. Mirabelli not only criticized the fascist governmental 
structure but also implicitly criticized the regime’s attitude and claims toward the Adriatic. 
Mirabelli argued that the “petty spirit of nationalism” mistakenly replaced national ambitions for 
redemption that, while legitimate on the Western border, still needed to be clarified with regards to 
the Dalmatia and more generally the eastern border.
109
 In disputing the extension of Italy's eastern 
border to the Dalmatian region, Mirabelli's arguments connected to nineteenth-century irredentism. 
Moreover, Mirabelli identified irredentism as a political phenomenon that pursued linguistic and 
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Republican unity and, embodying the Mazzinian goals of international brotherhood, created a 
“nation of Italians” who worked toward the establishment of a European federation in response to 
the vague Wilsonian ideas of self-determination.
110
 Thus, Mirabelli’s notions of “Italianità” became 
more closely associated with Mazzinian notions of national patriotism rather than aggressive and 
expansionist territorial nationalism. Anchored to the enigmatic view of a Europe of nations, these 
convictions remained the intellectual property of a small elite which was unable to challenge the 
new exclusively fascist reading of nationality in border areas.   
In Trieste, however, fascist efforts to mobilize public opinion around new mythological 
readings of the past such as the exhibition of the “Giugno Triestino (Triestine June),” the wide use 
of equestrian competitions and the exhibition of the “Three Venices,” did not enthuse the local 
Triestine population, proving local resistance to fascist intellectual homogenization.
111
 The 
credibility of the regime was further impaired by its generally unsuccessful economic measures. 
Indeed, fascist policies damaged Trieste’s port economy and only benefited pro-fascist or 
opportunist segments of the Triestine bourgeoisie in the short-term. Not only did the regime do little 
to improve Trieste’s trade and railways, but the city came out on the short end of the regime's 
uneven reallocation of national resources. Between 1922 and 1936 the fascist government invested 
only 110 million in Trieste while bequeathing 425 million to another port city, Genoa.
112
 In 
combination with the economic depression of the late 1920s that encompassed Trieste and its 
Danubian hinterland, the Triestine economy was ultimately relegated to a position of subordination 
to an overwhelming German economic influence in the 1930s.   
On a social level, fascist policies pursued the forced assimilation of the non-Italian 
population which, later referred to as "Italianization," reflected “fascist officials’ heavy-handed 
attempts to Italianize the population” and justify Italian acquisition of the newly acquired eastern 
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borderlands.
113
 This policy undermined perspectives of peaceful coexistence of the Italian and Slav 
communities and strengthened native Slav resistance in the region as exemplified by the activities 
of organizations such as TIGR or Borba.
114
 Maura Hametz’s study on the fascist surname policy in 
the Adriatic region demonstrates that Mussolini's regime used a combination of violence (i.e. the 
fascist destruction of the Trieste National Hall hosting the local Slovene Theatre in1921) and 
judicial decrees to legally persecute and ban the use of Slavic “alien names.”115 Indeed, the 
enforcement of such a legal provision forced the Slav inhabitants of the Adriatic region to change 
their names in order to avoid discrimination. In her most recent work, Hametz proves that this 
fascist policy was met with local resistance. Luigia Paulovich, an elderly Triestine widow, claimed 
that it was her duty to preserve her last name to honor her husband and family. Thus, she filed 
against the Prefect of Trieste in 1931 and successfully challenged the legislative provision that 
previously imposed the "Italianization" of her surname. Paulovich’s case shows that legal resistance 
to fascist control could succeed and public officials’ adherence to liberal principles of rule of law 
made the erosion of former political liberties a slow and gradual process.
116
  
Nonetheless, ideas of “Italianità,” loaded with a new and imperialist meaning, guided fascist 
domestic and foreign policies.
117
 The fascist regime pursued a strategy of homogenization that, 
especially in Trieste, was contrary to the traditional logic of assimilation and integration. Fascism’s 
centralized and repressive policies systematically attempted to reshape the ethnic configuration of 
the Adriatic border and, while advancing the private interests of the traditionally Italian commercial 
elite, only partially accomplished the Italianization of Trieste and its surrounding region. Instead, it 
definitively undermined the traditionally hegemonic position of the Italian commercial network in 
the entire region.
118
 With regard to this issue, Giorgio Tombesi, a local prominent political figure of 
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the Triestine Christian Democratic Party, argued that the city, traditionally ruled by a maritime 
rather than landowning bourgeoisie, was never fully fascist and was merely highly influenced by 
fascism.
119
 As Hametz has discussed, Triestine officials’ enforcement of the surname legislation 
revealed a “disjuncture between local understanding of nationalism and fascist vision of the Italian 
nation.”120 Residents like Paulovich understood her own “Italianità” as a form of patriotism and 
loyalty to an Italy that happened to be under fascist rule. Meanwhile, local governmental 
representatives also “remained confused and uncertain as to the contours of acceptable or expected 
acculturation and nationalization of fascist policy.”121 Thus, the enforcement of central directives 
was characterized by contradictions and inconsistencies that undermined fascist ambitions for 
ethno-cultural homogenization of the border. 
In addition, the late arrival of the Triestine society in the new Italian state and the 
collaboration between the Italian and Slovenian Communist movements boosted further resistance 
to the official policies of “Italianization” of the city and its surroundings. The radical left, in 
particular, vigorously opposed the harshness of the fascist repression on the Adriatic border 
between 1921 and 1928.
122 
In 1924, after Fiume's annexation, the government continued its policies 
of centralization which aimed to abolish regional autonomies, impose the use of Italian language at 
all social levels, and integrate the local society of this multicultural area into the national 
community.
123
  
Fascistization along the Adriatic border, Hametz argues, was clearly rooted in pre-war 
nationalist programs that attempted to downgrade yet assimilate the Slav population of the region. 
Fascist policies, indeed, were strongly informed by late nineteenth-century eugenic views which 
stressed the inferiority of Slavic civilization and its identification with the socialist enemy. 
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Beginning with the year 1930, however, these policies sharply diverged from early fascist policies 
of assimilation through education and moved toward a more exclusionary racial and ethnic 
approach toward local non-Italians.
124
 
The population of the province of Trieste, which included five political districts stretching 
from Monfalcone to Capodistria, already counted 348,494 people of whom only 9,400 were non-
Italians in 1931.
125
 Among them, about one third or 2,836 were Yugoslavs, 2,500 of whom lived in 
the urban area of Trieste. In 1936, the population rose to 357,142, with only 6,052 identified as 
“foreigners” and about 1,496 as Yugoslavs.126 As these statistics show, Slav minorities were 
gradually forced out of Trieste’s urban areas. In spite of this, scholars such as Raoul Pupo have 
disproved fascist claims of success in the process of denationalization and de-slavization.
127 
Pupo 
has shown that Slav minorities survived in the rural areas and maintained their economic assets 
despite fascist policies of expropriation. In fact, the fascist repression resulted in strengthening 
rather than weakening the irredentist claims of the Slovenian population. Contrary to what was 
expected by the regime, Slovenian irredentism did not disappear and rather strongly reemerged as 
part of the Yugoslav Communist resistance during World War Two.   
Until 1938, the fascist regime carried out a process of changing Slavic names, suppressed 
the Slovenian associational network, implemented the systematic confiscation of property, and used 
physical violence in the form of deportation and death sentences despite local resistance. All of the 
aforementioned policies tended to deny the existence of a minority problem and, instead, magnified 
the assimilatory capacity of the superior Italian civilization, best exemplified by the idea of 
“Italianità.”128 Such logic became further radicalized after 1938 and was targeted especially at the 
Slovenian clergy whose members were traditionally considered the vanguard of Slav nationalism. 
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In addition, the city's Jewish population, which was highly represented among local nationalists and 
members of the middle-class, fell victim to fascist racial policies. In 1945, only 400-500 Jews had 
survived out of the total population of about 5,000 who had inhabited the city before the war. 
Indeed, once the war began, Trieste became an epicenter of fascist anti-Semitism whose actions 
were facilitated by a security apparatus put in place between 1938 and 1941.  
Even though most of the local population acted as bystanders of the regime’s policies, 
republican and communist leaders organized the movement of local resistance.
129
 In 1941, after the 
Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, Italy occupied Dalmatia, the so- called province of Ljubljana (central 
and southern Slovenia), and Montenegro. The disastrous Italian military campaign in Greece, 
however, not only ended Mussolini’s plan of a “parallel war”, but also made Fascist Italy politically 
and militarily dependent on its German ally. As a consequence of the Barbarossa Operation, 
violence decisively escalated in the region. The Italian army carried out harsh and repressive 
policies against the Yugoslav partisans and set up a vast network of camps that incarcerated 
between 30,000 to 70,000 people. Thousands of partisans and civilians were executed during the 
Italian occupation yet the commanders of the Army remained unpunished after the war, despite 
military investigations of war crimes.
130 
Military occupation was opposed by the Yugoslav 
resistance, contributing to a vortex of violence which, pervaded by mutual acts of retribution and 
revenge, accompanied the last two years of the war and witnessed the demolition of Italian 
statehood along the Adriatic border.  
 
Surviving the War: The Experience of National Resistance and the Dark Age of “Italianità”  
On July 25, 1943, the fall of Mussolini’s regime immediately exposed the downsides of 
twenty years of fascism and its detrimental effect on pre-war expressions of Italian patriotism which 
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had been strongly connected to the myth of Risorgimento.
131
 In his edited volume on the history, 
memory, and representation of Fascism, Patrizia Dogliani has shown that during fascist rule, this 
myth found symbolic expression in the cult of the flag and the parallel militarization of society and 
its associative networks. Such a myth, however, proved weak amid the war-time economic and 
military crisis that crossed the Italian peninsula and fueled popular disillusion.
132 
  
On September 8, after signing the military government’s armistice with the Allies, the 
Italian Army fell apart.
133
 The Italian peninsula was occupied in the North by the Germans and the 
neo-Fascist Republic of Salò and in the South by the Allies.
134
 Some military officers and civilians 
called for national resistance in northern Italy while others decided to remain passive bystanders. 
The Italian scholar Ernesto Galli Della Loggia would later refer to September 8, 1943 as the “death 
of the fatherland,” associating the disintegration of the national army and the collapse of the nation-
state with the disruption of the nationalist ideas that were born from the nineteenth-century 
experience of Risorgimento.
135
   
Sentiments of national identity that were traditionally anchored to the legitimizing forces of 
the monarchy or the experience of fascism were indeed swept away by the war. In this context, the 
national resistance, under the leadership of the Committee for National Liberation located in Rome 
(CLN) and the Committee for National Liberation of Northern Italy located in Milan (CLNAI), 
slowly coordinated its activities with the Allied forces and the provisional government of General 
Pietro Badoglio.
136 
From the beginning, however, a variety of conflicting political and social 
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orientations fragmented the movement of national resistance, ultimately weakening popular 
sentiments of national identity.
137
   
The resistance movement was highly divided especially in borderland cities such as Trieste 
and, therefore, experienced the internecine strife of the national civil war to a larger extent.
138
 In the 
words of local intellectual Carl Schiffrer, September 8 coincided with “the year zero of 
Italianità.”139 From September 10, 1943 Trieste and its surrounding territory was occupied by the 
German Army which established the Operational Zone of the Adriatic Littoral.
140
 Thus, the northern 
Adriatic coast became a theatre of Nazi-fascist and Titoist violence that fueled the territorial 
aspirations of conflicting nationally and politically oriented movements.
141 
While violence from 
both partisans and collaborators became a daily occurrence for those living on the border, it also 
paralleled the social fragmentation and geo-political separation of Trieste from the rest of Italy and 
left an indelible mark in the memory of the Italian local population.
142
 Consequently, the dissolution 
of the Italian state and its institutions in the region promoted a deep sense of insecurity among the 
local Italian population and deprived it of any means of protection from Yugoslav waves of 
retribution. Therefore, whereas the Italian Armistice with the Allies became a day of national  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
that exemplified the idea of a nation in arms, provided a moral base for the new post-war Republic.
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Map III: the Operational Zone of the Adriatic Littoral 
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liberation in Slovenian popular memory, it represented defeat and mass murder in the memory of 
local Italians.
143
   
From 1943, the armed communist led Yugoslav resistance (AVNOJ) responded to German 
occupation by declaring plans to annex the Istrian lands as part of the post-war territorial goals of 
the Yugoslav liberation movement.
144
 Only a small fraction of Italian soldiers, about 8,000 out of 
40,000, joined Yugoslav communist resistance formations. Many of the remaining soldiers joined 
Italian partisan formations, were murdered or subjected to imprisonment in Titoist camps.
145
 
Moreover, among the Italian local population were significant segments that felt trapped between 
German hostility for Italian betrayal and mass violent retribution by Yugoslav partisans.
146 
  
During the fall of 1943 and the spring of 1945, about 4,000 to 10,000 people were murdered 
in caves in the Istrian region, also known as “Foibe Istriane" (Istrian Karsic Pits).147 These victims, 
who were mostly yet not exclusively Italian, became the main symbol of both the demise of Italian 
statehood on the eastern border and the aggressive Slav nationalism.
148 
Although scholars generally 
agree that the victims were members of the regional fascist hierarchy, collaborationists, civilians, 
potential political adversaries and, in particular, middle-class Italians, they still debate if the actions 
were planned or spontaneous.
149
 Most importantly, whether the "foibe" were means to ensure 
“Tito’s territorial goals and nation-building”150 or a dehumanizing “project of ethnic cleansing 
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carried out deliberately to eradicate Italians from Istria by killing them or forcing them to flee,”151 
over time they epitomized the anxiety and uncertainty of Trieste’s wartime experience which was 
perceived as a “traumatic cut of the umbilical cord and loss of motherland.”152 As I discuss in the 
next chapters, this argument of Trieste’s violent physical separation from the rest of the nation was 
often echoed in the post-war years and within national public discourse to justify the return of the 
city and its territory to Italian sovereignty.  
In this climate of violence and military defeat, early twentieth-century irredentist figures 
played significant roles both within the neo-Fascist Republic and the broader resistance movement.  
Collaborationists such as Cesare Pagnini and Bruno Coceani, previous members of the Italian-
German association, used their irredentist past to legitimize the role of the Civic Guard, an auxiliary 
formation that, in service to the Nazi occupation authorities, was presented as the defender of 
“Italianità” in Trieste. This military body, which was supported by former irredentists and fascists, 
used both force and propaganda (i.e. La Voce di Gorizia) to oppose the Triestine Committee for 
National Liberation (CLN). Moreover, the Civic Guard based its legitimacy on the untenable idea of 
“legal resistance,” and presented itself as the single element of continuity of Italian statehood. Its 
authority also rested on its claim to protect the local Italian population from the violent revenge of 
both German soldiers and partisans.
153
  
By contrast, the CLN, which was created from the anti-fascist Triestine group of patriots 
“Giustizia e Libertà" (Justice and Freedom), embraced the ideals of national “Risorgimento” and 
 portrayed resistance to Nazi-fascism as the fourth war of national independence.
154 
In particular, 
the CLN conceptualized “Italianità” according to nineteenth-century irredentist views which deeply 
diverged from the expansionist tones of aggressive twentieth-century fascism and “advocated a 
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moderate pro-Italian stance that sought reconciliation with minorities in the Italian state.”155 As 
historian Roberto Spazzali effectively argues, by adopting a conceptualization of “Risorgimento” 
shorn of nationalist motifs and slanted towards ideals of passion and liberty, the CLN situated itself 
between Communist and fascist forces by claiming September 8
 
as a day of national and European 
rebirth.   
The Committee, which represented the core of Julian democratic resistance, challenged 
traditional views of Trieste as a center of political and national extremism and sought to remake it 
as a post-war laboratory of democratic and European patriotism. It advocated Italian and Slav 
cultural autonomy in political union with the Italian state, a regime based on liberty and equality 
and integrated into a European Federation. In its view, the new Italian state would ideally guarantee 
peaceful co-existence between both the Italian and Slav elements of the region, whose free port 
would promote economic prosperity.  
These new "Europeanist" views were strongly influenced by ideas of Triestine 
cosmopolitanism and were used by local intellectuals to reshape traditional understandings of 
Italian identity in a more conciliatory nuance that echoed the former ideals of nineteenth-century 
irredentism.
156
 Indeed, in the pamphlet “Il Problema Nazionale della Venezia Giulia Orientamenti 
Repubblicani e del Partito d’Azione" (The Problem of the Julian Venetian Region Republican 
Orientation and Views of the Action Party) published in July 1943, Gabriele Foschiatti envisioned 
the union of all Italians living on the border as a preliminary step to the creation of a European 
Federation in which each nationality reasserted its cultural autonomy. The inclusive nature of 
democratic-patriotism, firmly anchored to “risorgimental” political traditions, contrasted with the 
aggressive and exclusionary nature of past national fascism. Intellectuals such as Gabriele 
Foschiatti and Carlo Schiffrer, both leading figures of the local patriotic movement, advocated the 
                                                 
155
Hametz  (2012), 140. 
156
See Karlsen Patrick e Stelio Spadaro. L’altra questione di Trieste: voci italiane della cultura civile giuliana 1943-
1955 (Gorizia: LEG, 2006). 
51 
 
defense of Trieste's Italian identity according to principles of self-determination and ethno-political 
tolerance.
157 
 
The Committee’s propaganda replaced the fascist myth of Imperial Rome with Mazzini’s 
ideals. The element of voluntary participation, especially among students and WWI veterans, was 
presented as the leading nexus between nineteenth-century patriots and the non-communist 
resistance movement of World War II. In addition, the movement proposed a new political solution 
for Trieste and Istria that was based on the idea of political autonomy within a new democratic 
Italy. The CLN rejected both monarchy and fascism, attacked the vicious collaborationism of the 
local commercial bourgeoisie, and criticized workers’ conformity and inaction.158 This group of 
intellectuals and political leaders was inspired by nineteenth-century ideas of nation which were 
echoed in journals such as Il Ponte or Giustizia e Libertà (The Bridge or Justice and Freedom) and 
guided the activities of patriotic associations such as the “Associazione Mazziniana Italiana” (AMI, 
Italian Mazzinian Association). More importantly, the experience of the Triestine CLN and its 
opposition to both Nazi-fascism and communist resistance represented an invaluable attempt to 
revitalize the unifying ideals of the past experience of national “Risorgimento” and advocate for 
Italian statehood over Trieste and its Istrian region.    
Indeed, in 1944, Trieste's future territorial status became the object of political negotiations 
whose possible outcome depended on military and strategic considerations. Stalin clearly expressed 
his desire for the territorial incorporation of the Julian city and its surrounding area to Yugoslavia; 
however, he made such a solution dependent on the acquiescence of the civilian population in the 
new Yugoslav Federation.
159 
Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), was 
aware of the potentially dangerous repercussions of the Yugoslav occupation of Trieste yet he still 
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yielded to Yugoslav requests.
160
 This decision was strongly affected by the problem of “dual 
loyalty” toward international communism and the Italian nation that pervaded the national PCI.161 
Failure to resolve this dilemma decisively affected its political actions toward the eastern border 
and, in an unclear response to Tito’s annexationist ambitions, produced a “disturbed relationship” 
between the Italian and Yugoslav communist parties.
162
 At the same time, due the party's 
international and ideological interests, the defense of Italian sovereignty over the Triestine territory 
was downplayed within the actions and propaganda of the Communist resistance.
163
 
Undaunted, Italian Communist partisan formations of the Julian Venetian Region complied 
with the directives of the Yugoslav resistance and acted with a single voice in the region until the 
summer of 1944.
164
 Slovene propaganda, massive retribution against Italians, incidents between 
Slovene and Italian partisan formations, and the inclusion of Triestine Communist formations 
(Garibaldi Brigades) within the XI Slovene Corp, alarmed the local population and heightened the 
concerns of the Italian national resistance movement for Tito’s annexationist goals.165 Ultimately, 
the PCI, which recognized Slovene rights for self-determination, had to face the dilemma of 
supporting either Yugoslav assertions or the CLN's defense of Italian territorial rights in the region.   
In October 1944, Togliatti aligned with Stalinist and Yugoslav foreign policy and implicitly 
recognized Yugoslav claims to the Julian city by inviting the local Triestine population to support 
Tito’s Army in the final struggle against the Nazi-Fascist regime of occupation.166 Within this 
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context, the PCI and its partisan formations left the Julian Committee of National Liberation whose 
leadership thereafter was entrusted to the "Partito d’Azione" (Action Party) along with the socialist, 
liberal, and Christian Democratic parties.
167
 This situation, which was undoubtedly complicated by 
the conflicting American and British strategic orientations toward the region, deepened the tensions 
among non-Communist Italian and Yugoslav partisan formations.
168
 Thus, between February and 
May, in his correspondence with Moscow, Togliatti asked for Soviet intervention to find a suitable 
accommodation with Tito and proposed the internationalization of Trieste. Despite this, he also 
recognized the legitimacy of specific Yugoslav rights over the pre-war Italian eastern border.
169
 
In this context, Allied and Titoist forces competed in what became known as “The race for 
Trieste,” a phase marked by mass violence and intense bombing that affected the entire population 
living in the region. The Italian-Slovenian Liberation Front successfully orchestrated a popular 
uprising on April 28, which anticipated the arrival of the Titoist formations.
170
 In commenting on 
the insurrection, which was preceded by negotiations between the local Italian bishop and the 
German forces, Spazzali has stressed that pro-Communist propaganda portrayed the actions of the 
CLN as “covert fascism.”171 Instead, a sophisticated urban network, the efficient coordination of 
small clandestine cells inside the city, and the significant participation of previous military Italian 
formations and railways employees underscored the successful actions of the CLN, which, Spazzali 
argues, played a greater role than Tito’s partisans in freeing Trieste.172    
On May 1, 1945, Yugoslav forces entered the city and disarmed the indigenous Italian 
resistance movement whose united front was broken when workers aligned with Tito’s partisan 
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formations.
173
 The division between local pro-Italian and Communist resistance movements 
highlighted the complex distinction between patriots and resisters; the former was committed to 
defending the Italian identity of the city while the latter was devoted to defeating Nazi-fascism and 
relied both politically and militarily on the Yugoslav movement of resistance to do so.
174
 As a 
result, the CLN became a target of Yugoslav repression, persecution, and accusations of 
collaborationism. Fearing Yugoslav retribution, the German commander in the region finally 
surrendered to New Zealand forces on May 2.   
For 40 days Trieste was held by the Yugoslav forces, resulting in a second wave of 
repression, deportation and murder of Italian fascists, collaborationists, and civilians as well as the 
abolition of any surviving Italian institutions.
175 Tito’s claims of “building socialism” became 
untenable amid the widespread violence in Trieste and forced de-Italianization of the Adriatic 
region which strengthened local feelings of anti-Communism.
176
 Even though Togliatti declared the 
indisputable “Italianità of Trieste” on May 7, the experience of Yugoslav occupation left a long-
lasting scar on the memories of the Italian population.
177
   
It is noteworthy that the experience of the non-Communist resistance on the border and the 
actions of the Triestine CLN were both motivated by fear and antagonism toward Yugoslav 
retribution as well as the determination to reassert Italian territorial sovereignty of the Julian 
Venetian region.
178 
The idea of continuity with pre-fascist democratic traditions which, as 
highlighted previously, were instilled within the experience of nineteenth century Adriatic 
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irredentism, made the CLN “a small laboratory of democracy and antechamber to liberty.”179 
Despite its invaluable efforts, the Triestine CLN occupied a marginal place within the post-war 
nationwide public discourse and was overshadowed by the uniform portrayal of the experience of 
national resistance.   
The new Republic, indeed, depicting Fascism as a parenthesis in Italian history, highlighted 
the idea of national resistance as the continuation of the experience of Italian Risorgimento;
180
 
however, the problematic reconciliation between its monolithic depiction and reality adversely 
affected the value of national resistance as a multi-faceted shared and regenerative experience for 
the entire nation. After 1945, when dealing with the eastern border, political leaders repeatedly 
turned to the myth of World War One and the idea of a nation in arms whose courage and sacrifice 
legitimized Italian rule of Trieste and its territory. On these bases, politicians and public opinion of 
center-right orientation relentlessly advocated Italian sovereignty of the eastern border in post-war 
years. 
 
A Complex and Violent Transition: from a Habsburg to an Italian City 
This chapter has underlined the existence of varied and unpredictable manifestations of 
Italian Risorgimento, among them Adriatic irredentism, that were partially eroded and supplanted 
by aggressive twentieth-century Italian nationalism. Mark Mazower has recently suggested that 
national irredentism embodied the nationalism of the nineteenth-century pan-Germans whose “goal 
had been to win the largest possible state, which left as few countrymen as possible outside its 
borders.”181 This view has also been generally associated with nineteenth-century Italian 
irredentism and its goal of territorial expansion. 
  In contrast to this standard view of irredentism, I have emphasized that Adriatic 
irredentism within the Habsburg Imperial framework was not simply violent, radical, or separatist 
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in its essence. Adriatic multi-national irredentists mainly promoted a national model of 
“consociationalism” which rested on the idea of cultural autonomy within a multinational state, 
namely the Habsburg Empire.
182
 In Trieste, especially, the Italian commercial bourgeoisie initially 
embraced these irredentist views which best served its economic interests and cosmopolitan 
orientation.
183
  
Due to the prominence of economic over political considerations, the Triestine bourgeoisie 
endowed “Italianità” with a cultural rather than territorial essence which found its best 
representation within an imaginary and constructed cultural community. Within this community 
both the commercial bourgeoisie and Italian-speakers in Trieste gradually identified themselves as 
Italian. This elite-led movement forged a specific ideal of Italian identity that enabled the 
coexistence of national groups who reinterpreted their own national myth in differing ways without 
necessarily resulting in violent conflict between them. At the same time, Adriatic multi-national 
irredentists also emphasized the strength of regional cultures, municipal traditions as well as 
dynastic loyalty during a period usually seen as the golden age of nationalism.   
In particular, until the late nineteenth-century, manifestations of autonomous cultural and 
linguistic ambitions, which became an ever-present theme within the public sphere for the Italian-
speaking population, supported ideas of “Italianità” and underscored Adriatic irredentism and its 
network of associations.  During this period, Trieste’s active patriotism was more an elite rather 
than mass phenomenon that strongly relied on a European conceptualization of self-determination 
as the indisputable right of historic nations.
184
 Afterwards, however, multiple interpretations of "the 
nation" grew and competed with each other, fostering mutual ethnic and cultural antagonisms both 
in Trieste and its hinterland. Such conflictual relations undermined the traditionally peaceful 
coexistence between Italian and Slav communities, whose presence respectively dominated the 
region's urban and rural areas. In Trieste in particular, the Triestine bourgeoisie increasingly used 
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the politics of national "redemption" as an instrument to protect their economic interests and oppose 
the emancipation of Slovene or Croatian peasants and traders.
185
   
Thus, Adriatic irredentism was gradually transformed and came to provide an increasingly 
ethnic and exclusive meaning to the idea of Trieste's Italian identity or "Italianità."
186
 While 
evolving into a clear and recognizable political actor with secessionist ambitions, the elite 
irredentist movement that had initially sought recognition for a specific Italian cultural identity 
merged with the nationalist mainstream of the twentieth century. Trieste's socio-economic 
degradation and liberal cultural assumptions that highlighted the dangerously backward nature of 
Slav civilization strongly emerged and fed the “clash of civilization” mentality among competing 
nationalisms. In a context of mutually exclusive economic competition and governmental 
discrimination, the Triestine irredentists radicalized their views. Although their claims found 
increasing support among significant segments of the local population, the cosmopolitan and 
municipal orientations of Trieste never entirely disappeared. 
On the eve of the Great War, irredentist thinkers promoted the radical transformation of 
“Italianità” from a cultural and linguistic into an ethno-territorial concept. Notably, the 
reincorporation of Trieste inside the national borders after the war became the hallmark of 
nationalist propaganda. Furthermore, as argued by Glenda Sluga, Trieste came to exemplify the 
complexity and drawbacks of the conceptualization of national sovereignty along ethnic lines that 
had originally emerged from the Versailles Settlement.
187
 World War One indeed provided the 
spark that inflamed mutually exclusive claims of state territorial sovereignty in this traditionally 
mixed ethnic area. After 1918, the surviving ideas of nineteenth-century irredentism were adopted 
by the socialist movement and strongly opposed by radical nationalists. These ideas were further 
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weakened by the nationalist propaganda of the “mutilated victory” and, unable to compete with the 
attractiveness of fascist “Romanità,” were relegated outside the new national narrative.188 
Twenty years of Fascism and the process of “fascistization” further promoted the 
transformation and radicalization of “Italianità” as the Mussolini regime's overwhelmingly 
imperialist and expansionist ambitions turned toward the Mediterranean.
189
 During the fascist era, 
ideas of “Romanità” were further reinforced by the historical experience of Venice and its 
correlated notions of “Venezianità” in the Adriatic.  It seems that both categories mutually 
reinforced each other and underscored colonial and imperialist conceptualizations of “Italianità.”  
As Elsa Damien has recently pointed out, “Venice became associated with the idea of a strong, 
dynamic and colonial state, eventually embodying national-fascist ideals of “Italianità” and its 
imperial model was even more Italian than the one proposed by Rome."
190
  
While both “Venezianità” and “Romanità” became fruitful means to legitimize national 
territorial expansion during the inter-war years, surviving notions of local identity or “Triestinità” 
strongly contrasted with the goals of fascist political centralization. “Triestinità,” indeed, forged a 
specific sense of belonging which, rooted within the intellectual legacy of Adriatic multi-
nationalism, was based upon past traditions of administrative self-autonomy.
191
 Historically, 
Trieste’s identity was effectively informed by four competing myths which were based upon its 
Hapsburg, irredentist, multicultural, and municipal past. The city’s cultural diversity made Trieste a 
political and territorial crucible of geo-political changes that could hardly be reconciled with fascist 
policy to assimilate and homogenize its local population.
192
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Consequently, the imperialist and aggressive policies of the fascist regime aggravated anti-
Italian feelings among the Slavic population in the Julian region and further reinforced aspirations 
for national self-determination among Slovenes and Croats. The downsides of the fascist attempt to 
achieve cultural and ethnic homogenization visibly manifested themselves on the eastern border 
during the last few years of the Second World War.
193
 Any claim that stressed the Italian territorial 
nature of the Adriatic border was mainly understood by the Yugoslav Communist resistance as a 
residual expression of Italian Fascism and its proponents became victims of a wave of violence and 
repression that was accompanied by the dramatic experience of the "foibe." Among the Italian 
speaking population of the eastern border, however, the defense of Trieste’s Italian identity was 
rescued by a small group of intellectuals who provided it political legitimacy after September 8, 
1943.   
In connecting to Mazzinian conceptualizations of national identity, the Julian democratic 
resistance reasserted the Italian identity of Trieste and its Istrian region and advocated the continuity 
of Italian statehood in the region. This effort, however, was strongly undermined by the ambiguous 
role of the Italian communist resistance whose support for Tito’s partisans adversely affected Italian 
claims on the border. Moreover, after 1943 the wartime Allies also debated the future settlement of 
the post-war Italian eastern border in diplomatic talks which, revealing the gradual  divergence of 
Soviet-Yugoslav and Anglo-American views on the political fate of Trieste and its Istrian region, 
paved the way to its territorial partition.   
In conclusion, the importance of Adriatic irredentism was gradually undermined by the 
nationalist impetus of the late nineteenth-century, the years of the Great War, national Fascism, and 
the complex experience of resistance, all of which radically transformed earlier ideas of “Italianità.” 
Traditionally associated with the ideals of Risorgimento and national patriotism, “Italianità” became 
synonymous with revanchist and aggressive Italian nationalism. Within a national and international 
context that shaped the formative stages of what became the “Trieste question,” a small group of 
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intellectuals and political leaders used nineteenth-century ideas of “Italianità” to legitimize the 
extension of Italy's eastern border and Trieste's role as a barrier to the Slav-Communist threat. After 
1945, however, the new Republic, torn between the need to defend its sovereignty of the Triestine 
territory and an unfavorable diplomatic context, searched for a compromise that prolonged Trieste’s 
occupation for nine long years. 
61 
 
Chapter Two 
From Occupation to the London Memorandum 1945-1954: Trieste’s Broken Statehood and 
Contested “Italianità” on the Eastern Border 
The end of the war cast serious doubt on the future territorial status of the Adriatic border. 
Together with the problematic definition of Italy's northern border with its Austrian neighbor, the 
“Trieste question” monopolized Italian foreign policy until 1954. Italian diplomatic efforts to 
preserve national sovereignty over the eastern border were greatly influenced by the Cold War.
217
 
American diplomat Adlai Stevenson effectively summarized this inescapable interdependence 
between national foreign policy and post-war international politics by stating that “any individual 
political acts may have an importance far beyond their local consequences.”218  
While coping with the new dynamics of the Cold War, the Italian government also had to 
respond to widespread public concern for the possible territorial loss of Trieste and its Istrian 
region. As discussed in the previous chapter, the experience of national resistance was presented by 
the governmental coalition as a re-generative experience for the whole nation which, in upholding 
Mazzini’s ideas of self-determination, had opposed Nazi-fascist occupation and strove to defend 
Italian national borders.
219 
As a consequence, after the signing of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty and 
the formal creation of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT), the defense of the border’s “Italianità” 
and the re-affirmation of Italian sovereignty over Trieste and its territory became powerful political 
tools used not only to mobilize a defeated nation but also contest the terms of what was depicted as 
a dictated peace. 
The postwar government's firm defense of Italian sovereignty over the FTT, however, was 
opposed by Communist and local independent political movements which advocated the partition or 
the internationalization of Trieste and its territory. Italian hopes of rule over the territory initially 
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overlapped with the Anglo-American goal of containing Soviet communism and limiting the gains 
of its Yugoslav ally; however, when Tito’s regime suddenly split from Moscow and proclaimed its 
new policy of non-alignment, the “Trieste question” turned into a source of geo-political tension 
between the new Republic and the Western Allies. Post-war Italian foreign policy, which had 
trumpeted the ideals of European and Atlantic unity, was now forced to face one of the internal 
contradictions of Cold War politics: the reconciliation of conflicting national and international 
interests. To respond to the pressure of significant segments of public opinion, political parties and 
patriotic associations, the national government and its Christian Democratic majority vocally 
advocated Italian rule over Trieste and its territory.  
Over time, however, this strategy risked jeopardizing American efforts to distance Tito from 
the Soviet sphere and to bring Yugoslavia closer to the West. Until 1954, Washington and Rome 
attempted to resolve this conflict of interest that had poisoned their diplomatic relations and fostered 
mutual misunderstanding. Belgrade, on the other hand, significantly benefited from the new views 
of the American administration. Guided by Western needs for peace and stability in the region, 
American pressure and staunch diplomacy eventually led to a compromise between Italy and 
Yugoslavia. This compromise, while partially deflating local irredentist dreams, also forced the 
Italian government to re-think its post-1954 politics of identity toward the Adriatic border. 
 
Post-war Trieste: from the Morgan Line to the Paris Peace Conference 
“It was therefore necessary to induce them to go away with all sorts of pressures. So we 
were told and it was done."
220
 With these words, Milovan Djilas remembered when, in 1946, he and 
Edvard Kardelj went to Istria to organize anti-Italian propaganda and legitimize in ethnic terms the 
territorial demands of the Yugoslav government at the Paris peace conference. The forced 
emigration of the Italian minority in Istria was an integral part of the war experience on the eastern 
border and became a powerful means to advance post-war Yugoslav territorial interests. The early 
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years of the Cold War, however, provided Italy the most favorable domestic and international 
context for challenging Tito’s claims on the Adriatic frontier.   
On May 21, 1945, after an uninterrupted series of diplomatic negotiations, the Allied and 
Yugoslav governments established the provisional division of Trieste along the Morgan line.
221 
 On 
June 9, 1945, the territorial partition was officially sanctioned with the Belgrade agreement and 
Trieste was freed of Yugoslav troops.
222 
This agreement, however, did not bring an end to the 
wartime suffering of its inhabitants, in particular the Italian population which experienced a mass 
exodus from the Adriatic region;
223
 rather, the émigrés who arrived in Italy were depicted by the 
parties of the left as fascists escaping from the Eastern lands under Yugoslav control and became 
victims of sporadic episodes of popular intolerance and denigration.
224
   
Between June 12, 1945 and October 5, 1954, the Allied Military Government (AMG) 
administered Trieste and intensively engaged in a feat of massive propaganda that underscored the 
goals of post-war economic and social reconstruction.
225 
Initially, the AMG directly ruled the three 
provinces of Trieste, Gorizia, and Pola. Its head replaced the local “Prefetto” (Prefect) and was 
supported by the activity of zone Councils.
226
 The AMG also abrogated both the previous Italian 
fascist and Yugoslav communist legislation. Despite the repeal of fascist laws, the de-fascistization 
of Triestine society was far from successful.
227
  
During Allied occupation, national and local pundits as well as political parties and 
associations of center-right inspiration continued to call for the reincorporation of Trieste and its 
territory within the Italian state. Nationalist forces, especially, championed the "Trieste question" by 
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presenting themselves as the sole defenders of Italian sovereignty over the Adriatic region.
228 
Italian 
nationalist and neo-fascist movements invariably profited from the Triestine problem in an effort to 
regain political legitimacy and consensus after the ignominy of Italian Fascism and the dramatic 
experience of World War Two.
229
 In an attempt to directly link the territorial defense of the border 
to irredentism rather than fascism,
 these movements relied on the emotional leverage of Trieste’s 
Italian identity;
230 
however, their nostalgic and aggressive tones only partially succeeded in winning 
national popular support.
231
   
Indeed, in an article published in Italia Libera on July 6, 1945, Gianni Stuparich, a 
significant voice of the Triestine Committee of National Liberation (CLN), condemned the fascist 
expropriation of the national myth of Trieste. Stuparich reasserted the specific national rather than 
nationalistic meaning of the borders established after the Great War that made Trieste an Italian city 
and fulfilled the goals of national unification. To legitimize the extent of Italian statehood to Trieste 
and its territory, leaders of the Republican Party exalted the continuity among patriots of 
“Risorgimento” and resisters of World War Two. They argued that their actions made it possible 
not only to legitimately dispute Tito’s claims on the Adriatic border but also prove the Italian nature 
of Trieste.
232
 By contrast, both socialist and communist segments of national public opinion 
advocated the independence of the Julian city and its territory as a shield from Tito’s annexationist 
ambitions, which were perceived as a “pretext for nationalist forces.”233     
Competing political views well reflected the diversity, uncertainty, and fragmentation of 
both national and local public opinion as proposed solutions to the "Trieste question" became 
polarized according to ideological dichotomies of East vs. West and Communism vs. Democracy.
234 
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In Trieste, especially, Slovenians became a national minority within a non-Slavic city whose 
identification with Tito's Yugoslavia was increasingly perceived by the Italian Triestines as a threat 
to the Italian identity of the city.
235
  Consequently, political anxiety and insecurity toward the future 
territorial settlement of the border inflamed relations between the Slovene and Italian populations 
and produced local incidents. In commenting on the local mass demonstrations of late 1945, the 
American Political Adviser in Trieste clearly predicted an increase in urban violence. In his report, 
he wrote that over the last few months local pro-Italian parties had been increasingly determined “to 
counteract aggressive pro-Yugoslav propaganda” and their activities “might result in overt clashes 
and violence.”236  
In addition, another report from the US Embassy in Rome confirmed that “local disorder 
provoked criticisms of the AMG for having failed to protect Italian citizens from attacks by filo-
Slav elements.”237 In line with such criticisms, local nationalists claimed that Allied authorities’ 
mild attitudes toward the strong and organized communist propaganda could easily lead to another 
Yugoslav occupation. In a city like Trieste, these fears fostered a steady sense of endangerment 
among the Italian local population and consequentially the AMG quickly became the main target of 
popular grievances.
 
 
In response to local needs for security and stability, the AMG initially created municipal and 
fire forces from the Italian police corps and entrusted local administration to personnel mainly 
coming from the British service until 1947, the year in which the American presence became 
predominant. By 1946, the “Venezia Giulia” (Venetian Julia) police force, led by Anglo-American 
commanders, could count on approximately 3,500 members, the majority of which was made up of 
members of Italian non-communist partisan formations, state police, and both communist and 
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partisan Slav units.
238
 This police force, however, became the object of uncompromising criticism 
and attacks by Slav-communist propaganda which depicted it as an “army serving reaction, acting 
as an instrument of dark forces of the Fascist organization of CLN.”239 As this passage shows, local 
governmental institutions were attacked by both nationalist and communist propaganda which 
weakened their popular support and fueled political extremism. 
In addition, Moscow’s open support of Yugoslav annexationist claims to Trieste aggravated 
the fears of the local Italian community. Coinciding with negotiations at the Paris peace conference, 
demonstrations in support of Trieste’s “Italianità” were paralleled by acts of sabotage and terrorism 
against the AMG as well as violent clashes between Italian and Slav segments of the local 
population. An Allied report on the political situation of July 1946 stated that “neither side agrees 
with the decisions of the foreign ministers to internationalize Trieste” and even though 
representatives of the local CLN called for cooperation with Slovenes in a future Julian Free State, 
these views did not “represent the majority of their countrymen.”240 For months, indeed, mass 
demonstrations of solidarity for Trieste spread from Milan to Palermo and accompanied the 
negotiations of the Paris peace talks.
241  
In commenting on these negotiations, Prime Minister Alcide 
De Gasperi firmly reiterated Italy's opposition to any territorial renunciation of Trieste and the 
northern part of the Istrian region.
242 
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Political as well as popular desires and expectations, however, badly fit the new reality of 
international politics. In 1946, The Nation, one of the leading American magazines devoted to 
politics and culture, described the narrow territory of the Julian Venetian region, calling it as “a 
concentrated example of the bitter fruits of our victory over fascism.”243 For the American 
magazine, the Julian case best exemplified the shameless reality of power politics which, 
instrumentally presented as a competition between Latin and Slav civilizations, hid the real nature 
of the problem: the geo-political competition between East and West for the magnificent harbor. 
The magazine strongly criticized the pro-Italian bias of the AMG which further complicated the 
cumbersome process of reconciliation between Slovene and Italian inhabitants of the region. It 
correctly highlighted that the Triestine common man proved little interested in the political nature 
of the dispute and was eager to restore past Habsburg prosperity. Trieste’s economic and social 
reconstruction, however, became a prominent goal of the Allied administration only after 1947.   
Instead, throughout 1946 and 1947 the Italian government and the Allies financially and 
militarily supported a variety of socio-political movements that, according to historian Spazzali, 
gathered under the umbrella of “Second Irredentism.” 244 This secret network was created to oppose 
Yugoslav communism and its local political formations.
245
 In a report of 1946, the US Political 
Advisor to Rome described in detail the structure of one of its formations, the “Fronte Unico di 
Italianità” (United Front of Italianess, FUDI). This military organization could count on 
approximately 800 members and mobilize a network of 9000 men to oppose an eventual Yugoslav 
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coup.
246
 Other such organizations appeared on the Adriatic border and the American Information 
Service documented the creation of clandestine cells of neo-fascists both inside and beyond the 
provisional Morgan Line.
 247 
These secret cells opposed Yugoslav rule in Istria by means of 
propaganda and sought to expose Yugoslav repressive policies toward the Italian minority. This 
practice, also broadly appearing inside the pages of La Voce Libera, was used to validate rumors of 
a possible Yugoslav occupation.
248 
  
Most important is the fact that while supporting Italian sovereignty of the border, a panoply 
of movements and associations of moderate as well as extremist nationalist orientations, which I 
later refer to as neo-irredentist, ultimately attempted to rally a nation in ruins around the "Trieste 
question" and its patriotic meaning. Among them, the “Lega Nazionale” (National League, LN) 
played a pivotal role to promote the idea of Italian statehood on the border as the best guarantee of 
independence and liberty from the oppressive policies of the Titoist regime.
249
 Communist 
propaganda responded to the pro-Italian campaign of the association by equating “Italian sentiment 
to fascist ideology.”250 On March 19, 1946, the National League publicly announced its program 
and in May 1946, after months of internal debates and discussions, it approved a provisional statute. 
It clearly supported the promotion of “Italianità” among the local population in educational, 
recreational, and cultural activities that were funded by benefactors, membership fees, 
governmental contributions, and the local political network.   
Support for the activities of associations such as the National League was part of a broader 
governmental strategy. Due to the necessity to compensate for diplomatic weakness and cope with 
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the Allied military occupation and the perceived Yugoslav threat, the Italian government created a 
special office for the border areas: “Ufficio Zone di Confine” (Office of Border Zones, 
hereafter,UZC).
251
 The UZC, located in Rome and connected to the Ministry of Interior, was 
directed by Silvio Innocenti.
252
  
In a 1945 letter to the Ministry of Interior, Innocenti wrote that “even though Fiume was 
publicly perceived as a symbol of fascist adventurism, it rather represented the center of “Italianità” 
in Eastern Istria and a strategic part of the Danubian railways.”253 In stressing the Italian nature of 
the city, its indissoluble economic ties to Trieste, and its role as a center of Italian culture in the 
Adriatic, the letter reveals a pronounced irredentist tone and provides an interesting example of the 
motives that drove the actions of the UZC.
 
The Ministry of Interior indeed controlled military 
groups, orchestrated pro-Italian propaganda, and exercised informal pressures on local and national 
authorities.
254
 It also greatly benefited from the presence and activities of significant Catholic 
figures and organizations both in Trieste and in the Istrian region, among them Bishop Antonio 
Santin
255
 and Catholic priest Don Marzari.
256
 Likewise, in the area that was subjected to Yugoslav 
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military occupation, the Istrian C.L.N. became the strongest expression of post-war Italian 
resistance to Tito’s policy of de-Italianization.257 
As discussed so far, after 1945 the “unredeemed” city, rhetorically depicted as bastion of 
Italian civilization, remained central to post-war conceptualizations of Italy’s imagined community. 
Both inside and outside Trieste people mobilized in support of Trieste’s “Italianità” and advocated 
its defense against Tito’s Yugoslavia. The Allied authorities, torn between Yugoslav accusations of 
favoring resurgent Fascism and local fears toward Yugoslav communism, experienced increasingly 
hostility from both local Italians and Slovenes and attempted to maintain public order. Meanwhile, 
the Italian government, exploiting the Allies’ anti-communism and eager to prove its 
uncompromising attitude toward any change of the Italian border in the Northern Adriatic, 
strengthened the Italian front inside Trieste by indistinctly supporting the activities of multiple 
military groups and associations of democratic or neo-fascist orientation. Despite the efforts of the 
Italian government, however, the border’s fate greatly depended on the decisions that were taken at 
the Paris peace conference. 
 
The Free Territory of Trieste: an Unworkable Solution  
In Paris, Italian diplomats proved impotent when dealing with Yugoslav territorial claims, 
strongly backed by the Soviet Union; however, after the Allies’ refusal to declare Trieste a free city 
under Yugoslav sovereignty, Stalin agreed to the French proposal for a new border.
258
 This 
decision, which settled the borders of the prospective Free Territory of Trieste (FTT), represented a 
compromise between Soviet views of the economic link of Trieste to the Danubian lands and Allied 
ideas of its Italian ethnicity.
259
 It is interesting to note that both the US and British representatives 
perceived the French border line proposal as the “nearest approach to a strictly ethnic solution” yet  
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Map IV: Proposed Borders of the Free Territory of Trieste at the Paris Peace Conference 
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“too restrictive as a boundary for a free territory” and they unsuccessfully attempted to extend it 
further south.
260 
In addition, the American administration, aware of the uneven Italian and Slav 
ethnic distribution in urban and rural areas, understood that Italian anxiety over the possible loss of 
Trieste was acute and its internationalization, in a context whereby its population was 
overwhelmingly Italian, would only create tension on the path of post-World War One Danzig.
261 
Strongly influenced by domino theories of international politics and aware of the complexity of the 
Triestine case, the American administration therefore eagerly replaced its British junior partner in 
the Allied Military Government to prevent communist “diseases and unrest” in the Adriatic 
region.
262
   
Furthermore, Soviet support for Yugoslav requests and Western will to impose a solution 
suitable to its strategic interests made a popular plebiscite an impracticable option.
263
 De Gasperi, 
concerned about both the potential results of a plebiscite in the Adriatic region after months of 
forced de-Italianization and political pressure to agree to a popular plebiscite
 
in other border areas 
such as South Tyrol, accepted the internationalization of Trieste and its territory.
264
 De Gasperi also 
hoped to exploit the recurring tension among former wartime allies yet his decision was criticized in 
many quarters. For example, Ernesta Battisti, wife of the socialist irredentist martyr, attributed De 
Gasperi’s unwillingness to support the idea of a popular plebiscite to his insufficient “Italianità.” In 
her mind, De Gasperi was ethnically Italian yet loyal to Austria and was driven by religious instead 
of irredentist faith that made him a great politician rather than patriot.
265
 By focusing on De 
Gasperi’s personality, this kind of interpretation unfairly minimized the diplomatic environment 
which, highly unfavorable to Italian interests, made the chance of upholding past irredentist claims 
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on Trieste and its Istrian region untenable, whatever the personal beliefs and orientations of the 
Italian leader. 
On February 10, 1947 the Peace Treaty was signed in Paris and postulated the partition of 
Trieste and the northern part of the Istrian region, under Anglo-American and Yugoslav 
administrations respectively.
266
 The Peace Treaty strongly reduced Italian influence in the Adriatic 
and Balkan regions and forced Italian post war foreign policy to accommodate itself to the bipolar 
logic of the Cold War, even if the restoration of national sovereignty of Trieste and its hinterland 
remained a formal goal of the new Republic.
267 De Gasperi, indeed, publicly called for a “passionate 
revolt at the unmerited fate of the Italian people of Trieste and Pola… who he cannot save,”268 
stating that “Italy won’t leave you alone… there are no borders able to break kinship.”269 De 
Gasperi’s speech was followed by demonstrations of workers, former partisans, and war veterans 
who came to Italian cities with flags of Fiume, Dalmatia, and Istria to show popular opposition to 
what was perceived as an “unjust peace.”  
As a consequence of the Peace Treaty, Italian emigration from the Yugoslav region further 
accelerated and peaked between 1947-1949, rising to 50,000 people.
270 
The incoming émigrés were 
dispersed across the peninsula, fled abroad, or were victims of a campaign of public denigration and 
politically ostracized.
271 
Pro-governmental newspapers such as Il Corriere della Sera proved 
sympathetic toward the incoming Italians and used the exodus to endorse national claims over the 
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Istrian region.
272
 At the opposite end, the communist journal L’Unità instead stressed that for the 
first time in history, “it is the population who reasserts its rights on lands inhabited for centuries to 
voluntarily leave those lands to people of different nationality.”273  
In line with former articles that depicted Yugoslavia as the worker paradise and minimized 
the drama of the Italian population along the border, L’Unità portrayed the exodus as the outcome 
of the political intrigues orchestrated by the Italian government to assert its rule of those lands. 
Examination of the personal accounts and judicial-political declarations of the Julian émigrés, 
however, debunks the distortions of both the Communist Party and its propaganda. Italian citizens 
who escaped from the zone B reported the planned and coordinated nature of communist violence 
against elements of pro-Italian sentiments as well as associations of clear Italian inspiration, 
especially those related to the Catholic Church. Their accounts stressed the inhumane suffering and 
treatment of priests and nuns in the prison of Stara Gradiska. In addition, they reported Yugoslav 
torture, bans to celebrate Mass, as well as mass arrests and expulsions from local convents that later 
became  boarding houses for Communist students.
 274
 
Pola, one of the main Italian urban centers on the Adriatic shore was also assigned to the 
new Yugoslav Federation by the Paris Peace Treaty. To protest this decision, Maria Pasquinelli, an 
unrepentant fascist, murdered the Allied General in that city, Robert De Winton. A New York Times 
article depicted the assassin as “dry-eyed, cold and calculating” with no regret for her actions.  
Pasquinelli defended the murder by claiming it was revenge for the Allies’ decision to strip Pola 
from the new Republic. Due to the lack of any connection between her action and any organized 
conspiracy, the article partially minimized its importance yet pointed out the existence of an “Italian 
tendency to regard her as a martyr.”275 
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Pasquinelli’s case, rather than proving the endurance of fascist sympathies among the local 
population, clearly exemplified local fears and anger toward the Western Allies which were 
publicly perceived as responsible for the upcoming Yugoslav administration. In Trieste these 
sentiments were partially mediated by the presence of the AMG, publicly perceived as a barrier to 
Tito’s plans for the annexation of the city. American officers indeed emphasized that, despite the 
low status of local public morale, “a great reservoir of good-will towards the Allies should not be 
dissipated”276 yet recommended that actions be taken to compensate for the weakness of Italian 
propaganda which implicitly benefited the local Communist movement.
277  
Nevertheless, the fear of a possible Yugoslav infiltration that could remove local anti-
communists and pave the way for a pro-Communist plebiscite seemed untenable, even to the AMG. 
The American intelligence confirmed that the local Italian front, mainly consisting of former 
soldiers and neo-fascists, could now count on a force of about 8000 men in the Osoppo brigades in 
the Northern area of the region and 2000 men in the Julian division that operated in the Isonzo 
area.
278 
These forces represented a valuable counterforce to the eventual penetration of 3500 
Yugoslav communist partisans.
279
 At the same time, however, they could become an additional 
threat to the precarious socio-political stability of the city whose Italian majority greatly feared 
Trieste’s Balkanization.280 
Indeed, the Allies proved increasingly concerned about achieving a diplomatic solution to 
temporarily minimize political tensions over the Adriatic city. Consequentially and notwithstanding 
Italian and Yugoslav protests, on  September 15, 1947 the United Nation Security Council formally 
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proposed the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste.
281
 This provisional solution was never 
implemented and for the next nine years, the territorial sovereignty over Trieste and its territory 
remained contested between the new Italian Republic and Yugoslav Federation.
282
 Within national 
and international public discourse, Trieste became the "Berlin of the Adriatic," a crucible of 
ideological conflict and a pawn in international politics.
283 
 
Most important, the formal announcement of the FTT did not alleviate social unrest inside 
Trieste. Throughout 1947, the city was a theatre of daily violence and crimes whose ethnic-political 
tones fueled local disorder. The widespread presence of deposits of weapons and munitions further 
benefited local political extremism and aggravated Allied concern for public order.
284
 Reports from 
the Allied Military Headquarter in Trieste portrayed a city deeply divided among pro-Italian, pro-
Yugoslav, and independent political groups. The Italian front coalesced around the National League 
which could mobilize up to 140,000 people and was led by a council of seventeen members of all 
political orientations except the Communists. In presenting itself as the direct heir of Adriatic 
irredentism, the association opposed the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference and gradually 
intertwined its propaganda with that of other political formations inside the region, in particular the 
“Giunta d’Intesa” (Junta) which replaced the Triestine CLN.285  The National League under the 
leadership of members of the local bourgeoisie and prominent intellectuals, mobilized public 
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Map V: the Free Territory of Trieste 
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attention around the "Trieste question" by editing and distributing pamphlets in Italian, English and 
French both at home and abroad.
286 
 
Local political violence, however, was externally read as a sign of resurgent nationalism and 
the National League itself was often portrayed by parts of national public opinion as a residual 
expression of Julian fascism.
287
 In contrast, local scholars such as Spazzali and Redivo have 
demonstrated that only small fringes of the association were compromised by the petty nationalism 
of the neo-fascist and extremist right.
288
 In fact, the National League along with cultural 
associations such as the “Dante Alighieri,” and “Università Popolare” (Popular University) 
promoted ideals of fatherland which were informed by the experience of the Julian democratic 
resistance.
289
  
Likewise, these ideals were echoed outside Trieste and within the pages of patriotic journals 
such as Il Ponte or Il Pensiero Mazziniano.
290
 These journals, in particular, advertised the views of 
multiple cultural and political associations, among them the "Associazione Mazziniana Italiana" 
(Italian Mazzinian Association, AMI).
291
 Although this patriotic association and Julian intellectuals 
highlighted Trieste’s coexisting national and European identity, post-war nationalist and socialist 
political cultures continued to read the Trieste’s reality through the lenses of nationalism, ethnicity, 
or class.
292
 As a consequence, expressions of “Italianità” were easily labeled as fascist and, more 
importantly, any solution that did not imply the return of Trieste and its Istrian region to Italy was 
labeled as anti-Italian and pro-Communist.   
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This proved particularly true for the segments of the local Triestine population whose 
support for the independence of Trieste and its territory found expression in political movements 
such as “Blocco Triestino” (Triestine Bloc) or  "Fronte per l’Indipendenza dello Stato Libero 
Giuliano” (Front for the Independence of the Free Julian State).293 From 1945 to 1959 the local 
newspaper Corriere di Trieste became the main voice of the Independence Movement and 
competed with both the Italian national and Titoist blocs.
294
 Inspired by leftist but not communist 
orientations, the movement espoused bilinguism and socio-political reconciliation between Italians 
and Slovenes. The newspaper, financially supported by Tito’s regime, provided an interesting 
solution for a multilinguistic, multiethnic, and independent state. Its views, however, clashed with 
those of the post-war Julian democratic movement which aimed to extend Italian statehood on 
Trieste and the northern part of the Istrian region.
295
 
Indeed, intellectual and politician Fabio Cusin, the main voice of the Independence 
Movement, proposed a distinctive conceptualization of Triestine identity which, inspired by 
Tommaseo’s nineteenth-century ideas of Adriatic multi-nationalism, supported the administrative 
autonomy of the FTT and rejected any form of Italian and Slav nationalism.
296
 Cusin harshly 
criticized the policies of both national and local governing elite because they exploited traditional 
patriotism and were either greatly affected by past fascist ideals or driven by peculiar economic 
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interests.
297 
Refuting common accusations of being pro-Yugoslav, Cusin reasserted his Italian 
cultural identity by envisioning Trieste’s territorial unification with Italy in the future; however, he 
added, due to the new international and geo-political configuration of the Cold War, the inclusion of 
the FTT inside national borders was not only unsuitable in the present but also harmful to the 
protection of the Italian population on the eastern border.
298 
  
This view was based upon the traditional administrative autonomy of the city, a trait 
intrinsic to its geo-political DNA.
299 
In inviting national elites to re-think Trieste as the bridge of an 
open border and use commercial agreements to eliminate mutual distrust between the Adriatic 
neighbors, Cusin greatly anticipated the post-1954 governmental strategy toward the Eastern 
border;
300 
in 1947, however, his message implied the renunciation of national sovereignty over 
Trieste and its Istrian region and was marginalized within public discourse as it was perceived as 
pro-Yugoslav.  
Until 1947 and differently from both democratic and nationalist parties that persistently 
opposed the FTT, the Italian Communist Party remained entangled between its competing national 
and international interests and, while supporting Trieste’s internationalization, also criticized the 
"dictated peace."
301
 Indeed, while recognizing Yugoslav socialism in zone B, Togliatti 
unsuccessfully proposed a territorial exchange between Trieste and Gorizia and supported the idea 
of direct talks between Italy and Yugoslavia to settle the Adriatic dispute.
302
 Trieste’s communist 
leader Vittorio Vidali, however, conscious of the problematic issue of Italian identity of Trieste and 
its territory, understood that the clear annexationist goals of the Yugoslav regime only strengthened 
resurgent local neo-fascism. Within this context, he argued, Yugoslav misperceptions of Italian 
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Communism’s “sick nationalism” only heightened antagonism among the Slav and Italian segments 
of the local population and further discredited communist claims in defense of Trieste’s 
“Italianità.”303   
As outlined so far, Italian territorial ambitions over the Adriatic border were strongly 
affected by the emergence of the Cold War. Indeed, the unattainable goal of establishing the FTT 
exemplified the irreconcilable views of the American administration and the Soviet Union over the 
Triestine problem. In implying the renunciation of Italian sovereignty over the fruits of the past 
irredentist struggle, this solution was firmly opposed by the Italian government which unfailingly 
continued to advocate for the cause of “Italianità” of Trieste and its territory. In so doing, the central 
government could count on the support of significant segments of local and national public opinion 
that also espoused a pro-Italian solution to the “Trieste question.” By contrast, minor segments of 
the Triestine population who were highly influenced by promises of economic prosperity and peace 
turned to the Independence Movement and supported forms of home rule. This solution, also 
encouraged by the ambivalent and pro-Yugoslav policy of the Communist Party, clashed with 
Italian territorial interests and was quickly portrayed by both the government and nationalist 
propaganda as anti-Italian. Thus, by the end of 1947 Trieste’s geo-political status remained 
uncertain and the political debate was polarized by irreconcilable pro and anti-Italian positions. In 
1948, however, abrupt changes in international politics significantly affected Italy's strategy toward 
the eastern border and further exacerbated local socio-political tensions. 
 
Failed Illusions of 1948 
In the immediate post-war years, economic difficulties and episodes of political violence in 
Trieste weakened popular support for both the AMG and the Italian government. Thus, in January 
1948, a secret report from the Italian representative in Trieste to Rome stressed the necessity to 
increase political pressure on the Allied government to grant major administrative autonomy and 
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better respond to the city’s needs. The extension of the European Relief Program to the zone A and 
changes in the territorial configuration of the AMG partially responded to the lobbying of the Italian 
government.
304
 Its local representatives, strongly anchored to non-Communist and anti-fascist 
traditions, used both formal and informal channels to negotiate with the foreign administration and 
capitalize on the apparently positive Allied attitude toward the Italian cause.
 305
    
The year 1948, however, drastically changed the Allied orientations and represented the 
turning point for Trieste. Anticipating the Italian elections of April, which took place in a context of 
international tensions inflamed by the communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade, 
De Gasperi attempted to trade concessions on Trieste in exchange for the Italian participation in the 
nascent Atlantic Pact. On March 20, 1948 the three Western powers issued the “Tripartite 
Declaration,” declaring their willingness to bring Trieste’s territory back under Italian 
sovereignty.
306
 The National League sent a telegram to the Western powers expressing enthusiasm 
for the proposed return of the FTT to Italy and printed celebratory leaflets that read “with fresh 
hope in our hearts let us proclaim to the world our only faith: long live Italy.”307  The emotional 
impact of the Tripartite Declaration was exemplified by mass demonstrations throughout Italy and 
student parades from Palermo to Tripoli where they placed an American laurel wreath at the foot of 
the monument of the fallen soldier.
308
  
 Moreover, national and local newspapers differently responded to the Allied declaration.
309 
 
For example, pro-governmental press generally welcomed the Allied proposal while raising the 
central question of Istria’s place within Allied policy and stressing the pronounced economic 
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interdependence between Trieste and its Istrian region.
310
 The "Associazione Nazionale Venezia 
Giulia Dalmazia" (National Association Venetia Julia and Dalmatia, ANVGD), founded in 1947 
and acting as the leading voice of Julian and Dalmatian émigrés through the pages of its journal 
Difesa Adriatica,  argued that the proposal revealed the unfairness of the Peace Treaty and 
reinforced the patriotic aspirations of the local Italian communities.
311
 By contrast, the communist 
press stressed the clear imperialist and purely electoral value of the declaration by emphasizing its 
negative effects on Tito’s search for peace and cooperation.312 Similarly, the independent movement 
portrayed the Allied declaration as a proof of the deceptive Anglo-American strategic actions and 
interest in the Adriatic.
313
 
Indeed, the Allies, aware of the significance of the Triestine problem within Italian national 
public opinion and disregarding Soviet and Yugoslav hostility, used the “Tripartite Declaration” to 
strengthen Italian democracy and the Christian Democrats against the communist threat. A dispatch 
from the American Embassy in Rome confirmed the uncertain climate that anticipated the national 
elections and emphasized the anti-American nature of both the Italian neo-fascist and communist 
movements. To forestall a possible communist victory, the Embassy also suggested advancing 
fictitious proposals for a peace treaty revision and even outlawing the Italian Communist Party.
314 
Another report, by contrast, emphasized how mass demonstrations in Trieste successfully mobilized 
80,000 Italians who cheerfully celebrated the prospect of gradual changes in local administration, 
which were locally interpreted as a clear sign of the gradual return of the city under Italian 
sovereignty.
315
 Such widespread optimism was also echoed within the American press, which 
emphasized the value of the three powers’ proposal to address the Allied distortion of the Peace 
Treaty, strengthen Italian anti-communist parties, and make Trieste safe from Yugoslav 
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annexationist ambitions.
 316 
As these arguments suggest, the Tripartite Declaration aimed to 
strengthen Western anti-communism at a crucial moment in which both the European Recovery 
Program and the Berlin question captured the attention of both national and international public 
opinion. 
In the face of Soviet objections and especially after the Italian national elections, the 
Tripartite Declaration quickly disappeared from the Allied political agenda; despite this, it 
strengthened both local and national hopes for the affirmation of Italian sovereignty over the 
Triestine territory and paradoxically aggravated rather than eased political and social tensions inside 
the city. Indeed, the US political adviser in Trieste reported that, following the Christian 
Democratic victory in the national elections and fearing violent urban disorders, the Allied 
authorities turned back numerous communists who tried to enter Trieste between April 27 and May 
3. Aware of the massive communist demonstration of the previous year that mobilized over 50,000 
people and as a consequence of the recent Allied decisions, the AMG feared a violent confrontation 
between Italians who composed about 80% of the city’s population and Tito’s supporters.317 Due to 
rising hostility of both the Italian and Slav population toward years of prolonged Allied occupation, 
a report from the Allied headquarters in Trieste also suggested the quick normalization of local 
politics by holding administrative elections in the city.
318   
 
 Only a few months after the Tripartite Declaration and the elections of 1948, which were 
rhetorically portrayed in Trieste as a plebiscite of "Italianità," Italian hopes for the reintegration of 
the Julian city and its territory were dashed by the Soviet-Yugoslav rift of June 28, 1948.
319
 The 
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Allied attitudes toward Tito’s regime changed drastically and decisively ended the tenuous hopes 
for the reincorporation of the Istrian region inside Italian national borders.
320
 Allied authorities 
interpreted the Yugoslav-Soviet rift as an invaluable opportunity to weaken the cohesion of the 
Communist bloc, which led them to rethink their strategies toward the Adriatic border. Commenting 
on the Tito-Stalin rift, the New York Times foresaw the subtle Soviet instrumental use of the FTT as 
a means to remove Western forces from the Adriatic, weaken Tito’s regime, and boost popular 
support for Italian communism after its modest electoral results.
321
   
The Truman administration initially looked with suspicion upon the new international 
position of the Titoist regime. In case of an eventual discussion within the UN Security Council, the 
American administration planned to use the totalitarian nature of Yugoslav communism in zone B 
to clarify the ineffectiveness of the FTT.
322
 In addition, US observers in Trieste noted that, even 
though the Tripartite Declaration had closed the door to any option for the creation of the FTT, the 
return of the disputed territory to Italy was not definitively decided “so long as there remained a 
chance of bringing Tito into the Western camp or otherwise taking advantage of the Yugoslav 
situation.”323 Such a phrase exemplified the new attitude of the American administration toward the 
Triestine problem and highlighted the relegation of Italian territorial claims to Cold War’s geo-
political interests. Therefore, Italian hopes to extend national sovereignty over the disputed border 
were fatally compromised. Within Italian public opinion, however, Tito’s excommunication 
initially endorsed feelings of confidence toward a positive solution of the Triestine question. For 
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example, Il Corriere della Sera, perceived Tito’s weakness as an invaluable opportunity to advance 
national interests on the Adriatic border.
324
 By contrast, the Italian communist movement 
experienced a significant internal fragmentation between Titoist and Cominformist groups whose 
divergent views resulted in sporadic episodes of violence along the demarcation line of the FTT and 
inevitably divided the communist movement.
325
 In Trieste, especially, Italian workers removed 
Tito’s picture from the office of the Communist Party and industrial factories whereas Slovene 
communists symbolically rejected both Tito and Stalin’s ideologies and envisioned a return to 
Marxism-Leninism.
326
 Although Togliatti initially addressed only mild criticism toward the 
Yugoslav leadership,
327
 the PCI quickly reasserted the myth of Soviet infallibility.
328
 It strongly 
criticized the violence and terror of the Yugoslav regime in its de-Italianization of the Istrian region 
and, emphasizing Italian governmental subservience to the imperative of pro-Titoist US foreign 
policy, presented the FTT as the only feasible solution to preserve Italian culture and language on 
the Eastern border.
329
   
Meanwhile, national and local political governing elites responded to the Tito-Stalin rift by 
showing increasing apprehension for the future of Trieste and opposed Yugoslav propaganda by 
encouraging any initiative which promoted the Italian identity of the territory.
  
For example, 
undersecretary of state, Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti, approved an appropriation of 
2,000,000 lire for the building of the local Church in S. Saba in order to strengthen “Italianità” of a 
neighborhood that was “mainly populated by Slavs.”330 In addition, the Italian government 
financially supported the wide network of pro-Italian local lay and religious associations.
331
 Rome’s 
distribution of financial support to these local associations depended on the opinions of the Office 
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of Border Zones (UZC) whose decisions were influenced more by the local representative of the 
national government, the zonal President Gino Palutan, rather than by the "Giunta d’Intesa" 
(Junta).
332
  
In late 1948, for example, Palutan suggested that the UZC grant financial support to the 
National League in order to re-orient the upcoming electoral campaign in strong national terms and 
strengthen the cohesion of the Italian bloc.
333
 These decisions were motivated by the necessity to 
respond to local criticisms of perceived governmental apathy toward the fate of the Italian lands 
beyond Trieste.
334
 As a response, the central government arranged a set of public initiatives that 
aimed to portray the border as indisputably Italian, among them the September 1948 exhibition 
“Trieste Italiana” (Italian Trieste).335  
More importantly, the Italian government viewed the activities of right extremist political 
groups in positive terms, which ultimately poisoned the relationship between political elites in 
Rome and Trieste. In December 1948, the Italian representative in Trieste sent a note to the UZC to 
dismiss alarms from the local “Giunta d’Intesa” after minor incidents that followed the clash 
between Italian nationalists and Slav communists. The Italian representative portrayed local 
national extremists as defenders of “Italianità” and, opposing any intervention from the Allied local 
police, proposed instead to reward their efforts by providing a “job, preferably in Italian 
territory.”336   
Moreover, in such a climate of connivance between central institutions and far-right political 
movements, the Ministry of Interior also established a special branch named “Ufficio Affari 
Riservati” (The Office of Confidential Affairs, UAR). Pre-existing governmental offices which had 
dealt with confidential general affairs and special information merged into this new governmental 
office. Mainly consisting of members of the fascist political police (Organization for Vigilance and 
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Repression of Anti-Fascism, OVRA), its aim was to collect information for security and public 
order. This complex network, which was very active in Trieste, monitored communist activity, 
cooperated with the US secret service, and provided significant support for rightist subversive 
forces.
 337
 
In summary, throughout the first few months of 1948, the Tripartite Declaration boosted 
Italian confidence for a favorable solution of the Triestine problem; however, the Tito-Stalin rift 
drastically changed the American attitudes toward the Yugoslav regime. Tito, previously considered 
a threat, now became a potential ally and the US administration perceived the border dispute as a 
potential obstacle to contain Soviet communism. American statesman Adlai Stevenson, later 
appointed as U.S. ambassador to the U.N., well summarized the new orientations of the US 
administration toward the Trieste question by referring to the renunciation of sovereignty over zone 
B as reasonable price for Italian entrance into the UN.
338
 Italian national interests were now 
irreconcilable with the major international goals of the American administration yet the Italian 
government, conscious of its possible political costs, opposed any renunciation of earlier claims to 
Trieste and its territory. 
 
1949-1952: Diplomacy at Work 
By 1949, the FTT had become “a needless source of tension between two countries the 
United States considered important” and the American and British position strongly supported a 
solution that favored a direct compromise between the Italian and Yugoslav governments.
339
 The 
reincorporation of the city and its territory within Italian state borders, however, was met with broad 
popular consensus inside and outside Trieste. The local administrative elections of 1949, which 
resulted in the victory of the Italian bloc under the leadership of Gianni Bartoli, the local leader of 
the Christian Democrats and future head of the local Committee for the Defense of the “Italianità” 
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of Trieste and Istria, confirmed the strength of support for a pro-Italian solution to the Triestine 
problem.
340
 In commenting on the electoral results of 1949, pro-governmental press rhetorically 
depicted it as proof of the “imperishable rights of Trieste’s essential Italian character.”341 The 
communist press, for its part, praised the success of the local PCI, the second strongest political 
party of the city, and emphasized the significant defeat of the Titoist front.
342
 The local PCI also 
emphasized the fictitious existence of pro and anti-Italian factions inside Trieste and presented the 
popular vote as a significant backlash to the anti-national and anti-communist campaign promoted 
by both local and national Christian Democrats.
343
  
Whereas the pro-governmental and communist press continued to read Trieste’s reality 
through the lenses of Cold War’s ideology, the Independence Front adopted a more pragmatic 
approach that highlighted the constant anxiety and hardship of the city and its territory. In his article 
of June 19, 1949, Fabio Cusin argued that the Italian state’s unresponsiveness to the economic and 
political crisis in Triestine society, and, most importantly, the dangerous resurgence of local 
Fascism could threaten the “Italianità” of the city.344 Consequently, the weakening of the Italian 
bloc and its “patriottardo” (jingoistic) spirit enabled the pro-Independence Front to become the third 
largest local political force in Trieste with 18,000 supporters.
345
 
 The Christian Democratic government, however, misread the impressive rise of the 
Independence Movement and did not understand that its growth revealed people’s increasing 
disapproval toward the Italian state and its local expressions. Similarly, the US political adviser in 
Trieste emphasized the local strength of the Communist Party and right extremism.
346
 Neither the 
Italian government nor the Allies understood the strength of the independence political parties 
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whose propaganda highlighted the limits of both Italian and Allied economic policies toward 
Trieste. Indeed, external financial contributions made Trieste a city based upon an artificial and 
subsidized rather than entrepreneurial market economy whose downsides would clearly emerge 
after 1954. Meanwhile, the neo-irredentist rhetoric of the Italian government that envisioned the 
reincorporation of the FTT inside Italy's borders continued to appeal to Triestines who perceived 
the AMG as the main obstacle to a definitive pro-Italian solution of the Triestine problem.
347 
In 
contrast, supporters of the Independence Movement restlessly advocated geo-political autonomy for 
the FTT and used the prolonged and unresolved status of the Triestine problem to locally weaken 
the image of the Italian state.  
In addition, the strengthening of economic and political relations between Yugoslavia and 
the United States as well as Italian inability to impose modifications to the objectionable clauses of 
the Paris Peace Treaty in exchange for loyalty to the new Atlantic alliance further exacerbated local 
criticisms.
348
 To appease local public opinion, the national government argued that, due to the 
failure to implement the UN resolution to establish the FTT, Italy had maintained its sovereignty 
over Trieste and its territory. Such a claim was first formulated by the rector of Trieste University, 
Angelo Cammarata. Later known as the “Cammarata thesis,” it was used by a variety of political 
actors to reassert the indisputable nature of Italian territorial claims over the border.
349 
 
 Likewise, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Edvard Kardelj’s declaration that “under no 
circumstances will Yugoslavia give up an inch of zone B” demonstrated Yugoslav views toward the 
issue.
350
 These conflicting arguments confirmed the cumbersome nature of the Triestine problem. 
Thus, when Yugoslav authorities decided to extend national legislation to the occupied zone B and 
introduce a single currency, political relationships between Rome and Belgrade were strained even 
further. Moreover, Yugoslav restrictions on people’s mobility between the demarcation lines, 
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repression of religious practices as well as physical violence against the Italian population of the 
area accelerated the exodus of the Italian minority.
351
 These discriminatory practices came to 
international public attention and were labeled by the Manchester Guardian as “the closest to the 
Nazi procedures.”352 Within Italian public opinion, the zone B was portrayed as the victim of 
Yugoslav oppression which ultimately aimed to carry out the forced de-Italianization of the region 
and the effacement of its historical memory.
353 
This anti-Yugoslav campaign implicitly suggested 
that only the extension of Italian statehood could restore a regime of justice and freedom.
354
  
In addition to the main Italian Istrian émigré association, the ANVGD, strongly 
disillusioned by the weak response of the central government to Yugoslav discrimination, defined 
the Christian Democrats in Rome as a bunch of "inept, unconscious, and political criminals.”355 The 
national governing elites, for their part, were eager to silence these criticisms. Viewing the presence 
of neo-fascists and nationalists among ANVGD's executive committee as detrimental to bilateral 
relations between Rome and Belgrade, the central government decided to interrupt financial support 
to the organization. This decision was driven by the necessity to prove the absence of any 
institutional connivance with resurgent neo-fascism, a factor that could weaken Italy’s international 
credibility and adversely affect diplomatic talks over the FTT.  
Between 1950 and 1951, indeed, the “Trieste question” became the subject of prolonged 
negotiations.
356
 Due to the expansion of the Cold War to new parts of the globe, the United States 
was forced to reformulate its strategy toward the Balkans and alleviate tension between the Adriatic 
neighbors. Therefore, the American administration, despite the pronounced Atlanticism of Italian 
foreign policy, actively promoted the accession of Greece and Turkey into NATO and signed a 
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mutual security agreement with Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1951. As The New York Times noted, the 
American administration had “to hold the reins of a team of horses that start pulling in opposite 
directions.”357 
In particular, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, while defining Soviet accusations of U.S. 
responsibility for the failure of the FTT as “nonsense,” also firmly dismissed Italian arguments 
regarding the Tripartite Declaration which judged it as “a pledge even if it was not such.” Indeed, 
Acheson clearly stated that direct bilateral talks between Italy and Yugoslavia remained the best 
means to find a positive solution to the "Trieste question," a position that clearly revealed the 
untenable nature of Italian hopes to extend Italian territorial sovereignty over the entire FTT.
358
  
The Italian government, therefore, operating in an unfavorable international political 
context, embraced a new aggressive strategy. First, it strengthened Italian propaganda in zone B.
359
 
Second, it irresponsibly contributed to an anti-Allied campaign that portrayed the AMG as the main 
obstacle to Trieste’s return to Italy.360 Finally, it showed greater complacency toward local right 
extremism.
361
 In so doing, the Italian government attributed an uncompromising political and 
ideological meaning to the defense of Trieste’s Italian identity. 
Concurrently, Italian authorities in Trieste increasingly feared the aggressive tone of 
Yugoslav policies and the popular success of the Independence Front, which was now perceived as 
the main threat to Trieste’s “Italianità.” 362 Trieste’s Prefect portrayed the movement for the FTT as 
"poison" that, increasingly supported by both white Yugoslavs and unhappy Italians, was even more 
dangerous than local communism.
363
 To cope with the threat of the growing Independence 
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Movement, the Prefect suggested the central government to strengthen Italian propaganda and 
present any communist or anti-Italian solution as an open threat to the moral and territorial integrity 
of the nation itself.
 364
  
In writing the central government, the National League also accentuated the threat of the 
pro-Independence Movement. The association, while explaining the rising success of the 
Independent Front in terms of “the lack of action of governmental political parties to unmask its 
anti-national strategy,” requested the creation of a central pro-Italian newspaper to back its alleged 
apolitical activity.
365  
To respond to these requests and cope with the rising demands of the 
incoming émigrés, the national government established a special fund for Trieste whose impressive 
resources also gradually became the subject of political speculation and controversy between the 
local Italian authorities and political groups of nationalist inspiration.
366
   
While responding to the pressure coming from local institutions and neo-irredentist 
associations, the central government continued to view the identity of the city and its territory in 
purely national terms. It proved unable to understand the significant legacy of concurrent Italian 
cultural identity and autonomous economic ambitions, and mistakenly perceived the rise of pro-
independence sentiment as the cause instead of the consequence of the weakening of local patriotic 
sentiments after years of Allied occupation. Above all, it failed to fully understand people’s 
disillusionment toward the central government, which had been unable to uphold the promises of 
territorial reunification and economic prosperity. 
Throughout 1951, the central Italian government, hoping to further undermine the 
legitimacy of the Allied authorities in Trieste, also showed an increasingly benevolent attitude 
toward political extremist movements.
367 
 For example, the Italian representative in Trieste 
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confirmed to the central government that the bomb attacks of February and September against both 
the AMG and the Independence Front had been likely carried out by right extremists; however, only 
in November and following the discovery of illegal weapons and munitions did the local police 
proceed to arrest a few well-known local extremists, a delay that was hardly justifiable.
368
 In 
addition and by means of local propaganda and the press, central authorities underscored rightist 
views of the newly appointed head of the AMG, General John Winterton, as an intransigent anti-
Italian.
369 
The leader of the Independence Movement, Fabio Cusin had predicted this gradual 
change in Roman politics and denounced the dangerous connivance between neo-fascism and local 
politicians. Their subservience to Roman politicians and their machinations, he argued, threatened 
to place the future of Trieste on the past paths of Fiume and other Istrian cities.
370 
 
In a context of rising local political extremism, Prime Minister De Gasperi travelled to 
Washington in September 1951 and made his final attempt to win American support for Trieste’s 
return to Italy by predicting that a significant decline in the US presence of the Adriatic border 
would lead to a further weakening of the Western front against the communist threat. De Gasperi 
also emphasized that Italy would never accept further territorial losses yet his arguments were 
overshadowed by the crucial strategic role of Tito’s regime in any future European conflict with the 
Soviet Union.
371  
The positive status of American and Yugoslav relations, indeed, made the partition 
of the Triestine border inevitable. As a result of these diplomatic developments, the Italian 
community of the zone B and its associations became increasingly disillusioned about a future 
possible return of the territory to Italian sovereignty.
372
   
Meanwhile, the Yugoslav government, aware of its privileged position, hoped to debunk the 
irredentist claims of the Italian government and disprove its accusations that it had forcibly removed 
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the Italian minority from the Istrian region.
373 
With the support of Yugoslav agents who proved 
particularly active in Trieste and the Julian region, the Yugoslav authorities planned mass 
demonstrations in Trieste.
374 
To respond to Yugoslav propaganda, neo-fascist groups under the 
leadership of Marshall Rodolfo Graziani, former fascist Governor of Italian colonies in Africa and 
Commander in Chief of the Italian Army during WWII, organized counter-demonstrations in 
Trieste and established patriotic committees against foreign occupation and for national 
independence. Connected to the most radical segments of the Salò Republic and also partially 
supported by the Communist Party, these groups were strongly divided and played only a marginal 
role in subsequent events;
375 
however, their presence further confirmed the existence of dangerous 
political right-wing extremist movements in Trieste. 
As discussed so far, between 1949 and 1952 the "Trieste question" remained unresolved and 
the unsatisfactory results of the diplomatic talks strengthened feelings of frustration, pessimism, and 
apathy among significant segments of the Italian community in Trieste. The central government, 
stressing the bloody nature of Tito’s dictatorship, attempted to mobilize lay, religious, and political 
organizations to advance national Italian interests on the eastern border. In addition, the 
governmental coalition still naively believed it had a privileged relationship with the Western Allies 
and, while rejecting any alternative solution, continued to assert the value of the Tripartite 
Declaration.  
The failure of diplomatic negotiations, however, strengthened the pro-Independence Front 
and its popular attractiveness as well as the anti-governmental campaign of both communist and 
neo-fascist movements. The national government, unable to assert Italian rule over the Triestine 
territory, experienced its first local electoral setback in the administrative elections of 1949 which 
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witnessed the rise of both extremist parties of the left and right and the Independence Front. In this 
context, the Christian Democratic government, striving to extend Italian involvement in the 
administration of the zone A and increasingly frustrated by Western openness to Tito, gradually 
embraced the nationalist rhetoric animating significant fringes of both local and national public 
opinion and also proved willing to support any local anti-Yugoslav movement. Apprehension and 
fear for the fate of the Julian city combined with Rome’s awareness of the unbearable political costs 
of “losing” Trieste. Facing the celebration of the fourth anniversary of the Tripartite Declaration 
and the popular vote in the upcoming local administrative elections, the Italian government was 
tempted to flirt with the Italian radical right. 
 
On the Path to Territorial Partition: Political, Social, and Military Tension across the Border  
Over time, Allied proposals for a resolution that was based upon territorial modifications, 
shared control or popular plebiscite clashed with the irreconcilable positions of both the Italian and 
Yugoslav states. In particular, the Italian public’s nervousness over the diplomatic deadlock on 
Trieste was aggravated by rising distrust toward the pro-Yugoslav attitudes of the Allies. Thus, the 
Italian government and its local representatives, fearing the loss of popular support among 
nationalist fringes of national public opinion, acted with increasing political firmness.   
First, to consolidate the Italian presence in zone A, the national government exercised 
political pressure on the Allied administration and requested the establishment of a specific office in 
Trieste, that of the Italian Political Advisor. Second, the UZC financially supported the local 
committee for the defense of the “Italianità” of Trieste and Istria, which was led by Mayor Bartoli 
and locally coordinated the activities of pro-Italian political parties and associations that mobilized 
to reassert Italian territorial claims over the FTT. In March of the fourth anniversary of the 
Tripartite Declaration, the committee requested that the AMG authorize a mass celebration. Despite 
its refusal, on March 20 and 21, 1952, Triestines gathered in "Piazza Unità" (Unity Square) to 
demand the implementation of the Allied declaration and expressed popular opposition to Allied 
97 
 
rule, chanting “get out of Italy! get out, foreigner!”376 In the meantime, right wing extremists, 
profiting from widespread local hostility toward the Allies, fomented local disorders as well as 
skirmishes between the local population and the Allied authorities, all of which resulted in 21 
wounded and 64 arrests.
377
   
The Triestine demonstrations were enthusiastically celebrated by the émigré press as 
spontaneous expressions of patriotic pride.
378
 Similarly, pro-governmental press, while depicting 
the demonstrations as a proof of the unbreakable physical and emotional unity of the Istrian region 
and Trieste, also highlighted the brutality of the civil police which operated under the AMG.
379 
Interestingly enough, the communist press also emphasized the occupiers’ repressive and 
unnecessary violence against the local population yet explained it as a consequence of De Gasperi’s 
long-term subservience to the American ally.
380 Indeed, it argued, the central government’s rhetoric 
about the application of the Tripartite Declaration was motivated by pure electoral interests and the 
central government had already agreed to the definitive partition of the city and its territory.
381
 In 
the United States The New York Times, partially reinforcing the idea of a territorial partition, judged 
the Triestine events as a “genuine explosion of national feeling” which further emphasized Italian 
attachment to Trieste, a city metaphorically depicted as a “volcano ready to explode at any time.”382 
These arguments highlighted that socio-political anxiety was increasingly growing inside 
Trieste and its uncontrolled escalation could produce unpredictable consequences. After labeling the 
Tripartite Declaration as an “election stunt,” American journalist Alexander Werth also claimed the 
existence of “a deep and genuine Italian national feeling” toward Trieste and the territory of the 
zone B. Due to its rooted Italian identity, according to Werth, Trieste was a new “Fiume” within 
Italian public discourse and only a plebiscite could peacefully settle the problem. However, Tito’s 
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uncompromising attitude and America’s friendly stance toward Yugoslavia had made such a 
solution unfeasible and fomented anti-British and anti-American feelings from below. Such 
sentiment, in Werth's opinion, combined with spreading disillusionment toward the national 
government in Rome and seriously threatened the young Italian democracy.
383
 Likewise, the 
Independence Movement in Trieste publicly accused the central government of complacency 
towards right-wing movements. In particular, it repeatedly claimed that the central government as 
well as segments of both local and national public opinion was searching for a martyr to justify the 
opposition to the AMG and legitimize the city’s return to Italy.384  
Above all, the 1952 riots clearly revealed the necessity to break the long diplomatic impasse. 
Although the national government leaned toward movements of nationalist inspiration, it financially 
supported only local movements whose views publicly aligned to those of the Christian 
Democrats.
385
 Indeed, it refused to support the initiative of the ANVGD, which it viewed as easily 
subjected to the political influence of local extremist fringes.
386
 Although the national government 
proved willing to sharpen the tones of the political campaign against the Allies, De Gasperi’s 
leadership and its strong inclination toward European and Atlantic loyalty helped temporarily 
contain the spread of radical extremism.  
It was in such a tense socio-political context that the AMG, anticipating the local 
administrative elections, eventually approved the expansion of Italian administration to zone A in 
May 1952.
387
 The pro-governmental press celebrated the Italian involvement in the administration 
of Trieste as a preliminary step to the fulfillment of the Tripartite Declaration without any prejudice 
to Italian claims over zone B.
388 
 The communist press, by contrast, highlighted Rome’s betrayal of 
the Italians living on the border, in particular the Istrians of zone B. Whereas five years earlier 
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Italians in Istria had been portrayed as fascists and ostracized by the same press, they were now 
portrayed as sacrificial victims of higher Western strategic interests.
389
  
 It is interesting to note that the language and content of both the leftist and rightist press 
against the national government and its subservience to Allied occupation showed some unexpected 
convergences. Arguments presenting the reassertion of Italian territorial sovereignty as a gradient of 
the state's ability to defend the Eastern border’s “Italianità” became central to political propaganda 
against the central government. Meanwhile, the Independence Front, supporting the FTT as the only 
option to preserve the multi-cultural and multi-linguistic identity of the region, presented the 
diplomatic talks that were taking place in London between Italian, British, and American diplomats 
as the platform to finalize the shameful barter: Trieste to Italy and the zone B to Yugoslavia.
390 
     
The Christian Democrats lost about 7,000 votes in the late May administrative elections as 
compared to those of 1949. At the same time, local support for the neo-Fascist party increased and 
especially the Independence Front doubled its previous results, achieving 27,000 popular votes.
391
 
The political success of the Independence Front confirmed that people in Trieste did not simply turn 
to solutions offered by local and national neo-fascist formations, but they also embraced the policies 
and goals of groups calling for home rule. Together with Yugoslav plans to remove the Italian 
presence from the area under its administration, growing support for the Independence Movement 
further weakened the image of the Italian state on the border.
392
 In July Rome appointed Diego De 
Castro
393 
as Italian political adviser to the Allied government in Trieste,
 
without Anglo-American 
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approval.
394
 De Castro’s goal was to ease the transition from the AMG to the Italian administration 
in zone A and resolve the Triestine problem.
395
 Despite De Castro’s appointment, confidential 
reports from Trieste emphasized that the local Italian population proved increasingly frustrated by 
the prolonged diplomatic negotiations over the Triestine territory and its animosity toward the 
Allied authorities further soured.
396
  
In the meantime, De Gasperi, aiming to reassert the Italian sovereignty over the cities 
located on the Istrian shore from Trieste to Umago and fearing an electoral backlash, refused a final 
advantageous American proposal for the recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty over zone B in 
exchange for Capodistria, Isola, and Pirano.
397  
Such a choice, also motivated by the prospective and 
definitive loss of about half of the Italian population living in zone B, ended any realistic Italian 
ambitions to regain control over part of Istria. Despite this, diplomatic negotiations between the 
Italian and Yugoslav governments continued; their opposing positions, however, were hardly 
reconcilable. Meanwhile disillusionment and concern toward the fate of Trieste mounted within 
Italian national public opinion in light of the “New Look” of the Eisenhower administration.398  
This "New Look" postulated a twofold strategy that aimed to strengthen the relationship 
between Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece on the one hand and induce the involvement of 
Yugoslavia in NATO on the other, potentially creating a buffer against the Soviets in southeastern 
Europe.
399
 Talks regarding the withdrawal of the Allied troops from the area were met with the 
favor of the British government, yet the American administration showed increasing concern for the 
potential defection of the Italian government from the Atlantic Pact and refusal to ratify the treaty 
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establishing the European Defense Community, a development that would further weaken NATO’s  
southern front.
400
 
 
Consequently, Trieste increasingly became a “sore spot” which also interfered with the 
unfolding of the Ankara Pact pursued by the Eisenhower administration to militarily tie Yugoslavia, 
Greece, and Turkey.
401
 A report of the National Security Council confirmed the necessity to resolve 
the Triestine question by bilateral talks and maintain Tito’s regime outside the Soviet sphere. By 
increasing military and economic aid to Tito, it was expected that the Yugoslav attitude toward the 
Western world would improve and, in the long-term, also soften Tito’s communist dictatorship.402 
Thus, by 1953 American political interests in the Adriatic proved irreconcilable with Italy's 
orthodox defense of its territorial claims over the Triestine territory. Consequently, right-wing 
political extremist groups in and outside Trieste used the conflicting Italian and Allied interests to 
locally fuel anti-American sentiments among the Italian population.  
In its campaign, nationalist groups not only attacked the Allied government for its 
opposition to a pro-Italian solution of the Triestine problem, but they also highlighted Allied 
support for the local Independence Front. In such a political climate, right-wing extremists 
increasingly targeted any political formations advocating a non-Italian solution to the border 
dispute. On March 8, 1953, indeed, following an electoral speech, neo-fascists detonated a bomb at 
the headquarters of the Independence Movement in Trieste. Members of the local neo-Fascist party 
(MSI) later revealed to the Italian intelligence service that during the demonstrations of March 8
 
the 
planned bombing had been initially suspended due to the presence of police officers, yet the bomb 
had been mishandled and accidentally exploded. In addition, foreseeing possible incidents on the 
occasion of the approaching fifth anniversary of the Tripartite Declaration, the Italian political 
adviser in Trieste reported to the central government that “the Allied authorities requested the 
Italian police to closely control the protesters coming to Trieste.” De Castro also guaranteed to the 
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Allies that he would talk with student organizations and extremist right groups before the 
demonstration in order to moderate the protest against the AMG; however, “the local head of the 
M.S.I. only controlled 1,000 out of 10,000 members of the movement.” In particular, De Castro 
concluded, “after March 8, the Allies changed strategy... and now fear that local tension could 
escalate into a bloody confrontation between the local police and right-wing agitators.”403 As this 
report suggests, not only the AMG was concerned about local political urban violence but also both 
Roman and Triestine authorities were aware of the plans of political extremist groups.
 404
 
The importance of the March 8 bombing incident, however, was minimized by the Allied 
authorities
 
who intended to forestall Yugoslav criticisms, debilitate neo-fascist propaganda, and 
hide from the public any former relationship with right-wing extremists. Among some members of 
the Italian government, this decision fostered the idea of Allied impotence toward subversive 
actions.
405
 Thus,
 
the central authorities increasingly perceived local right-wing groups as a political 
resource to mobilize against both the AMG and the Independence Front. American intelligence, 
however, continued to look with suspicion to local neo-fascist formations and increasingly saw the 
zone A of the FTT as a ramp used by Moscow agents to penetrate into Yugoslavia and undermine 
Tito’s government.406  
Anticipating the summer national elections, De Gasperi made a last desperate attempt to tie 
the ratification of the European Defense Community project to the resolution of the Trieste 
question.
407 
This political move was received negatively by the US administration which, was 
mainly concerned about the gradual rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
following the death of Stalin and the problematic end of the Korean War. The 1953 electoral defeat 
of the coalition led by De Gasperi revealed the weakness of the centrist parties and the growing 
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influence of the Italian Communist Party, both of which persuaded the United States to accelerate 
the resolution of the Triestine problem.
408
  
Meanwhile, the new Italian government led by Christian Democrat Giuseppe Pella hoped to 
quickly resolve the Triestine question and decided to flex its muscles in the confrontation with the 
Yugoslav neighbor. This decision, aiming to reaffirm Italian claims to sovereignty over the border 
and defy the local Independence Movement, marked Trieste’s last immediate postwar crisis. 409 The 
increasing popularity of the Independence Movement and the repressive nature of Yugoslav policies 
in zone B weakened the image of the Italian state inside and outside Trieste.
410
 In this context, 
mutually uncompromising attitudes led Italy and Yugoslavia to the brink of a military 
confrontation.
411
 
In response to Tito’s threatened annexation of zone B, the Italian government strengthened 
the security of the border by providing military and financial support to about 6000 members in 
anti-communist and anti-Slav partisan formations.
412 
In August 1953, it also mobilized the Italian 
Army (Delta Operation) with the substantial acquiescence of both the American and British 
governments.
 L’Unitá, labeling Prime Minister Pella as a clown, highlighted the dangerous illusions 
of past and present expressions of nationalism, which could again bring down the Italian state in a 
vortex of violence and war.
413
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In his personal diary, Paolo Emilio Taviani, Minister of Defense at that time, drew attention 
to the danger of losing Trieste in case of Italian unresponsiveness to Yugoslav rising economic, 
cultural, political, and military penetration, which he later referred to as "Balkanization."
 414 
Taviani 
stated that Tito in early September, aware of the clear Italian majority of the FTT and determined 
not to sacrifice Slovene access to the Adriatic, had refused to settle the issue by means of a popular 
plebiscite. The Italian government, aware of the marginal geo-political and economic value of the 
zone B and concerned about new possible national elections, refused any solution that implied the 
loss of Italian sovereignty.
415
 In view of the risk of Trieste’s Balkanization, the Italian establishment 
embraced the idea that “time works against us” and pursued the immediate return of Trieste, while 
postponing the settlement of the zone B.
416
  
Center-left Triestine politicians, regardless of the strong adventurist pronouncements and 
actions of the Pella’s government, still openly embraced the concept of broad autonomy for the 
entire territory of Trieste. This solution slightly differed from that of the Tripartite Declaration and 
had been already promoted by the Julian autonomist movement four years earlier.
417
 This option 
was supported by local political figures such as socialist Bruno Pincherle, with his ties to wartime 
lay and social democratic resistance movements, and symbolized the survival of autonomous 
strivings within parts of the Triestine community that ultimately influenced local politics after 
1954.
418  
 
Nevertheless, large segments of the Triestine community envisioned the restoration of 
Italian political and territorial control over Trieste first and the entire FTT later. In her account of 
those “hot” days, Clare Boothe Luce, U.S. Ambassador to Italy and one of the main proponents of 
an Italian resolution of the Trieste question, reported her concern to the Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles. She predicted a possible wave of anti-Western and anti-American attitudes among 
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the Italian population which was strongly disillusioned by the Allied policy in Trieste. Pella 
confirmed to Luce that Trieste represented a key to his Atlantic and Europeanist foreign policy, yet 
his government needed to settle the problem at least in the spirit of the Tripartite Declaration. Even 
though a plebiscite remained the most favorable option, Pella’s government was willing to accept a 
provisional solution to better prepare national public opinion for a future definitive resolution. 
Italian Minister of Defense Paolo Taviani also confirmed to Luce the necessity to avoid a definitive 
solution which no Italian government would be able to survive and made clear that “once Trieste 
was returned, the highly emotional state would subside since most of Italians had no idea where 
Capodistria or Pirano were located.”419 These conversations revealed that the Italian government, 
concerned with the risks of a possible “Balkanization” and aware of the unbearable political 
consequences coming from the formal sacrifice of zone B, proved willing to suspend informally its 
claim to sovereignty over that part of territory which that had been lost since 1947, if it now made 
possible Trieste’s return. 
In addition, Luce, fearing possible incidents in Trieste to justify the intervention of Italian 
troops in zone A, urged both Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower to 
quickly implement the partition of zone A and B of the FTT, which also met with the acquiescence 
of Pella and his government.
420
 To urge the Eisenhower administration to finally resolve the Trieste 
question, Luce wrote to the President’s Special Assistant, Charles Douglas Jackson, “if the 
President doesn’t settle Trieste in the next few weeks, he may lose his next Congress.”421   
In her personal memoirs of September 1953, Luce emphasized the continuity between Pella 
and De Gasperi’s foreign policy and expressed confidence in Italian understanding of the futility of 
any military attempt to modify the status of zone A. She also recorded Tito’s personal assurance of 
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Yugoslav unwillingness to go to war over Trieste yet showed concern for an irresponsible Italian 
attempt to connect the Triestine problem to important issues of Western security. On September 28, 
Pella’s requests for a plebiscite in zone B after the Italian annexation of zone A, which were 
unacceptable to Belgrade, convinced Luce of the need to secretly pursue a three-power agreement 
to work out a reasonable compromise.
422
 A few days before this meeting, after being informed of 
the withdrawal of Italian troops from the border, Luce clearly stated to the British Ambassador to 
Italy Victor Mallet that “within the agenda of the conference a plebiscite should not be an 
option.”423 
On October 8, 1953 the American and British governments made a common declaration, 
also known as the Bi-Partite Declaration that proclaimed their willingness to transfer sovereignty of 
zone A to Italy.
424
 This announcement was anticipated by secret communications in which the 
Anglo-Americans confirmed the definitive partition of the zones A and B to Tito.
425 
In the 
meantime, they also stated the partition's temporary status to Pella.
426 
Despite this reassurance and 
because of the pressure by the Slovenes, Tito firmly rejected the perspective of an immediate 
restoration of Italian rule in the city of Trieste and rhetorically threatened the use of force if Italian 
troops entered zone A.  
As discussed above, the Italian government gradually increased its political influence inside 
Trieste by establishing the figure of the Italian Political Advisor and holding local administrative 
elections. Due to the prolonged failure of diplomatic negotiations, the local Italian political front 
witnessed a gradual decline in popular support to the advantage of the Independence Movement. 
Meanwhile, the AMG, locally perceived as the main obstacle to Trieste’s return to Italian 
sovereignty, became the target of local political extremists whose actions and anti-Allied 
                                                 
422
Library of Congress (LC), Clara Boothe Luce, “Memories,” Conversations with Pella September 1953, Box 315. 
423
LC, Clara Boothe Luce, “Ambassador to Italy, 1953-1961,” September 25, 1953, Box 600. 
424
Valdevit (1994), 25.
  
425 
NARA, RG 84 (Fsp), Department of State Italy Rome Embassy Records of Clara Boothe Luce 1953-1955, Trieste 
Vol. I, Action Plan, Top Secret, Telegram from Dulles to Tito on October 6, 1953, Box 1.  
426 
NARA, RG 84 (Fsp), Department of State Italy Rome Embassy Records of Clara Boothe Luce 1953-1955, Trieste 
Vol. I, Action Plan, Top Secret, “Meeting Luce and Pella,” Telegram October 7, 1953, Box 1.  
107 
 
propaganda met the acquiescence of the Italian central authorities. The American administration, 
coping with increasing popular hostility inside Trieste and fearing a possible rapprochement 
between Tito and the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, decided to accelerate the resolution of the 
Triestine problem. As a response, the new Italian government led by Christian Democrat Giuseppe 
Pella turned to a more aggressive strategy. Further promoting public anxiety for the “Balkanization” 
of Trieste, the Pella government escalated political and military tension with the Yugoslav 
neighbor. American pressure, however, helped defuse the threat of military conflict. In response to 
the American administration’s firm determination to settle the issue, both the Italian and Yugoslav 
governments accepted the October Bi-Partite Declaration.  
 
Rallying around the Flag: Dying for Trieste November 1953 
In October 1953 Italian public opinion celebrated the American and British Bi-Partite 
Declaration with cheerful expressions and mass demonstrations. Popular enthusiasm, however, was 
only partially echoed within the pages of pro-governmental press. Its temperate response contrasted 
with the joy and confidence with which it had welcomed the Tripartite Declaration five years earlier 
and emphasized both Trieste’s joy and sorrow for a decision that was clearly aimed toward a 
possible partition.
427 
The communist press, especially, stressed that legitimate Italian interests in the 
zone B were now fatally threatened by the imminent partition and political weakness of the Italian 
government.
428
  
Above all, both the nationalist and communist press highlighted the inability of the Christian 
Democrats to reassert national sovereignty over the disputed border. In contrast, external observers 
such as The New York Times warmly welcomed the Bi-Partite declaration as the final diplomatic 
step to resolving the crisis; however, fears of resurgent nationalist violence and widespread concern 
for the foolishness of a possible localized war did not disappear. The American newspaper 
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condemned both Tito for his careless accusations against the Allies and the Italian government’s 
“equally pugnacious mood.”429  
Entangled between Allied pressure and the necessity to uphold the image of a firm defense 
of Italian claims over the disputed border, the central government also feared the detrimental role 
that acts of local political violence could play on the prospected partition. Indeed, the Italian 
Minister of Interior, Christian Democrat Amintore Fanfani, invited local authorities to carefully 
monitor the activity around Allied diplomatic missions, requesting that they allow a mass jubilee 
demonstration in Trieste yet repress any excessive outburst that could endanger the government’s 
position.
430
  
Consequently, intelligence reports about the massive infiltration of Titoist agents in Trieste 
only exacerbated the apprehension of the central government which feared an uncontrolled 
escalation of political violence in the city.
431
 These concerns were further aggravated by the reports 
of the Triestine Prefect Giuseppe Vitelli to the central government. According to Vitelli, both 
"Radio Trieste" and "Trieste Libera," two Italian-language radio stations under Yugoslav control, 
were spreading misinformation and inciting local antagonism against the AMG.
432 
In addition, 
secret telegrams from the Udine Prefect reported that the Independence Front planned 
demonstrations to oppose the AMG orders and create incidents that could later be blamed on the 
Italian front.
433
 The independence front press especially warned the public of possible Yugoslav 
military plans to occupy Trieste, ultimately increasing socio-political anxiety inside the city.
434 
As 
these reports suggest, the Independence Front, supported by the Yugoslav government, purposefully 
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raised tension inside Trieste and provoked a violent clash between opposing Italian and Slovene 
nationalist factions which could ultimately hold back the prospected partition.
435
  
At the same time, the Italian Army Information Service discovered the preparation of acts of 
sabotage and smuggling of weapons inside the FTT by members of the Italian extreme right. In 
addition, extremist groups planned mass demonstrations both inside and outside Trieste to prove 
popular opposition to any renunciation of Italian sovereignty over the city and its territory.
436
 The 
Italian government, however, proved more concerned for a possible coup by pro-Tito forces.
437
 This 
threat, further aggravated by rumors about a possible American military disengagement from 
Trieste,
438
 was used by the Italian government to justify to the Allies the transport of weapons to 
Trieste with the goal of arming and training pro-Italian military formations.
439 
In late October 
Prefect Vitelli also confirmed that the Committee for the Defense of the Italianess of Trieste and 
Istria and Christian Democrat Mayor Gianni Bartoli agreed to orchestrate a series of acts of 
sabotage against Slav propaganda.
440
 Under the leadership of former chief of police and Army 
General Giovanni D’Antoni, all Italian parties except the local communists, agreed to take action 
against Titoist armed groups and participate in a mass demonstration of Trieste’s "Italianità" on 
November 4.
441
 As a result, tensions between the local Allied authorities, in particular General 
Winterton, and the Italian government in Rome increased exponentially.   
At the same time, Prime Minister Pella insisted that a conference be held after Trieste’s 
formal annexation and the entrance of Italian troops into zone A. Minister of Defense Paolo Taviani 
explained to American Ambassador Luce that, even though the Italian national government was 
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aware of the fact that Yugoslav troops in zone B had been gradually withdrawn, it needed a 
significant success in foreign policy for the upcoming elections.
442
 On October 29, Secretary of the 
Italian Christian Democratic Party De Gasperi also addressed the political rather than territorial 
nature of the problem, making it clear that “no Italian government can renounce zone B forever.” 
However, he added that an Italian government could guarantee “to never resort to arms in 
connection with any dispute about zone B.”443  These remarks demonstrated the general willingness 
of the Italian government to publicly accept the partition of the FTT as long as it allowed the 
government to present it as a temporary solution which would then appear to be an outstanding 
victory in foreign policy.   
The concurrent mobilization of local pro-Italian groups inside Trieste and the desperate 
search for a diplomatic success by the Italian government were symptomatic of its mounting 
political adventurism and were promptly exploited by the communist press to denigrate the central 
state authorities.
444
 In the diplomatic conversations during the days anticipating the celebrations of 
November 4, the thirty-fifth anniversary of Trieste’s liberation from Austria-Hungary, state officials 
repeatedly referred to the danger of possible explosions of localized political violence.
445  
In one of 
such instances, on November 3, Italian Ambassador Alberto Tarchiani met with American Secretary 
of State Dulles to discuss the Triestine problem. During the conversation, Tarchiani, based upon the 
previous American failure to uphold the Tripartite Declaration, doubted U.S. commitment to the 
October 8 declaration and subtly mentioned a “possible civil takeover which might not include the 
introduction of Italian troops.” Dulles harshly criticized the attitude and tones of the Italian 
government, which he believed, made the implementation of the October decision problematic. 
Dulles firmly warned the Italian representative about the necessity to resolve the problem according 
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to US wishes rather than “Italian alleged credit of confidence toward the US.”446 This conversation 
highlighted American negative views towards the Italian government's reckless strategy over 
Trieste and perhaps played a crucial role in containing the violent riots of the following days.
 
Anticipating the celebrations of November 4, the local and national press conducted a new 
campaign of vilification against the Allied administration in Trieste, which was often portrayed as 
the instrument of the pro-Independence Movement.
447
 In particular, the pro-governmental press, 
while celebrating the memories and sacrifices of the Great War, advocated a local common patriotic 
effort at the local level to oppose foreign occupation and assert “Italian self-determination.”448 In the 
peak of hostility against the AMG, Trieste celebrated its expected return to Italy with unruly 
expressions of enthusiasm between November 4 and 6. In the process, violent skirmishes between 
demonstrators and local police erupted and were brutally suppressed.
449
   
In his report on the dynamics of the incidents, Trieste’s local police Prefect strongly 
emphasized that the Allies were responsible for the conflicts.
 
Vitelli reported that on November 3, 
after the local council’s decision to show the Italian flag, the Anglo-American authorities had it 
removed. The day after, about 200 people responded to the Allied decision through mass protest 
and their repeated efforts to demonstrate their opinions were strongly suppressed throughout the 
entire day. On November 5, the protest of about 1,000 students outside the Sant’Antonio Church 
was again violently suppressed by the police whose shooting caused two deaths and resulted in 
street fighting that lasted until night. Finally on November 6, the repressive police actions resulted 
in four other deaths and the protesters responded by means of bombs and shootings until order was 
finally restored by Allied forces. The accidents, in which 6 people died, 83 were wounded, 39 
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arrested and 79 policemen were wounded, created a climate of tension, fear, and mutual 
accusations.
450
  
The Prefect’s reconstruction of those days, however, has been largely disproved by recent 
scholarly works that have minimized Allied responsibility and emphasized the planned nature of the 
riots.
 
Anna Millo has convincingly shown that on November 3, Mayor Gianni Bartoli’s decision to 
install the Italian flag at the top of the local council building had purposefully contradicted 
Winterton’s directives, ultimately causing the clash between Anglo-American authorities and the 
crowd that gathered in the main square on November 4. Furthermore, on the morning of November 
5, new riots broke out between protesters, mainly young students, and civil police in response to 
police orders to disband. Some protesters, located between San Giusto Church and the police 
headquarters, looked for shelter inside the Church yet the police violently broke in and arrested 
them. In particular, during the afternoon re-consecration of Sant’Antonio Church, civil police 
responded to the throwing of rocks by shooting; however, it is now clear that the shots which killed 
two people did not come from the local police. On November 6, the Italian front under the 
leadership of the Committee for the Defense of the Italianità of Trieste and Istria arranged a mass 
protest in the main city square, which hosted both the local council and the palace of the 
government, in order to protest against the repressive police actions of the previous day. Violence 
again erupted in the exchange between protesters and civil police and resulted in four other deaths. 
Despite the highly inflated number of 20,000 people provided from the AMG government, 
participants in the popular rioting were not more than 3,000 and only a few hundred were actively 
involved in the events that resulted in 6 deaths and 167 wounded during those days.
451
  
Documents of the Office of Border Zones (UZC) have further confirmed this interpretation 
and the existence of armed squads in Trieste that were only partially disbanded after the anti-Allied 
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demonstrations.
452 
In particular, in commenting on Winterton’s decision to ban the Italian flag from 
the local council building, a report of the UZC stated that since Trieste had already been virtually 
given back to Italy, Allied orders to postpone symbolic displays of the transfer of power could only 
foment possible incidents that someone “expected and wished.”453 Although the report did not 
clearly state who or which institution would have actually benefited from the rioting against the 
Allied authority, the involvement of significant personalities of the Pella’s government is hardly 
disputable. Indeed De Castro, a few days after the Triestine events and while informing General 
Secretary of Italian Foreign Affairs Vittorio Zoppi of the November riots, stressed that foreign 
diplomacy firmly believed in a theory of Italian governmental complicity with right extremism to 
accelerate the passage of powers in Trieste. Such an interpretation, defined as "idiotic" by De 
Castro, was instead supported by the presence of local neo-fascist extremists who, also known as 
the Cavana squads and connected to the most intransigent anti-communist fringes of the central 
government were present in the crowd outside the Church and the assault in Unity Square.
454
 
Although De Castro attempted to dismiss such an interpretation, he later admitted to having been 
unable to navigate the obdurate positions of those days and that he had been aware of the intricate 
connection between national political elites, intelligence services, and right extremists as well as 
their subversive plan to foment the uncontrollable escalation of violence in Trieste.
455
 Thus, in an 
attempt to reduce tensions with the Allied administration and remove any evidence of its complicity 
in the Triestine riots, the Italian government enabled the escape of local agitators who had been 
involved in the riots.
456   
When considering the agreement on the territorial partition of the FTT, the widespread anti-
Allied rhetoric, Italy’s eagerness to refuse any direct responsibility for the loss of the zone B, the 
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diplomatic talks of early November, and the mild persecution of well-known local extremists, the 
Italian government’s responsibility for the violence in Trieste in early November is clear.457 In a 
revival of past nationalism and aiming to accelerate Trieste’s return to Italian administration, the 
central government used both secret services and neo-fascist squads to compensate for its 
diplomatic weakness and used the riots to make clear the inadequacy of the AMG to guarantee local 
order and stability. Its mischievous behavior, strongly motivated by political opportunism and 
prospected electoral gains, led to the deaths of those days.  
On November 7, Triestines responded to Allied violent suppression of the local 
demonstrations by invoking a mass strike and on November 8 nearly the entire city attended the 
funeral of the “Triestine martyrs.” The commemoration of the victims was used by the central 
government to reinforce local as well as national sentiments of collective identity and “as a source 
of group empowerment, as a vehicle for reclaiming the past and as a means of readdressing past 
injustices.”458 Most important, views of the Pella government on the Triestine incidents mirrored 
the attitudes and orientations of significant segments of both local and national public opinion, 
whose feelings of outrage for Allied violence were vividly expressed in the following days by 
popular demonstrations.
459 
Supporters of Italian rule of Trieste and its territory, especially, stressed 
Allied responsibility.
460
 The Independence Movement, for its part, highlighted the role of secret 
political circles and the existence of a long-term plan to foment local tension.
461 
This interpretation 
                                                 
457This interpretation finds further evidence in Grassi’s work. This author discusses the memories of  Mr.Petruzzi, an 
Italian policeman  employed by the Julian Police during the Allied administration. Petruzzi confirmed the Allied 
awareness of pre-ordered nature of the local disorders, acknowledged the existence of military formations to oppose 
Titoist forces, and confirmed the broad support for the Independentce Front among members of the AMG. In particular, 
Petruzzi revealed that preparations outside the Church began a few days earlier to provide the necessary rocks to create 
disorder and Italian elements inside the police, exploiting local disorders, should have facilitated a takeover of the local 
"Questura” by local Italian political extremists. Grassi, 114-118. 
458See B. Misztal, “The Sacralization of Memory,” European Journal of Social Theory 7 (1) (7) (2004): 67-84. 
459
Mass anti-British manifestations crossed the nation.  In Genoa, for example, 5000 students manifested solidarity for 
Trieste and the protest was accompanied by burning of British flags, riots with police as well as fights among neo-
fascist and communist factions. 
460“Basta sangue italiano a Trieste,” La Voce Repubblicana ( November 8, 1953). 
461“Trieste ha pagato col sangue un cinico e abietto giuoco politico,” Il Corriere di Trieste (November 6, 1953). 
115 
 
was partially reinforced by the communist press, which highlighted the responsibility of both the 
Italian and Allied authorities.
462
  
Within public discourse, however, the events of 1953 made Trieste a “lovely victim” of the 
Cold War.
463
 In particular, “the martyrs of November ’53…were the necessary preamble… to make 
possible Trieste’s return to Italy.”464 Such an interpretation, loaded with sentimental and rhetorical 
meanings, crystallized over time and, further underscored by scholarly works, became an integral 
part of the public memory of the city.
465
 The November incidents, however, perhaps politically 
accelerated the transfer of power in Trieste, yet only marginally affected the diplomatic process that 
had already defined Trieste’s return to Italy in October 1953.    
Despite this, the resonance and significance of the Triestine facts surpassed the local context 
and, while proving the political value of the instrumental use of the irredentist rhetoric, also 
revealed the endurance of nationalist understandings of the “Italianità” of the eastern border in post-
war Italy.
466 
The narrative of the Triestine riots, indeed, dramatized and sentimentalized the issue of 
Trieste, symbolically gathering the entire nation around the sorrow and anger of the Julian city. An 
example of such a process can be found in the open letter that nationalist journalist Alberto 
Giovannini wrote to American Ambassador Luce. Giovannini harshly criticized the American 
establishment for its views and attitudes toward the Julian problem that strictly contrasted with 
Luce’s passionate love for Italy. In claiming “we are the creditors, US and Britain our debtors,” 
Giovannini stressed that the privileging of diplomatic relations with Tito’s totalitarian regime had 
emptied Eisenhower’s words of justice for Italy of any meaning. Above all, the image of the Italian 
Army, “powerless at Trieste’s gate, to the spectacle of their allies firing on their fellow citizens,” 
produced popular feelings of enmity toward the Allies among Italians.
467
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From an American perspective, however, the incidents were not representative of 
widespread Italian attitudes toward the Allies, but the outcome of communist and neo-fascist 
irresponsibility. The New York Times, for instance, praised the effective response of the Allied 
government during the riots and, echoing its previous editorials on the issue, invited the American 
administration to finally remove “this powder keg” from Western Europe.468  The complexity of the 
Allied occupation of Trieste and its detrimental effect on the image of the Allies in Italy was vividly 
exemplified in a report of the American Consulate in Palermo. It recounted sporadic episodes of 
violence, which were often fomented by small groups of students. These students were reported as 
having thrown rocks and oranges at the Consulate and delivering offensive notes gently translated 
and reported as “Englishmen! Bastards you are all sons of ___and ___and Winterton , the brown-
noser of the Prince of Edinburgh.” In its account of these demonstrations, the report also 
emphasized the broad public misinformation that exaggerated the size of these protests, inflating the 
number of participants from 3,000 to 50,000 and clearly aiming to foster an emotional rather than 
dispassionate common understanding of the November incidents.
469
  
Not all pro-governmental newspapers and magazines in Italy, however, firmly aligned with 
the prominent criticisms of the Allied powers of those days. Il Pensiero Mazziniano, for example, 
expressed solidarity for the victims of unjustifiable diplomatic, political, and ideological tensions. It 
firmly condemned the instrumental manipulation of national patriotism and significantly asked 
“Italian politics…to not take the same hopeless road to dark nationalism on which the chauvinist 
attitudes of the Yugoslav dictator are based upon.”470 Decisively distancing itself from nationalist 
rhetoric, this journal demonstrated a rare understanding of the events that had revealed the 
downsides of an uncompromising strategy toward the Adriatic border. 
 
Meanwhile, meeting with Ambassador Luce, De Gasperi stated that the prospective solution 
of the Trieste question now posed a drastic change for the centrist governmental coalition. In an 
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interesting passage De Gasperi added that if the US had given him the October 8 decision before the 
summer elections, “that would have spared much of what happened since.” Such a statement 
revealed De Gasperi’s criticism of Italian recklessness during those days yet does not clarify the 
role of the old statesman during the most heated phase of the Triestine crisis.
471 
 
Luce, before Christmas, and probably after this meeting, wrote to Secretary of State Dulles 
criticizing both Pella’s attitude and British diplomacy. Stating “there is nothing the US can do for 
Italy to prevent the gradual disintegration of the center party and a swing to left or right, if we do 
not soon settle the matter,” she confirmed the impressions provided by De Gasperi. In addition, to 
support Pella’s government and “with it our best chance of getting EDC, facilities, and action 
against the communists,” Luce recommended that the American administration should turn over 
zone A to Italy and disregard Tito’s reactions “who surely won’t go to war but might turn toward 
the Soviets.”472 Meantime, Secretary of State Dulles had indeed threatened to withdraw 
infrastructural investments from Italy in case of obstruction to the creation of the EDC or opposition 
to West Germany’s involvement in NATO, and clearly stated the foolishness of connecting the 
Trieste question with Western European security.
473
 Thus, in December, Pella, aware of widespread 
political opposition to renounce the area from Servola to Muggia and the bay of Zaule, confirmed 
Italy’s commitment to the EDC project and its willingness to participate in a conference based upon 
the terms of the October Anglo-American Bi-Partite Declaration.
474 
Dulles reacted positively to 
Pella’s statements yet stressed the irresponsible attitude of the Italian leader whose former 
declarations had resulted in Tito’s hostility and negatively affected the implementation of the 
October agreements.
475
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In 1953, when asked “Does it pay to be a communist dictator?” Luce replied “Apparently it 
pays very well.”476 Such a statement well exemplified the privileged position of Yugoslav 
diplomacy vis-a-vis Italian impotence and frustration. Indeed, the Italian government, eager to 
reaffirm Italian sovereignty of the Adriatic border, had become increasingly alarmed by the pro-
Yugoslav views of the American administration. Therefore, fearing national public opinion in case 
of the definitive loss of the zone B and hoping to accelerate Trieste’s return to Italy, it orchestrated 
an irresponsible anti-Allied campaign which, fed by a subversive network and supported by the 
UZC, sparked political violence in Trieste. This nationalist outburst, which was accompanied by 
anti-Allied and anti-Slav hysteria, well reflected the views of leading figures of the Italian 
government who believed that “our move has been somehow useful, it made the Allies understand 
that if they stay in Trieste, they will lose both Italy and Yugoslavia.”477 Instead, it negatively 
affected American views of Italy, strained political relations between Rome and Trieste, and 
resulted in an unnecessary spiral of violence which further weakened the low morale of the Italians 
living in the city of Trieste and its surrounding territory. 
 
Farewell to Istria: the London Memorandum and the End of the “Trieste Question”? 
At the beginning of 1954, following Pella's resignation, Christian Democrat Mario Scelba 
was appointed by the national Parliament as Prime Minister of Italy. Fearing that any delay in the 
resolution of the Triestine problem would further jeopardize the terms of the Bi-partite Declaration 
and Italy would become internationally isolated, the new centrist coalition government undertook a 
sharp turn in foreign policy and saw national interests best served by the Atlantic relationship.
478
 As 
a result, the resolution of the border dispute could be no longer postponed and, from the Allied 
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perspective, the partition of the FTT became the best means to prevent any future threat to Western 
security coming from southeastern Europe.
479
     
Meanwhile, Trieste continued to be a city dominated by fear and insecurity. Arrests of 
Italians for threats to public security and order exacerbated social tensions. In this context, the 
recreation of the infamous "Nucleo Mobile" and the acquittal of the Venetian Julian Police 
Inspector, Ozebek, of judicial charges for the harsh repressive actions of November, further 
undermined the public’s confidence and threatened the outbreak of new incidents.480 In addition, the 
mass exodus from the zone B further reinforced ideas of the harsh nature of Yugoslav rule and was 
instrumentally used in nationalist propaganda to re-launch the idea of a popular plebiscite for 
Trieste and its territory.
481
   
This option, however, had been long removed from the Allied agenda. To overcome the 
diplomatic stalemate in direct Italian-Yugoslav negotiations, separate bilateral consultations 
continued in 1954 between the Anglo-Americans and their Italian and Yugoslav counterparts. 
Scelba, in his correspondence with Dulles, outlined the problematic connection between the EDC 
and the Trieste question in national public opinion. He also stated the necessity to carry out no 
further change to zone A and to mediate with Tito on the problematic issue of Capodistria.
482
  
In May, American pressures on Italy to meet Tito’s requests for guarantees of Slovene access to the 
upper Adriatic and to make financial reparations to Yugoslavia for the crimes of Mussolini's regime 
broke the diplomatic deadlock.
483
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During the summer, the Italian government formally agreed to a provisional agreement 
marked by a minimum of written commitments.
484 
This decision was the outcome of three main 
factors. First, in June, Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino received a Memorandum from Italian 
officers who reported Ambassador Luce’s criticisms of the Italian government and her fear that the 
country could go communist if the Triestine question was further postponed.
485 
Second, Italian 
hopes of gaining further concessions on Trieste in exchange for the ratification of the EDC were 
quickly dashed.
486
 Indeed, following the signature of the Balkan Pact on August 9, 1954 between 
Greek, Yugoslav, and Turkish representatives, the failure of the EDC project further strengthened 
the hand of Yugoslav diplomacy. Finally, in mid-September and under American pressure, Tito 
accepted a minor territorial revision to the Morgan line and agreed to resolve the "Trieste question," 
which in Eisenhower’s mind had become “a needless distraction.”487   
Throughout 1954, the Italian government would indeed clearly abandon the goal of 
regaining the Istrian region, at least in the short-term.
 
Despite this, fringes of the central authorities 
still harbored nationalist ambitions. For example, the UZC advised the central government to 
continue its financial support for both the National League and the Popular University and provide 
an extraordinary yet strictly confidential contribution to these organizations which strongly 
proclaimed the Italian identity of Trieste and its territory. According to the UZC, it was imperative 
to uninterruptedly support "the indisputable Italian sentiments of the local administration" which 
were debased by the pro-Slovene attitudes of the AMG.
488
  
In particular, the state authorities needed to avoid further compromise to the credibility of 
the Italian government by maintaining either the nationalist or communist ownership of the 
weapons used during the November riots.
489
 The discovery of Western military weapons and 
munitions in the railway station in Trieste, however,
 
threatened to belie the Italian government's 
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denial of any responsibility for the Triestine incidents.
490
 Rumors of Western ownership of the 
weapons had already been spread and instrumentally used by the independence press, which wished 
to prove Italian responsibility for the riots of 1953. Consequently, in a desperate attempt to dismiss 
these accusations and remove any evidence of its complicity, the Italian government had promised 
significant benefits to local extremists who refused to cooperate with the Allied authorities during 
the investigations.
491
 Indeed, although judicial investigations initially blamed the neo-fascist 
movement, numerous pieces of evidence proved that weapons were sent from Great Britain to 
Trieste before the incidents of November and were purposefully delivered to the Italian secret 
services.
492
 In this context, the reckless communications of local patriotic squads created 
apprehension among central government officials who now attempted to dissociate themselves with 
any possible connections to past and future threats to Trieste's local order.
493
    
While confronting the political aftermath of the Triestine incidents, the Italian government 
continued to discuss the terms of the territorial agreement with both the Anglo-American 
representatives.
 494 
After months of negotiations, on October 5, 1954, the representatives of the 
United States and Great Britain signed with the Italian and Yugoslav ambassadors a Memorandum 
of Understanding in London and the "Trieste question" was apparently settled.
495
 The agreement 
provided for the withdrawal of the Allied military troops from zone A and its transfer to Italian 
administration as well as a tiny territorial modification of the border and a shared definition of 
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minority rights by both the Yugoslav and Italian sides.
496
 The Italian surrender of the coast below 
Punta Sottile, however, resulted in the loss of 27 hamlets and about 3,855 Italians, proving that 
“Trieste did not help the Istrians, and neither did Rome.”497 Partially echoing these views, Amintore 
Fanfani, a leading Christian Democrat politician, recalled in his diary that after years of wasting 
time and missing more advantageous conditions such as those proposed in September 1951, “we are 
lucky for what we got now.”498  
The Italian government treated the arrangement as provisional in order to avoid the real 
significance of the London Memorandum with public opinion and to maximize the greatest possible 
political benefit for the reaffirmation of Italian sovereignty of Trieste.
499
 Indeed, Trieste’s return to 
Italy was accompanied by popular celebrations across the nation. Trieste’s reincorporation within 
national borders was celebrated as "a gift to the indefatigable efforts and indisputable faith in the 
homeland that virtuously defended the sacrifice of its martyrs."
500
 The Christian Democrat press 
advertised Scelba’s words "time never worked…on our side" to emphasize the importance of a 
provisional solution that, leaving unchanged Italian territorial claims to zone B, saved the city from 
the dangers of "Slavization" and prolonged foreign occupation.
501
 The nationalist press praised the 
nation’s solidarity with Istria and focused on the crucial role that the youth’s enthusiasm played in 
the conflict over Trieste. This romanticized depiction portrayed the Triestine youth as the element 
of continuity with the martyrs of World War One, now recast as the "Good War."
502
 The actions of 
the Triestine youth made the undisputable “triumph of the nation and its unbreakable will” 
possible.
503
 The irredentist tones and patriotic rhetoric that marked the narrative of Trieste’s return  
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Map VI: Italy’s Eastern Border after the 1954 London Memorandum 
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to Italy further confirmed the endurance of nationalist conceptualization of the city's Italian 
identity.
504
   
On October 26, when Italian troops first reentered Trieste, the Triestine newspaper Il 
Piccolo celebrated the symbolical reunion between soldiers and civilians with photos, patriotic 
statements, and reiterations of the image of Trieste as the most Risorgimental city. Despite the 
shrouded reference to the unforgivable breach between Triestines and Istrians and the partial regret 
for an agreement perceived as unavoidable, the journal vividly expressed hope for Trieste's 
prosperous future in Italy, ideally portrayed as the "house of liberty and progress."
505 
Partially 
detaching itself from local and governmental rhetoric, La Voce Repubblicana, the traditional voice 
of Mazzinian thought, highlighted the presence of mixed feelings of joy and sorrow for the 
uncertain fate of those “Istrian brothers whom hopes for a future liberation were definitively 
dashed.”506 Its criticism of the government’s deceitful claims about Istria were strongly echoed by 
the émigrés press which celebrated the return of Trieste as an expression of residual patriotism,
507
 
but argued that pragmatic considerations had fatally undermined local defense of the “natural” 
borders of the nation which extended beyond Trieste.
508 
These feelings of fear and uncertainty for 
the fate of the Istrian region were strongly echoed by both the communist and neo-fascist press. The 
former emphasized the contrast between the local hopes for a bright yet uncertain future, and Tito’s 
confirmation of the definitive nature of the territorial partition.
509
 The latter bluntly celebrated the 
sacrifices of the Salò Republic for the "Italianissima" region of Istria and blamed the new Republic 
for its loss.
510
 The neo-fascist movement, which now replaced slogans of the struggle for Trieste 
with new ones for Istria, celebrated the murder of the Allied commander in Pola in 1947 by former 
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fascist Maria Pasquinelli as the supreme embodiment of national sacrifice and an indomitable 
example of Italianess in the Venetian Julian lands.
511 
  
Most important, while the national community perceived Trieste’s reincorporation as the 
end of a historical trajectory that resulted in passionate feelings of national unity, the local Istrian 
population in and outside the zone B experienced Trieste’s return as the death of traditional Adriatic 
irredentist dreams. Trieste's Mayor Bartoli and its Roman Catholic Bishop Santin celebrated the 
unbroken patriotic faith of the city that had resisted an unbearable peace treaty. They also endorsed 
the government's proclaimed ambitions for future border revisions which, based upon the ethnic 
principle, aimed to heal the scars of the imposed agreement.
512
 In journalist Indro Montanelli’s 
words, Santin in particular became the “personification of Trieste, of that mutilated Trieste that 
went back to the homeland... perhaps the only Italy for which he feels to be an Italian.”513  
Thus the central government, trying to dismiss any direct responsibility for the deaths of the 
November riots and aware of its rising diplomatic isolation, was compelled to accept the terms of 
the London agreements.
514
 Trieste’s return to Italian sovereignty was accompanied by expressions 
of national patriotism across the country and formally ended the border dispute with the Yugoslav 
neighbor. However, its acclaimed provisional status fed the hopes of those Italians who also 
dreamed of a second “redemption” for the Istrian region.     
 
Cold War Trieste 
After 1945, Trieste, rhetorically depicted as the “unredeemed” city and a bastion of Italian 
civilization, remained central to post-war conceptualizations of Italy’s imagined community. In the 
context of the Cold War, the Italian government pursued a politics of identity toward the eastern 
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border which ultimately aimed to assert Italian sovereignty over Trieste and its territory. The state’s 
politics was intrinsic of a new ideological meaning which, in the pre-1948 Allied perspective, made 
Trieste a bulwark against Yugoslav Communism. For nine long years and regardless of American 
changing policy toward Tito, political leaders of the Italian centrist coalition government read the 
“Trieste question” through the lenses of modern nationalism. The Italian government used 
diplomacy, mass mobilization, and covert action to maintain territorial control of Trieste and its 
territory and gain popular support for the new Republic.  
Meanwhile, local and national political movements either supported or opposed Italian 
sovereignty over Trieste and its territory. Their readings of the Triestine problem either aligned with 
or diverged from modern nationalist conceptualizations, making also possible the re-emergence of 
more localized notions of the city’s identity which combined with ideas of territorial or 
administrative autonomy.
515 
Although irredentist views of Trieste’s identity were overwhelming 
within national and local public opinion between 1945 and 1954, the experience of the 
Independence Movement proved that ideas of Italian identity did not only relate to a set of territorial 
and cultural propositions but, over time, they also took a more complex political and economic 
meaning. 
The final compromise on Trieste, embodied in the London Memorandum of October 1954, 
further reduced the territorial extent of the Italian eastern border and assumed a symbolic 
importance within the changing context of Cold War, which had been marked by gradual Soviet and 
Yugoslav diplomatic normalization. This compromise also highlighted the weakness of Italian 
diplomacy and the strength of the Cold War logic.
516
 Most important, the “Trieste question” 
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magnificently demonstrated that the partition of a disputed territory had a strong impact on the 
geopolitics, statehood, and identity of the national and, especially, the local community.
517
  
Although national and local public opinion celebrated the return of Trieste as “a single and 
residual expression of that national sentiment which had died on September 8, 1943,”518  the 
partition of the FTT played a pivotal role in disrupting and reshaping the confidence of the Italian 
community living along the disputed border toward the reborn Italian state.
519
 Indeed, on November 
4, 1954, when Prime Minister Scelba addressed the Triestine crowd, the jubilant atmosphere was 
punctuated by loud cries of “Istria! Istria!”520 At the same time, people in Gorizia were waiting for 
information on the train coming from Trieste en route to Rome and complained about the 
unbearable confusion of the train traffic. Some of them lamented, “You can tell that the Italians 
came.”521 This anecdote suggests that, despite the strong patriotic rhetoric of those days, people’s 
loyalty toward the Italian state would increasingly depend on the ability of the New Republic to 
respond their needs. This took specific importance in post-1954 Trieste, an issue that I investigate 
fully in subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 3 
After London: Re-Thinking Border Politics 1954-1962 
After 1954 and the resolution of the border dispute with the Yugoslav neighbor, the Italian 
government transformed Trieste's image from a stronghold of “Italianità” into the Western “gate” to 
the East. Consequentially, the de facto partition of the Adriatic border, which was later formalized 
in the Osimo Treaty, relegated the issue of what once was zone B to the margins of Cold War 
politics. The Italian government, therefore, embraced its new European and Atlantic impulses in 
foreign policy and, in purposing a new and friendly relationship with Tito’s Yugoslavia, also 
inaugurated a season of political relaxation which greatly anticipated Nixon’s détente.1   
Even though the new relationship between Italy and Yugoslavia was oriented toward 
economic cooperation and social reconciliation between border communities, local ethno-political 
antagonisms did not disappear from Trieste.
2
 Indeed, the territorial dispute over the Istrian region, 
which had only been provisionally but not formally settled, provided fertile ground for residual 
expressions of nationalism and also empowered localized understandings of the border's identity.
3
 
In particular, the defense of the integrity of those ethnic pre-war borders stretching to Istria 
remained significant among fractions of the Julian civil society. For example, local authors such as 
Pier Antonio Quarantotto Gambini or Biagio Marin, while celebrating Trieste’s return to Italy, also 
criticized the general apathy of the Italian community for the fate of the population living on the 
border and the gradual minimization of Trieste and Istria to cases of peripheral interest.
4 
Although 
these views only partially recognized the prolonged efforts of both national and local authorities in 
defending Italian territorial claims over the Triestine territory, they decisively reinforced a specific 
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sense of victimization and uniqueness that shaped the attitudes of the local community toward the 
Italian state.   
Throughout this chapter I suggest that after 1954 Italians in both Trieste and the ex-zone B 
perceived their Italian identity not simply according to notions of territorial sovereignty but rather 
their understanding of this identity depended on the ability of the new Republic to guarantee 
security from the communist neighbor, defend formal territorial claims over the ex-zone B, and 
promote the economic well-being of Trieste.
5
 In making Trieste’s economic prosperity the physical 
representation of post-war achievements of the new Republic and the center of Italian propaganda 
in the Adriatic, the national government ultimately aimed to reassert Trieste’s Italian identity and 
the city's role as a modern outpost of Western civilization.   
 
The London Memorandum: Definitive or Provisional?  
In 1954, while recognizing the end of one of the most “vexing and dangerous conflicts in 
Europe,” The New York Times also cast doubt on the value of the provisional agreement and 
portrayed it as a potential source of “future contention.”6 Such an impression, it argued, was 
confirmed by the far from “wild exultation” that accompanied Trieste’s return to Italy.7 The 
American newspaper approached the issue from a pure geo-political perspective and provided a 
more detached and less romanticized account of the Italian national response to the end of the 
Triestine problem.
8
  
The American newspaper's depiction recognized the reality of an externally-imposed 
compromise which required the renunciation of former claims by both governments. In 1955, 
                                                 
5The attempt to renew the traditional maritime trade of the Triestine port and promote a “renaissance” of commercial 
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American observers confirmed these impressions and understood that economic pressure had 
played a crucial role in forcing Tito to accept the London Memorandum; indeed, they predicted that 
whenever economic and military aid would become less urgent, Italian and Yugoslav relations 
could degenerate again.
9
   
This reading of the London agreements revealed the complexity of its acclaimed and 
deceitfully provisional nature.
10
 For the next twenty years, the Italian government repeated its claim 
to territorial sovereignty over the Istrian region. At the same time, however, the central state 
authorities had to carefully mediate between maintaining the new friendly diplomatic relations with 
Tito’s Yugoslavia and realizing the political and economic promises made to the Triestine and 
Istrian community.
 11
 Therefore, a wide set of unresolved issues remained subjects of prolonged 
diplomatic negotiations between Rome and Belgrade and also inflamed mutual hostility between 
Italians and Slovenes along the border.
12
   
As discussed in the previous chapter, Allied pressures, political calculations and the 
necessity to remove the burden of the "Trieste Question" from post-war foreign policy eventually 
persuaded the Italian government to accept the London agreements. Nevertheless, leading Christian 
Democratic figures such as Amintore Fanfani, while briefly acting as Prime Minister after Pella's 
resignation of January 1954, contended that “the separation of the zone A and zone B hurt the 
Italian national interests” and firmly opposed the idea of the definitive partition of the FTT.13 In 
commenting on the Memorandum, Fanfani stated that it was “unacceptable for the Italian people” 
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FRUS 1955-1957, Volume XXVI, Central and Southeastern Europe, Document 240, April 4, 1955. 
10Tombesi remembers that, except for the first few moments after De Gasperi’s promises to return to the issue, no one 
believed in the territorial recovery of the Istrian region. In spite of this, local elites only gradually accepted that Italy 
had indeed lost the war and could hardly improve its position in the Adriatic quarrel.   
11For an examination of Tito’s post-1954 foreign policy see Stefano Pilotto, La politica di non allineamento della 
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13ASR, Sezione I, Attivitá Politica, Serie 1, ss.4, Busta 8, fasc.2, “Confidential Note President of Council Fanfani to 
Ministry for Defense and Foreign Affairs,” January 30, 1954. 
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and, due to its clear definitive rather than provisional character, invited the Christian Democratic 
Party to simply approve rather than ratify the agreement.
14
 The national Parliament, indeed, 
approved the London Memorandum with 295 votes against 265.
15
 The Communist Party, for its 
part, opposed the London agreements and organized its local branch inside the former FTT as a 
separate entity of the PCI.
16
 Right-wing parties also opposed the London Memorandum and 
continued to demand the re-extension of Italian sovereignty over the ex-zone B.
17
   
The reticence of the Italian centrist political parties to accept the border’s partition and their 
rhetoric in support of the Italian community under Yugoslav administration reflected their 
traditional views toward the Triestine problem and was motivated by unwillingness to accept 
responsibility for the definitive loss of zone B. In a letter to Fanfani, the local Triestine Christian 
Democrat Redento Romano vehemently criticized the inability of the national government to obtain 
any significant concession for the Italians of the ex-zone B, despite granting three cultural centers 
for the Slovene minority in Trieste. In particular, Romano criticized the statewide party’s attitude 
toward the Triestine representatives who were treated like “little children.”18 Similarly, prominent 
Triestine intellectuals and patriots such as Umberto Saba, Gianni Stuparich, and Ercole Miani 
signed a common declaration in which they expressed their opposition to an agreement with a 
totalitarian state that promised to economically suffocate Trieste and create an abyss rather than a 
bridge between Italians and Yugoslavs.
19
 In supporting the extension of Italian statehood to the 
                                                 
14
Due to the different clauses that not only made any future territorial change impossible but also any guarantee for the 
Italian minority irrelevant, the secretary of the Christian Democrats, Fanfani, prospected three options: make a simple 
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Istrian region according to ideas of self-determination, these figures once again related to the 
political and intellectual legacy of Mazzini’s patriotism.   
Within national public discourse, however, the Memorandum was generally perceived as an 
unjust yet necessary compromise. In Trieste, by contrast, any issue related to either the émigrés or 
the territorial sovereignty of the ex-zone B fostered sporadic expressions of neo-irredentism that 
detrimentally affected diplomatic relations between the Adriatic neighbors.
20 
In attempting to 
compensate for its alleged indifference toward Trieste’s needs and respond to the criticisms of the 
neo-fascist movement, the government claimed that every effort would be made to reassert Italian 
sovereignty over the ex-zone B.
21
 In its pronouncements for public consumption, the central 
government claimed the Italian residents of zone B as Italian citizens and the southern extension of 
the former FTT as the ultimate state border between Italy and the Yugoslav Federation.
22
  
Despite these rhetorical claims, the Italian state authorities moderated their views of the 
Yugoslav neighbor and placed greater trust in its relations with the West. Contrary to previous 
assumptions, a Yugoslav invasion was considered unlikely. According to a secret report prepared 
by the heads of the Italian Army in the region, General Eugenio De Renzi, Trieste’s immediate 
defense was entrusted to a thousand volunteers and a military brigade of 300 soldiers. This small 
force, which was considered by De Renzi to be completely inadequate in case of a Yugoslav attack, 
was expected to resist in such a contingency and support the evacuation of Triestine civilians while 
morally reasserting Trieste’s "Italianità."23 Such a strategy confirmed that, contrary to the 
government’s propaganda, the Yugoslav neighbor was hardly perceived as a source of military 
threat and Trieste’s defense had assumed a mere political nature. 24 Although the London 
Memorandum partially defused Italian territorial ambitions toward the Istrian region, its intrinsic 
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ambiguity also provided the Italian state an outstanding opportunity to maintain its image mainly 
yet not solely among the Italians of the Adriatic. 
 
The Return of the Italian State in Trieste: Restoring its Lost Prosperity 
The central government, after rhetorically celebrating the return of the “Italianissima” 
Trieste, hoped now to strengthen local political consensus and minimize popular concern for the 
uncertain fate of the zone B. To ease the process of socio-political and economic reintegration of 
the city within the national community, the government arranged public works, tax incentives, and 
special funds for the city.
25
 This set of provisions, however, only partially succeeded to overcome 
the chronic crisis of a city in which 15% of the local population remained unemployed.
 26
  
After 1954, Trieste’s economic difficulties were instrumentally used by political parties of 
the Left and Right to weaken popular support for the Christian Democratic government. For 
example, the local Communist Party, aware of the economic isolation of the Triestine port, 
advocated the creation of a free trade zone between Trieste and its former Istrian region.
27
 Also the 
local Socialist Party, while attributing the decline of Trieste’s port to its long-term separation from 
the Istrian hinterland, rhetorically advocated revisions to the London Memorandum.
28
  
In commenting on the terms of this agreement, the national PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti 
claimed that “we cannot transform what is now provisional into definitive.” This statement 
highlighted the problematic reconciliation of the national question with the ideological tradition of 
the party's internationalism and its new orientation toward a rapprochement with Yugoslav 
communism.
29
 Therefore, the Communist Party, while freezing the territorial issue and finally 
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removing this "Cold War hotbed” from its political agenda, claimed to promote workers' interests 
by supporting Trieste's economic recovery, Adriatic friendship and international political 
relaxation.
30
 In Communist views the strife over Trieste’s “Italianità” had decisively moved from 
the territorial to the economic dimension.  
Triestine Communist leader Vittorio Vidali, however, continued to believe that “Titoists 
never abandoned the idea of conquering this territory as well” and feared Tito’s ambitions to 
establish a chauvinist and violent socialist regime similar to the one ruling in the ex-zone B in 
Trieste.
31
 These views reflected widespread hostility among Communist Triestines toward Tito’s 
regime and further separated the local from the national Communist movement.
32
 Consequently, 
many local Italians as well as Slovene communists re-oriented their political support toward the 
local Socialist Party.
33
 
Despite this, external observers believed that people of Trieste, unable to understand the 
massive commitment of the Italian administration and too preoccupied with "bewailing the 
grimness of their economic present and future," could still resort to desperate measures and turn to 
communism.
34
 To respond to this threat and attempt to restore the local economy, the central 
government made Trieste one of the main beneficiaries of the Committee for the Economic 
Assistance to Northern Peripheral Areas.
35
 In so doing, central authorities indeed hoped to 
strengthen popular consensus toward the new Italian administration and consequently enhance the 
political support for the Christian Democratic governing elites. 
 Not only local communists but also the Independence Movement and its main political 
voice, the "Unione Triestina" (Triestine Union), could profit from popular disillusionment toward 
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the Italian administration.
36
 In the words of the vice director of the Corriere di Trieste, Eugenio 
Laurenti, the Independence Movement’s support was “directly related to citizens’ prosperity.”37 
Anxieties over socio-political security and economic stagnation effectively favored the survival of 
the Independence Movement which found political support in the local lower and middle classes.
38
 
Laurenti believed that the November 1954 outburst of Italian patriotism only temporarily 
overshadowed traditionally local feelings of “Central Europeanness and cosmopolitanness” within 
both the Italian and Slovene communities.
39
   
A 1955 report from Giovanni Palamara, local head of the General Italian Government for 
the Territory of Trieste (GCGTT), further confirmed the intimate connection between the state's 
response to Trieste’s needs and the strength of local Italian sentiments. Governor Palamara wrote 
that people in Trieste were increasingly disappointed by the ineptitude of the new Italian 
administration to stimulate the local economy, a problem not of mere political or economic 
consequence.
40
 The steady decline of Trieste’s port, indeed, was promptly exploited by Yugoslav 
propaganda which highlighted the shortcomings of the new Italian administration.
41
 To respond, the 
Italian government financed a single economic and anti-communist network of local cooperatives 
that spread from Trieste to the hills of Carso.
42
  
Anti-governmental parties, in particular, greatly profited from this situation and depicted the 
Italian state as a passive bystander to Trieste’s decline.43 Also American observers related the 
endemic local economic crisis to the port’s loss of Central European customers and the 
government’s delays in following through with its previously announced economic plan to assist the 
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Triestine port.
44
 It is noteworthy that neither the Italian government, nor the American 
administration understood the true catalyst of Trieste’s crisis.45 After 1947, the new geo-political 
situation of the city had precluded Trieste from performing its traditional role as an economic center 
of a broad and highly integrated region.
46
 The port’s economic potential, indeed, had been 
irreversibly affected by post-war reconstruction strategies that had massively relied on the external 
aid of the Marshall Plan.
47
 After 1948 the city's prospective maritime development was based upon 
short-term political considerations that privileged the massive influx of external investments to 
accelerate ship production in an unfavorable context of mass emigration and rising international 
marginalization.
48 
In attempting to compensate for the lack of technological innovation and the 
competitive advantage of airplane transport, this policy eventually created a dependent and 
unproductive economy which ultimately strengthened Trieste’s expectations for massive state 
support.
49
  
As a consequence, Christian Democrats continued to pursue a paternalistic policy by 
sending significant flows of money toward Trieste.
50
  This strategy ultimately aimed to promote 
infrastructural innovation and increase maritime traffic with both the Austrian and Yugoslav 
neighbors.
51
 The government’s initiatives, however, were highly debated between the central 
government and elements of the local political and economic elites who requested major regional 
autonomy and accused the Christian Democrats of nepotism in its privileging of specific local 
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economic groups. As a result, political cooperation among the major parties within the local council 
for trade and industry ended in 1955.
52
   
Meanwhile, proving sensitive to the complaints of the local entrepreneurial elites, the central 
government sought to restore Trieste’s competitiveness by opposing the Yugoslav policies of 
economic dumping.
53
 To do so, it strengthened economic relations with the Yugoslav neighbor, 
despite diplomatic and political relations which still remained distant.
54
 For example, in January 
1955, Italian and Yugoslav delegates began to negotiate a potential trade and navigation treaty.
55
 In 
August 1955, the signing of the Udine Agreements removed the status of partial embargo which, 
since October 1953, had constrained both the movement of people and the traffic of goods across 
the demarcation line between the ex-zones A and B.
56
 The terms of the agreement were extended to 
all the areas within ten kilometers of the Italian and Yugoslav border as the movement of people 
became regulated by specific visas.
57
 In the following years, the Udine agreements covered a rising 
number of political and economic issues and a new text was released in 1963 yet their territorial 
extent remained substantially unchanged.
58
  
Moreover, aware of the cumbersome issue of fishing in the upper Adriatic, Undersecretary 
of state Carlo Russo requested from the central government the immediate and urgent definition of 
an agreement to allow the free movement of fishing vessels between the ex-zones A and B of the 
former FTT in 1956. Italian violations of entering into Yugoslav territorial waters, indeed, often 
resulted in confiscation and detainment by the Yugoslav authorities.
 59 
In connecting the signing of 
the fishing agreements to the liberation of the boats, the Italian authorities intended to prove to local 
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public opinion its firm commitment to Trieste when dealing with Tito’s regime.60 In addition, 
Italian officers argued, the conclusion of such an agreement would strengthen the image of the 
Italian state among the Italians of the ex-zone B who were migrating to Italy, due to the arbitrary 
and repressive measures of the Yugoslav government.
61
     
At the same time, the central authorities understood that the growth of the Yugoslav 
shipyard industry further weakened the Triestine economy.
62
 In an effort to counter increasing  
public criticism, the local government also promoted a set of propaganda initiatives such as the 
"Mostra Viaggiante del Porto di Trieste" (Trieste Port Exhibition) of 1956 or the "Fiera di Trieste" 
(Trieste Fair) of 1957 and 1958 which aimed to project an image of a prosperous port. Financial 
funding for such initiatives, however, significantly fluctuated, adversely affecting their success.
63
 
To better respond to the new geo-political configuration of the eastern border and minimize 
popular discontent, the central government also established a special office whose goal was to act as 
a liaison between the local government, the State Presidency of Council, and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. This new office was perceived by local public opinion as a sign of uncertain Italian 
sovereignty over Trieste; however, it became a valuable means to monitor the behavior and 
attitudes of the Yugoslav government while pursuing a set of commercial and diplomatic 
agreements.
64
 For example, after the confidential and informal talks in 1956, Italian and Yugoslav 
negotiations for the final delimitation of the northern territorial border around Gorizia quickly 
accelerated.
65
 The definitive territorial settlement of the border between the former zones of the 
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FTT as well as the delineation of the territorial waters, however, remained unresolved.
 66 
Moreover,
 
the clandestine entrance of Yugoslav refugees and military personnel
67
 across the demarcation line 
as well as sporadic incidents between Italian and Yugoslav frontier guards, continued to strain 
Italian-Yugoslav relations.
68
   
In this climate of Trieste’s economic crisis and diplomatic uneasiness, the municipal 
elections of April 1956 became a crucial test of popular support for the new Italian administration 
and were accompanied by months of anti-governmental propaganda. The Italian government’s 
financial contributions to the Slovene minority in Trieste, notably its support for a Slovene House 
of Culture, were locally perceived as violations of the principle of reciprocity stated in the London 
agreements and made Italians in Trieste feel like second-class citizens.
69
 At the same time, 
however, the arrest of former Slovene partisans, the expropriation of Slovene properties, and the 
ban on the use of Slovene language in the city center exposed the existence of Italian discrimination 
toward the city’s Slovene minority.70  
In particular, each local political party opposing the centrist governmental coalition used the 
city’s problematic transition under Italian administration to weaken popular support for both central 
and local authorities. The neo-Fascist Party (Italian Social Movement, M.S.I.), for example, used 
the government's concessions to the local Slovenes to criticize the new Italian administration.
71
 In 
its public campaign, it emphasized that the government’s policies had not only overlooked 
Yugoslav discrimination in the ex-zone B but had also enabled the process of Slav cultural 
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penetration of Trieste.
72
 While embracing the opposing argument and under pressure from Moscow, 
the local Italian Communist party also intensified local propaganda against the new Italian 
administration.
73
 The Triestine Communists, following the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress and 
modifying their previously strong anti-Titoist stance, now highlighted Italian violations of the 
London agreements while, at the same time, attempting to tighten their local ranks.
74
 For its part, 
Social Democrats rejected extremist propaganda and emphasized the value of widespread 
administrative autonomy to better harmonize the legislative provisions of the London Memorandum 
and adequately protect Italian interests in the region.
75
 Thus, fearing any declaration that hinted at 
recognition of full Yugoslav sovereignty over zone B, the local Christian Democrat Giacomo 
Bologna suggested to Fanfani that its provisional status be maintained while gradually replacing the 
state administrative unit in Trieste with the administrative structure of an autonomous region.
76
 
Also, aware of the strength of anti-governmental propaganda, local governor Palamara 
invited Rome to take symbolic actions that could prove its commitment to defend the Italian 
identity of the city and dismiss charges of subservience toward Tito.
77
 For example, Palamara asked 
the government to gain restitution of three Italian properties in the ex-zone B before making any 
further concession to the Slovene minority.
78
 The central government, also concerned with the 
attempt of local political leaders to create a lay and socialist coalition in opposition to the Christian 
Democratic Party, 
 welcomed Palamara’s idea and intensified its propaganda.79 In using the weekly 
journal of a local association affiliated with the Christian Democrats, the government highlighted 
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the achievements of the Italian administration in Trieste and ultimately intended to weaken local 
communist support.
80
 
The election results saw a significant decline in votes for the local Christian Democrats as 
well as the republican and communist parties, which paralleled growing support for the neo-Fascist 
Party.
81
 The Independence Movement, excluded from participation in the local elections due to a set 
of procedural reasons, experienced a gradual decline which ended in 1959 with the closure of its 
journal, which was financed and controlled from Belgrade.
82
 Its supporters gradually merged their 
votes with those of the Triestine Communist Party which appropriated its programmatic platform 
calling for an independent Trieste.
83
 Talks between Italian and Yugoslav communists, however, 
confirmed the partition of the Triestine territory as definitive and Italian delegates depicted the 
“Trieste question” as an experience that had been “bothersome for you and painful for us.”84   
In commenting on the electoral results, Palamara interpreted the decline in support for the 
Christian Democrats as a clear sign of local political apathy and weakness of the state’s patriotic 
rhetoric.
85
 For his part, Mayor Gianni Bartoli explained the outcome of the elections as a 
consequence of the concessions to the Slovene minority, the government’s unilateral 
implementation of the London Memorandum, and its mistakes in arranging local propaganda.
86
 
Palamara had indeed mistakenly encouraged the central government to deny the Istrian C.L.N. any 
form of financial support, a decision that adversely affected support for the Christian Democrats 
among the émigrés in Trieste.
87
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Although the results of the municipal elections effectively reflected people’s anger over the 
state’s failure to restore Trieste’s economy, the local population still proved sensitive to symbolic 
expressions of national patriotism that, while recalling feelings of national unity, also minimized the 
sense of Trieste’s isolation on the nation’s periphery.88 These feelings responded to the deep socio-
political anxiety of the local population for which even simple acts like Khrushchev’s visit to Istria 
enhanced feelings of insecurity and fear.
89
 In his report to the central government, Trieste’s chief of 
police, Domenico De Nozza, described the massive public participation in the celebrations of 
November 4, the anniversary of the entrance of the Italian troops in Trieste. Rituals such as the 
union of the waters of the Piave River with the soil of the Ardeatine caves inside San Giusto 
Cathedral symbolized the unique sacrifice of the martyrs of the Great War and Nazi-Fascist 
occupation.
90
 These rituals represented an idealized continuity between generations of Italians who 
died for national independence and, especially in the “unredeemed” city of Trieste, assumed a 
unique rhetoric and patriotic tone to which people enthusiastically responded. Rituals like these, 
however, could only alleviate temporarily the feelings of apathy toward the new Republic whose 
inability to resuscitate the local economy was broadly interpreted as a sign of neglect toward the 
city.  
The strong discrepancy between the patriotic rhetoric of the government and its unsuccessful 
economic strategy for Trieste was not only criticized from communist or neo-fascist perspectives. 
Also local Catholic figures like Don Edoardo Marzari expressed their disapproval of the policies of 
the central government which had failed to stimulate local economic entrepreneurship. 
Nevertheless, the Catholic attempt to promote sentiments of national identity among the local 
Italian community that detached from past irredentist and cosmopolitan rhetoric, proved partially 
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successful.
91
 The activity of Catholic philanthropic associations such as "Figli del Popolo" 
(People’s Children), indeed, succeeded in re-educating younger generations to the values of 
patriotism and Christian ethics.
92
 This success explains why the local Christian Democrats 
effectively contained the challenge posed by the anti-democratic movements of both fascist and 
communist inspiration.
 93
   
Due to Trieste's proximity to the border, however, popular support for the Christian 
Democrats was greatly affected by the government's response to Yugoslav policies toward the ex-
zone B. For example, in the fall of 1956, the Yugoslav decision to resume compulsory military 
service in the ex-zone B provoked a wave of criticism of local patriotic and émigré associations. 
The Italian authorities, aware of the sensitive nature of the issue, also protested against the 
illegitimate nature of the Yugoslav action.
94
 Indeed, the Italian government, in categorizing the 
residents of the ex-zone B as Italian citizens, publicly demonstrated its formal consideration of the 
territory as indisputably Italian.
95
 At the same time, however, the decision to transform the Italian 
representation in Capodistria into an Italian Consulate, an institution traditionally located outside 
the national borders, revealed the contradictory behavior of the national government.
96
    
Governor Palamara, carefully monitoring Triestine response to these events, reported that, 
although local public opinion was broadly interested in the news coming from the ex-zone B, 
people in Trieste generally reacted with calm to them. Triestines, indeed, were aware of the gradual 
absorption of the ex-zone B into the Yugoslav state and the rapid decline in the number of its Istrian 
population; however, he added, Triestines were increasingly frustrated with the unclear provisional 
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status of the London Memorandum, which they felt needed to be clearly declared either as 
provisional or conditionally definitive with amendments.
97
  
To sum up, in the immediate years after 1954, restoration of Trieste’s economy provided the 
main motivation behind the new border strategy of the central government. Indeed, while 
strenuously claiming Italian sovereignty over the ex-zone B, Italian political authorities provided 
financial support to Trieste and simultaneously pursued the normalization of political relations with 
the Yugoslav neighbor. Popular disappointment in the government’s inability to fulfill its promises 
of economic prosperity, however, limited the effect of its patriotic rhetoric and ultimately 
undermined local support for the Christian Democrats.  
 
A New Christian Democratic Leadership for Trieste: Moving on a Progressive Path 
After the unsatisfactory results of the 1956 municipal elections, the Triestine Christian 
Democrats experienced a pivotal generational change in the second half of the 1950s. The new 
political class made of young Istrians, who identified with Christian Democratic leader Amintore 
Fanfani, replaced the old local conservative and clerical representatives and gradually opened their 
ranks to the leftist forces of the political spectrum. This new elite distanced itself from the 
previously intransigent nationalist rhetoric that had driven the battle for Trieste’s “Italianità,” yet 
nationalist views survived among local Italians. Indeed, on the occasion of the third anniversary of 
Trieste’s November 1954 deaths, Governor Palamara reported an attempted attack of 4,000 students 
against the local headquarters of Communist and Slovene organizations. Episodes like these 
revealed the endurance of ethno-ideological tension between segments of the local Italian youth and 
Slovene communities, the former of which was still highly affected by nationalist propaganda.
98
  
At the same time, the change inside the local Christian Democratic leadership also produced 
the progressive marginalization in Triestine politics of previously relevant figures such as former 
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Mayor Gianni Bartoli and Bishop Antonio Santin. The end of the logic of the Italian bloc in Trieste, 
a key element of the governmental strategy during the years of the “Trieste question,” paved the 
way for greater Christian Democratic openness toward the Social-Democrats. This political process, 
which had been inaugurated by Fanfani at the national level in 1954, was delayed in Trieste and saw 
the affirmation of the most progressive faction of the Christian Democrats only in 1959.
99
   
In Trieste, this new political configuration further undermined local support for the 
Independence Movement and minimized former antagonism between the national Christian 
Democrats and the local municipal authorities, who were traditional supporters of a pro-Italian 
solution of the Triestine question defined in terms of broad administrative autonomy.
100
 Figures 
such as Bartoli, however, expressed his concern for a political shift that threatened to further widen 
the gap between the people and the state in Trieste. In his speech of 1957 at the Julian and Dalmatia 
circle in Milan, Bartoli claimed that Trieste’s problems remained largely unresolved after 1954 and 
Triestines were perceived as "complainers who did not even know what they wanted."
101
 These 
views, Bartoli claimed, ignored the problematic status of the city which he compared to a human 
head deprived of its body.  
Indeed, the progressive strengthening of Capodistria’s port facilities, which revealed 
Yugoslav intentions to transform the city into a key entry point to the upper Adriatic, harmed 
Trieste’s own maritime traffic.102 In addition, the sustained growth of Fiume’s port and the 
expansion of Hamburg, Bremen, and Rotterdam’s ports further undermined Trieste’s 
competitiveness with Europe more broadly. In particular, Fiume’s traffic with Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia benefited from geo-political factors and its privileged connection to the Danubian 
hinterland from which Trieste remained partially excluded.
103
 All these factors made Trieste 
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particularly vulnerable to national and international events.
104
 Thus, only a global approach to the 
Triestine economy could facilitate the restoration of its port’s traffic; however, the tension between 
the centralizing impulses of the national government and the autonomous ambitions of the local 
economic elite for greater autonomy adversely affected this possibility.
105
   
Indeed, the views of the President of the local council for trade and industry, who sought the 
creation of a free economic zone, clashed with the strategy of the local representative of the central 
government.
106
 As a result, the national government dissolved the sitting local council and, on the 
basis of existing legislation, appointed a new council with a President of Christian Democratic 
orientation with expertise on port issues.
107
 This decision, clearly motivated by the unwillingness of 
the national government to make concessions to demands for greater autonomy, was therefore 
perceived locally as a clear sign of revenge.
108
 
Nonetheless, parts of the local community recognized the commitment of the central 
government to restore local prosperity. For example, the Istrian C.L.N. criticized members of the 
independence movement whom, while profiting from the magnanimity of the Italian government 
and disregarding the expanding volume of local consumption as well as rising employment, were 
"sticking their heads out of the sand."
109
 At the same time, however, the C.L.N. harshly criticized 
the Italian government for its mild defense of both Italian territorial claims and culture in the ex-
zone B.
110
 In this fashion, the 1958 agreement on Italian access to Yugoslav territorial waters, made 
possible by a significant payment from the Italian government, was portrayed locally as a sign of 
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indisputable political weakness and was harshly criticized for its unclear benefit to Istrian 
fishermen.
111
 
In anticipating the municipal elections of 1958, these issues were exploited by both the local 
neo-fascist and communist movements. Neo-fascist propaganda stressed the party’s invaluable role 
in opposing the communist threat to Trieste’s "Italianità" and expressed support for local neo-
irredentism by organizing street demonstrations, which often resulted in vandalism of Slovene and 
resistance monuments.
112
 Palamara, concerned about an exacerbation of ethnic antagonism between 
Italians and Slovenes and possible Yugoslav reactions, called upon the central authorities to deny 
the authorization for a planned demonstration of the neo-fascist youth association “Giovane Italia” 
(Young Italy).
113
 The central government’s fears for the detrimental effect of local expressions of 
neo-irredentism on Italian-Yugoslav diplomatic relations resulted in the suspension of the state’s 
financial contributions to neo-fascist associations.
114
 Although local and national Christian 
Democrats proved certainly less tolerant toward visible expressions of resurgent Fascism in and 
outside Trieste, the existence of right-wing parallel structures outside the control of the state 
intelligence agency demonstrated the strong anti-Communism of fringes of the governing elites.
115
   
In such a context, the national PCI exploited the problematic re-birth of the Triestine 
economy for political goals and stressed the central authorities’ ineptitude to advance political 
relaxation with the Yugoslav neighbor, an outstanding example of socialism.
116
 In Trieste, local 
Communist leader Vittorio Vidali and his followers, however, continued to distrust Tito’s regime 
and firmly opposed any Titoist organizations while also actively supporting the anti-Titoist network 
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in the ex-zone B.
117
 Furthermore, the Triestine communists firmly supported the creation of an 
autonomous region as the best means to realize a free economic trade zone and advance the interests 
of Trieste’s workers.118 In its campaign against the central government, the party greatly exploited 
people’s anger over the prolonged crisis of the local economy which resulted in waves of mass 
strikes.
119
  
To contain the loss of popular support inside the city, the national government promptly 
announced a plan of investments for Trieste and a set of initiatives to foster the social re-integration 
of the Adriatic émigrés. Moreover, Palamara, increasingly irritated by communist propaganda, 
denied the local Communist party permission to hold its political meeting in the main Triestine 
square because the use of the Slovene language “would be offensive to the national and patriotic 
feelings of the majority of the local population.”120 This emphasis on Trieste’s patriotic feelings 
responded to the necessity to defy both nationalist propaganda against the government and the 
pressure from a variety of veteran associations.
121
 Indeed, on November 4, 1958, the government 
arranged patriotic manifestations that proclaimed an imagined unity of the cities of Trento and 
Trieste and celebrated the sacrifice of the Triestine martyrs of World War One as sublime proof of 
the spiritual unity between the city and the homeland.
122
 Despite these efforts, the national elections 
of 1958 saw the significant weakening of the Christian Democrats and the growing strength of left-
wing and extremist parties, especially the neo-fascist M.S.I.
123
   
In addition, the traditional domain of the Christian Democrats in Triestine politics was 
further challenged by the re-appearance of new independent political formations. On May 21, 1959, 
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a group of Triestine residents established a new independence formation, the Movement for the 
Independence of the Free Territory of Trieste which aimed its activities at the larger population of 
the Triestine territory.
124
 Through the pages of local journals such as Trieste Sera or 
L’Indipendenza, the movement re-asserted the nexus between Trieste’s political independence and 
its port’s economic prosperity. In an effort to mobilize international public opinion, the movement 
symbolically sent letters and memoranda to international organizations such as the UN and to key 
political figures, including US President Eisenhower and Soviet Secretary Khrushchev, to seek 
support for the creation of the FTT.
125
 Inside the Triestine territory, however, political support for 
the movement and other similar political formations remained minimal. 
Despite its relative marginalization, the movement's strong anti-governmental tone and 
propaganda inflamed the local and national debate on issues such as the city’s irreversible economic 
decline and the unclear territorial sovereignty over parts of the border region. In its public 
campaign, the movement first criticized Italian subservience to the pro-Yugoslav attitude of both 
the American and Austrian governments which had diverted their traffic toward Fiume.
126
 Second, 
it depicted the construction of a civil airport in Fiume and a hydroelectric dam in Capodistria as 
fatal blows to Trieste's already crumbling economy.
127
 Finally, it disputed the legitimacy of a 
General Government for Trieste, an institution that was previously sponsored by the Allied 
government and now unnecessary due to the Italian government's declared sovereignty of Trieste.
128
   
Such issues found resonance within the local public sphere and were used to further weaken 
the state's image in Trieste. At the press conference held on the five-year anniversary of the 
restoration of Italian administration in Trieste, Palamara first rhetorically praised the passionate 
feelings of "Italianità" that drove the actions of the Triestine martyrs in 1953 and highlighted the 
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positive trends in employment and productivity.
129
 In commenting on local pessimism, Palamara 
pointed to an unjustifiably low morale among the general population and also stressed its 
detrimental effect on potential investors.
 130
   
Local public opinion in Trieste, however, showed little interest in Palamara's press 
conference and instead devoted specific attention to the November 4 anniversary of national 
liberation from Austria-Hungary.
131
 This occurrence was widely advertised by a variety of local 
neo-irredentist groups that also partially mimicked neo-fascist propaganda. National patriotic 
associations also used the opportunity to criticize the central government for its feeble protection of 
the rights of the Italian minority in zone B and depicted the Slovene bank as well as Slovene 
cultural circles in Trieste as clear signs of Slav penetration.
132
 In their public campaign, they asked 
the central government to not “make the Italian majority of Trieste pay for the nationalist mistakes 
of the fascist past.”133 At the same time, however, patriotic groups of democratic inspiration also 
firmly condemned the local neo-fascist movement whose rhetorical defense of Trieste’s Italian 
identity was accompanied by acts of unacceptable political violence, such as the bombing of 
Slovene commemorative sites.
134
  
In the late 1950s, these more moderate views were broadly shared among the local Italian-
speaking population whose political preferences increasingly turned toward a local political 
progressive coalition, which was composed of Social and Christian Democrats.
135
 Also Gianni 
Bartoli, an indefatigable defender of Italian territorial claims over Trieste and its Istrian region, 
suggested that Trieste’s Christian Democratic secretary Corrado Belci strengthen political relations 
with the Social Democrats and distrust the political forces that not only failed to recognize the 
                                                 
129“Trieste ha celebrato il ritorno all’Italia,” Il Popolo (October 27, 1959).  
130
UZC, Sezione IV, Busta 23, Folder passaggio di poteri nel Territorio di Trieste, "Palamara Public Press," October 26, 
1959. 
131
Umberto Segre, "Trieste cinque anni dopo," Il Ponte (September, 1959). 
132“Il voto slavo a Trieste sollecitato e contrattato dalla DC,” Il Secolo (January 22, 1960). 
133Giuseppe Tramarollo, “Umanità senza nazioni non può esistere: la situazione di Trieste,” Il Pensiero Mazziniano 
(November 15, 1959).  
134
In particular, AST, Fondo CGGTT, Pacco 136, Fascicolo 13/14, Vigilanza sedi partiti e associazioni, "Confidential 
Note to Palamara," June 9, 1960.  
135
AST, Fondo Bartoli, Busta 47, Rapporti con il mondo politico, "Bartoli’s Speech," March 19, 1959. 
151 
 
democratic nature of the new political system but had also cast doubts on the “Italianità” of Trieste 
and its territory.
136
  
Trieste's experience of a progressive coalition government followed the path of Fanfani's 
government in 1958 which, opening to the Social Democratic Party and the Republican Party, 
significantly departed from the practice of former post-war governments of conservative 
orientation. This process, however, proved to be complex but reversible and the Christian 
Democrats created a new coalition government which, under the leadership of Christian Democrat 
Fernando Tambroni, relied on the support of the neo-Fascist Party in 1960. This coalition 
government, however, also quickly fell apart. Indeed, during the summer, the government's decision 
to allow the neo-Fascist Party to hold its national convention in Genoa provoked a massive wave of 
local and national demonstrations that resulted in violent skirmishes between workers, partisan 
associations, and the local police. These dramatic events fatally undermined political and popular 
support for Tambroni's government which was forced to resign. As a result, the neo-Fascist Party, 
which had been previously involved in the coalition government, was relegated to the margins of 
national politics.
137
 Thus, in the early 1960s, Christian Democrats turned again toward the 
formation of center-left coalition governments.
138
 As I explore in detail in the next chapter, this 
process of Christian Democratic openness toward the left was met with specific resistance in the 
Triestine context as some factions of the local Christian Democrats feared the strengthening of the 
Communist Party.
139
 
Meanwhile, reports from local Christian Democrats and local authorities demonstrated that 
the party's popularity increasingly depended on the state response to Trieste’s economic needs.140 
Corrado Belci, in a set of letters to Christian Democrat national secretary Aldo Moro, repeatedly 
asked for approval of a free industrial zone to defy Yugoslav competition and accelerate Trieste’s 
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economic recovery.
141
 In addition, Palamara reported to the central government that local fears of 
the existence of secret clauses in the London Memorandum and the absence of a programmatic 
industrial plan for Trieste made the city more sensitive to the rising competitiveness of Fiume’s port 
and weakened its public spirit.
142
  
Local representatives and entrepreneurs, indeed, called for the government’s intervention to 
accelerate the modernization of the industrial network, reduce maritime tariffs, build up the local 
airport, and improve the highway system to facilitate the connection between the Adriatic littoral, 
the city, and the Austrian region.
143
 In response, the national government pursued a set of economic 
agreements with the main countries of the Adriatic region to facilitate the maritime traffic through 
the Triestine port.
144
 Moreover, Christian Democratic secretary Aldo Moro exerted political 
pressure on the government to assign to the city of Monfalcone the construction of a new ship that 
could temporary provide work to about 2,500 unemployed workers.
145
 Measures like these show 
that the central government and the Christian Democrats proved extremely concerned about the 
political implications of Trieste's economic crisis yet were unable to reduce public 
disillusionment.
146
  
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the government's political opponents had indeed 
increasingly used Trieste’s steady economic impoverishment, its demographic decline, and the 
presence of a large number of émigrés still located in its refugee camps to highlight the 
government’s ineffectiveness to facilitate the city's socio-economic reintegration.147 In addition, the 
national government’s plan to grant local administrative autonomy to the Julian Venetian region 
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and its policy of diplomatic normalization with Yugoslavia had been instrumentally used by the 
neo-fascist movement to argue that the government intended to recognize the definitive partition of 
the ex-zone B.
148
 These factors exacerbated socio-political tension in a frontier city such a Trieste 
which still looked at Tito's regime with deep suspicion. 
Contrary to right-wing accusations of the government’s subservience to advancing 
communism, Italy's new policy of Adriatic friendship actually intended to reach out to socialist 
countries in foreign policy in order to ultimately promote their autonomy from Moscow and reduce 
communist influence on domestic policy.
149
 As part of this policy, the Christian Democratic Party 
believed that the improvement of bilateral diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav neighbor could 
effectively facilitate the defense of the Italian minority living in the ex-zone B. In this fashion, the 
1960 visit of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popovic provided the Italian government the 
opportunity to discuss issues related to minority rights and re-open the negotiation of the northern 
border. At the same time, however, it confirmed that while the southern border between Trieste and 
the ex-zone B may have been considered definitive from a Yugoslav perspective, the Italian 
government still viewed it as provisional.
150
 These opposing Yugoslav and Italian interpretations of 
the London Memorandum, which well mirrored the views of their border communities, remained a 
bone of contention for the next fifteen years; however, the Adriatic neighbors significantly 
intensified their efforts to advance diplomatic negotiations over a variety of unresolved issues. 
In 1961, for example, although Yugoslavia firmly refused to discuss the status of the 
demarcation line between Trieste and the ex-zone B by claiming its definitive and unchangeable 
nature, the Italian and Yugoslav governments agreed to proceed with the negotiation of minor 
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territorial disputes in the northern area of the Julian Venetian region.
151
 In addition, the Yugoslavs 
committed themselves to the removal of discriminatory practices against the Italian minority of the 
ex-zone B both in the administrative and educational matters.
152
 Consequently, the Yugoslav 
government decided to introduce bilingual teaching in Italian schools of the ex-zone B from the first 
grade, but also extended national legislation over the area now under Slovene and Croatian 
administration. According to Governor Palamara, such a provision violated the terms of the special 
statute of the London Memorandum which applied only to the former territory of Trieste. Palamara, 
indeed, feared that by accepting such an initiative, the Italian government itself would also be 
forced to extend bilingual schools outside Trieste, especially to Udine and Gorizia, cities with 
significant Slovene minorities. Therefore, Palamara advised the central government to limit the new 
legislation only to the former Triestine territory.
153
  
This political development was also paralleled by the Italian government’s initiative to 
organize seminars of Italian language for both teachers and high school students in the ex-zone B.
154
 
This decision was enthusiastically received by the Italians living under Yugoslav administration 
which read it as a sign of the government’s commitment to the defense of the Italian heritage of the 
region.
155
 As this case shows, the protection of linguistic rights for the Italians of the ex-zone B 
remained indeed a sensitive matter for the central government and consolidated local hopes for 
possible future revisions of the London Memorandum or at least the preservation of its provisional 
character. 
 At the same time, any reference to the definitive nature of the demarcation line established 
by the London Memorandum still had the potential to easily inflame local animosity toward 
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Rome.
156
 In 1962, for example, the political debate regarding the implementation of constitutional 
provisions for the creation of an autonomous Julian Venetian region provoked the protests of both 
émigrés and nationalist associations.
157
 They feared that the creation of an autonomous Julian 
Venetian region would strengthen the ambitions of the independence movement and, especially, 
sanction the definitive partition of the ex-zone B from Trieste.
158
  
Widespread local opposition to the loss of formal Italian sovereignty over ex-zone B was 
motivated by a mix of nationalist and economic considerations. Given the failure of the 
government's economic strategy for the city, the future reunion between Trieste and its economic 
hinterland represented the only hope to restore economic prosperity. The central government, 
unwilling to take any decision that could impair Italian territorial interests along the border, 
subsequently postponed the establishment of the autonomous region until 1963.
 159
  
In such a context, Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, while promoting the government's 
Mediterranean over Atlantic interests and supporting political openness to the East, also sought to 
improve Adriatic commercial relations to better respond to Trieste’s economic needs.160 Although 
Fanfani was locally perceived as an indefatigable defender of Italian interests in the Adriatic, he 
firmly pursued the political rapprochement toward Yugoslavia. Indeed, both Fanfani and Christian 
Democratic secretary Aldo Moro, who was later accused of political defeatism, inaugurated a new 
political season in Italian-Yugoslav relations.
161
 During his meeting with Yugoslav Minister of 
Internal Affairs Aleksandar Rankovic, Fanfani mainly discussed economic issues yet also was 
prepared to examine some adjustments to the northeastern border.
 162 
In addition, both men restated 
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the unfeasibility of any change in zone A as well as the maintenance of two-thirds of the Triestine 
territorial waters under Italian administration.
163
 In Fanfani’s views, the general economic 
agreement represented a necessary preamble to the strengthening of bilateral efforts to solve 
problems of mutual interest.
164
 This new approach to Italian-Yugoslav relations came to play a 
pivotal role in the making of the Osimo Treaty.  
As discussed so far, popular anxiety and widespread distrust toward state institutions was 
motivated by the prolonged economic crisis which adversely affected identification with the Italian 
state in Trieste; however, sporadic expressions of national patriotism also revealed the endurance 
nationalist rhetoric within the Triestine population. In such a context, the Christian Democratic 
Party in Trieste experienced a significant change in its political elite and gradually opened the door 
to coalition with the Social Democrats. Despite this, Trieste's economic decline remained a 
powerful political tool that was used by local extremist forces to weaken popular support for both 
local Christian Democrats and the central government.  
In the early 1960s, as mentioned, the short-lived center-right coalition government became 
object of widespread popular protests at the national level which led to its resignation. From this 
moment, the Christian Democrats' support for a center-left coalition and a policy of Adriatic détente 
met increasing support across the country yet was opposed by significant segments of the Triestine 
population.
165
 In the Adriatic city, nationalists and conservatives read the process of political 
normalization with Yugoslavia as well as the establishment of the autonomous region as decisive 
steps toward the definitive renunciation of Italian sovereignty over the ex-zone B. Indeed, both the 
reaffirmation of Italian territorial claims and the defense of Italian culture and language inside 
Trieste and its territory had long symbolized the government's commitment to the Italian identity of 
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the border. The post-1954 experience of both the Italian residents of the ex-zone B and its émigrés 
magnificently exemplified the complexity of this issue for the Italian government. 
 
Forgotten and Unwelcome “Brothers”: the Italians of the ex-zone B     
After 1954, while claiming Italian territorial sovereignty over the ex-zone B and attempting 
to restore the Triestine economy, the Italian government had to cope with a set of problems 
pertaining to the Italian citizens of the ex-zone B. Among them, the problem of the Italian soldiers 
still detained in Yugoslav camps or the judicial persecution against the Italian residents still living 
in the ex-zone B adversely affected local views of the restored Italian administration in Trieste.  
Critics argued that not only did the government sign the London agreements without gaining 
from Tito’s regime the release of Italian citizens from the Yugoslav camps, but in doing so it also 
contradicted the principles of Christian justice and solidarity.
166
 Only in 1955, due to rising pressure 
from both public opinion and Istrian associations, the Italian and Yugoslav governments began 
negotiations for the release and exchange of prisoners. Yet by 1956 about 1,700 out of 3,000 
detainees were still being held in Yugoslav camps.  
Political considerations, however, delayed a quick resolution of the issue and persuaded 
Italian representatives to omit the problem from meetings with their Yugoslav counterparts. The 
government decided instead to release Yugoslav citizens in exchange for the liberation of Italian 
citizens who had been detained for supporting Italian claims over the disputed border. The sluggish 
pace of diplomacy, which strongly contrasted with the ratification of numerous Italian and 
Yugoslav commercial agreements, exacerbated feelings of abandonment among the families of the 
prisoners.
167
 
Similarly, the expulsion of Italian citizens from the Yugoslav territory for political reasons 
enhanced a sense of impotence among the residents of the ex-zone B who proved increasingly 
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disillusioned about Rome's inability to defend their interests.
168
 These views were further 
strengthened by the arbitrary conviction of Italian citizens for espionage or their brutal mistreatment 
and arrest while visiting the ex-zone B. Their experiences often resulted in “physical persecution, 
forced confessions and months of jail.”169 In response to these cases of arbitrary violence, the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged the national government to retaliate by expelling Yugoslav 
citizens who had displayed anti-Italian sentiments; the national government, however, fearing that 
such an action would produce diplomatic tension, decided instead to expel Yugoslav citizens who 
had been condemned for threats to the public order. This measure applied to all cities but Trieste, a 
decision that significantly restricted its effectiveness.
170
  The disagreements between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s office highlighted the ambiguous attitudes of an Italian 
government which pursued the defense of only the Italian interests that did not jeopardize the new 
friendly relationship with Tito’s regime.   
In addition, the perceived impunity of arbitrary Yugoslav decisions corroborated the image 
of an Italian state seemingly weak and indifferent to its citizens’ needs across the border. In his 
speech commemorating World War One hero Nazario Sauro, Bishop Antonio Santin commented on 
the expulsion of Italians from the region and referred to the Italian state as “impotent before 
Yugoslav injustice and violence.”171 In response, the Italian Embassy in Belgrade firmly protested 
to the Holy See which promised to control Santin’s public speeches. Papal diplomats agreed that the 
Istrian bishop’s comments were indeed detrimental to both the Italian state and the Vatican which 
was already experiencing extreme political tension with Tito’s regime.  
Émigré associations, especially, manifested their concern for the Italians under Yugoslav 
administration. Among them, the “Unione Istriani” (Istrian Union, UI), founded after 1954 by 
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dissidents of the C.L.N. Istria, called for the revision of both the Peace Treaty and the London 
Memorandum.
172
 In a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Giuseppe Pella, its President, Sardos 
Albertini, reported the continuous violations to Italian minority rights which made any further 
concessions to the Slovenes of Trieste unfeasible.
173
 Likewise, the “Lega Nazionale” (National 
League) also carefully monitored the conditions of the Italian minority of the ex-zone B and in its 
correspondence with the Consulate of Capodistria echoed the U.I.'s position.
174   
Although the mistreatment of Italian citizens in the ex-zone B fueled local apprehension in 
Trieste, the central government only responded to the arbitrary behavior of the Yugoslav 
government in moderation. At the same time, however, Rome also firmly sought to remove any 
opposition to Italian rule inside Trieste. This process intertwined with the mass emigration from the 
city and between 1954 and 1961about 20,000 people emigrated from Trieste to Australia, a 
phenomenon that contradicted the demographic growth of the rest of the country.
175
  
 The high demands for specialized manpower, loose rules on immigration, and the presence 
of a significant community of Julian Venetians, however, only partially explains why about 10% of 
the Triestine community moved to Australia. In examining this issue, Gianfranco Cresciani argues 
that the volatile local political situation and wave of nationalism that characterized post-1954 
Trieste encouraged those who had been lukewarm in their support of a pro-Italian solution to the 
"Trieste question" to leave.
176
 Among the émigrés were also those who had given proof of Italian 
patriotic sentiments but had been forced to leave for economic reasons.
177
 Mass emigration 
particularly affected representatives of the Independence Front, former members of the Allied 
administration, and significant personalities of the local Slovene community. Despite this, some 
segments of the Triestine community criticized the central government for the mild purge of Italian 
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employees who had previously opposed a pro-Italian solution to the Triestine problem. The popular 
chant “Fracassi and Vitelli’s good times are over, now begins Palamara’s bitter time” expressed 
popular nostalgia for the local Italian Prefects of the immediate post-war years, a time in which the 
struggle for Trieste’s “Italianità” indisputably drove the political strategy of the Italian state toward 
the border.
178
  
These criticisms, however, proved ineffective. After 1954, indeed, in a context of 
heightened patriotic zeal and socio-political antagonism, about 6,000 individuals who were former 
employees of the Allied Military Government were accused of being "independent and notoriously 
anti-Italian," and became targets of both public resentment and state discrimination.
179
 In particular, 
Italian citizens who were former AMG employees encountered a set of bureaucratic procedures and 
legislative provisions that adversely affected the pace of their reallocation. These difficulties 
ultimately fueled local anger and disappointment among those who had firmly supported an 
independent Trieste and continued to support the Independence Movement.
180
    
Above all, the new local Italian authorities looked with deep suspicion upon the Italian 
members of the former Allied police, the Julian police force.
181
 After the approval of the London 
Memorandum, about 35 former members of its most infamous division, the "Nucleo Mobile," left 
immediately for England with their families as they were locally perceived as mainly responsible 
for the November 1953 deaths.
182
 By 1956, another two thousand members of the Julian police 
were encouraged to emigrate.
183
 Italian state agents in Trieste informed the central government that, 
while travelling to the ex-zone B to visit their relatives, Italian and Slav members of the Julian civil 
police were approached by agents of the Yugoslav secret police and, under the threat of retaliation 
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against their families, were forced to pass confidential political and military information.
184
 To 
safeguard Italian security without fomenting diplomatic tension, Governor Palamara decided to 
deny travel permits to members of the Julian police or ex-members of the AMG whom, while still 
working for the new Italian administration, often travelled to the ex-zone B.
185
   
In a context marked by widespread governmental and popular suspicion toward former 
detractors of a pro-Italian solution to the Triestine problem, the central government also had to cope 
with the massive migration of Italian residents from the Istrian region.
186
 Although these émigrés 
were protected by specific clauses of the London Memorandum, the contrasting democratic and 
communist nature of the Italian and Yugoslav systems made the enforcement of its working 
principle, reciprocity, unfeasible. Thus, the Italian government faced again the criticism of those 
who pointed to its lack of firmness in defending Italian rights in the ex-zone B or its excessive 
concessions to the Slovene minority in Trieste.
187
 As it happened in the past, Rome tried to respond 
to local criticism without incurring accusations of discrimination by the Yugoslav authorities. For 
example, in 1955 Slovene residents of Trieste who acted for the Slovene theatre were accused of 
being part of the local pro-Titoist network. The national government, fearing possible Yugoslav 
retaliation, decided to restrict the mobility of the actors between Trieste and the ex-zone B rather 
than proceeding with their expulsion.
188
  
Meanwhile, the Italian government repeatedly protested to the Yugoslav administration for 
its unwillingness to provide adequate infrastructure and administrative autonomy for the Italian 
schools in the ex-zone B.
189
 At the same time, however, the central government also decided to 
reduce its financial support to Italian associations of the ex-zone B, which had traditionally assisted 
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local Italian teachers and students by providing didactic material.
190
 Although the activity of these 
associations had been significantly constrained by the Istrian exodus and the massive purge of 
Italian teachers, representatives of these associations argued that, in abandoning the remaining 
personnel of zone B, Rome was further weakening the Italian identity of the border.
191
 From their 
perspective, the closure of the last Italian magazine of ex-zone B, La Nostra Lotta, became 
symbolic of the continuous process of de-Italianization of the Istrian region.
192
  
Il Piccolo, the main Triestine newspaper, stressed the limits of the Italian state and the 
feeling of abandonment that pervaded the Italians of the ex-zone B. In its views, the London 
Memorandum represented the final step in creating an “iron border.”193 Eager to prove its 
commitment to the Italian residents still living in the ex-zone B and to show its support of Italian 
culture and language, the government exported Italian newspapers and journals to the area.
194
 Such 
initiatives, however, only had a limited impact on the morale of the émigrés who, within local 
public discourse, were portrayed as a living proof of the "unique, natural, and geographic reality" 
that made of Trieste and Istria a single region.
195
   
As mentioned above, emigré organizations themselves were also directly affected by Rome's 
increasing accommodation to the principle of peaceful co-existence with the Yugoslav neighbor, 
which coincided with a partial reduction in state financial support to associations such as the Istrian 
C.L.N., the Istrian Union, and the National Association Venetia Julia and Dalmatia (ANVGD). 
After 1953, for instance, the national government repeatedly dismissed requests for support from 
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the Triestine Committee of the ANVGD.
196
 This decision had responded to the protests of the 
Istrian C.L.N. over the leading role that fascists like Libero Sauro and Bruno Coceani had in the 
association.
197
 Consequently, the Triestine Committee of the ANVGD was only able to resume its 
activities in the city in 1956;
198
 however, even then, the role of Maurizio Mandel, one of its leaders 
and a former member of the fascist black shirts, continued to fuel suspicion and distrust toward the 
association.
199
 Following Mandel’s exclusion from its Presidency in 1957, ANVGD began to 
increasingly conform to the progressive views of the central government and as a consequence 
would come to benefit again from its financial support.
200
 
In 1956, members of the Istrian C.L.N. elaborated a detailed memorandum which 
highlighted the detrimental effect that the presence of fascist personalities among the Istrian Union 
had on the image and reputation of the émigrés, who were publicly portrayed as sentimental 
nationalists.
201
 The Istrian Union rejected these accusations by pointing to the democratic, 
republican, liberal, social democrat and Catholic affiliations of its leadership, yet these 
counterclaims remained largely unheard by the central government.
202
 The government, completely 
disregarding the moderate views of the C.L.N. and its pivotal role in "educating the émigrés to the 
values of democracy and keeping them away from extremist political formations," also decided to 
reduce financial contributions to this association.
203
 As these cases show, the government cut 
financial support for émigré organizations that had strongly supported a pro-Italian solution to the 
border dispute and the presence of former fascists within the émigré associative network also 
significantly discredited its entire community.  
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Indeed, Yugoslav propaganda continued to portray Italian mass migration as a voluntary 
phenomenon which arose from the unwillingness of the Italians to concede their traditional position 
as the dominant nationality.
204
 Local associations like the C.L.N and relevant political and religious 
figures, among them Bishop Santin, vigorously opposed Yugoslav claims.
205 
Despite the stereotype 
of the émigrés as intransigent fascists promoted by Yugoslav propaganda, its majority did not in 
fact harbor extremist sentiments. Local authorities in Trieste reported that the new wave of 
incoming émigrés consisted of individuals who had escaped to avoid rising fiscal pressure and 
Yugoslav military service rather than for clear sentiments of "Italianità."
206
 Similarly, in an 
interesting letter to the leader of the Italian Socialist Party, Pietro Nenni, a group of informants from 
the zone B stressed that about 70% of the Italian émigrés were members of the small and middle 
entrepreneurial class. They left in order to exercise their right to private property rather than 
because of their deep nationalism.
207
  
Most yet not all of the Italians, however, had decided to leave from the Istrian region. Those 
who decided to stay were increasingly disillusioned by the apathy of the Italian government and 
saw the Consulate in Capodistria as the single Italian institution able to defend their rights in the 
region.
208
 In addition, segments of the Italian community in Yugoslavia had also embraced 
Yugoslav socialism.
209
 About 20,000 Italians participated in the Yugoslav elections of 1958 and 
members of the Italian community were elected to its federal Parliament. According to the Istrian 
C.L.N. these representatives were Yugoslav nationalists of Italian ethnicity who misrepresented the 
political orientations of the community surviving in Istria and Fiume. Interestingly enough, center-
left journals noted that, as a consequence of the forced expatriation of its ruling class, the local 
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Italian community in Yugoslavia had become politically insignificant and its proximity to Trieste 
had become more an ethnic barrier than a bridge.
210
  
Thus, to assist about forty thousand incoming émigrés from the Istrian region, the central 
government established a special fund of five billion lira between 1954 and 1956.
211
 The housing 
program faced numerous delays and flaws, however, exacerbating popular disillusionment toward 
the Italian administration.
212 
The absence of a specific office to better coordinate the efforts of both 
Roman and Triestine authorities, indeed, greatly reduced the responsiveness of the Italian state to 
mass immigration.
213
 Palamara noted that in a city with 20,000 unemployed, only a third of the 
émigrés could find jobs and their survival depended on the assistance of local associations which 
proved insufficient. The only possible solution for the incoming émigrés was state support to "grant 
them the house and job for which they escaped to Italy," which would prevent their social 
degradation and reduce their support for extreme political parties.
214
    
These measures aimed to ease the socio-political re-integration of the incoming émigrés, a 
problem that was further aggravated by the fact that some of them were former members of the 
Yugoslav police, had manifested anti-Italian feelings and had also persecuted their fellow residents 
in the ex-zone B. The local authorities labeled these émigrés as "undesirable" and, in order to 
minimize tension with their former victims inside the Triestine refugee camps, suggested their 
transfer to other cities.
215
 The Ministry of Interior, concerned about possible socio-political tension 
deriving from the presence of these émigrés in local communities outside Trieste, initially leaned 
toward the creation of separate camps in the city.
216
 Ultimately, the prospective return of these 
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“undesirable” people to Yugoslavia and its beneficial effect on Trieste persuaded the central 
government to embrace Governor Palamara’s proposal and temporarily remove these émigrés from 
Trieste.
217
 This measure, while aiming to minimize social tension inside Trieste, also responded to 
local grievances and émigrés’ complaints about the unfair living conditions of the camps.218 Local 
neo-irredentist associations such as the National League for example, had repeatedly claimed that 
the mistreatment of the incoming émigrés weakened the image of Italy as a symbol of civilization 
and justice. Upholding this image could ultimately prove the stark contrast between a democratic 
Italy and an oppressive Yugoslavia and finally equate the struggle for the Italian claims toward the 
border to the struggle for freedom.
219
  
This fact took specific importance in the early 1960s when the number of émigrés in 
multiple camps inside and outside Trieste reached 12,000, a symbol of the government’s failure to 
respond the needs of the incoming émigrés who had left the Yugoslav territories.
220
 Their cause 
found support among ex-combatant associations, World War One veterans, and local right-wing 
formations who established committees for the defense of national unity and irredentism.
221
 The 
propaganda of these groups, which preyed on the disillusionment and anger of the refugees still 
living in the city’s camps, weakened popular support for the Italian government and threatened the 
process of reconciliation between Italian and Slovene segments of the local population. For 
example, the youth irredentist and neo-fascist association "Giovane Italia" (Italian Youth) posted 
two anti-Slav flyers that invited the Triestine community to oppose the rising threat of pan-Slavism 
inside a Triestine refugee camp.
222
 The flyers depicted the government’s approval for a Slovene 
bank and the prospective legislative provisions to introduce judicial and administrative bilinguism 
as a clear sign of the increasing weakness of the Italian state.   
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The problem of the émigrés, but also the accommodating behavior of the Christian 
Democrats toward the local Slovene minority and its gradual openness toward the political parties 
of the center-left, became central to the anti-governmental propaganda of right-wing groups. In 
response, the central government significantly cut contributions to local ex-combatant, monarchic 
and patriotic associations, a decision that well symbolized the new Christian Democratic strategy 
toward the border, and, more interestingly, also aligned with former cuts in the contributions to the 
émigré associations.
223
  
These associations, already weakened by the government's strategy, also experienced rising 
internal division. In an exchange of letters, Piero Almerigogna, a prominent political figure of the 
Istrian émigrés, wrote to the Julian-Dalmatian intellectual Luigi Papo that "the local Christian 
Democratic Party does not oppose the social-democratic orientations of the Istrian CLN; therefore, 
for people like us who identify themselves with right-wing political formations and do not have any 
political influence over the local Christian Democrats, it is very difficult to challenge the leftist 
views of the CLN."
224
  This statement confirmed the divergent views of the Istrian Union and the 
CLN. Indeed, while the CLN proved supportive of the gradual Christian Democrats’ shift toward 
the coalition experiment of the center-left,  Almerigogna, reflecting the sentiments of the majority 
of the émigrés, firmly opposed this change on behalf of  the Istrian Union and hoped to re-orient the 
Istrian community toward the right. The danger of an extremist turn toward the right was also 
confirmed by Libero Sauro, the newly elected President of the ANVGD. In his letter to Minister of 
Interior Mario Scelba, Sauro stated that in order to strengthen the association’s democratic 
orientations and defeat the propaganda of its rightist fringe, it urgently needed economic support 
from the central government.
225
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While claiming its intention to strengthen the democratic views of its members, the ANVGD 
increasingly feared that the new progressive views of the Christian Democrats would also affect the 
government's foreign policy and induce Rome to acquiesce to Yugoslav pressure for a formal 
definitive settlement of the eastern border. In response, the associations, together with the Istrian 
Union established the "Centro di Vigilanza Nazionale" (Committee of National Defense) to oppose 
widespread misinformation about the geo-political situation of the Istrian region and preserve 
Italian territorial claims over the ex-zone B.
226
 Although the leadership of the émigré association 
and the majority of its members generally showed Christian Democratic political orientations, their 
views toward the ex-zone B remained substantially unchanged and continued to uphold the 
preservation of Italian territorial claims over the Istrian region. 
 Thus, Slovene authorities in Yugoslavia continued to read the initiatives of the émigrés 
through the lenses of classic Italian nationalism and labeled them as “irredentist and revanchist.” 227 
In such fashion the Slovenes understood the “émigrés day,” a celebration arranged in Trieste by the 
Istrian émigré associations to remember the mass Adriatic exodus.
228
 In response to these criticisms, 
Gianni Bartoli, Trieste's former mayor and a member of the executive committee of the Refugees 
National Association for Julian and Dalmatians, celebrated the cosmopolitan tradition of Trieste as 
an antidote to past forms of nationalism. He claimed the unbreakable unity between Trieste and 
Istria in the phrase “Trieste without Istria stagnates and Istria without Trieste is dying.”229 Bartoli’s 
statement well summarized the leading views that dominated both the Triestine population and its 
Istrian émigrés who still viewed the city as the promoter of Italian cultural traditions and the bridge 
to the Istrian region, an integral part of Italy’s imagined community temporarily located outside its 
physical border. 
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Although local demonstrations of émigrés from Istria and Dalmatia were generally peaceful, 
sporadic damage to monuments celebrating Yugoslav resistance and anti-Slav graffiti such as "Fora 
i s’ciavi!" (Go away Slavs!) certainly revealed the strength of revanchist attitudes among fringes of 
the local Italian population.
230
 In commenting on these sporadic episodes of intolerance, Giorgio 
Tombesi, one of the most intransigent detractors of the Osimo Treaty and leading figures of the 
Triestine Christian Democratic Party, argued that the majority of the population did not harbor 
feelings of hostility towards the Slovene minority. Tombesi claimed that Italians and Slovenes had 
indeed coexisted for centuries and interacted in Trieste’s urban and peripheral communities. In post-
war Trieste, local hostility took a specific political rather than ethnic meaning and was directed 
toward the Yugoslav regime and its local supporters, who were generally perceived as responsible 
for the unforgivable experiences of the "foibe."
231
 In the 1960s and early 1970s, such an issue 
repeatedly re-emerged in local public discourse to oppose both the government's concessions to the 
local Slovene minority and, especially, the formal recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty of the ex-
zone B, an issue that is explored in-depth in the last chapter of this dissertation.   
As discussed so far, after 1954 the Italian government's efforts to guarantee the rights of the 
Italian minority of the ex-zone B had to increasingly conform to the goal of diplomatic 
normalization with Tito’s Yugoslavia.232 While searching for a new Adriatic partnership, however, 
the Italian government also intended to consolidate popular support in Trieste and welcomed the 
mass emigration from the city of those members of its local population who had opposed a pro-
Italian solution to the Triestine problem. Furthermore, while coping with the city's transition from 
an Allied to Italian administration, the Italian state also had to respond to the massive Istrian 
immigration to and beyond Trieste. The state’s inability to facilitate the social integration of the 
incoming émigrés and protect both the property as well as the rights of Italians still living in the ex-
zone B boosted local criticism of the central government.  
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By the late 1950s, not only central but also local authorities became objects of widespread 
popular criticism. The gradual political shift of the Christian Democrats toward governmental 
coalition of leftist orientations also determined the cut of financial support to the émigré 
associational network, ultimately enhancing the concerns of Trieste and its Istrian émigrés. This 
political change which was read as a threat to the Italian identity of the city was also accompanied 
by increasing tension between the more moderate and extremist segments of the émigré associations 
as well as sporadic expressions of anti-Slav sentiments.  
Thus, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the strategy of both the Italian central and local 
authorities toward the émigrés and their associations in the ex-zone B significantly changed. 
Despite this, the strategy of the Italian government toward Trieste was not radically altered after the 
signature of the London Memorandum. As explored in the next section, the central authorities 
continued to significantly support local propaganda of "Italianità" in Trieste through the Office of 
Border Zones (UZC), especially before the Christian Democratic opening to the Socialist Party of 
the early 1960s.
233
  
 
Making the Border Italian: New Wine in Old Bottles 
After 1954 the Italian government abandoned its goal to reincorporate the Istrian region 
within the state's borders despite its official rhetoric. Popular support for the Italian administration 
depended more on the ability of the Italian state to extend the Italian "economic miracle" to Trieste, 
safeguard  the rights of the Italian residents of the ex-zone B, assist the Istrian émigrés, and preserve 
Italian language and culture across the border rather than extend Italian sovereignty to the ex-zone 
B.
234
 As a consequence, the revision of the demarcation line remained a possible yet remote 
political option that languished amidst commercial agreements and diplomatic negotiations.    
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Although the majority of Italians in Trieste proved more concerned about the status of the 
local economy than about the assertion of former Italian claims over the disputed border, the 
intransigent defense of the Italian identity of the city and anti-Titoist feelings fueled phenomena of 
ethno-political conflict, negatively affecting the pace of democratization of post-war Trieste.
235
 
Thus, significant segments of the local population greatly criticized the Christian Democrats’ move 
toward a center-left political coalition. These views found further support in the Catholic Church 
and its opposition to Yugoslav communism. In uninterruptedly supporting the unitary and 
indivisible character of the Triestine dioceses which extended over both Trieste and the ex-zone B, 
the Catholic Church implicitly upheld the fiction of Italian formal territorial rights over the ex-zone 
B.
236
 
The central government, indeed, understood that Trieste and its Istrian émigrés were by no 
means willing to recognize Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-zone B, at least in the short-term. 
Thus, the Italian government, eager to enhance local political support, unevenly granted significant 
financial contributions to a variety of associations with recreational, social, economic, cultural, or 
artistic goals.
237
 These contributions, officially recorded as expenses for "propaganda d’Italianità," 
were entrusted to the personnel of the Office of Border Zones (UZC), which after 1954, took the 
name of "Ufficio Regioni" (Office of Italian Regions).  
From the beginning, however, the relations between this office and the local Christian 
Democrats were tense. The border office intended to appoint a bureaucrat who would continue its 
former nationalist policy and would be easily subjected to the political influences of Rome. Local 
Christian Democrats instead supported a politically autonomous figure who would better 
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understand the city’s needs and combat political independence sentiments among the population.238 
The UZC eventually prevailed and, over time, continued to support associations whose alleged 
apolitical nature were a subterfuge to consolidate the Italian cultural and linguistic identity of 
Trieste and its territory, among them the “Dante Alighieri.”239 Financial support for these 
associations often increased in proximity to local and national elections or patriotic celebrations.
240
   
Thus, the central government, upon the suggestion of the UZC, allocated its funding to 
organizations based on their nature and political utility. Local associations purely giving assistance 
or those with educational goals generally experienced a gradual decrease in governmental 
contributions.
241
 The central authorities, instead, proved particularly willing to support cultural, ex-
combatant, and youth associations of democratic and patriotic orientations. The Yugoslav 
government, for its part, continued to perceive patriotic and émigré associations as expressions of 
aggressive Italian irredentism which, it believed, ultimately aimed to remove the Slovene minority, 
figuratively portrayed as a "trnj v peti" (thorn stuck in the heel) of Trieste.
 242 
These criticisms were 
also echoed within journals of leftist political orientations which claimed that right extremists and 
elements of the American intelligence community actively cooperated to support the anti-
communist and pro-Atlantic foreign policy of the national government.
243
  
After 1954, however, the central government firmly distanced itself from its nationalist 
tendencies of the past and, in Trieste, significantly reduced financial support to associations that had 
been compromised by political extremism. Not surprisingly, it expanded support for specific 
initiatives of the Christian Democrat party, among them the Political Economic Agency of Rome 
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(A.P.E.). The goal of this information agency was to support the policies of the central government 
through its propaganda of "Italianità." Its activities consisted of daily coordination with leading 
figures of the national Christian Democratic Party, among them Giulio Andreotti, and prominent 
journalists of the Christian democratic newspaper Il Popolo.
244
 The government also supported the 
Triestine cultural circles which ultimately aimed to promote the recovery and reintegration of the 
local economy within the national and European markets. Between 1957 and 1983, the central 
government supported these activities with significant amounts of money that peaked on the fiftieth 
anniversary of Trieste’s national “redemption” in 1968.245  
By contrast, the central government denied support to local associations that were politically 
irrelevant and dominated by radical nationalist orientations.
246
 The judgment of the central 
government was strongly affected by the reports of the UZC and especially the impressions 
provided by the local Governor Palamara.
247
 In one of such instances, Palamara's unfavorable views 
toward associations such as the Triestine branch of the Italian Nationalist Association resulted in the 
denial of all contributions from the central authorities.
248
 Indeed, the government proved willing to 
support the cultural Italian identity of the border by mobilizing local and national associations of 
democratic orientations yet looked with rising suspicion upon associations of nationalist and pro-
fascist orientations. Even among these, however, associations like the "Lega Dalmata" (Dalmatian 
League) had lost faith in a possible reintegration of the Dalmatian region inside Italian borders, 
while others reorganized under the leadership of both the neo-fascist and monarchic parties to 
uphold irredentist ambitions for Istria, Carnaro, and Dalmatia.
249
 Members of these associations 
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were usually veterans who belonged to the neo-fascist movements and identified with the motto 
"God, Homeland, Family."
250
  
Not only the Italian government but also patriotic and democratic associations negatively 
perceived extremist groups that called for the territorial re-conquest of the territories that had been 
lost with the Paris Peace Treaty and were now under Yugoslav administration.
251
 For example, 
veteran associations such as the "Federazione Italiana Volontari della Libertà" (Italian Federation of 
Volunteers Freedom, FIVL), established in 1948 and counting approximately 100,000 members of 
Christian democratic orientations, called for state support in defense of Italian culture and language 
across the Triestine territory rather than its unlikely territorial reintegration.
252
 In its actions, the 
FIVL was strongly supported by the Italian Mazzinian Association and its journal Il Pensiero 
Mazziniano.
253
 These associations, which showed moderate nationalist attitudes, were positively 
perceived by the Italian government and, over time, received significant financial support.
254
   
Among all them, the National League played a pivotal role in the preservation of both the 
Italian heritage of Trieste and its territory.
255
 Even though the diplomatic resolution of the Triestine 
question indisputably weakened the popularity of the association, it continued to defend Italian 
culture and language in the Adriatic while hoping for future revisions to the territorial provisions of 
the treaties signed by the Italian and Yugoslav governments.
256
 In promoting the “Italianità” of the 
border, the National League criticized the Paris Peace Treaty and its unfair territorial clauses which 
“stripped Italy of its lands across the Adriatic border.” 257 Its propaganda, supported by journals 
such as Difesa Adriatica (Adriatic Defense) or Arena di Pola (Pola Arena), reached both Italians at 
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home and abroad, including Latin America. In Trieste especially the association actively mobilized 
the local population by means of cultural, recreational, educational, and charitable activities, such as 
the organization of summer camps for Triestine children.
258
  
Moreover, the National League supported local expressions of Italian patriotism by widely 
celebrating Trieste's contribution to national unification, arranging memorials of the "foibe," and 
pilgrimages to patriotic sites, such as the military cemetery of Redipuglia which represented the 
sacrifice of Italian soldiers' in World War One.
259
 Publicly recognized as the main referent of the 
patriotic and émigré associations, the National League greatly benefited from the financial support 
of both local and central authorities in the years immediately following the London Memorandum. 
However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s governmental support decisively decreased. As 
mentioned above, this change coincided with the gradual opening of the Christian Democrats to the 
Left in national politics and saw a cut of about two-thirds from previous funding levels. 
Interestingly enough, the government’s contributions to the National League quickly rose in the 
early 1970s, which coincided with new moments of tension with the Yugoslav neighbor.
260
     
After 1954, the National League, led by the Christian Democrat Ugo Harabaglia and an 
executive council of center-right politicians, represented more than forty political groups and 
various patriotic associations. Although the majority of its members traditionally shared traditional 
democratic views, the presence of figures such as Cesare Pagnini, a former fascist and head of the 
local Civic Guard during Nazi-Fascist occupation, partially discredited the National League. In 
particular, after the Yugo-Soviet rapprochement of 1955and the 1956 elections, nationalist 
propaganda increasingly infected the organization.
261
  
At this time, not only members of the National League but also the ANVGD became 
increasingly concerned by the communist threat. Through the pages of its press, the ANVGD 
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argued that the loss of political support for the local Christian Democrats in the administrative 
elections of 1956 was a clear sign of the weakness of those Italian parties in Trieste that tolerated 
the local communist and Slovene community and their goal to transform Trieste into a “multilingual 
and bastard city.”262 The ANVGD, while celebrating the Hungarian events as the rehabilitation of 
the principle of independence, also claimed that Trieste’s resistance to Communism was being 
undermined by the Yugoslav occupation of the Istrian region.
263
 In requesting that the National 
League actively mobilize its patriotic network as a sign of protest against barbaric Soviet 
communism, the émigré associations aimed to direct public attention toward the communist threat 
that, on the Adriatic border, was forcibly removing any signs of “Italianità.”264   
In 1957, following the change of leadership of the local Christian Democrats, the National 
League continued to request economic provisions to re-launch the Triestine economy and better 
defend its cultural and linguistic identity from the attack of anti-national forces.
265
 To show its 
commitment to the defense of the Italian identity of Trieste and its territory, the National League 
celebrated irredentist heroes and patriotic anniversaries by means of postcards and pamphlets that 
often underlined a sense of tragedy and vehemently opposed the detractors of the Istrian cause.
266
 
To further strengthen its public image, the National League continued its support for charitable 
initiatives to assist the poorest segments of the Triestine population.
267
   
The national government, hoping to gain local support for the recently installed Italian 
administration, further promoted local patriotic commemorations, such as the hundredth anniversary 
of the birth of irredentist hero Guglielmo Oberdan.
268
 On this occasion the central government 
financed a variety of public initiatives such as the exposition of Oberdan’s personal items, a 
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celebrative stamp, as well as a set of round-tables to commemorate his life and patriotic spirit. Its 
costs were paid by a special fund of 10,000,000 lira and were listed as “expenses for the propaganda 
of Italianità.”269 This further confirms that even though the Italian government significantly cut 
financial contributions for the Italian associational network in Trieste, it still continued to support 
local associations whose economic, social or artistic activities underscored “moral and patriotic 
values that ultimately aimed to reassert the border’s Italianità.”270  
As mentioned in the previous section, the support of Italian associations inside the ex-zone 
B, by contrast, proved increasingly complicated. While ignoring the pressure of the President of the 
Italian Olympic National Committee (CONI) and attempting to avoid political and diplomatic 
tension with the Yugoslav government, the Italian government interrupted its funding of sport clubs 
that operated inside the ex-zone B as centers of Italian propaganda and were locally perceived as 
"expressions of quintessential Italianess."
271
 Despite this, the central government still supported 
Italian culture and language in the Adriatic region by means of exchange programs between 
Venetian and Istrian students.  A similar exchange between Slovene and Triestine students, 
however, was opposed by both the national government and Governor Palamara who feared 
Yugoslav plans to use the program as a means of nationalist and ideological indoctrination among 
Triestine youth of Slovenian descent.
272
   
When looking at Trieste in the late 1950s, what emerges is the image of a city in which both 
the initiatives of the border office and especially the patriotic rhetoric of the National League 
unchangeably supported its Italian identity. Thus, state institutions and local Italian associations 
became the object of harsh criticism by local intellectuals. In his article “La Politica delle Bandiere” 
(The Politics of the Flags) Carl Schiffrer argued that the defense of Trieste’s “Italianità” had been 
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used to justify public acquiescence toward ideals that were complementary to revanchist neo-
fascism. This criticism exposed the thin line between democratic patriotism and neo-fascism and 
also suggested the existence of a complex system of connivance between fringes of the governing 
elite and right political extremism. For example, former Mayor Gianni Bartoli himself, regardless of 
his efforts to minimize the influence of right-wing politics on the émigré network, became the target 
of criticism from the new center-left leadership of the local Christian Democrats for his affinity 
with members of the ANVGD who clearly had a fascist past.
273
 
At the same time, the defense of Trieste's Italian identity also allowed movements that were 
traditionally depicted as anti-national, such as the Communist Party, to present anti-fascism as the 
single expression of patriotism. As Schiffrer brilliantly summarized, Trieste’s “Italianità” could 
easily become an object of political manipulation.
274
 Local resistance to legislative proposals that 
supported the introduction of bilinguism in judicial and administrative proceedings exposed the 
multi-faceted nature of this issue.  
 
Resisting the Change: Nationalist Outbursts in Trieste 
After 1958, the Italian government began to discuss a legislative proposal that, only 
formally approved in 2001, aimed to extend the use of Slovene language to judicial and 
administrative offices in Trieste.
275 
In response, nationalist associations were quick to remind the 
government that such a proposal strictly contrasted with the policies of the Yugoslav administration 
against Italian culture and language in the ex-zone B.
276
 These views, shared by the majority of the 
Triestine  population, were expected to foment vehement protest in Trieste should such legislation 
be enacted.
277
 For example, the government’s decision to grant financial contributions to the local 
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Slovene community for the opening of a student center with the pro-Titoist and communist Pahor 
Drago as its director, had already further exacerbated ethno-political tensions inside Trieste.
278
  
In a letter to national secretary Aldo Moro, the local Triestine Christian Democrat Corrado 
Belci argued that the Slovene minority already enjoyed constitutional rights and that the 
introduction of bilinguism was unnecessary. Belci instead suggested accommodating Slovene 
requests for the extension of Slovene language in public education. To minimize the loss of votes 
for the local DC, Belci suggested that the party deny the use of bilingual signs for public buildings, 
which would violate Trieste’s Italian traditions and greatly benefit the neo-fascist movement.279  
Local public opinion also vehemently criticized the plans of the central government to 
equalize the use of Italian and Slovene. Chino Alessi, director of local Il Piccolo, defined the 
imposition of bilinguism as the betrayal of Trieste’s Italian tradition and praised the massive 
mobilization of the local Italian associative network.
280
 Similarly, neo-fascist propaganda drew 
parallels between the protests of the Triestine youth and the Pirano revolt of 1894, both of which 
they hailed as courageous.
281
  
The National League, for its part, depicted the government's plan as a further step in making 
Trieste a new South Tyrol. Significant concessions to the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol 
had indeed resulted in the rise of local violence, a possible scenario that could further hamper social 
reconciliation between Italians and Slovenes on the eastern border.
282
 In such a tense political 
climate, the, Triestine demonstrations of February 1961against the government’s plan to officially 
introduce the use of bilinguism degenerated into urban violence. The incidents, which lasted for 
four days, exposed popular animosity toward a decision that was locally perceived as detrimental to 
the Italian identity of the city.  
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The neo-fascist press celebrated the patriotic spirit of the protesters and, evoking the deaths 
of November 1953, harshly criticized local authorities for their employment of unnecessary 
brutality.
283
 By contrast, the pro-governmental press highlighted the responsibility of the neo-
Fascist Party for pre-planning the local incidents which took place in close proximity to Slovene 
cultural institutions.
284
 Communist propaganda also highlighted the responsibility of the neo-
fascists but also concurrently stressed the government’s inability to guarantee protection to the 
Slovene minority.
285
 The language and arguments of the different political parties effectively 
resembled those of the Fall of 1953 as all sides used the incidents to seek popular support.   
The unrest in Trieste also produced friction with the Yugoslav government which saw the 
irredentist tones of local protests a clear sign of diehard Italian imperialist ambitions toward Istria.  
A set of telegrams between the Italian Embassy in Belgrade and Rome focused on the vigorous 
protest of the Yugoslav authorities over the offensive tone of the Triestine demonstrations against 
President Tito and episodes of violence that targeted Slovene organizations and citizens. In 
response, the Yugoslav authorities also arranged a mass demonstration in Ljubljana to condemn the 
Italian student protests and the Italian state’s acquiescence toward forms of national and local 
irredentism.
286
   
In Trieste, communists, socialists, and Slovene representatives accused Christian 
Democratic Mayor Mario Franzil and the local neo-Fascist Party (M.S.I.) of inciting young 
demonstrators and tainting peaceful coexistence between Italians and Slovenes. Their arguments 
emphasized that, while the right to the use of the Slovene language was established by the 
Constitution and the London Memorandum, it had been portrayed by the nationalist press as 
unacceptable and used as a pretext for violence. For their part, neo-fascist representatives criticized 
the local government for its inability to properly defend the city’s interests. Mayor Franzil, 
condemning the local incidents as an expression of a tiny and unrepresentative segment of the 
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Triestine population, responded to the accusations of both right and left-wing parties by 
highlighting the Christian Democrats' commitment to the defense of Trieste’s "Italianità" by means 
of the London Memorandum and its principle of reciprocity.
287
 
Franzil’s response well expressed the views and orientations of the Christian Democrats 
who were aware of the damage that the incidents would do to Italy’s reputation internationally and 
feared that relations with the Adriatic neighbor would be compromised.
288
 To restore local order 
Governor Palamara imposed a ban on any public manifestation for thirty days.
289
 This provision 
was strongly criticized by the neo-fascist movement which accused the government in Rome of 
subservience to Tito’s regime.290 Palamara, however, on behalf of Prime Minister Fanfani, assured 
the President of the Istrian Union that bilinguism in judicial and administrative offices would not be 
implemented in the city.
291
 While the Italian government agreed to discuss the use of bilingual signs 
in Trieste, it also claimed that the protection of Slovene linguistic rights was satisfactory and rather 
stressed the unequal treatment of the Italian minority in the ex-zone B.
292
    
Following the Triestine events, in an article entitled "Erosione alla Frontiera" (Erosion along 
the Italian Frontier), the Roman-based Il Tempo, accused the government of having increasingly 
weakened the Italian identity of the border and strengthened Slav-communism.
293
 Christian 
Democratic figures like Bartoli also were critical of the government’s support for bilinguism; 
however, the former Triestine mayor understood that, in order to foster public support for the Istrian 
cause, local neo-irredentists had to use more moderate political tones.
 294
 In March, while 
celebrating the opening of the “Casa Istriana” (Istrian House) in Trieste, Bartoli praised the Istrian 
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community for its patriotic irredentism, Christian values, and lack of petty nationalism.
295
 Bartoli 
argued that the Italian Istrian community did not harbor resentment or desire for revenge toward the 
Yugoslav neighbor. At the same time, however, the community continued to envision the territorial 
connection between Trieste and Istria.  
Although his statement confirmed the longevity of irredentist dreams among the émigré 
community, Bartoli argued that the protection of the minority rights of the Italians of the ex-zone B 
should be the priority of the Italian government, an invaluable step to defuse feelings of local 
resentment. In line with these views, the Italian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Alberto Berio, warmly 
encouraged the government to support Italian cultural circles in the ex-zone B in order to preserve 
“Italian language and traditions."296  
In the meantime, events such as the bombing of the local Slovene newspaper and the anti-
Slav demonstrations within the context on the hundredth anniversary of national unification further 
strained the relations between Italians and Slovenes inside Trieste.
297
 A second explosion at a 
Communist club in Trieste confirmed the government’s fears for an uncontrolled escalation of local 
political violence.
298
 In response to these events, the local Communist Party promptly advocated the 
end of ethnic discrimination toward the local Slovene minority and presented itself as the epitome 
of Italian and Slav brotherhood across the border.
299
 It accused the government of connivance with 
the National League and criticized its inability to contain both resurgent neo-fascism and violent 
attacks against Slovene institutions.
300
 In addition, it depicted the National League as the leading 
expression of the local clerical and fascist forces whose goal was to use fear of Slav penetration to 
                                                 
295
AST, Fondo Bartoli, Busta 47, Rapporti con il mondo politico, "Vigilare le Porte d’Italia," March 6, 1961.  
296
UZC, Sezione II, Trieste,  Busta 44, Folder Estensione della legislazione jugoslava alla ex zona B ed al distretto di 
Capodistria, "Confidential Telegram Berio to Consolate Capodistira and MAE,"April 25, 1961. 
297
The bomb was found in the courtyard of the Slovene newspaper "Primorsky Dnevnik." The responsibility for such a 
threat, however, remained unclear. AST, Fondo CGGTT, Pacco 285, Fasc. 13/6, Ordigno esplosivo, "Mazza to PCM," 
April 25, 1961. 
298“Bomba all’entrata di un circolo comunista,” Il Piccolo (August 12, 1961). 
299
The local P.C.I.. UZC, Sezione II, Trieste, Busta 83, Vol.II, Folder Partito Comunista Italiano, "CGGTT to PCM, 
Confidential Flyer P.C.I.," January 26, 1961. 
300AFG, Fondo Apc, RP, MF0479, p.3047, “Letter from Paolo Sema,” March 17, 1961. 
183 
 
oppose bilinguism.
301
 Such criticism of the government was also echoed within the pages of the 
Slovene newspaper Il Delo which reported that police acquiescence and widespread popular 
intolerance toward the Slovene minority were examples of the strength of fascism and weakness of 
the working class in Trieste.
302
  
Although certain members of the National League were affiliated with the local neo-fascist 
movement, the appointment of President Giusto Muratti as its president in 1961 and the growing 
presence of representatives with centrist political orientations inside its executive council confirmed 
the strength of moderate views within the organization. Indeed, the dominant political orientations 
of the National League remained predominantly conservative rather than fascist. In his 
correspondence with Bishop Santin, Muratti stressed that, contrary to recent accusations, the 
association was not nationalist and that it opposed bilinguism on the basis of its potentially 
detrimental effects to the peaceful coexistence between the Italian and Slovene parts of the Triestine 
community.
303
  
In particular, the National League argued that, due to the knowledge of Italian of the fifty 
thousand Slovenes living inside the national borders, the introduction of Slovene language in 
judicial proceedings appeared unnecessary and offended the last vestige of Trieste’s "Italianità." 
The presence of translators and the teaching of Slovene language in Trieste guaranteed minority 
rights that in Yugoslavia had yet to be realized for the Italian minority.
304
 More important for the 
argument conveyed in this chapter, the problem of bilinguism showed that any legislative act which 
was locally perceived as a threat to Trieste's linguistic and cultural Italian identity could provoke a 
massive wave of anti-governmental sentiments with significant political costs for both local and 
national governing elites.  
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While coping with the complex issue of bilinguism, the Italian government was also 
confronted by the nationalist rhetoric of political movements and associations that widely celebrated 
the hundredth anniversary of Italian unification.
305
 The central government, eager to defuse neo-
fascist propaganda in the city, supported the Committee for the Study of "Risorgimento" that 
promoted a set of round-tables, talks, and books which stressed the Italian identity of Trieste.
306
 At 
the same time, properties that were used by Slovene cultural associations in the Triestine periphery 
were transferred to the Italian youth association.
307
 These decisions, as well as the placing of new 
restrictions on Slovene cultural manifestations along with cut to governmental contributions to the 
Slovene Cultural and Economic League, met the approval of the Italian community and especially 
its local émigrés; however, they were used by both local Slovene and communist organizations to 
accuse the Italian authorities of political and social discrimination, an issue that aroused diplomatic 
tension between Italy and Yugoslavia.
308
 In an attempt to reduce political tension with the Yugoslav 
neighbor, Palamara decided to exclude the National League from the Committee for the 
Anniversary of Italian Unification.
309
 A few months after, the local Governor also notified the 
association that, due to financial difficulties, the central government was forced to reduce its 
financial support for local patriotic initiatives, such as the pilgrimage to "Redipuglia."
310
 
In commenting on these decisions, Bartoli argued that the government was disregarding the 
patriotic role of the National League. Moreover, during the official celebration of Italy's hundredth 
anniversary of national unification, the central government downplayed symbols of Italian 
patriotism such as Fiume and Dalmatia, and therefore, minimized the contribution of these cities to 
national "Risorgimento."
311
 The former mayor of Trieste edited a pamphlet which recalled the 
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heroism of about seventy gold-medal holders from the region, dismissed the equation of nationalism 
with patriotism, and broadly celebrated Trieste’s role as center of Adriatic irredentism.312 Bartoli 
ultimately urged the national community to neither forget nor renounce its legitimate interests, in 
particular Italian formal sovereignty over the Istrian region.
313
  
  During the centennial celebrations in Trieste, nationalist propaganda emphasized that 
concessions to the Slovene minority disregarded the continuous violence and discrimination toward 
the Italian community of the ex-zone B.
314
 Its anti-Yugoslav and especially anti-Tito slogans caught 
the attention of both local Slovene associations and Yugoslav observers who vehemently protested 
to the Italian government.
315
 At the same time, local communist leader and parliamentary 
representative Vittorio Vidali protested to the central government over the alleged fascist and 
irredentist tones of the centennial celebrations in Trieste. During a Parliamentary session Vidali 
complained that, during the local official celebration, Triestines were chanting "Dux, Dux!" The 
government, however, responded to Vidali that the protesters were yelling "Fiume, Fiume!" The 
government argued that, as these words simply reflected the endurance of local feelings of 
brotherhood toward the émigrés, it had approved the police’s decision not to intervene and therefore 
prevent possible skirmishes with the local population.
316
 Following this parliamentary debate and, 
perhaps in response to local criticisms, President of Council Fanfani delivered a significant speech 
in Trieste in June 1961 in which he emphasized the entire nation’s eternal debt to the city and the 
commitment of the Italian state to its socio-economic progress.
317
  
 In particular, state financial support to a variety of local patriotic associations demonstrated 
that local and central authorities were politically invested in the preservation of Trieste’s Italian 
identity; at the same time, however, they feared the detrimental effect of irredentist demonstrations 
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on Italian-Yugoslav diplomatic relations.
. 
For this reason, Governor Palamara refused to authorize 
the national convention of the Istrian Union in Trieste.
318
 The newly-established Committee of 
National Defense, which consisted of Catholics and patriots interpreted this decision as a clear sign 
of the widespread defeatism of the Italian government and mobilized to publicly reiterate the image 
of the ex-zone B as the territorial extension of "the geographical and ethnic national borders."
319
   
Although these views further confirmed the endurance of past irredentist views among the 
most nationalist segments of the émigré community, most of the Triestine population had over time 
resigned themselves to the territorial loss of the ex-zone B and focused instead on the preservation 
of the Italian cultural identity of the city. Meanwhile, nationalist associations which had 
traditionally sought to re-incorporate the former Istrian territory inside national borders gradually 
endowed their propaganda with a more populist tone and highlighted the themes of a degenerated 
and corrupted democracy that was unable to respond to the real needs of the city.
320
   
After the tension produced by the issue of bilinguism and the centennial celebrations in 
Trieste, the summer meeting between the Italian and Yugoslav presidents eased diplomatic 
relations, yet the result of the local census in Trieste newly upset the Adriatic friendship.
321
 
Yugoslav authorities, receiving the complaints of the local Slovene associations, requested that the 
Italian government change the official survey as it misrepresented the real size of the Slovene 
community and, therefore, violated the spirit of the London Memorandum.
322
 Rome, however, 
rejected Yugoslav accusations and in turn criticized Belgrade for the anti-Italian tone of the local 
demonstrations in Capodistria.
323
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In particular the Italian government, eager to respond to the local population’s wishes to 
reassert Trieste’s Italian identity, welcomed Palamara’s proposal to raise the Italian flag in Trieste’s 
main square.
324
 Such symbolic acts were widely advertised in the local press and attended by 
patriotic youth associations.
325
 These ceremonies, while opposing anti-Italian propaganda across the 
border, also reinforced ethnic and ideological stereotypes that continued to perceive Yugoslav 
communism and the Slovene community as the main threat to Trieste’s “Italianità.” This partially 
explains the reason why Vidali’s visit to Slovenia aroused local criticism among the anti-communist 
segments of the Triestine population.
326
 The rapprochement between the local and Yugoslav 
communist parties, however, was intended to show communist support for regional autonomy, 
improve opportunities for political proselytism, and establish a political foothold in the émigré 
community.
327
  
Nevertheless, Vidali’s visit also provoked the criticism of the President of the national 
partisan association who depicted Tito’s regime as fascist rather than socialist.328 Similarly, center-
left wing movements criticized Vidali for his inconsistency toward Tito’s regime, which was now 
suddenly depicted as the house of true socialism.
329
 As a consequence, the Italian and Slovene 
branches of the local communist party again clashed and some supporters of the movement shifted 
their political loyalty toward the local socialists.
 330
   
Following 1954, the growth of the Triestine socialist movement provided local and national 
Christian Democratic leaderships a unique opportunity to reshape their political strategy toward the 
border and promote a new image of the eastern frontier as a space of mutual political understanding 
and economic cooperation rather than a center of ethno-nationalist rivalries. While firmly opposing 
local Communism, the local Christian Democrats had gradually distanced themselves from their 
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pre-1954 nationalist rhetoric and could now vigorously embrace the experiment of the center-left.
331
 
Aware of the endurance of irredentist sentiments among the émigrés and fringes of the Triestine 
population, the Triestine DC also attempted to attack socio-political intolerance. For example, it 
created local youth circles that gathered all the representatives of Triestine associations regardless 
of political orientations and ethnicity.
332
  
Initiatives like these were only partially successful in countering local extremist propaganda. 
On the anniversary of the 1948 Tripartite Declaration, groups of students mourned the memory of 
the November deaths and shouted anti-Tito slogans. Even though some of them were prosecuted as 
apologists of fascism and arrested for offensive statements against the head of a foreign state, the 
charges were dropped.
333
 Right-wing extremists especially targeted Slovene personalities and 
carried out a bombing of Trieste’s communist headquarter in the San Giacomo neighborhood.334 In 
addition, they set off two explosions at the Yugoslav embassy and the Yugoslav Consulate in 
Rome, respectively in 1962 and 1964.
335
  
In April 1962, after the bombing of the residence of local anti-fascist Carl Schiffrer, the 
local state authorities were publicly accused by the political opposition for funding terrorist groups 
under the cloak of cultural associations. Newly appointed local Governor Libero Mazza responded 
to these accusations by claiming that even though funds were provided to associations with cultural, 
philanthropic, and recreational goals, "no money was provided to political groups or associations 
with political goals."
336
 In addition, the culprit for the attack on Carl Schiffrer’s house was arrested 
as well as 92 others who had been convicted for acts of political violence during the early 1960s. In 
reporting these arrests to the central authorities, Mazza went so far as to deny the existence of a 
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right extremist and terrorist network in Trieste.
337
 As discussed above, however, nationalist 
associations as well as local feelings of enmity and suspicion toward the Slovene community did 
not disappear from Trieste. 
Political distrust toward Slovene political groups remained significant also among the 
Triestine governing elites. In anticipating the municipal elections of November 1962, for example, 
the local electoral committee prohibited representatives of the Slovene minority from using a single 
party name in Slovene.
338
 In so doing, the local governing elites hoped to both weaken the Slovene 
movement and dismiss any accusation of acquiescence towards the local Slovenes. Despite this, the 
elections resulted in the weakening of support for Christian Democrats, communists, and neo-
fascists, as well as the increase in popular support for the socialist and liberal parties.   
The electoral results pointed to the strengthening of both progressive and moderately 
conservative political views among Triestine Italians who, while moving away from extremist 
movements, also looked for alternatives to the Christian Democrats. The elections also revealed that 
the Triestine society and especially its youth had experienced a gradual process of democratization 
which weakened the neo-fascist movement and its propaganda against the Slovene segments of the 
Triestine population and their cultural institutions.
339
 At the same time, the presence of two 
independence movements not only proved the unexpected endurance of popular political ambitions 
for home rule, but also emphasized the failure of the new administration to win the support of a 
segment of the local community that continued to harbor dreams of a separate political status for 
Trieste and its territory.
340
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The Return of the Italian State: Success or Failure?   
In Trieste, the government’s inability to restore its port economy weakened its relationship 
with the city as local sentiments of “Italianità” increasingly related to the political and economic 
performance of the new Italian administration rather than its pre-1954 efforts to maintain Italian 
sovereignty of the city and its territory. Between 1954 and 1962, Yugoslav violations of the London 
Memorandum as well as the city’s seemingly unstoppable slide toward impoverishment adversely 
affected the image of the new Italian administration. In such a context, the new course of the state's 
policy for the border and the progressive views of its Christian Democratic leadership increasingly 
detached from its former nationalist rhetoric and met widespread concern among key elements of 
the local population.  
  Local political changes and economic insecurity, the detention of Italian citizens in 
Yugoslavia, the forced emigration of Italians from the ex-zone B, and the prolonged presence of the 
émigrés in local camps vividly highlighted the negative aftermath of the London agreements. The 
widespread discontent among the incoming Istrians and the local Triestines was promptly exploited 
both by the political opposition and the Italian associational network to criticize the Italian state’s 
diplomatic weakness and inability to protect the Italian minority in the ex-zone B. It was also used 
by local political extremists to foment ethnic and ideological antagonism toward local communists 
and Slovenes. The central government, caught between the criticism of both patriotic and émigré 
associations as well as the need to further advance the new Adriatic friendship, sought to avoid a 
final resolution of territorial issues while improving economic relations with Tito’s regime. 
Notwithstanding a new conciliatory foreign policy of co-existence with Tito’s Yugoslavia, 
the Italian government enhanced patriotic celebrations and rhetorically reasserted formal territorial 
claims over the ex-zone B, finding invaluable support in the Catholic Church. More importantly, 
Rome continued to promote Trieste’s Italian cultural and linguistic identity by means of the Office 
of Border Zones (UZC) as well as support for politically moderate patriotic and émigré 
associations. Among them, the National League and figures like former Mayor Bartoli played a 
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pivotal role in promoting the Italian identity of the Triestine territory by projecting an ideal 
territorial and especially cultural continuity between Trieste and its Istrian region.  
The intransigent views of the local neo-irredentist network, its irrepressible defense of 
Italian sovereignty of the ex-zone B, and its opposition to any provision that excluded the principle 
of reciprocity outlined in the London Memorandum, inflamed local tensions and strained relations 
between Rome and Trieste. Still experiencing the process of democratization and excluded from the 
Italian economic miracle, people in Trieste perceived Yugoslav discrimination toward the Italians 
of the ex-zone B and the Italian concessions to Trieste’s Slovene minority as frightening threats to 
the city's “Italianità.” These fears and anxieties, best exemplified by the harshness of the political 
debate that surrounded the issue of bilinguism and the centennial celebration of national unification, 
ultimately produced episodes of ethno-political violence in Trieste. These events, while confirming 
the endurance of former nationalist views inside the Triestine community, also revealed widespread 
popular opposition to the opening of the Christian Democrats to the Socialist Party in both national 
and local politics.
341
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Chapter 4 
Trieste’s Red Years: the Last Breath of Adriatic Irredentism 
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the government’s failed attempts to restore Trieste’s 
port economy and protect the Italian minority in the ex-zone B decisively weakened the effects of 
its patriotic rhetoric in the Julian city. At the same time, it also enhanced a sense of local 
disillusionment toward the new Italian administration and facilitated the sporadic resurgence of 
ethno-political violence against the Slovene minority. Thus, the empty rhetoric of “Italianità” and 
the economic decline of the city aroused local animosity toward the Christian Democrats. In 1963, 
the shift of the Christian Democratic Party to the left in national politics and the establishment of 
the Friuli Venezia Giulia autonomous region were therefore received with increasing apprehension 
in Trieste, especially among émigré and patriotic associations. 
This chapter investigates the effects of the government’s new center-left political 
configuration, its economic plan for the local port, and its foreign policy of “active co-existence” 
with Tito’s regime on Italy’s former politics of identity toward the border as well as Trieste’s 
response to it between 1963 and 1968. It argues that the progressive views of the Christian 
Democrats both in domestic and foreign policy ultimately swept away any residual irredentist 
ambition of the governing elites toward the ex-zone B. In Trieste, however, fringes of the local 
Christian Democrats as well as segments of the Triestine community, perceived the new political 
and economic strategy of the Christian Democratic Party as an impending threat to the Italian 
identity of the city and, reading the socio-political reality of the border through the lenses of the 
Cold War, firmly opposed it.  
In the mid-1960s, both the Hrescak case and the decisions of the “Comitato Interministeriale 
Programmazione Economica” (Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning, hereafter, CIPE) 
magnified the complexity of local readings of Trieste’s “Italianità.” Both issues sparked forms of 
popular opposition which exposed the growing tension between the central government in Rome 
and key segments of the Italian population in Trieste. While the local political debate as well as the 
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Hrescak protests demonstrated the survival of nationalist views, the CIPE plan was met with the 
widespread opposition of not only the port workers but indeed the entire city toward the central 
government. Above all, the controversy surrounding CIPE exposed the strength of ambitions for 
political autonomy inside Trieste. The central government, however, partially ignored the long-
standing political implications of local dissent over economic issues as it firmly pursued a definitive 
settlement of the border dispute.  
 
A Costly Turn: the Experiment of the Center-Left in Trieste 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1960 fall of Christian Democratic Fernando 
Tambroni's center-right government marked the end of political centrism, a former political 
configuration that, beginning in the immediate post-war years, had relied on the alliance between 
the Christian Democrats and lay parties of moderate views. From the early 1960s, therefore, the 
Christian Democrats aimed to include leftist forces within the government, a complex political 
process that was delayed by the internal division of the Christian Democratic Party.
1
 In 1963 this 
process culminated in the creation of a center-left coalition government which politically relied 
upon the support of Christian Democrats, Republicans, Social Democrats, and Socialists.
2
 The 
gradual opening to the left was also transposed to foreign policy and shaped the new strategy of the 
Christian Democratic leader and Foreign Minister Aldo Moro, an Italian form of what the West 
Germans later called “Ostpolitik.”3  
As a consequence, the Italian government, while firmly supporting political relaxation 
between the Western and Eastern blocs, showed a more friendly and conciliatory attitude towards 
Tito’s regime.4 In 1963, during Prime Minister Fanfani’s visit to Yugoslavia, the Italian political 
adviser Gianfranco Pompei met with Yugoslav Ambassador Vejvoda and agreed to advance the 
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border negotiations in an informal and discreet discussion. While supporting talks over the north-
eastern border between Italy and Yugoslavia, the Italian diplomat clearly understood that the 
Yugoslav neighbor intended to “transform the demarcation line between the zone A and B into the 
state border.”5   
Although the formal recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty over the northern part of the 
Istrian region could have effectively enhanced the international prestige of the Italian government 
and greatly benefited bilateral relations, Rome also understood the political implications that any 
definitive renunciation of the ex-zone B could have on its popularity. Especially in Trieste such a 
decision could provoke a significant loss in popular support for the Christian Democrats who were 
already being criticized for their opening to the non-communist parties of the left. This process, 
which had begun with the generational change of the Christian Democratic leadership in the mid-
1950s, culminated with the election of progressive and local Christian Democratic leaders such as 
Corrado Belci, supporter of Aldo Moro, and Giacomo Bologna, supporter of Amintore Fanfani, to 
the national Parliament in 1963.  
Between October 16 and 19, 1963, following the announcement of the formation and 
implementation of the new center-left coalition in Trieste, hundreds of  right-wing students and 
members of the neo-fascist movement arranged a set of demonstrations in front of both the local 
headquarters of the Christian Democrats and the city council.
6
 Due to their threatening tone, the 
local police disbanded the protesters and arrested some of the main agitators.
7
 In response to the 
arrests, patriotic and émigré associations joined the protest of the “Giunta Giovanile di Vigilanza 
Nazionale” (National Defense Youth League).  
This group, the leading voice of the local right-wing student movement, published and 
distributed a pamphlet that claimed that “Christian Democrats and Social Democrats forgot the 
interests of the nation in order to gain a few thousand votes of the local Slovenes.” The pamphlet 
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declared that, in forgiving the drama of the “foibe” and the forced emigration of 300,000 Italians 
from Yugoslavia, this policy had one single name: "betrayal!”8 The harsh tone and bitter accusation 
of the local protesters clearly revealed the widespread hostility of the right-wing part of the 
Triestine population which portrayed the political shift to the center-left as a deadly threat to the 
city’s Italian identity.9 Above all, the neo-fascist movement, under the guise of national patriotism, 
used its propaganda to target the Triestine youth which, differently from the other Italian cities and 
until the late 1960s, promptly responded to the nationalist rhetoric with mass mobilization.
10
  
The national elections of 1963, however, witnessed the success of the Christian Democratic 
coalition of the center-left inside Trieste as well as the slight loss of popular support for the neo-
Fascist Party (Italian Social Movement, M.S.I.).
11
 Due to a new electoral law, however, only one of 
the Socialist Democratic candidates was elected to the Senate. In addition, the Triestine Communist 
Party was successful in electing Vittorio Vidali to the Senate and the Slovene candidate Maria 
Bernetic to the Chamber of Deputies, further consolidating its role as the leading promoter of 
Italian-Slav brotherhood in Trieste.
12
  
Although the Christian Democrats remained the most popular party at national and local 
level, the choice of its Triestine candidate for the Senate was accompanied by a heated debate 
which revealed internal hostility toward the new political strategy of the center-left. Bartoli argued 
that, by selecting the ex-Consul in Capodistria as the party's candidate for the Senate, the Roman 
elites had behaved like fascists. This decision, also motivated by the leftist views of the ex-Consul, 
completely disregarded the strong conservative views of the Triestine community. While 
indignantly addressing Moro and Fanfani as "criminals," the most conservative fringes of the local 
Christian Democrats firmly supported Bartoli’s grievances against the party’s policies.13 As 
                                                 
8
UZC, Sezione IV, Busta 7, Vol.I, Folder elezioni provinciali e amminstrative,"Flyer Giunta Giovanile di Vigilanza 
Nazionale," October 19, 1963. 
9
"Il nostro patriottismo la nostra fede nazionale," Trieste (September-October, 1963). 
10
Vezzà and Comelli, Trieste a destra, 116. 
11
UZC, Sezione IV, Busta 11, Folder elezioni politiche, 1963. 
12AFG, Fondo Apc, RP, MF0490, p.3198, “Senate Candidate for Trieste,” February 16, 1963.  
13
AST, Fondo Bartoli, Busta 57, Carteggio, "Letter from DC Members of Committee of Foreign Affairs Bettioli to 
Bartoli," January 12, 1963.   
196 
 
demonstrated by this case, the party’s turn to the left was neither a smooth nor a linear process and 
was also accompanied by an internal diatribe between the progressive and conservative fringes of 
the Christian Democrats.
 
 
Meanwhile, the political debate that accompanied the creation of the Friuli Venetian Julian 
autonomous region further inflamed the anti-governmental propaganda of the political opposition. 
Supporters of the new autonomous region claimed that this new political entity would complete 
Trieste’s reintegration within the national community.14 In a similar fashion, left-wing parties 
depicted the autonomous region as the ideal means to overcome past local rivalries and restore 
Trieste’s economy.15 Right-wing parties, patriotic as well as émigré associations, in stark contrast, 
portrayed the autonomous region both as a threat to the Italian identity of Trieste and national 
political unity.  
In a speech in Trieste, the monarchist representative Alfredo Covelli described the 
autonomous region as the outcome of the post-war clerical-communist Republic. Its creation, he 
argued, exposed Trieste to the threat of pan-Slavism through the “Trojan horse of political and 
modern Titoist communism.”16 This nationalist rhetoric aimed to brand the victory of the center-left 
coalition as the preamble to the definitive renunciation of what Covelli called the "holy rights" over 
the ex-zone B. Such arguments were not uncommon among post-war nationalists whose rhetoric 
connected the rise of the political left to the demise of national security, especially in Trieste. 
These views belonged to a political minority that read the border’s condition through the 
lenses of past Adriatic irredentism and were alarmed by the increasing statewide apathy over the 
issue of the ex-zone B. Although gradually minimized within national public opinion, this issue 
remained important within local public discourse. Any sign of acquiescence toward Yugoslav 
territorial claims, indeed, was often negatively judged and widely publicized inside the pages of the 
local press. In August 1963, for example, Yugoslav Consul Rudi Janhuba wrote a letter to Chino 
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Alessi, director of Trieste’s newspaper Il Piccolo in which he harshly criticized its publication of 
offensive images against President Tito during his Brioni’s meeting with Italian Senate’s President 
Cesare Merzagora. Freedom of the press, Janhuba argued, “should not equate to freedom of 
insulting other heads of state.”17 
This episode provoked Yugoslav diplomatic protests and created political tension between 
Italy and Yugoslavia. Merzagora, acknowledging Yugoslav protests, recognized that the issue of the 
ex-zone B was still incredibly sensitive and was intimately related to the memories of both world 
wars. The political costs of its renunciation, therefore, were too high, regardless of Tito’s desire to 
“clear up the issue.”18 In his letter to local Christian Democratic secretary Guido Botteri, Bartoli 
also reported local widespread hostility against the accommodating views of the central government 
toward the local Slovene minority and Yugoslav socialism. These views well mirrored the general 
feelings of the nationalist and conservative elements of the Triestine community which continued to 
perceive the opening to the left and defeatist attitudes toward the ex-zone B as a prelude to the 
advancement of the goals of Yugoslav communism within Trieste.
19
  
In confronting the political experiment of the center-left, "Costituente Adriatica" (Adriatic 
Constituent), the most nationalist fringe of the émigré associational network, attempted to attract 
national and international attention for the issue of the ex-zone B. After his famous speech in 
Berlin, the executive committee of the association sent President John F. Kennedy a telegram 
during his trip to Italy. In the letter, the committee rhetorically depicted the past struggle of 
Venetian and Roman civilization against the barbarian Slavs, pleading for “the extension of 
American firmness on Berlin to Istria and Dalmatia.”20  
In addition to reaching out the American President, on November 3, 1963, members of 
“Costituente Adriatica” (Adriatic Constituency) recreated the “Associazione Nazionale Italia 
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Irredenta” (National Italian Irredentist Association, ANII).21 This association, which later merged 
into the "Centro Studi Adriatici" (Center for Adriatic Studies) in 1964, presented itself as the heir of 
the 1877 “Associazione in Pro dell’Italia Irredenta” and aimed to unify the panoply of post-war 
nationalist associations that had emerged after 1945. In its statute, the association claimed to be 
apolitical and that its goal was to defend the moral and spiritual values of Italian and European 
civilization as well as the "Italianità" of the "unredeemed" lands. By means of local and national 
councils, it intended to create an informational network whose ultimate goal was the revision of the 
territorial borders that had been "arbitrarily changed by the Peace Treaty of 1947."
22
 In its 
propaganda the association repeatedly referred to a set of Risorgimental and Mazzinian values such 
as the idea of homeland and self-determination, ideals that still held significant meaning among 
large strata of national public opinion and best served its irredentist goals. 
The constitutive assembly of the National Italian Irredentist Association extended its 
invitation to important figures of moderate or extremist irredentist sentiments, in particular Bartoli 
and the ex-commander of the X-Mas Valerio Borghese. The former mayor of Trieste responded by 
espousing a single and cohesive irredentist action for the association to uphold the provisional 
rather than definitive status of Yugoslav administration of the ex-zone B. Detaching himself from 
extremist nationalist views, however, Bartoli claimed that the association should maintain its 
political autonomy yet adhere to the Constitutional political order and conform to the democratic 
spirit of the Julian and Dalmatian population. By contrast, Valerio Borghese called for the opening 
of the association to figures of the past fascist regime who had been affiliated with the national 
M.S.I. and carried out a public campaign for the re-appropriation of former Italian territories in the 
Adriatic region, and an unrepentant refusal to compromise with the national government.
23
 Even 
though both personalities opposed the experiment of the center-left and feared the penetration of 
Slav-Communism, Bartoli espoused the use of political dialogue and diplomatic negotiations to 
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safeguard Italian territorial rights of the ex-zone B, minority rights in Istria, and the Italian culture 
in the Adriatic region. Contrary to Borghese’s mindset, Bartoli refused to cooperate with figures of 
doubtful patriotic sentiments whose reputation, political adventurism, and extremist views 
discredited the émigré community.  
Bartoli’s moderate views were generally shared by the "Lega Nazionale" (National League) 
which represented the leading expression of the local neo-irredentist movement in Trieste. As 
examined in the previous chapter, this association uninterruptedly propagated the Italian identity of 
the city and its territory. After the DC’s opening to the left, its relations with both the local and 
national Christian Democratic leadership drastically changed. From the late 1950s, the conservative 
faction of the Triestine Christian Democrats had been gradually marginalized inside the party and 
its leadership was entrusted to more progressive Triestine figures who identified with the leadership 
of Aldo Moro, also known as “Morotei.” This faction represented the majority of the party in 
Trieste and, until 1965, its progressive policy was also supported by the minority of the party which 
identified with Fanfani, the “Fanfaniani.”24 Although both leaders initially promoted the center-left, 
Fanfani and his supporters would move to more conservative positions in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, ultimately opposing the Osimo Treaty and breaking the party’s unity in Trieste.  
In 1963, the new local Christian Democratic governing elite was expected to better respond 
to Trieste’s changing historical and political context and also facilitate its administrative 
reintegration inside the Italian state. The creation of the new autonomous region, especially, 
represented the hallmark of the new political strategy of the Italian government toward the eastern 
border. Local Christian Democrat secretary Botteri claimed that, differently from the years before 
1954, the defense of Trieste’s “Italianità” was not limited to the Triestine community; rather, it 
needed to address the priorities and necessities of the entire nation and any sign of self-defense 
coming from the local community would be interpreted a priori as distrust toward the new Italian 
state.   
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Above all, Botteri argued, the time to fight with Yugoslavia over was over and the most 
important thing was the new peaceful spirit of dialogue and cooperation between the city and its 
Adriatic neighbor. Trieste, he concluded, would “finally return to its traditional role of an open 
frontier city.”25 These views were greatly shared by the majority of the Italian Christian Democrats 
and their allies and demonstrated the increasing strength of support within governing circles for a 
moderate and progressive strategy toward the border. Well summarized in the expression of 
“Adriatic détente,” it provided an outstanding opportunity to put an end to the needless conflict over 
ex-zone B, minimize socio-political tensions inside Trieste, and strengthen both economic and 
political relations with Tito’s regime.    
At the same time, however, national Christian Democratic figures such as former President 
of Council Mario Scelba were critical of the party’s opening to the Social Democrats and Socialists. 
In response to a letter from Bartoli in which the former Trieste’s mayor condemned Italy's new 
friendly attitude toward Yugoslav socialism as foolishness, Scelba acknowledged his regrets for 
having failed to stop the party’s turn toward the left. While referring to the Triestine context, Scelba 
agreed with Bartoli that the nationalist rhetoric of Tito’s regime clashed with Italy’s territorial rights 
over the ex-zone B and fanned the local flames of Italian nationalism.
26
   
Indeed, the turn toward the left could have resulted in a possible “hemorrhage of votes 
toward the right,” especially among voters who were strongly affiliated with patriotic associations 
of clear anti-communist inspiration.
27
 In an attempt to minimize this risk, Christian Democrat 
politicians such as Aldo Moro asked Minister of Interior Paolo Taviani to maintain financial support 
to the patriotic network and especially its main association, “Alleanza Tricolore Italiana” (Italian 
Tricolor Alliance).
28
 This decision was motivated by the pivotal role that the association had 
traditionally played in swinging the vote of its members toward the Christian Democratic Party. 
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Similarly, Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani publicly called for the preservation of irredentist 
Nazario Sauro’s house in Capodistria, a symbolic act that aimed to both promote the Italian heritage 
of the ex-zone B and, more importantly, strengthen political support from the émigrés.
29
  
To summarize, the Christian Democratic opening to the left provoked a number of political 
responses that, especially in Trieste, fueled popular hostility toward the local and national 
governing elites. Not only political parties but also associations opposed the political move which 
was widely perceived as an advantage to the national and local communists. In particular, the  bitter 
legacy of years of ideological confrontation between movements that had advocated a pro-Italian, 
pro-Yugoslav, or independent solution to the Triestine problem intertwined with a prolonged socio-
economic crisis that ultimately boosted people's animosity against the central government and its 
center-left political strategy. The government, however, understood that people both in and outside 
Trieste were unprepared to move decisively away from past conservative political orientations and, 
therefore, it needed to proceed cautiously on the new political path.  
 
Resisting the Change: the Émigrés and the Center-left 
While pursuing the experiment of the center-left, the Christian Democratic-led Italian 
government also had to respond to the request of the émigré associations which feared the further 
marginalization of the Istrian problem within national public discourse. Being a frontier city, Trieste 
had been the main crossing point of Yugoslav immigration from Yugoslavia which would 
significantly decrease between 1963 and 1967.
30
 In 1963, the Italian government decided to extend 
the status of émigrés only to ethnic Italians who were living outside the ex-zone B and were able to 
prove their loyalty to the Italian state. This decision also required the incoming refugees of the ex-
zone B to prove they had opted for Italian citizenship after 1945 or possessed adequate knowledge 
of Italian language to be granted the status of émigrés.    
                                                 
29ACS, PCM, Busta 36, Fasc. L3,“Ufficio Consigliere Diplomatico,” 1963.   
30
UZC, Sezione II, Fondo Trieste, Busta 55, Vol. II, Folder prospetto statistico profughi, 1963-1967. 
202 
 
Patriotic, veteran, religious, and, above all, émigré associations along with members of the 
local Christian Democrats firmly protested against this new law.
31
 Not only did it overlook the 
problematic exercise of citizenship rights for Italian residents under Yugoslav administration after 
1945, but it also disregarded the fact that the lack of knowledge of the Italian language among many 
residents was a direct consequence of the post-war Yugoslav policy of de-Italianization. 
Recognizing the merits of such criticism, local Commissioner Libero Mazza, head of the 
Government Bureau for the Friuli Venetia Julian Region which had replaced the General Italian 
Government for the Free Territory of Trieste (CGGTT) as the new local state authority in 1963, 
proposed that the central government conduct individual investigations to better determine the 
ethnicity and national sentiments of the incoming émigrés.
32
  
Istrian philanthropic associations also called upon the central government to promptly 
extend Italian citizenship to the émigrés who had been forced to leave because of their Christian 
faith. A more inclusive measure, they argued, could have finally put an end to the social 
"ghettoization" of the incoming Istrians, accelerated their re-integration within the national 
community, and removed widespread prejudice within segments of local and national public 
opinion which had long labeled the émigrés as unrepentant fascists.
33
 The Istrian C.L.N., eager to 
disprove such prejudices and stereotypes, cooperated with the national government by providing 
detailed reports on each individual and family who requested Italian citizenship.  
To facilitate the recognition of the incoming Italian citizens and reduce the infiltration of 
anti-Italian sentiments, the government also decided to gather all of the incoming émigrés from the 
ex-zone B into a single camp in Cremona. Members of the Istrian C.L.N. who had worked as 
intermediaries between the Italian minority in Yugoslavia and the Italian government also wrote a 
set of letters to the members of the Italian government in which they supported the émigrés’ return 
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to Italy. In these letters, they stressed the bureaucratic impediments and widespread violence against 
the Italians in Yugoslavia who attempted to exercise the right to opt for Italian citizenship after 
1945. The C.L.N. members argued that, although the émigrés had been stripped of their properties 
and belongings, as best symbolized by the metaphor of the "focolare" or "household fireplace," the 
sentimental attachment to their native Istria remained unbroken as well as the faith in the 
righteousness of their cause.
34
  
In their correspondence to the central government, the Istrian associations complained that 
only 41% of the incoming refugees from the Yugoslav territory were granted the status of émigrés 
despite their efforts. In response, the central government decided to ease the immigration procedure 
for members of the former Italian community in Yugoslavia. At the same time, it also highly 
restricted the flow of non-Italian Yugoslav citizens who represented about 90% of the total 
immigrants in Italy from Eastern Europe between 1960 and 1966.
35
 Nonetheless, the presence of 
Italian and Yugoslav citizens across the provisional border remained a source of tension that further 
strained political relations between the Italian and Yugoslav governments. For example, between 
1965 and 1968, about fifty Yugoslav citizens illegally tried to enter Italian territory and were 
arrested. In addition, a few incidents between Italian and Yugoslav guards occurred across the 
demarcation line and Yugoslav authorities also arrested fifty Italian citizens on accusations of 
espionage. These episodes provoked the vibrant protest of the Italian government.
36
 At the same 
time, however, Belgrade accused the Italian government of providing shelter to a widespread anti-
Titoist network that in Italy, especially in Trieste, was led by the Cetnik movement and aimed to 
overthrown Tito’s regime.37  
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In a telegram from November 1963, however, the Yugoslav government clearly stated its 
intention “to transform the Italian minority of the ex-zone B into the human face of the reconciling 
dialogue between Adriatic border communities.”38 Despite the Yugoslav claims, mutual suspicion 
still firmly pervaded political relations between the Adriatic neighbors and good intentions often 
remained on paper. Indeed, even after 1963, the Italian delegates to the joint Italian-Yugoslav 
committee for minorities continued to raise the issue of Yugoslav discrimination toward both the 
Italian culture and the political rights of the Italian minority in the ex-zone B. In response, the 
Yugoslav representatives stressed that the Slovene community in Trieste was a victim of judicial 
and educational mistreatment, a situation that violated the terms of the London Memorandum.
39
  
To counter the Italian state's complaints over the mistreatment of the Italian residents of the 
ex-zone B, the Yugoslav government used Radio Capodistria and its program "Neighbor Regions 
and their People." Through this medium, Belgrade argued that by publishing the legal statute 
establishing the new autonomous region in 1963 only in the Italian language, the Italian government 
had not only ignored the requests of the local Slovene community but also violated the spirit of the 
London Memorandum.
40
 In addition, the radio station also reported any episode of ethno-political 
intolerance that proved the survival of irredentist and fascist views among the local Italian 
population. Acts of vandalism against Slovene monuments and local skirmishes between Slovenes 
and Italians were usually attributed to the initiatives of "fascist bad boys."
41
 
These criticisms from Belgrade were often echoed in the words of local Triestine political 
formations, especially the Communist Party and the pro-independence youth socialist 
associations.
42
 These associations attacked the de-nationalizing nature of the Italian administration’s 
policies and presented themselves as a bridge to young Slovenes across the demarcation line.
43
 
While supporting the grievances of local Slovenes, Italian Socialists and the Independence 
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Movement also enthusiastically embraced the experiment of the center-left. This new political 
alignment, which was also welcomed by Belgrade, represented an outstanding opportunity to 
significantly advance political and economic relations with Italy.
44
 In addition, the Commissioner of 
the Italian Government in Trieste, Libero Mazza, reassured Prime Minister Moro that the new 
course of both Italian domestic and foreign policy could effectively serve as an antidote against the 
recurrent episodes of socio-political discrimination towards the Slovene minority and a unique 
opportunity to consolidate the Adriatic friendship.
45
 Despite such confidence, both the émigrés and 
Triestines continued to perceive Tito’s regime in a negative light and looked with increasing 
suspicion to a political rapprochement with the Communist dictator.  
Thus, the official announcement of Moro’s visit to Yugoslavia inflamed local criticism of 
the Roman governing elites. Bishop Santin wrote Moro, stating that his initiative would pave the 
way for Tito’s future visit to Italy and offended the feelings of many Italians “who loved their 
homeland without being nationalists.”46 Santin argued that the indifference of the government to the 
continuous Yugoslav violations of religious freedom, violence against Italian fishermen in 
Yugoslav territorial waters, and the widespread discrimination against the Italian minority of the ex-
zone B greatly fed the hostility of the city toward Tito. In an attempt to reassure Santin, Moro 
responded that his visit to Yugoslavia aimed at the protection of the Italian minority by 
consolidating diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav regime.   
In 1964, however, the presence of signs denoting the Yugoslav state’s borders rather than 
the demarcation line between the ex-zones A and B of the Triestine territory produced vigorous 
protests among the émigrés. Above all, it required the Italian government to show firmness against 
what was locally perceived as symptomatic of Yugoslav territorial ambitions. Thus, the Italian 
government accused Belgrade of disregarding the provisional status of the demarcation line and 
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reasserted the claim of Italian sovereignty over the northern part of the Istrian region. This decision 
was motivated by the awareness that any renunciation of sovereignty over the ex-zone B “could 
inflame the Italian nationalist environment which was already opposed to any concession to the 
Slovene minority.”47 Although the sign dispute temporarily strained Italian and Yugoslav 
diplomatic relations, both governments still decided to discuss further economic and political 
cooperation during Moro’s visit.  
By clearly reaffirming its strict opposition to any change in the formal status of the ex-zone 
B, the Italian government won the sympathy of both émigrés and significant segments of the 
conservative national press. Newspapers such as Il Giornale d’Italia hoped that new bilateral 
agreements would improve the lives of the minute Italian minority still living in the ex-zone B and 
accelerate Trieste’s economic recovery. According to the newspaper, a prosperous Trieste, while 
becoming the new center of both Adriatic “Italianità” and Western ideals of liberty, could 
ultimately expose the dictatorial nature of Tito’s regime.48  
These arguments, while aligned with the leading views of both the governing elites and 
national public opinion, further confirmed the gradual weakening of irredentist rhetoric. Indeed, a 
wealthy Trieste, rather than the reincorporation of its former territory, would better serve the 
preservation of the Italian identity of the border and, at the same time, work as a barrier to Yugoslav 
Communism. Over time, the territorial reincorporation of the ex-zone B had indeed disappeared 
from the diplomatic agenda of the central government and, especially after 1963, any reference to 
this issue was increasingly perceived as a “needless element of contentiousness amid the Adriatic 
friendship.”49   
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Meanwhile, the émigré associations continued to criticize the “fanatic opening” of the 
Christian Democrats to the political left.
50
 Also a few Italian committees still operating in the ex-
zone B, while praising Moro for his past defense of Italian sovereignty over the Istrian region, 
expressed concern for the accommodating behavior of the Italian government toward Yugoslavia. 
Therefore, the association asked the national government to not renounce formally any sovereign 
rights to the ex-zone B.
51
 This emphasis on the preservation of the territorial status quo and the 
protection of the linguistic and cultural right of the Italian residents of the ex-zone B exposed a 
gradual sense of discouragement that, in recognizing the abandonment of the former irredentist goal 
of winning back the Istrian region, was gradually consuming the Adriatic associational network.  
Neo-fascist propaganda, for its part, unrepentantly used nationalist arguments to undermine 
the new Adriatic détente which favored “the expansionist ambitions of an uncivilized population.”52 
In this view, not only the dialogue with the Yugoslav neighbor, but especially the creation of the 
autonomous region was depicted as a political move that catered to communist and socialist 
expectations. Due to its acquiescence to the pressure of the leftist parties, the government was 
accused of passively accepting Yugoslav sovereignty over the Istrian region, the real cause of the 
city’s economic decline.53  
In confronting the policies of the center-left, the émigré associations repeatedly stressed the 
image of Trieste as the center of Adriatic “Italianità.” This image remained attractive to significant 
segments of the Triestine community. Above all, similar to the political propaganda of the 
immediate post-war years, the idea of Trieste as a symbol of national patriotism and independence 
from Austrian Imperial rule became a useful tool for both right and left-wing political parties. While 
celebrating the patriotic sacrifice of nationalist figures such as Guglielmo Oberdan and Nazario 
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Sauro as well as socialist figures such as Cesare Battisti, opposing political formations rhetorically 
portrayed the defense of Trieste's Italian identity as a problem of liberty and independence.
54
  
 In their campaign for the ex-zone B and against the new policy of the center-left, the 
émigrés were supported by the National Italian Irredentist Association (ANII) which advocated the 
creation of a single national front.
55
 Its proposal was received with enthusiasm by many patriotic 
and veteran associations which displayed their solidarity with the irredentist cause and proved 
willing to coordinate their actions.
56
 Despite this, the support of neo-fascist groups for the initiative 
of the ANII discouraged other organizations from joining the national front. These groups, 
identifying themselves with the adventurism of the Fiume expedition, exposed the negative effects 
of fascist views over the border.
57
 The ANII, repeatedly criticized by other émigré and patriotic 
formations for its unrepentent fascist views, responded to such accusations by claiming that 
members of the National Venetia Julia and Dalmatia Association were acquiescing to the directives 
of the Christian Democrats and ultimately weakening Italian formal claims over the ex-zone B.
58
   
Although internal disagreements had long characterized the Adriatic associational network 
and adversely affected its propaganda, both émigré and patriotic associations had traditionally 
agreed on the irrepressible defense of Italian formal claims to the ex-zone B. Indeed, in September 
1964, when Tito declared in Lissa that the zone B was Yugoslav territory, the National League and 
the émigré associations promptly requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs make an official 
statement in defense of Italian territorial sovereignty. Partially in response to these complaints, 
President Saragat denied any changes to the provisional status of the demarcation line.
59
  
Over time, the demarcation line’s judicial status had become an object of public 
misinformation and had been often treated as a part of the Yugoslav federation. For example, the 
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geographical maps within the Encyclopedia Universo neglected the existence of the ex-zone B yet 
depicted the ex-zone A as an area outside the Italian borders. The bilingual toponomy of the ex-
zone B was also partially ignored and the Istrian exodus barely mentioned. The National League, 
therefore, firmly protested and demanded the correction of these mistakes, reiterating the 
association’s campaign for defense of the status quo of the Adriatic border.60 It also invited national 
newspapers and magazines to undertake a campaign about both the Triestine problem and the 
perpetual Yugoslav threat to the Eastern border.
61
  
Right-wing journals promptly responded to the appeal of the local patriotic and émigré 
associations. On the tenth anniversary of the return of Italian administration to Trieste, the right-
wing press employed derogatory language toward the local Slovene minority and harshly criticized 
the new policies of the center-left coalition for both the local economic crisis and the demise of 
local patriotism which had ultimately made Trieste a "childless city."
62
 By contrast, the most 
progressive fringes of local public opinion celebrated the London Memorandum as an "act of 
political courage that violated the sentiments of the Italian population yet removed nationalist 
antagonism."
63
 This interpretation, however, only partially applied to the specificity of the Triestine 
context. During the local demonstrations of 1964, a group of about a hundred right-wing students 
marched against the separation of the city from its Istrian territory and were later disbanded by the 
local police.
64
   
 These local sporadic expressions of nationalism certainly discredited the émigré campaign 
in support of the ex-zone B and, within national public opinion, weakened political support for it. 
Above all, the émigré campaign strained diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Rome. The 
political debate that anticipated the first Istrian national meeting of November 3
 
and 4, 1964 in 
Trieste revealed the complexity of this issue. Foreign Minister Giuseppe Saragat, fearing Belgrade's 
                                                 
60
ALN, Segreteria Riservata, Folder 1964/II, "Muratti to Editor Universo," November 30, 1964.  
61
ALN, Segreteria Riservata, Folder 1964/II, "Muratti to Editor Epoca," September 8, 1964. 
62
Gianni Preda, "Requiem per Trieste," Il Borghese (July 23, 1964). 
63
Giorgio Cesare, "Dieci anni dopo il 26 Ottobre 1954," Trieste (September-October, 1964). 
64
UZC, Sezione IV, Busta 51, Folder manifestazione di studenti a Trieste, "Telegram from Mazza to MI," October 7, 
1964.  
210 
 
reaction, firmly opposed the government’s financial support for the Istrian National Convention.65 
Initially, both local authorities and the “Morotei” leadership of the Christian Democrats had also 
agreed to postpone the Istrian convention for political reasons. However, Commissioner Libero 
Mazza, who was concerned about a possible backlash in the upcoming elections, ultimately agreed 
to host the event and participated in it.
66
  
 Although the Istrian CLN, which was increasingly aligning itself to the government’s views 
toward Tito and openly disputing the political views of the other émigré associations, refused to 
attend the event, the convention had a strong symbolic impact on the émigré community.
67
 In his 
speech, Bartoli invited his "Istrian brothers" to bury their feelings of resentment and desire for 
vengeance for the unfortunate fate of their region and, instead, communicate their hopes for a 
peaceful revision of the unjust peace treaty to the central government without being tempted by 
political extremism.
68
 These arguments were also echoed by a variety of ex-combatant 
associations.
69
 Those that showed strong democratic leanings could count on the active support of 
leading Christian Democratic figures such as Giulio Andreotti and represented about 495,000 
soldiers.
70
 These associations, while espousing Italian sovereignty over the territories of Istria and 
Dalmatia, also showed an ambivalent attitude toward the experiment of the center-left. 
On the other hand, Socialists and Social Democrats supported this new political 
configuration and its correlated policy of peaceful coexistence with the Yugoslav neighbor.
71
 In 
order to maintain good bilateral relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia, the government sought to 
minimize the visibility of the most overtly neo-irredentist associations during the November 4, 1964 
celebration of national independence from Austria-Hungary which coincided with the Istrian 
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convention in Trieste. Thus, the National Italian Irredentist Association (ANII) was prohibited to 
walk up the "Altare della Patria" (Altar of the Fatherland) and display its flag in Rome. Addressing 
this episode, the right-wing press accused the Christian Democrats of marginalizing not just the 
ANII but also the border issue within public discourse.
72
 In a letter to Christian Democratic leader 
Fanfani, Saragat exposed the government's views on this issue by stating that "popular expressions 
of irredentism had to be firmly discouraged.”73  
As the central authorities expected, the Triestine demonstration of November 4 was harshly 
criticized by Yugoslav observers who depicted Bartoli’s speech as a clear example of Italian 
irredentism.
74
 Fearing that similar demonstrations would impede the ongoing process of diplomatic 
normalization with the Yugoslav neighbor, the government would later refuse to authorize the 
second Istrian national convention of 1966.
75
 This decision, resolutely criticized by the émigré 
community in Trieste, further reinforced local beliefs that the center-left government had 
definitively abandoned the defense of Italian claims over the ex-zone B because it had become a 
sore spot in the new relationship with Tito’s regime.76  
 
1965: the “Great Divergence”  
As discussed in the previous sections, the new center-left coalition government and its 
policy toward Yugoslavia produced significant opposition to the Christian Democrats in Trieste, 
especially among members of the émigré community who feared Italian formal recognition of 
Yugoslav sovereignty of the ex-zone B. In order to advance political and economic relations with 
the Yugoslav neighbor, Prime Minister Aldo Moro understood that the Istrian problem effectively 
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required a final settlement. In 1965, Moro’s visit to Yugoslavia seemed an outstanding opportunity 
to remove this burden from the government’s agenda in foreign policy.  
In a confidential note to newly elected President Giuseppe Saragat, the Italian Ambassador 
to Belgrade, Roberto Ducci, confirmed that the Yugoslav government expected Italy to formally 
recognize Yugoslav sovereignty of the ex-zone B during Moro’s upcoming trip. While defining the 
Istrian problem as politically and militarily irrelevant, Ducci merely recognized its historic and 
political value and optimistically predicted the negotiations to conclude by June 1965. According to 
the Ambassador, the prospective agreement would require the abandoning of any Italian territorial 
claim to the Istrian region; therefore, he suggested to Saragat that the Italian government propose a 
"package deal" or global negotiation in which Italy would receive significant compensation for 
renouncing its formal sovereignty over the ex-zone B.
77
 
In his proposal, Ducci clearly stated that “Trieste’s economic suffocation was a direct 
consequence of the territorial losses caused by both the Paris Peace Treaty and the London 
Memorandum.” For these reasons he believed that, while waiting for the inevitable Italian 
recognition of Yugoslav formal sovereignty over the ex-zone B, diplomatic negotiations and 
economic agreements should proceed in order to improve Trieste’s economy. Ducci advised Saragat 
to include a new fishing agreement, clauses on property indemnities, and guarantees for minority 
rights within the “global package.” Above all, Ducci believed that the Italian government should 
persuade the Yugoslav leadership to extend the protection of minority rights for the local Italian 
community of Capodistria to cities such as Fiume and Pola.
78
  
Although Ducci’s proposal well mirrored the views of the majority of the Christian 
Democrats, a secret report from the Italian Military Intelligence Service discouraged the central 
government from making any definitive settlement over the border and stressed the fickle nature of 
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Triestine public opinion.
79
 Moro, reassured by a telegram from Ducci who confirmed that Belgrade 
understood the Italian government’s unwillingness to formally renounce sovereignty over the ex-
zone B at that political moment, suggested to Foreign Minister Fanfani that he remove all territorial 
issues from the agenda of the Belgrade meetings.
80
  
This exchange of letters explains the government's decision to not proceed with the 
definitive settlement of the border dispute in 1965. It also reveals that, by the mid-1960s, the 
political will of the central government did not correspond with the wishes of the majority of the 
Triestine population and the émigrés, who were still reluctant to formally surrender Italian formal 
rights on the Istrian region once and for all. Thus, after 1965, in order to facilitate the formal 
renunciation to claims over the ex-zone B and minimize its political costs, the central government 
provided significant financial support to the Triestine cultural circles that promoted social 
reconciliation between local Italians and Slovenes.
81
 At the same time, it also continued to finance 
patriotic associations that had traditionally provided support for the Christian Democrats.
82
 
Discussing the central government’s strategy, Sergio Coloni, vice-secretary of the Triestine 
Christian Democrats, argued that the gradual democratization of Triestine society would not only 
weaken local expressions of nationalism but also promised to politically isolate the Communist 
Party.
83
   
Although promising, this strategy would greatly depend on the central government's ability 
to preserve the cultural and linguistic Italian identity of Trieste while concurrently strengthening its 
local economy. Indeed, the restoration of Trieste’s past economic prosperity would ultimately 
strengthen local support for the Christian Democrats, the center-left coalition, and the process of 
Adriatic detente. In the 1965 economic context, however, the National League reported to officers 
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of the Italian foreign affair ministry that people in Trieste understood the new course of Italian 
foreign policy toward Yugoslavia as a threat not only to the city’s Italian identity but also to its 
local economy.
84
   
Local apprehension spiked in February 1965 when the French journal Combat published an 
article that claimed to expose the existence of secret negotiations between members of the Italian 
foreign ministry and the Yugoslav government for the definitive recognition of Yugoslav 
sovereignty over the ex-zone B. In response, the right-wing press, recalling the 1964 dispute over 
border signs, pointed to Rome’s diplomatic weakness and its ambiguous defense of the provisional 
status of the demarcation line.
85
 It also added that the ongoing marginalization of Istria and 
Dalmatia within public discourse catered to the wishes of a governing elite that was eager to silence 
the neo-irredentist network.
86
   
In opposition to the government, the neo-fascist M.S.I. demanded that Italian claims over 
the ex-zone B be upheld. Its representatives called upon the local Triestine council to support a 
popular plebiscite which would be held under the supervision of the UN and open to all who had 
resided in the area prior to June 1940. This proposal rested on traditional arguments of 
uninterrupted Italian territorial sovereignty over Istria and the fact that the London Memorandum 
had never been ratified by the national Parliament. As time passed and the exodus continued, MSI’s 
Ferfoglia argued, “the issue was becoming increasingly relevant and required government action to 
avoid the loss of a territory whose economic rather than sentimental value represented an 
indispensable tool to recover Trieste’s prosperity.”87  
The Christian Democrats, however, had abandoned the idea of a plebiscite already in 1954. 
They believed that such an idea was senseless, especially when considering the mass migration of 
the émigrés, and, therefore, thought it could be detrimental to the good standing of Italian-Yugoslav 
relations. Local Socialists such as Bruno Pincherle also condemned the neo-fascist proposal. In a 
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speech in 1965, Pincherle claimed that the Italian-Yugoslav border should be emptied of rivalry and 
antagonism and instead transformed into a point of “osmosis of different cultures and economies.” 
By metaphorically drawing this border with a pencil instead of a pen, the Socialist leader advocated 
the dissolution of the artificial frontier into a “space of brotherhood, equality, and freedom.”88 This 
argument in support of socio-political reconciliation across the border well reflected the views of 
the majority of Italy's political establishment which considered the ex-zone B as an integrant part of 
Yugoslavia; the issue, however, could still inflame the sentiments of the émigrés. Above all, Italians 
in Trieste continued to read the city's frontier identity through the lenses of the Cold War and 
responded to changes in local politics accordingly.  
 
The Hrescak Case 
In the mid 1960s, Pincherle’s hopes for an open border greatly depended on the successful 
transformation of people’s attitudes and views. The Christian Democrats’ decision to appoint Dusan 
Hrescak, a Slovenian Socialist with a Titoist past, as a local administrator, fueled local hostility.
89
 
This issue, which became known as the Hrescak case, was generally perceived by patriotic and 
émigrés associations as well as the most conservative fringes of the local Christian Democrats as 
the result of a politically premature move.
90
 Since1963, both the National League and the “Unione 
Istriani” (Istrian Union) had contended that  the appointment of Slovene representatives in 
prominent roles inside the local council would endanger the Italian identity of Trieste and 
overlooked the political responsibility of Slovene communist leaders in the process of de-
Italianization of the Istrian region.
91
 In claiming that representatives of Titoist and pro-
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independence political orientations threatened Trieste’s Italian cultural and linguistic heritage, these 
associations ultimately aimed to defy the experiment of the center-left.
92
  
Partially echoing these arguments, Republican newspapers such as Il Pensiero Mazziniano 
argued that the Christian Democrats’ choice of Hrescak “enraged Trieste’s national sentiments.”93 
In choosing a Slovene personality who had cooperated with Tito’s regime, Il Secolo argued, the 
Christian Democrats “offended the memory of the victims of Yugoslav wartime retribution.”94 By 
contrast, leftist parties welcomed the Christian Democrats’ decision as a first step in progressively 
distancing themselves from political formations that, while embracing conservative and nationalist 
orientations, exacerbated ethno-political and social animosity against the Slovene minority.
95
 In an 
interesting entry in the local magazine “Trieste,” Carl Schiffrer also stated that the Triestine 
population now had to detach itself from past irredentist interpretations of the city’s “Italianità.” 
Schiffrer argued that these views badly fit both the political and economic needs of the city as well 
as its gradual democratization.
96
     
The Hrescak case provoked local demonstrations with a pronounced irredentist tone.
97
 The 
political confrontation between Italians, Slovenes, and the local police resulted in skirmishes in 
which 73 people were arrested.
98
 The local neo-fascist movement decisively contributed to 
fomenting public disorder and further exposed its chauvinist nature.
99
 The Yugoslav authorities 
promptly condemned the incidents as well as the attitudes and behavior of significant segments of 
Italian national and local public opinion.
100
 In line with Yugoslavia's reproach, the local Communist 
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Party also criticized right-wing parties, patriotic associations, and the local Church, whose 
instrumental use of Hrescak's past had served neo-fascist propaganda.
101
  
Meanwhile, the National League with the support of the Istrian associative network 
collected 42,000 signatures to protest Hrescak’s appointment inside the local administration.102    
Although these numbers were lower than expected, they still proved the endurance of conservative 
views within the Triestine community. Above all, Hrescak’s appointment stimulated an internal 
debate within the National League whose executive committee discussed how to deal with those 
members who had supported the candidature of the Slovene representative inside the local council. 
Considering the fact that many relevant local political personalities were also members of the 
association, this discussion took on particular importance.  
As consequence, local Mayor Mario Franzil was accused of violating his duties as a member 
of the association and was therefore arbitrarily suspended.
103
 Bishop Santin, however, expressed his 
disapproval of any form of disciplinary punishment taken by the association towards its members. 
Santin argued that even though Franzil's support for Hrescak’s candidacy was wrong, he had 
complied with the directives of the national Christian Democratic Party. Moreover, Santin wrote to 
the President of the National League Giusto Muratti, stating that that forgiving Franzil was not 
simply a Christian duty but also as a political necessity in order to maintain the traditional bonds 
between the association and the Christian Democratic Party.
104
   
In his response to the criticism of the association, Franzil explained that his decision to 
support Hrescak’s appointment responded to the party’s policy. The mere political nature of the 
issue, Franzil argued, freed him from any responsibility toward the association. In discussing his 
case, the executive committee of the association predicted a possible disengagement from the 
Christian Democrats who would act in solidarity with Franzil; however, after long debates, 
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Franzil’s November resignation was accepted and his membership was withdrawn, regardless of his 
valuable commitment to the Italian cause of Trieste in the past.
105
 
The decision of the National League, which contradicted its self-proclaimed apolitical 
nature, indeed clashed with the local strategy of the Christian Democrats who aimed to win the 
support of the anti-Titoist Slovenes who were associated with the Socialist Party. The Hrescak case 
also created a significant breach between the party and the association which experienced 
increasing political ostracism from both local and national Christian Democrats.
106
 Above all, it 
proved the discrepancy between the Christian Democratic leadership and its center-left strategy and 
the uncompromising segments of the party's popular base.
107
   
The correspondence between Franzil and Muratti confirms that many Italians in Trieste 
generally opposed the inclusion of Slovene personalities inside the local administration, which they 
viewed as a threat to the Italian cultural and linguistic identity of the city.
108
 Aware of the endurance 
of these views, right-wing propaganda used the Hrescak case to claim that the deceptive behavior of 
both national and local governing elites had facilitated the economic, political, and cultural 
penetration of the Slovene minority over time, a factor that had ultimately weakened Trieste’s 
Italian identity.
109
  
In commenting on the Hrescak case, historian Elio Apih argued that popular hostility toward 
the Slovene representative was the outcome of the complex relationship between Trieste’s 
patriotism and its frontier identity. From the early twentieth century, the Italian state had 
successfully manipulated Italian patriotism to fulfill its expansionist ambitions. In this process, local 
hopes for a Danubian Federation made of independent nations were dashed amidst local nationalist 
and socialist understandings of the idea of the nation. Under Fascism, Apih argued, everything that 
was not Italian became anti-national. As a result, Risorgimental ideas of patriotism that were 
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centered upon the right of self-determination were drastically minimized until they had disappeared 
entirely after the war. Apih well understood that the dialectic of the Cold War was directly related 
to the surviving legacy of aggressive Adriatic irredentism and had boosted local antagonism toward 
the Slovene minority.
110
 Thus, after 1945, the government's efforts to safeguard the region's Italian 
heritage while simultaneously facilitating the peaceful coexistence of different cultures in a frontier 
city like Trieste were bound to contradict each other and generate frustration among the local Italian 
population.  
The conflicting views of associations and parties that had traditionally acted with a single 
voice in Triestine politics also revealed the complex and multifaceted features of the Hrescak case. 
Political groups like the Republican Party, for example, recognized the Christian Democrats 
valuable defense of Trieste’s Italian identity. This view, which contained a unique interpretation of 
the political reasons that drove the Christian Democrats’ strategy in Trieste, was also echoed by the 
Mazzinian Association. Such a perspective, however, clashed with those of the Italian National 
Irredentist Association. Indeed, its President, Ezio Garibaldi, wrote to Moro, asking the Prime 
Minister to exercise political pressure and remove the Slovene representative.
111
 Moreover, in a 
letter to the local Christian Democrat party Secretary Guido Botteri, the National League President 
Muratti addressed the social and political implications of the Hrescak case. Muratti argued that 
since the Christian Democrats' goal to isolate the communist party had instead broken the unity of 
Trieste’s Italian bloc, “the Lega had not won but you really lost.”112   
The socio-political turmoil of the Hrescak case effectively exposed the strength of political 
hostility toward the Slovene minority among segments of the local Italian population. It 
demonstrated that the defense of Trieste’s Italian identity not only remained politically significant 
to its residents, but it also furthered the preservation of conservative notions of “Italianità” which 
stemmed from the city's irredentist past. Thus, “a sense of sudden nationhood” resurfaced in Trieste 
                                                 
110
Elio Apih, "Patriottismo democratico e patriottismo nazionalista,"Trieste (May-June, 1965). 
111
AUS, Fondo Luigi Papo, Busta 5, fasc.46, "Letter from National Secretary Garibaldi to Moro," November, 1965.  
112
ALN, Folder 1965/II, Carteggio Nobile, “Muratti to Botteri,” December 10, 1965.  
220 
 
and produced high levels of socio-political polarization that exposed the complexity of the city's 
frontier identity.
113
   
 
After Hrescak: Making Progress with Tito    
After the weeks of tension that accompanied the Hrescak case, the Triestine branch of 
Italian public television broadcasted a series of lessons whose content, previously approved by the 
Ministry of Education, was delivered in Slovene. This initiative, which was intended to serve local 
schools and associations, was enthusiastically received by Slovene families, teachers, and Triestine 
authorities.
114
 Local Christian Democrats applauded the initiative and actively mobilized in support 
of granting Slovene children equal opportunity in schools and the use of cultural institutions. In 
addition, they also declared their opposition to any form of discrimination against the presence of 
members of the Slovene minority in prominent political positions. Christian Democrat Sergio 
Coloni claimed that this new set of social and political programs aimed to defy political opponents 
who were promoting a climate of "apartheid" in Trieste between Slovenes and the rest of the Italian 
community.
115
   
In stark contrast to the opposition from significant elements of the local political class to the 
proposed introduction of bilinguism in 1961, the political support of the majority of the Christian 
Democratic governing elite for Hrescak marked a further step in the local process of 
democratization. Also, important representatives of civil society grew increasingly suspicious of 
movements that used nostalgic, anti-democratic and populist methods of political mobilization 
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inside and outside of Trieste. This change in people’s attitudes eventually forced the neo-fascist 
party to also drastically change its strategy, at least for the time being.
116
    
Already in the early 1960s, Italian public opinion outside of Trieste increasingly perceived 
the orthodox defense of the city's Italian identity and Italian sovereignty of the ex-zone B as 
examples of nationalist nostalgia. Thus, Christian Democrats had reason to hope that Moro’s visit to 
Yugoslavia in late 1965 would lead to a definitive settlement of the border issue and would finally 
put a “nail in the coffin of the Istrian question.”117 Similarly, the Italian communist press celebrated 
Moro’s visit as the outcome of the Communist Party’s long-term policy of support for the peaceful 
coexistence of Italian democracy with Yugoslav socialism.
118
 These views mirrored those of the 
majority of Italians who, outside Trieste, had come to equate the city’s return to Italy in 1954 to the 
end of the dispute over the Adriatic border. On the other hand, the right-wing press used the 
November mass celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Trieste and Istria from 
Austria-Hungary during the First World War to claim that Moro, during his official visit to 
Belgrade, would secretly pursue the definitive renunciation of the ex-zone B “which had cost 
numerous lives and sacrifices.”119  
These arguments played well into the fears of the local neo-irredentist network, above all the 
National League. In writing to Moro, National League President Muratti reminded him of the Italian 
state's sovereign rights to the ex-zone B. Muratti argued that although the unfair terms of the Paris 
Peace Treaty had determined the loss of the Istrian region and its forced de-Italianization, the Italian 
government was ultimately responsible for the continued Yugoslav discrimination toward its Italian 
population as well as Yugoslav abuses against  “monuments, tombs, and schools which represented 
the last few symbols of the region’s Italianità.” Drawing an interesting  parallel to Berlin, a city that 
Moro had visited a few months earlier, Muratti added that the traditional unity of both cities had 
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been broken by the proximity of two irreconcilable regimes; however, while “East Berlin was 
perceived as a foe of the Western world, Tito was one of its best allies.” Muratti concluded that in 
light of such historical contradictions and considering the oppressive nature of Tito’s regime, the 
Italian government should reassert its sovereignty “on lands that are consumed with the blood of 
Italian martyrs.”120 The rhetorical tone and content of this letter exposed the association's strong 
sentimental attachment to the Istrian region and well summarized the views of the most 
conservative segments of the Triestine community. At the same time, it also proved that by 1965 the 
National League was aware of Tito’s international prestige and understood that the geo-political 
configuration of the eastern border could not be changed; therefore, the provisional status of the ex-
zone B would ultimately be lost or at best, simply preserved. 
Meanwhile, the most extremist fringe of the neo-irredentist movement, best represented by 
the National Italian Irredentist Association, continued to promote the assertion of Italian territorial 
rights on the lands lost in the Paris Peace Treaty. In attempting to rally support for Adriatic 
irredentism, the association organized demonstrations that were often led by dubious figures such as 
Bruno Coceani and Valerio Borghese.
121
 Its goal was to demonstrate the attractiveness of former 
irredentist ideals at the national level to the central government and, especially in Trieste, overcome 
the possible conflicts with the National League which was locally perceived as the main voice of 
Trieste’s "Italianità." After the Hrescack case, however, the National League had dissociated itself 
from associations whose members showed strong neo-fascist sentiments, including the National 
Italian Irredentist Association.
122
 Although the National League consciously decided to distance 
itself from movements or personalities that were part of the neo-fascist movement, it still continued 
to be considered by the political left as an extremist association in its own right.
123
  
The National League, however, gradually aligned itself to the views of the more progressive 
elements of the émigré associations, above all, the National Julian and Dalmatian Association 
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(ANVGD). This association, indeed, had long supported the improvement of Italian and Yugoslav 
diplomatic relations as the best means to protect the rights of the Italian minority across the border. 
The ANVGD claimed that the Italian government, by supporting cultural exchanges with the Istrian 
region, also supported Italians in the ex-zone B. Their mistreatment, the association argued, was a 
“problem of national interest whose resolution relied on the spirit of collaboration that pervaded the 
Adriatic region before the explosion of nineteenth century nationalisms.”124 At the same time, the 
ANVGD also criticized Moro for not treating the economic and the territorial dimensions of the 
border issue as a single problem, a factor that demonstrated his impaired understanding of the crisis 
of Trieste’s port-driven economy.125  
The Istrian Union by contrast, maintained an uncompromising attitude toward the issue of 
the border and called upon Moro to pursue the reintegration of the ex-zone B within Italy's national 
borders. The association went so far as to suggest an unlikely exchange of territories based on 
ethnicity. This proposal would not only give Merano to Austria, Istria to Italy, and Carinthia to 
Yugoslavia but it would also create independent cities in places such as Zara and Fiume.
126
 Moro, 
however, did not take into consideration any of the aforementioned proposals as they hardly fit with 
his understanding of the reality of international politics and Italian-Yugoslav bilateral relations. In 
his meeting with Tito, instead, Moro confirmed the Italian government’s willingness to resolve 
problems of common interest through all-embracing negotiations.
127
  
The Christian Democratic turn to the left in 1963 had certainly advanced Italian and 
Yugoslav diplomatic relations yet mutual suspicions still remained. The Italian government, for 
example, refused to reissue Italian travel permits to the Yugoslav citizens who had been suspected 
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of working as foreign agents.
128
 It also refused to extradite the leader of the Serbian community in 
Trieste whose anti-Titoist propaganda was harshly condemned by Belgrade.
129
 At the same time, 
the Yugoslav government still prosecuted and imprisoned Italian citizens for espionage on 
Yugoslav territory.
130
  
Such issues, which produced temporary diplomatic tensions, were often minimized in 
official talks. For the same reason, the Italian government purposefully avoided any reference to the 
heated issue of the “foibe.” Not only right-wing representatives but also Triestine Communist leader 
Vittorio Vidali proved very critical of Moro’s decision to exclude this issue from his agenda for the 
Belgrade’s meeting. Vidali called up the Christian Democrat leader to make an official statement 
condemning Yugoslav wartime violence and praising “Italians who had sacrificed their lives for the 
nation.”131 Similar arguments that pointed to the lingering hostility between the Triestine and 
Yugoslav Communist parties also revealed the profitability of the political utility of history and 
wartime memories, especially in the frontier city of Trieste.  
These issues, although provocative, only had a marginal impact on the ongoing process of 
gradual political reconciliation between Belgrade and Rome. Eager to achieve a significant success 
in foreign policy, Prime Minister Moro desired to accelerate diplomatic contacts throughout 1966. 
By contrast, Foreign Minister Fanfani suggested that Moro should have greater patience and 
promote a more gradual process of political normalization. It is noteworthy that, although Fanfani 
and Moro slightly disagreed on the pace of the Adriatic détente, both personalities agreed to exclude 
the problem of the territorial border from the planned talks with the President of Yugoslavia's 
Federal Assembly Edvard Kardelj in 1966.
132
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In summary, after the Hrescak case, the breach between the central government and the 
Triestine émigrés and patriotic associational network widened further. Local responses to Prime 
Minister Moro’s visit to Yugoslavia clearly revealed that key segments of the local community 
proved unprepared to abandon their conservative views and formally recognize Yugoslav 
sovereignty over the ex-zone B, despite rejecting nationalist extremism.
 133
 At the same time, 
however, diplomatic negotiations were gradually moving forward and, within the context of 
Adriatic détente, the Italian government was determined to resolve the border dispute. Christian 
Democrats understood that people in Trieste, mindful of Yugoslav war-time occupation and 
experiencing increasing impoverishment, firmly opposed any further political, economic, and 
territorial concession to Tito’s regime. Indeed, from a local perspective, the chronic economic crisis 
of Trieste and its port was a direct consequence of the Italian state’s incompetence and the loss of 
its Istrian region. For its part, the Italian government had already implemented a new economic 
plan, the intent of which was to revamp the Triestine port and its economy. Its unintended 
consequences, however, were a weakening of local loyalties to the Italian state and a reawakening 
of Trieste’s independent spirit.     
 
"Ora basta!" (Enough is Enough!): Trieste's Response to the CIPE Plan 
Since the early 1960s, Trieste's shipyard industry had fallen into a state of decay due to an 
irrational post-war reconstruction policy that had damaged its traditional competitiveness.
134
 Indeed, 
a comparative analysis of the port traffic showed that a steady revenue increase for the ports of 
Fiume and Hamburg, which were favorably supported by advantageous tariffs and infrastructure, 
had relegated Trieste’s traffic to the level of 1940.135 In line with the European Community's 
economic provisions for the modernization of national shipyard industries, the central government 
therefore decided to restructure the productive capacities of the Triestine industry, in particular the 
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“San Marco” shipyard. During the 1963 parliamentary debate on how to increase the 
competitiveness of the Italian shipyard industry, the central government claimed its intentions to 
upgrade San Marco’s facilities.136   
In 1965, the government publicly announced its plan for the San Marco facilities and, more 
generally, Trieste’s port economy. The plan prospected the end of ship production in San Marco 
and the conversion of its facilities into a repair dock with the guarantee of reallocating its workers 
in other regional facilities to avoid any problem of unemployment. The terms of the plan, however, 
were harshly criticized by the political opposition which claimed that the government strategy for 
Trieste would lead to the closure of the San Marco shipyard facilities. Trieste’s Commissioner 
Libero Mazza sent a note to Prime Minister Moro explaining that the complexity of the issue 
surpassed its pure economic dimension. The San Marco shipyard mattered not just for the workers 
but also for Trieste as a whole and its alleged prospective closure would only detrimentally affect 
local support for the central government. After years of Allied occupation and invaluable sacrifice 
in the defense of the border’s “Italianità,” Mazza argued, “Trieste would perceive Rome’s decisions 
as a clear sign of disinterest toward the city,” regardless of governmental claims that it needed to 
meet European expectations for the modernization of the Italian maritime sector.
137
 This note 
clearly stressed the inescapable interconnection between the economic and political aftermath of the 
CIPE plan on the Triestine community, which was eager to receive some proof of national solidarity 
after years of economic and social decay.  
At the time, growing resentment toward the central government for years of inaction and 
empty patriotic rhetoric was expressed in ordinary conversations and jokes. In asking each other 
what the government would do at San Marco when it stopped making ships, people answered “they 
will make a tubular pipe from which politicians will proclaim that Trieste is dear to every Italian 
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heart.”138 Despite its wealthy appearance, Trieste had indeed paid for its geographical isolation and 
lack of infrastructure. Beginning in 1956, the city’s income rate had grown at a pace that was half of 
the national average.   
Not only political opposition but also the Triestine local council, led by a center-left 
majority, stressed that the chronic crisis of the maritime sector of the shipyard industry needed state 
intervention to modernize and optimize its uncompetitive facilities and infrastructure.
139
 In his 
correspondence with Moro, Trieste’s mayor Mario Franzil stressed that, due to its geo-political 
location, the implementation of the CIPE plan threatened to further suffocate rather than save 
Trieste’s port economy. With an aging population, stagnant maritime traffic and comparatively 
lower incomes, the CIPE plan would have greatly benefited the Yugoslav Adriatic ports and fatally 
compromised Trieste’s competitiveness, according to the mayor. In addition, Franzil emphasized 
the political backlash that would result from the government’s decisions for both Trieste’s local 
economy and politics. In confronting local reactions to the plan, “the local Christian Democrats 
would have been forced to break party discipline and align with the protests of the local population 
which would have had unpredictable consequences on the fall elections of 1966.”140        
As outlined above, the national government was well informed about the potential 
downsides of the CIPE plan. In spite of this, it thought it could rely on the support of segments of 
the local Christian Democrats who hoped to negotiate with the central government and modify 
some of its crucial economic provisions. With regard to this issue, local Christian Democrat Sergio 
Coloni vigorously opposed the criticism coming from the Communist Party which had long 
advocated an alternative strategy based upon massive state investments and favorable tariffs to 
restore Trieste’s lost competitiveness in the European market. Indeed, in Communist propaganda, 
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ending the production of ships in the San Marco facilities represented a “deadly blow” to the 
Triestine economy.
141
   
During a local economic conference that overlapped with the debate over the modernization 
of San Marco shipyard, the keynote speaker repeatedly stressed the steady regression of Trieste as 
compared to other Italian cities and the minimal growth of the port’s traffic. The main reasons for 
its decline, he claimed, rested on the unnatural border that separated Trieste from its hinterland and 
the rising competitiveness of the other Adriatic ports, resulting in the mass emigration of qualified 
manpower and net redirection of maritime traffic toward ports better connected to East-Central 
Europe. This negative portrayal overlooked and unfairly minimized the achievements of the local 
administration since 1954.
142
 In addition, it also ignored the significant political achievements of the 
post-war governments in fostering political discussion with the Adriatic neighbor and opening the 
way to new economic opportunities. These new opportunities, however, required a specific 
intervention to replace and upgrade the outdated infrastructure of its shipyard industry.
143
    
From the government’s perspective, the CIPE plan responded to these needs. Between 1965 
and 1966, the plan redesigned the national shipyard industry and optimized the conversion of the 
productive facilities of the San Marco shipyard from the production of ships to a repair dock. As a 
form of compensation for putting an end to the production of ships in San Marco, Trieste was 
granted the general headquarters of the state controlled company “Italcantieri.” Despite the apparent 
prestige that came with locating the company in Trieste, the CIPE threatened to minimize Trieste 
within worldwide maritime traffic and, in the eyes of the Triestine population, further increased 
unemployment. Thus, the CIPE became object of a prolonged political debate in Trieste. 
 Christian Democratic leader Sergio Coloni, for example, predicted a bright future for the 
production of diesel engines, significant improvements to the transportation system between Trieste 
and the new facilities of Monfalcone, the modernization of San Marco, and the invaluable role that 
                                                 
141
AFG, Fondo APC, Serie Regioni e Province (RP), MF0524, Conference on Triestine Economy, January 30-31, 1965. 
142
ACT, Verbali Seduta Ordinaria, March 1, 1966.  
143
UZC, Sezione IV, Busta 52, Folder conferenza economica problemi triestini, "Triestine Municipal Council to Moro," 
March 24, 1966.  
229 
 
“Italcantieri” could play in revitalizing the local economy and reducing the drain of skilled 
workers.
144
 In contrast, the National League criticized the outdated use of diesel technology and its 
problematic absorption of a high number of workers employed in the Triestine maritime sector. As 
for the Monfalcone facilities, the National League argued that they would transfer prominent 
economic activities next to the Yugoslav border and further the ongoing depopulation of Trieste and 
concurrent Balkanization of the Italian Eastern border, which would then serve as a preliminary step 
to Yugoslav annexation.  
In purely economic terms, the executive committee of the National League argued that the 
San Marco shipyard was ill equipped to face its new proposed task to serve as a repair dock. As a 
consequence, incoming ships would divert their routes to more prepared Yugoslav ports and the 
volume of maritime traffic in the Triestine port would decline. This result would jeopardize 
potential economic benefits coming from the transalpine oil pipe Trieste-Ingolstadt that, beginning 
in Trieste and running through Italy, Austria, and Germany, could boost the flow of maritime traffic 
through the Triestine port. The National League argued that the CIPE plan left the unfavorable trade 
tariffs for the port unresolved, would lead to the unemployment of 1,500 qualified Italian workers, 
and would increase the immigration of Slovene workers in Monfalcone.
145
   
Similarly, the President of an Istrian group of ex-zone B sent a letter to the National League 
in which he argued that the weakness of the local Christian Democrats and the government’s 
economic decisions had greatly facilitated the “Slavization” of Trieste. According the letter, the 
leadership of the local secretary of the Christian Democrats, Guido Botteri, a figure strongly 
connected to the politicians in Rome, had also facilitated this process and revealed the increasing 
marginalization of prominent Triestines and Istrians inside the city’s political establishment. As a 
result, he said, local émigrés feared that the central government was gradually withdrawing from its 
traditional defense of Italian claim over the ex-zone B.
146
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In voicing their dissent against the CIPE plan, both the National League and the émigrés 
underscored the idea of "Slavization" as a consequence of Trieste’s economic weakness and 
decline. Not only these associations but also large segments of the local population viewed the 
government’s plan as a deadly threat to both the port economy and Italian identity of Trieste. 
Therefore, popular anger exponentially rose, targeting  the local Christian Democrats who were 
accused of being submissive to Rome and ignoring Trieste’s needs. However, local Christian 
Democratic Party representatives like Franzil repeatedly stressed the socio-economic repercussions 
of the CIPE plan, but their concerns were downplayed by the central government.  
The national Christian Democratic leadership, indeed, had shown a lack of political 
foresight toward a city that during the post-war years had experienced continuous economic, 
political, and cultural marginalization from the rest of the nation. Over time, this process 
transformed the Triestine Christian Democrats into the main targets of both leftist and rightist 
propaganda. Socialist Bruno Pincherle, for example, accused the local Christina Democrats of 
complying with the central government which favored local private interests at expense of the local 
city’s shipyard industry. He also added that all previous state commitments such as a new highway, 
railway, airport and port docking facilities, which could have removed Trieste from its geographical 
and economic isolation, remained on paper. After years of failing policies, Pincherle concluded, 
“the city’s council should send a clear signal of discontent to the Roman authorities by opposing the 
closure of San Marco and, if necessary, taking over the industry.”147   
Although the CIPE plan intended to convert the San Marco’s facilities to a repair dock, the 
left and right-win political opposition publicly claimed its forthcoming closure. Rightist politicians 
such as the Italian monarchist Alfredo Covelli also harshly criticized the central government for the 
potential aftermath of the CIPE plan which would further Trieste’s continuous economic 
marginalization. Covelli stated that the Julian city, the traditional core of Adriatic trade and 
patriotism, had slowly declined in the midst of the apathy of the national community and the 
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cynicism of its governing elites, despite the sacrifices that its population had consciously faced to 
reassert its "Italianità." Covelli, recalling Trieste’s past strivings for autonomy and independence, 
argued that “Trieste could demand to be free rather than beg for help.”148 
In a letter to Senator Giusto Tolloy, Prime Minister Moro proved aware of the growing 
popular animosity toward the central government that boiled in Trieste.
149
 These impressions were 
further confirmed by Commissioner Libero Mazza, who proposed to raise state financial support for 
Trieste to positively shape local public opinion and make the terms of the CIPE plan more 
acceptable. In particular, Mazza highlighted the renewed activism of the pro-Independence Front 
which best exemplified the discontent and disillusionment within the local community. However, he 
also labeled the phenomenon as socially marginal and politically insignificant.
150
 
 In contrast, Guido Botteri understood the possible negative effects of a rising local pro-
independence and nationalist opposition. In stressing the discrepancy between Rome’s patriotic 
rhetoric and lack of attention to the real problems of the city, Botteri warned Moro once more of a 
possible political backlash in the November elections.
151
 Consequentially, a faction of the Triestine 
Christian Democrats decided to embrace the defense of Trieste’s port economic interests and, by 
refusing to abide by the directives of the central government, ultimately broke ranks with the party’s 
traditional discipline. 
Meantime, neo-fascist propaganda claimed that the “closure” of the San Marco shipyard was 
the natural consequence of the foolish domestic and foreign policy of center-left coalition 
government.
152
 The right-wing press emphasized that Trieste, which had been already deprived of 
its natural hinterland after nine years of foreign occupation, was now on the verge of economic 
collapse. Indeed, the city’s economy, untouched by the Italian economic miracle, drained by the 
competition of the ports of Fiume and Capodistria, and damaged by the absence of adequate 
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infrastructure, had been long forgotten by the political establishment in Rome. Above all, neo-
fascists argued that the government's new plan only supported Genoa’s maritime interests and 
would spark a process of Balkanization that would transform the eastern border into an open gate 
for Slavism rather than an opulent and prosperous outpost against Yugoslav Communism.
153
     
Furthermore, the central government also had to respond to communist propaganda which 
called for workers’ mass strikes in Trieste during both the summer and the fall of 1966.154 Luigi 
Longo, the secretary of the Italian Communist Party, assured the local trade unions that the 
workers’ protests against the CIPE plan would have total support from the party. Moreover, Longo 
stressed the communists’ commitment to the creation of a free trade area and a regional port 
authority in order to save Trieste’s economy from policies that would only accelerate its decline and 
spur mass emigration.
155
 
Thus, the CIPE plan increasingly strained political relations between Trieste and Moro’s 
center-left coalition government. In a letter to Socialist leader Pietro Nenni, the ex-director of 
Triestine progressive newspaper Il Piccolo, Rino Alessi, articulated the feelings of discontent and 
isolation that pervaded Trieste and highlighted their main socio-political implications. Due to 
Trieste's proximity to Yugoslav Communism, Alessi argued that the escalation of the local protests 
could impair the progress of the Adriatic friendship. Indeed, Alessi added, “only a re-born Trieste, 
free of the seeds of past nationalisms” could be the fulcrum of a new Italian policy toward 
Yugoslavia.
156
 In a context of rising unrest in Eastern Europe and economic growth of the Istrian 
region, a prosperous Trieste could indeed function as a bridge between a new socialist Europe and 
Italy, Alessi asserted. Its economic crisis, however, had weakened feelings of confidence and trust 
toward the new progressive polices of the center-left coalition and needed to be promptly reversed 
to advance Italian interests in the Adriatic region. In his analysis, Alessi effectively summarized the 
                                                 
153Amedeo Principi, “Trieste come un rimpianto,” Il Borghese (September 1, 1966).  
154
An interesting video of the strike is available at Archivi AAMOD, Rome (Italy), Sciopero Generale a Trieste, July 7, 
1966. 
155
AFG, Fondo Apc, RP, MF0533, p.0216, “Longo to Venezian,” September 6, 1966. 
156
ACS, Carte Nenni, Busta 17, Fasc. Alessi Rino, "Letter from Alessi to Nenni," September 23, 1966. 
233 
 
political costs of an economic plan that, along with the bitter disapproval of local politicians, 
boosted hostility toward the central government among the local population, as proven by mass 
protests and the distribution of a petition against the prospective “closure” of San Marco that 
collected 80,000 signatures.
157
  
In a desperate attempt to minimize local tension and political antagonism, newspapers such 
as the Christian Democrat Il Popolo depicted the central government’s decision to locate the new 
“Italcantieri” in Trieste rather than in Genoa as a sign of its intentions to make the Triestine port the 
cornerstone of a five-year plan to re-launch maritime traffic in the Adriatic.
158
 The local newspaper 
Il Piccolo also echoed this argument by praising the government’s decision as an “act of justice for 
the Julian shipyard.”159 Both the right and left-wing press, for its part, negatively portrayed the 
government’s initiative. The right-wing newspaper Il Secolo d’Italia claimed that, while Genoa 
benefited from massive investments and financial support that made it the Italian maritime capital, 
Trieste continued to languish.
160
 Likewise, the national communist newspaper L’Unità argued that 
the downsizing of the local shipyard industry favored foreign private interests, minimized state 
commitment to Trieste’s maritime sector and ultimately undermined the interests of the Triestine 
port workers.
161
 The journal, which had traditionally supported the internationalization of the 
Triestine port, reiterated an economic strategy that advocated Trieste’s role as the engine of regional 
economic integration with the eastern and southern part of the Adriatic.
162
  
The political debate within the Triestine public sphere showed that supporters and detractors 
of the government’s economic strategy for Trieste used the CIPE plan to respectively point to state 
commitment or state disengagement from the city’s port economy. The public campaign of both 
right and left-wing political parties ultimately overshadowed the state’s compensation for the 
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conversion of the San Marco’s facilities and persuaded the Triestine workers to mobilize against the 
imminent “closure” of the San Marco shipyard. Thus, in early October 1966, after months of 
political polemics and accusations against the central government, Trieste exploded in social and 
political turmoil. Mass demonstrations and worker strikes, which also saw the participation of right-
wing groups on the side of the port’s workers, met with the strong repressive actions of the local 
police.
163
 The communist press described the local incidents as the logical consequence of years of 
chronic depression and praised the unitary and heroic action of the workers of both Genoa and 
Trieste.
164
    
The violent demonstration of October 8 represented the peak of Trieste’s protest against the 
CIPE plan and was subsequently portrayed as the “dark days of the Triestine October.”165 Protesters 
threw bricks as they headed towards the Christian Democrat headquarters and the main office of the 
newspaper Il Piccolo, which they perceived as supportive of the government. Workers created 
barriers and confronted local authorities in a prolonged riot which, according to local Christian 
democrat leader Sergio Coloni, was premeditated and incited by communist agitators, also defined 
as “sangiacomini.”166 The vandalism and violent nature of the protests resulted in 450 wounded and 
50 arrests; among them, 22 had previous criminal records. External observers also depicted these 
urban riots as the outcome of the actions of a thousand angry workers who violently responded to 
the government’s plan to convert the San Marco shipyard into repair docks.167   
 Instead, in its coverage of the riots, L’Unità stressed the repressive actions of the local 
police which it connected to the authoritarian nature of the Italian state. The newspaper depicted the 
urban riots and the indiscriminate police attacks against 7000 workers and unarmed bystanders in 
great detail. Such widespread violence, it argued, left the city in a state of unbelievable chaos until 
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late evening.
168
 This account, which highlighted the brutality of the local police, crystallized into 
the local communist narrative of the events which portrayed the days of October as one of the most 
important moments in the history of the city. These “glorious” days were later used in communist 
propaganda to enhance a local sense of victimization and fuel workers’ animosity toward the 
government.
169
    
Conversely, the right-wing newspaper Il Secolo d’Italia depicted the riots and the police 
repression against the San Marco’s workers as the outcome of communist activities.170 The 
newspaper harshly criticized the workers and depicted them as communist believers who 
transformed “a justified reaction against unfavorable economic decisions into a political event with 
a strong anti-national accent.”171 Christian democratic newspapers such as Il Popolo also 
emphasized the responsibility of the Communist Party which they believed had fomented urban 
fighting and had spread unfounded rumors about the imminent closure of the San Marco facilities. 
The communists, Il Popolo argued, had caused local workers to attack the Triestine Christian 
Democrats and claimed that the urban riots were part of a broader communist plan to gain support 
before the upcoming elections.
172
   
During the parliamentary debate of October 10, 1966, members of the national government 
reiterated their belief in the planned rather than spontaneous nature of the Triestine accidents. They 
argued that, on the night before the incidents, the Communist Party had not only fostered local 
tensions against the Triestine authorities but had also profited from the support of agitators who had 
infiltrated across the Adriatic border and were very well-known to the Triestine communist 
movement.
173
 To further prove this point, Christian Democratic representatives also reported that 
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the local Communists used Radio Capodistria to spread false news about the death of two 
workers.
174
  
A report from Commissioner Libero Mazza effectively confirmed the responsibility of the 
workers, infiltrated agitators, and the Independence Front especially. On October 8, Mazza argued, 
members of the Independence Front provoked local disorder with the specific aim to provide the 
mass demonstrations with a strong anti-national tone. Indeed, in the aftermath of the incidents the 
Independence Front partially succeeded in attracting support among workers and leftist extremists 
who favorably looked at the idea of a free and independent territory of Trieste not for “sentimental, 
but rather utilitarian goals.”175  
The CIPE plan and its socio-political aftermath effectively undermined popular confidence 
in the government’s ability to restore Trieste’s port economy. In an interesting letter to Trieste’s 
Christian Democratic secretary Sergio Coloni, local economist Maurizio Fanni argued that the CIPE 
plan and the prospective realization of the Trieste-Ingolstadt oil pipe were necessary yet insufficient 
measures to restore Trieste’s traditional trade with its Danubian hinterland. The detail of utmost 
importance, Fanni argued, was the intensification of commercial agreements with the Eastern 
European socialist economies and “the transformation of Trieste into the eastern library of the 
Western world.
“176
 In such a view, the city would work as a sort of research center for the collection 
and elaboration of marketing information in order to better calibrate national economic strategies 
toward the countries of the Soviet bloc. 
Thus, from this perspective, by employing political and economic pragmatism, the 
government would support Trieste’s economic growth, the strengthening of local loyalty toward the 
Italian state, and the process of political relaxation with the Yugoslav neighbor.
177
 At the time, these 
goals occupied a prominent role in the government’s agenda and best fit the new strategy for 
Trieste. In a note to Moro, members of the Ministry of Finance reiterated these views. They noted 
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that the prolonged economic crisis as well as the political debate surrounding the CIPE plan had 
produced phenomena of political violence and had threatened the cohesion of the Christian 
Democrats; however, they added, public disorder also strengthened the attractiveness of the political 
experiment of the center- left as a barrier to political extremism.
178
  
The days of violence had indeed shocked the Triestine population whose majority still 
traditionally voted for the Christian Democrats and deeply distrusted the communist movement.  
Despite this, Coloni argued, the violent protests of early October had also sent a clear message to 
Roman politicians: “Trieste needed to be given a specific role within the general interest of the 
nation.”179 This issue took on specific importance in the context of the upcoming municipal 
elections and became a test of stability for the city, which was still in shock by the urban violence 
and was pervaded by the anti-governmental propaganda of the neo-fascist, communist, and 
independence movements.  
In anticipating the local administrative elections, the central government claimed that the 
CIPE plan would lead to massive investments during a transition period of four to five years and 
ultimately save the local shipyard industry.
180
 These claims, however, only partially succeeded to 
persuade the local population which looked with increasing confidence toward the Independence 
Movement. After 1954, this movement had often highlighted the government’s violations to the 
terms of the London Memorandum and repeatedly stressed its failure to rescue Trieste’s local 
economy; however, popular support for the movement had remained minimal.
181
 Its popularity 
suddenly surged in 1966 in the aftermath of the CIPE.
182
 Perhaps predicting the electoral success of 
this movement, the Communist Party also sought an electoral alliance with the local independence 
                                                 
178
UZC, Note from Members of the Chamber of Deputy, Sezione IV Trieste, Busta 48, October 9-10, 1966. 
179
DT, Fondo Sergio Coloni, Busta 3. 
180
DT, Fondo Coloni, B. 3, Folder Democrazia Cristiana, 1967. 
181
ACS, MI, Schedario Partiti Politici 1944-1966, B.106, fasc.,312/P, Trieste Movimento Interdipendentista, "Mazza to 
Gabinetto," July 23, 1966. 
182See Stelio Spadaro, “Due momenti salienti dell’ indipendentismo": il Boom del 1952 e il Piano Cipe del 1966, in 
Dalla liberazione agli anni ‘80, Trieste come problema nazionale, edited Armando Cipriani (Roma: Salemi editore, 
1984), 119-147. 
238 
 
group, the “Unione Triestina” (Triestine Union).183 Its refusal to enter a political alliance, however, 
further isolated the Communist Party.
184
  
In the local administrative elections of November 1966, the Independence Front gained 
significant electoral support that did not go unnoticed by the local, national, and international press, 
including the New York Times which read the electoral result as a “rebuff to Rome.”185 Even though 
the discrepancy in voting support for the independence front (4.4%) as compared to the governing 
Christian Democrats (31.9%) was evident, its rise and the Christian Democrats’ decline in popular 
votes demonstrated the mounting disillusionment within the city. Above all, the ability of the 
independence movement to attract local support at this specific and critical moment highlighted the 
lasting tension between Trieste’s autonomous economic ambitions and its identification with the 
Italian state.
186
  
According to local intellectuals such as Carl Schiffrer, the re-emerged Independence 
Movement, while nostalgically appealing to past and consolidated understandings of the special role 
played by the port city inside the Adriatic space, ultimately aimed to undermine the progressive 
measures taken by the central government to promote its European integration. Consequentially, 
Schiffrer argued, the problematic reality of Trieste was that it was a city in which the “municipal 
dimension was surpassed.” 187 Local resistance to the CIPE plan definitively exposed this tension 
between nostalgia for Trieste’s past prosperity and the need to modernize its port economy, 
including the conversion of the San Marco facilities.  
Although the CIPE plan had promised to break the vicious economic spiral that had 
relegated the city to a condition of “dependence” and re-integrate Trieste into the global economy, 
pro-independence political movements such as "Trieste ai Triestini" (Trieste to the Triestines) used 
Trieste’s response to it to stress the lack of credibility of the national political class, its misleading 
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economic strategy, and unnatural separation of Trieste from its Istrian hinterland in the slogan, "We 
are not eternal watermelons!"
188
 The watermelon and the halberd represented the old Triestine 
nobility and symbolized Trieste's autonomous ambitions which could now take a more aggressive 
path. 
 Thus, the government in Rome, while rhetorically promising to restore Trieste’s port 
economy, also mobilized the local associations that had traditionally supported its post-1963 policy 
toward the border. Through the border office, the central authorities financially supported the 
activities of pro-governmental Italian cultural, recreational and Catholic associations as well as non-
communist trade unions. In addition, it financially sustained local newspapers and magazines such 
as La Voce Giuliana or Trieste which publicly supported the experiment of the center-left and its 
positive effects on Trieste’s port economy.189 Furthermore, the Office of Border Zones (UZC) also 
reinstated former financial support for the Istrian C.L.N. which was led by an executive committee 
of Republicans, Christian Democrats, and Socialist Democrats. Governmental contributions to this 
émigré association were made on a regular basis and were also accompanied by extraordinary 
funding on special occasions such as the twentieth anniversary celebration of its foundation in 1965.  
From a Christian Democratic perspective, the Istrian C.L.N., later renamed "Associazione 
delle Comunità Istriane" (Association of the Istrian Communities) in 1967, had played a crucial role 
in assisting the émigrés of the ex-zone B and the Italian community still living in the territory under 
Yugoslav administration. In particular, this association and its democratic propaganda had worked 
as a shield against the infiltration of right extremists within the émigré community in Trieste.
190
 At 
the same time, the Italian government drastically reduced governmental contributions to the 
national émigré association, the ANVGD. In firmly opposing Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-
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zone B, the views of this association clashed with the new imperatives of the Christian Democratic 
foreign policy toward Tito’s regime, among them the formal settlement of the Istrian problem.191 
 This strategy effectively aimed to draw local public opinion away from former intransigent 
positions, especially in relation to the status of the ex-zone B, an issue that still impeded the full 
normalization of political relations with the Yugoslav neighbor. In addition, this issue became 
object of political manipulation by local and national neo-irredentist associations whose extremist 
views found in the Italian neo-fascist party their main political referent.
192
 The National Italian 
Irredentist Association (ANII) was certainly representative of this broader phenomenon. In 1967, 
during the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, the ANII organized a 
demonstration against the ignominy of the “dictated peace” in Rome. In his speech to the 
demonstrators, Bruno Coceani argued that while the fascist regime extended the nation’s natural 
borders from “Brennero to Nevoso,” the new Republic passively witnessed the territorial mutilation 
of the Julian region.
193
 In its correspondence with Prime Minister Moro, the ANII went so far as to 
claim that the government’s policy would ultimately lead to the “Slavization” of Trieste.194 These 
arguments were saturated with radical nationalism and were rejected by other parts of the neo-
irredentist movement, such as the National League war veteran and patriotic formations that 
politically identified with the Christian Democrats.
195
  
Although these groups condemned the strong neo-fascism that pervaded associations such as 
the National Italian Irredentist Association, they also opposed a definitive renunciation to the ex-
zone B and supported the status quo that, established by the London Memorandum, best served the 
political, cultural, and economic rights of both the émigrés and the Italian minority of the ex-zone 
B. The Italian government, partially aligning with the objectives of these associations, still firmly  
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monitored the situation of the Italians living in the ex-zone B and exercised political pressure on the 
Yugoslav government to improve their conditions.
196
 For example, in 1967, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Fanfani agreed with Moro to interrupt commercial negotiations in order to safeguard the 
citizenship rights of the Italian residents of the ex-zone B who had experienced further restrictions.  
Despite this, in a secret report from Belgrade, the Italian Ambassador Roberto Ducci 
informed the Italian political adviser Gianfranco Pompei that the government’s show of strength 
toward the Yugoslav neighbor on the issue of the documents had been received only with moderate 
satisfaction among the Italian community living in the ex-zone B. The report stated that while 
Triestine entrepreneurs proved more interested in protecting good economic relations with 
Yugoslavia, Italians in the ex-zone B would have hardly protested against provisions that violated 
their rights to Italian citizenship; rather, they preferred to preserve good socio-political relations 
with the local Yugoslav authorities. Indeed, the report continued, Triestine entrepreneurs 
increasingly favored a definitive agreement on the eastern frontier, a decision that “would have 
caused tension some years ago, would foment popular protests now but will be accepted without 
excessive problems in a few years.”197   
This report aptly summarized mainstream thinking within the entrepreneurial segments of 
the Triestine community that mirrored the views of the Christian Democratic governing elites. It 
suggested that segments of the Italian community who were living along the Adriatic border 
gradually understood the limits of an outdated irredentist policy toward the ex-zone B which was 
almost depopulated of its Italian minority. It therefore overwhelmingly approved the state’s policies 
that, while preserving the Italian cultural and linguistic identity of Trieste and its Istrian region, 
sought to boost local economic prosperity while largely abandoning ambitions of territorial re-
incorporation.  
 This strategy also explains why Ambassador Ducci proved critical of the Italian 
government’s decision to interrupt commercial negotiations with Yugoslavia in 1967. This move, 
                                                 
196
ASR, Sezione IV, Fanfani Diari, January 19, 1967. 
197
ACS, PCM, Ufficio Consigliere Diplomatico, Busta 66, Sfasc.5, “Note to Pompei,” March 8, 1967.  
242 
 
along with the problematic issue of the Adriatic platform for fishing rights, was perceived by both 
the Yugoslav government and public opinion as a clear expression of irredentist feelings.
198
 Fanfani 
therefore suggested to Moro to cautiously re-open negotiations with the Yugoslav government and, 
when dealing with Italian sovereignty over the ex-zone B, “to conceal the fact that the Italian 
government would be ready for a future formal recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty without 
appropriate compensation.”199 As this letter demonstrates, figures like Fanfani, who was later 
depicted as a strong defender of the border’s “Italianità,” also understood the problematic defense 
of formal Italian rights over the ex-zone B and agreed to seek maximum economic compensations 
for a territorial loss that was inevitable and could only be postponed.   
 Instead, the views and attitudes of the majority of the local neo-irredentist formations did 
not significantly change. Indeed, the commemorations as well as the promotion of the cultural 
legacy of leading irredentist figures remained central to the activities of multiple neo-irredentist 
formations.
200
 Groups of émigrés inside the National Italian Irredentist Association also proposed 
the creation of a new Parliament of Fiume, Istria, and Dalmatia to strengthen émigrés’ political 
support for rightist political formations. In particular, they planned to better coordinate the activity 
of different associations, national parties and foreign governments that might be interested in 
sabotaging Italian and Yugoslav relations. This plan, however, did not meet significant support 
among associations such as the National League and the ANVGD which, once more, distanced 
themselves from the radical nationalist initiatives of the National Italian Irredentist association. As a 
result, the strength of the neo-irredentist associational network further faded.
201
    
As discussed, amidst rising political disillusionment and chronicle economic stagnation, the 
CIPE plan was exploited by national and local political formations to weaken popular support for 
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the Christian Democratic coalition government.
202
 In Trieste, mass protests against the CIPE plan 
also facilitated the resurgence of popular pro-independence sentiments and resulted in a vortex of 
urban violence. Not only had the protest against the CIPE plan mobilized the port workers but also 
other key elements of the Triestine population who nostalgically looked at a past and obsolete 
industrial model.
203
 Local demonstrations underscored the classic populist themes of an inefficient, 
degenerate and corrupted democracy along with local accusations to have been “sold out” by 
Rome.
204
  
As former Mayor Bartoli argued, the city’s prolonged economic stagnation decisively 
weakened Trieste’s traditional patriotism and, I suggest, local loyalty toward the Italian state.205 In 
response, the Christian Democrats further supported associations and political movements that 
proved sympathetic to center-left coalition government while also opposing moderate and extremist 
neo-irredentist formations that demanded the reassertion of Italian territorial rights over the ex-zone 
B. At the same time, however, segments of the Triestine population were increasingly open to the 
renunciation of the ex-zone B if accompanied by significant economic benefits. Thus, Rome firmly 
pursued the formal settlement of the eastern border in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
 
1963-1968: Challenging the Politics of Identity  
This chapter has emphasized that Italy’s defense of the territorial sovereignty over the ex-
zone B was greatly affected by the political experiment of the Center-Left, and its abandonment 
became a mere matter of time and political opportunity. In this context, the Christian Democrats 
embraced the idea of a global negotiation in exchange for the definitive renunciation of the ex-zone 
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B. This new approach promised to connect Tito’s Yugoslavia to the Western world and, especially, 
restore Trieste’s port’s economy. Thus, it would directly strengthen the state’s image on the border 
and, indirectly, Trieste’s identification with the Italian state.   
The Hrescak case, however, exposed the problematic nature of the new Christian 
Democrats’ political project for Trieste.206 The controversy produced a sudden explosion of Italian 
nationalism in the city which revealed lingering political animosity, fear and distrust toward the 
Slovene minority. The heated local political debate was accompanied by the re-emergence of the 
confrontation between the forces perceived as pro or anti-Italian and marked a watershed for 
Trieste: a progressive path toward democracy or regressive turn to the old nationalist ground.  In 
this fashion, the success of the “Morotei” in Triestine politics proved the strength and gradual 
affirmation of local views which underscored the idea of an open border and the use of political 
dialogue over violence.
207
  
At the same time, however, the protest against the CIPE plan vividly demonstrated the effect 
of years of local resentment toward Rome. Indeed, after 1954, the port’s uninterrupted economic 
crisis had over time exacerbated political tensions between the disillusioned local population and 
the national government. The government’s inability to extend the “Italian economic miracle” to the 
city and surpass Yugoslav economic competition transformed its past promises of economic 
prosperity into “empty words.” The central government, eager to cope with the stagnant status of 
the local economy, firmly pursued a policy of economic modernization that attempted to 
compensate for the loss of the Triestine economic hinterland, the ex-zone B. The CIPE plan 
however, fell victim to widespread political manipulation from opposing parties whose propaganda 
escalated local tensions and contributed to a major outbreak of urban violence in October 1966.  
People in Trieste, therefore, increasingly perceived the Italian state as a motherland 
indifferent to their needs and showed their dissent toward the central authorities by politically 
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supporting the Independence Movement. The reemergence of pro-independence political attitudes 
among segments of the Triestine community also demonstrated the resilience of Trieste’s past 
municipal traditions and administrative autonomy.
208
 In the words of scholar Liliana Lanzardo, over 
time Trieste had become “a small city whose past outweighed its size.”209 Thus, local nostalgia for 
the city's prosperous past and its broad home rule strengthened the cosmopolitan rather than 
national identity of Trieste, ultimately weakening loyalty toward the Italian state. This perspective, 
however, remained that of a small though growing minority that opposed former irredentist views 
of Trieste’s identity.210   
Both the Hrescack case and the CIPE plan ultimately deepened the breach between the 
conservative thinking of the neo-irredentist associations, the aspiration of a part of the local 
population for considerable autonomy, and the progressive views of the Christian Democrats and 
their allies in the center-left coalition. Over time, the government’s attempts to reverse Trieste’s 
steady economic decline and uphold the fiction of Italian sovereignty over the ex-zone B had indeed 
adversely affected its local credibility and fostered a sense of apathy and indifference. By 1967, 
however, the renunciation of sovereign rights to the ex-zone B in exchange for significant economic 
benefits had already won the support of the majority of the governing elites and appeared a feasible 
solution also for the Triestine entrepreneurial elites; however, amid the hostility of the neo-
irredentist network, it still needed an external pretext to minimize its predictable political cost. As I 
explore in the next chapter, the Prague Spring worked as an ideal catalyst to consolidate the 
Adriatic friendship and resolutely pursue a formal settlement of the border dispute.
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Chapter 5 
The Final Farewell to Zone B: the Age of Détente and the Path to Osimo  
In 1853, U.S. President Abraham Lincoln wrote to Italian patriot Macedonio Melloni 
stating, “The Italian nation must be unified from Venice to Dalmatia and ... any further territorial 
depredation would be a matricide.”1 More than a century later, in 1969, the National Italian 
Irredentist Association sent an excerpt of this letter to Richard Nixon with hope that the American 
President would challenge both the process of Adriatic detent and Yugoslav rule of the Istrian 
region during his visit to Italy. Despite their attempts to persuade Nixon, the territorial 
reincorporation of the ex-zone B within Italy’s national borders had not been a political option for 
the US administration since 1948. Likewise, the Italian government understood that no change to 
the territorial status of the ex-zone B in Italy's favor would be made after 1954 and that it could only 
indefinitely postpone the formal resolution of the border dispute.  
After 1954, however, the government’s failure to restore Trieste’s economy and stop 
Yugoslav discrimination against the Italian minority of the ex-zone B had increasingly fueled local 
socio-political animosity toward the Italian state.
2
 During the 1960s especially, both the Adriatic 
détente and the experiment of the Center-Left were locally perceived as mounting threats to the 
restoration of Italian sovereignty over the Istrian region and, therefore, were firmly opposed by a 
variety of neo-irredentist associations. Thus, the progressive fringes of the Christian Democratic 
Party avoided any definitive recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty of the ex-zone B until the late 
1960s. 
However, the 1968 Warsaw Pact's repression of the Prague Spring persuaded the Italian 
establishment to formally end the border dispute over the ex-zone B. Diplomatic talks began during 
the official visit to Italy of representatives of the Yugoslav Federation in early 1969.
3
 This official 
visit was received with significant enthusiasm from segments of national public opinion which 
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depicted it as the beginning of a new diplomatic process whose goal was the quick resolution of a 
wide range of pending bilateral problems.
4
 On the other hand, right-wing propaganda depicted the 
event as an “ignominy that offended the memory of the deaths of the "foibe.” 5 Throughout the late 
1960s and early 1970s these conflicting arguments repeatedly emerged within both national and 
local public discourse, ultimately aggravating the political debate over the Istrian problem.  
Thus, in the early 1970s, the central government continued to firmly reassert its commitment 
to the preservation of Italian claims over the ex-zone B in public while privately undertaking secret 
negotiations. By doing so, it was greatly facilitated by the climate of international relaxation and the 
domestic shift toward the Communist Party which paved the way to the definitive recognition of 
Yugoslav sovereignty. This chapter focuses on the years from the Prague Spring to the 1975 Osimo 
Treaty and examines both the complex relationship between Trieste and Rome as well as the 
broader political process that led up to it.
6
 It suggests that the deceptive behavior of the Christian 
Democratic governing elites and Osimo’s unclear economic benefits further weakened Trieste's 
loyalty to the Italian state and led to the emergence of a new political movement that radically 
challenged the Christian Democratic rule in Triestine politics. 
  
Consolidating the Adriatic Friendship: the Prague Spring and its Political Aftermath 
During the 1960s, the Christian Democrats' policy of both the center-left and Adriatic 
friendship encountered political and popular resistance. This was particularly true for Trieste, a city 
in which the division between "Morotei" and "Fanfaniani," supporters of Moro and Fanfani 
respectively, played a greater role than in the rest of the country. Segments of the local bourgeoisie 
and Istrians of center-left inspiration aligned with the "Morotea" faction of the party, which was 
willing to proceed with a final settlement of the eastern frontier by judicially recognizing Yugoslav 
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sovereignty over the ex-zone B. Others, instead, supported the “Fanfaniana” faction of the party 
and, therefore, supported the maintenance of Italian claims over the ex-zone B. This political 
division was best personified by its local leaders, Sergio Coloni and Giacomo Bologna, whose 
positions mirrored the views and approaches of the most progressive and conservative factions of 
the Christian Democrats. Interestingly enough, despite its geographical proximity to the border, 
Trieste was ruled by a "Morotea" Christian Democratic majority in which local Triestines 
outnumbered Istrians.  
Outside of the party, associations such as the National Italian Irredentist Association (ANII) 
feared that the Christian Democrats were taking the party further to the left, greatly accelerating 
“the gradual, silent, and deceptive” renunciation of the ex-zone B.7 During the 1968 senatorial 
elections, members of the association sent a letter to Gianni Bartoli, a member of the executive 
committee of the National Association for the Adriatic Refugees, in which they urged him to tighten 
the local political forces of the center-right and oppose the possible affirmation of pro-Slovene and 
leftist candidates in Trieste.
8
 In his correspondence with the Christian Democratic national secretary 
Mario Scelba, Bartoli clearly stated that he feared the strengthening of the left in national politics 
and its detrimental effects on Trieste. Bartoli argued that the Yugoslav international strategy of 
peaceful coexistence ultimately aimed to “advance the Yugoslav national economy by suffocating 
the Triestine port economy.”9   
The most progressive faction of the Christian Democrats repeatedly dismissed these 
arguments and instead highlighted the positive impact of the government’s policies for Trieste. In 
his private correspondence with leading figures of the party, Coloni stressed that, although the CIPE 
plan had experienced some delay, the transformation of the shipyard industry had positively 
affected the Triestine economy. The government, however, still needed to introduce a set of 
economic policies that could effectively cope with the aging of the local population and the slight 
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decline in both skilled and unskilled workers. To begin with, Coloni added, state institutions needed 
to integrate rather than assimilate the Slovene minority of the region both inside and outside Trieste. 
This strategy would ultimately strengthen the regional economy, improve relations between 
Slovenes and Italians, and also minimize local nationalist outbursts. At the same time, Coloni noted, 
the central authorities “had to protect the rights of the Italian minority in the ex-zone B, a problem 
that significantly affected the credibility of state institutions in Trieste.”10    
Coloni perceptively understood that the central government while restoring Trieste’s port 
economy and weakening ethnic tension, also had to publicly support the rights of the Italian 
community still living in the ex-zone B. Indeed, a confidential report from the Italian Foreign 
Service reported that even in a city like Fiume where the Italian population had nearly disappeared, 
the emotional attachment to the idea of the Italian homeland still survived after years of Yugoslav 
repression. For example, during the meeting on October 4, 1969 at the Communist headquarters of 
Fiume, local Italians responded to the Triestine Communist delegation's harsh criticism of the 
Italian state by leaving the speech and voicing their disappointment.
11
   
Most of the Italians living in Yugoslavia, however, were politically organized in the 
“Unione degli Italiani di Istria e Fiume" (Union of Italians in Istria and Fiume), an association 
which, according to the Triestine authorities, was gradually transformed by members of the 
Yugoslav Communist League into a mere tool of socialist propaganda.
12
 The association 
consistently stressed the failure of the Italian state to guarantee the protection of the minority rights 
of the local Italian community as well as the inability of the Italian administration to enforce the 
principle of reciprocity that underscored the London agreements of 1954. Trieste’s former mayor, 
Bartoli, harshly criticized this association whose subservience to Tito’s regime had long supported 
Yugoslav annexationist policies toward the ex-zone B.
13
 These accusations were further reiterated 
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by the President of the National Venetia and Dalmatia Association (ANVGD), Paolo Barbi, who 
noted that the pro-Communist views of this association not only discredited its members, but, above 
all, sanctioned the definitive political isolation of about 26,000 Italians who were still living in 
Yugoslavia.
14
  
By 1968, the socio-political status of the Italian minority living under Yugoslav 
administration effectively remained a sensitive issue for the Italian government and was promptly 
exploited by the political opposition in Trieste. Intransigent nationalists like Bruno Coceani argued 
that the central government, while improving diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, had pursued a 
set of mistaken economic policies which would ultimately result in the gradual “Slavization” of 
Trieste and the abandonment of any territorial claim over the ex-zone B.
15
 In his campaign for the 
ex-zone B, a few months before the Prague Spring, Coceani argued that the preservation of the 
status quo would preserve popular hope for the reintegration of the Istrian region within national 
borders after Tito’s death and strengthen national security against a possible Communist threat.16    
These arguments, however, hardly affected the Italian government which increasingly 
viewed the strengthening of the Adriatic friendship as the best means of opposing the Communist 
threat. The government's position was also largely shared by significant segments of national public 
opinion which remained unmoved by the neo-irredentist propaganda of both émigré and patriotic 
associations. In such a context, the conflicting relationships between the "Associazione Comunità 
Istriana" (Association of Istrian Communities, heir of the Istrian CLN), the "Lega Nazionale" 
(National League) and the ANVGD further weakened public support for the defense of Italian 
territorial rights over the ex-zone B. 
 While both the ANVGD and the ex-Istrian CLN supported the new Christian Democratic 
policy of Adriatic friendship as well as a coalition government with the parties of the non-
communist left, the National League continued to firmly oppose any compromise with leftist parties 
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and advocate the preservation of Italian formal claims to the ex-zone B. At the same time, however, 
this association repeatedly distanced itself from the revanchist claims of the neo-fascist movement 
whose territorial ambitions in the Adriatic region still called for an unrealistic revision of the Paris 
Peace Treaty and undermined reconciliation between national groups inside Trieste.
17
  
In 1968, however, neo-irredentist claims were further debased by the Warsaw Pact invasion 
of Czechoslovakia which revived Italian fears of Soviet Communism.
18
 Tito’s role as a buffer to 
contain Soviet aggressiveness persuaded the governing elites to decisively accelerate the resolution 
of the border dispute and ensure Italian national security along the Adriatic. From Italy's 
perspective, a permanent state border would consolidate Yugoslav political stability and alleviate 
Belgrade’s fears. Indeed, the Yugoslav authorities had strengthened military security along the 
demarcation line, as they were increasingly concerned about the possible infiltration of anti-Titoist 
agents from the Italian border.
19
  
Addressing the issue from Belgrade, Folco Trabalza, the Italian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 
wrote to Foreign Minister Fanfani confirming that the Yugoslav leadership was experiencing the 
“psychosis of an external plot.”20 To mitigate these fears, Trabalza advised the central government 
to send Tito clear signals of political cooperation and support for the crumbling Yugoslav economy. 
Stronger Yugoslav involvement in the European markets would also work to advance Italian 
economic interests in the Balkans, Trabalza argued. Thus, the Italian government reassured Tito 
that, in case of Soviet aggression, Italy would not threaten the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav 
Federation in the Istrian region.
21
 This verbal commitment, which was warmly welcomed by 
Belgrade, ultimately confirmed the Italian government's unwillingness to challenge Yugoslav rule 
in the ex-zone B and demonstrated its future preparedness to renounce definitively claims to Italian 
sovereignty.  
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Although most of Italy's governing elite firmly supported Yugoslav geo-political stability, a 
small minority still feared a possible yet very unlikely Soviet-Yugoslav alliance and rhetorically 
portrayed Trieste as the Western stronghold against international Communism. During the crisis of 
the Prague Spring members of the Foreign Ministry in Rome sent a secret telegram to the Italian 
Embassy in Belgrade which equated “Adriatic irredentism with liberty and progress for the 
population of the Adriatic region.” In promoting ideas of freedom by means of Italian language and 
culture, the telegram continued, the preservation of the region's Italian cultural legacy was 
particularly significant to oppose advancing Communism.
22
 This view, also shared by moderate 
segments of the neo-irredentist movement, emphasized the defense of Italian cultural as well as 
linguistic rights and, far removed from past expansionist territorial ambitions, diverged from the 
nationalist rhetoric of its neo-fascist wing.   
Although these groups had experienced increasing political isolation inside and outside the 
neo-irredentist network, Soviet intervention in the Prague Spring had largely benefited its 
propaganda.
23
 In frontier cities like Trieste, neo-fascism sought to use past fears of the combined 
threat of both Yugoslav Communism and Slav nationalism to gain popular support.
24
 In a climate of 
anxiety and insecurity, neo-fascists created small military cells that, located on the Carsic hills, 
were prepared to confront a possible Yugoslav invasion.
25
 Terrorist organizations such as “Ordine 
Nuovo” (New Order), a movement that was inspired by the revolutionary program of fascist 
syndicalism, would have been able to mobilize up to 3,500 people inside Trieste.
26
 Its extremist 
tone and agenda, however, detrimentally affected popular support for the neo-Fascist Party 
(M.S.I.).
27
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The responses of the most radical fringes of the neo-irredentist network were strongly 
motivated by ideological precepts and, above all, the desire to exploit local animosity toward Tito’s 
regime. In this fashion, the National Italian Irredentist Association, which was eager to benefit from 
the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, decided to organize its national convention in Trieste. 
The convention coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War One which became 
objects of dispute between the National Italian Irredentist Association and the Italian government. 
Since the central government decided to neglect cities like Pola, Zara, or Fiume from the official 
celebration, neo-irredentists accused the Christian Democrats of subservience to the politics of 
relaxation.
28
 Thus, when the "Unione Istriani" also organized its national convention in Trieste in 
1968, the Italian Foreign Ministry discouraged the central government from authorizing the event. 
In contrast, Minister of Interior Paolo Taviani claimed “deep trust in the behavior of the 50,000 
émigrés who populated Trieste.”29 Only after months of uncertainty and discussion of the precise 
themes and tones of the planned meeting, the national government authorized the event.
30
   
 The Istrian convention saw the massive participation of both émigrés and Army veterans 
who repeatedly emphasized their invaluable roles in the fulfillment of national unity and the defense 
of national territorial interests along the Adriatic border. Moreover, nationalist rhetoric pervaded the 
speeches of prominent political figures. For example, Gianni Bartoli defined Istria as a “distinct yet 
not detached part of the nation” which was indissolubly tied to the Italian community for economic, 
political, and moral reasons. The former mayor of Trieste then argued that the legacy of democratic 
irredentism, stemming from the experience of national Risorgimento, supported the peaceful 
revision of the Paris Peace Treaty and the rights of the Italian border community to self-
determination.
31
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Admittedly, personalities like Bartoli, who had shown strong democratic sentiments, still 
saw the Adriatic border that extended from Trieste to the Istrian region as a cultural and territorial 
space of indisputably Italian rather than European identity. In his view, the preservation of the geo-
political status quo of the Triestine territory would save its acclaimed "Italianità" and connect the 
Italian population living across the border to the rest of the nation. Despite the local strength of 
these views, the émigrés’ ability to rally people around the irredentist flag outside Trieste was 
decisively impaired by the increasingly weak effect of patriotic rhetoric.
32
  
Although the campaign for the ex-zone B had gradually lost resonance with the public, it 
was still being used as a valuable political tool to prove the Roman authorities' inability to cope 
with the problems of the Adriatic border in Trieste. To respond to local criticism, the Christian 
Democrats sought to strengthen local political support by including Slovene party formations within 
the 1969 coalition government with Socialists and Republicans.
33
 This political move was 
supported by the "Morotea'" fringe of the national Christian Democratic Party whose progressive 
strategy both in domestic and foreign policy had met increasing popular support outside Trieste.
34
 
At the same time, however, this policy provoked the opposition of a variety of right-wing 
extremist formations, among them the "Associazione Fronte Nazionale" (National Front 
Association, AFN). This association, under the leadership of Valerio Borghese, ex-commander of 
the X-MAS and leading member of the National Italian Irredentist Association, relied on the 
support of past members of the former fascist Republic of Salò, dissidents of the neo-Fascist Party 
(MSI), industrial entrepreneurs, and right-wing Masonic groups. In 1969, the AFN and the National 
Italian Irredentist Association coordinated a mass demonstration in Rome which called for "the 
return of the unredeemed lands of Istria and Dalmatia under Italian sovereignty."
 35
 Although the 
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nationalist press celebrated the demonstration and its popular massive participation in it, it generally 
went unnoticed by national public opinion.  
As discussed, neo-irredentist rhetoric in support of the ex-zone B had little effect on popular 
sentiments, especially outside Trieste and after the Prague Spring. At this time, Tito was 
increasingly perceived within public discourse as a valuable partner in countering the Soviet threat 
within public discourse. Thus, the progressive views of the Christian Democratic government and 
its allies increasingly clashed with those of both moderate and extremist elements of the neo-
irredentist network. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations over the ex-zone B significantly 
accelerated.    
 
Moving Further the London Memorandum 
 Over time, the idea of all-embracing negotiations to finally settle the territorial dispute over 
the ex-zone B had significantly strained political relations between the central government and its 
political opposition. In addition, the search for a formal agreement with Tito's Yugoslavia 
increasingly divided the progressive and conservative factions of the Triestine Christian Democrats, 
especially in Trieste.
36
 In response to the increasing discord within the party, Mario Scelba, former 
Prime Minister during the negotiation of the London Memorandum, invited the party’s elites to 
recreate an internal committee that would draw up a single and unequivocal agenda in foreign 
policy and avoid internal factionalism.
37
   
The political opposition indeed exploited the divergence of views inside the Christian 
Democrats to criticize the central government and its policy toward the border. They argued that the 
government, by adopting the new policy of Adriatic friendship, would ultimately renounce 
"legitimate Italian claims" over the Istrian region.
38
 In addition, liberal political leaders argued that 
even if Moscow threatened Yugoslav independence, the Italian government should not renounce its 
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territorial interests along the Adriatic.
39
 These views were greatly shared by the conservative 
segments of the Italian community in Trieste which understood the 1969 visit of Italian Foreign 
Minister Pietro Nenni to Yugoslavia as a prelude to the recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty over 
the ex-zone B.
40
 Effectively confirming these fears, the Italian Consul in Capodistria praised the 
positive effects of the Christian Democratic-led coalition of the center-left on Italian-Yugoslav 
relations. In his report to his superiors in Rome, he stated that the spirit of Adriatic detente had 
fostered cooperation between Italian and Slovene socialists both in Gorizia and Trieste and, above 
all, “exposed the anachronism of whoever was still anchored to nationalist myths and theories of 
limited sovereignty."
41
 
This report confirmed that reasserting Italian formal territorial rights over the ex-zone B was 
no longer a part of the government’s agenda. During his visit to Yugoslavia in September 1969, 
Moro revealed the intentions of the Italian government. The diplomatic talks, while covering a 
broad set of political and economic issues, also extended to the sphere of security and cooperation 
in Europe. As confirmed in a secret telegram sent from the Italian Embassy in Belgrade to Rome, 
both Italian and Yugoslav delegations agreed to proceed cautiously with confidential talks between 
Italian vice-director of Political Affairs Luigi Milesi Ferretti and Yugoslav Ambassador Zvonko 
Perisic on the major unresolved territorial issues.
42
   
As expected, Moro’s visit to Belgrade was criticized by both the National Italian Irredentist 
Association and the Istrian Union which refused to accept any change to the status quo of the zone 
B.
43
 In its telegram to the main political parties, patriotic associations, and national newspapers, the 
National Italian Irredentist Association claimed that, acting as heads of the national government at 
different times, both Moro and Fanfani had been committed to the defense of Italian territorial 
sovereignty over the ex-zone B. Therefore, it continued, the government had to uphold its former 
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claims and oppose the ongoing de-Italianization of the Istrian region which had experienced the 
unforgivable tragedy of the "foibe."
44
 As in the past, the neo-irredentist associational network used 
the "foibe" to legitimize Italian territorial claims as a form of compensation for war-time Yugoslav 
violence and its opposition to the process of “peaceful coexistence” with Tito’s regime.45  
The steady improvement of economic and political relations, however, had allowed Italy and 
Yugoslavia to overcome past tensions and create the “most open border of Europe.”46 From the 
perspective of the Italian government, the new climate of “Pax Adriatica” provided the ideal context 
to foster cross-cultural relations, pave the way for Tito’s visit to Italy, and resolve unsettled issues.47 
By contrast, war-veteran associations centered their propaganda upon figures like D’Annunzio to 
claim the undisputable Italian nature of the Istrian region under Yugoslav administration.
48
 
Likewise, the Istrian Union promoted cultural events which, publicly presented as the highest 
expression of patriotism and sacrifice, underscored the legacy of Adriatic irredentism and hoped to 
reinvigorate the increasingly weak ideals of homeland within local and national public opinion.
49
 
In the late 1960s, however, the broad use of political violence by right-wing extremist 
movements strongly discredited patriotic rhetoric, especially in Trieste. In November 1969, for 
example, the Triestine police found a deposit of explosive materials, weapons, and munitions in a 
cave about twenty kilometers from city. The ownership of the arms was attributed to one of the neo-
fascist youth organizations that operated on the border. In addition, the following month the 
Triestine police arrested a group of local neo-fascists who were accused of bombing a Slovene 
school. During these investigations, the local police also determined that, contrary to the 
propaganda of the National Italian Irredentist Association, no Italian irredentist cells were operating 
inside Yugoslavia. Indeed, the Italian minority in Yugoslavia was not carrying out any organized 
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terrorist actions in support of Italian irredentist ambitions.
50
 Although the police demonstrated the 
merely propagandist nature of the claims of the National Italian Irredentist Association, progressive 
media used this information as well as the aforementioned activities of neo-fascist groups to 
highlight the extremist nature of both émigrés and patriotic associations in Trieste. 
To counter these claims, local neo-fascist groups attacked the Christian Democrats for their 
acquiescence toward the communist party which was accused of having betrayed Trieste’s 
“Italianità” and cooperatinig with Tito during the tragedy of the "foibe."51 Although the central 
government had certainly shown a compromising attitude toward the Italian Communist Party, the 
most conservative factions of the Christian Democrats still harbored suspicion of its intentions. In 
his diary, Fanfani noted that the PCI, strongly supported by Moscow, planned to take control of the 
government by increasing commercial ties with the Soviet Union, controlling regional councils and 
trade unions, and finally by exploiting its popularity among soldiers in the national Army.
52
  
These views revealed the long-standing effects of the climate of Cold War on leading 
figures of the central government. At the same time, they also explain why the Italian state 
continued to financially support anti-communist associations of Christian Democratic orientations.
53
 
In Trieste, over time, anti-communist rhetoric and wartime memories had been used to infuse 
popular attitudes with hostility toward Tito and his regime.  
 
Tito’s Visit: Bringing the Zone B Back within National Political Discourse 
By the late 1960s, the preservation of the Italian culture and language within the Triestine 
territory and the restoration of its port’s prosperity had become complementary to any renunciation 
of Italian sovereignty over the ex-zone B for the Italian government. Indeed, any change in the geo-
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political status of the eastern border required some form of economic or political compensation; 
otherwise, it would be locally understood as proof of the state’s indifference to Trieste's problem 
and strengthen local support for neo-irredentism, ultimately affecting Italian-Yugoslav relations.  
In 1970, public discourse regarding the ex-zone B had crystallized around two irreconcilable 
positions. Center-left political parties and associations advocated the formal resolution of a 
senseless dispute whose terms had informally been resolved in 1954 and created the most open 
border in Cold War Europe.
54
 On the other side, center-right political parties and associations 
reasserted claims to formal territorial rights over the northern part of the Istrian region and stressed 
the negative effects of a definitive border that would physically separated Italians across the 
Adriatic.
55
 The demarcation line rather than a definitive state border, neo-irredentists argued, 
represented the best means to guarantee peaceful coexistence with Tito’s regime. 
Religious figures such as Bishop Santin had traditionally embraced these views. Thus, in 
February 1970, the news of Santin’s possible resignation as Bishop of the Triestine diocese fostered 
a sense of disappointment inside the Adriatic city. In a private letter to the Pope, Bartoli begged the 
Pontiff “not to accept Santin’s resignation, a fact that would further weaken the rights of the Italian 
minority living in the ex-zone B under an ignoble Socialist regime.”56 These arguments were also 
echoed within the pages of both the nationalist and émigré press which publicly advertised the 
imminent separation of the dioceses of Trieste and Capodistria as a sign of the definitive partition of 
the ex-zones A and B.
57
  
Thus, in March, when the Yugoslav press agency "Tanjug" reported that the Croatian 
Communist party considered the political and territorial status of the ex-zone B under Yugoslav 
control unchangeable, the Istrian Union called upon the national government to release an official 
declaration disproving Yugoslav claims.
58
 In denying the claim of Yugoslav annexation, the Italian 
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government’s response was well received in Trieste, especially among the 60,000 émigrés from 
Istria and Dalmatia and their associations. Although the national government dismissed rumors 
about the imminent partition of the Adriatic border, it also sought to accelerate the recognition of 
Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-zone B. As it happened in the past, the central government 
significantly reduced financial support for both émigré and patriotic associations that opposed the 
final settlement of the issue.
59
 Associations like the ANVGD, therefore, experienced a net decrease 
in government's contributions and were able to only partially assist the émigrés in their struggle to 
receive compensation for their lost properties and to maintain traditional recreational and cultural 
activities.
60
  
All of these factors certainly increased the émigrés' opposition to the course of events, which 
rose exponentially in October 1970 when Tito officially announced his visit to Italy.
61
 In his private 
correspondence with the President of the National Italian Irredentist Association, Gianni Bartoli 
stressed that the growing apathy of national public opinion toward the issue of the ex-zone B had 
endangered Italian territorial rights and, therefore, neo-irredentist associations should give Tito a 
"glacial welcome."
62
 Also firmly opposing Tito's visit, right-wing war veteran associations decided 
to hold thier national meeting in Trieste and claimed that “Italian territorial sovereignty over Istria 
was undisputed and further legitimized by the personal sacrifices of the Italian minority that became 
victims of Tito’s crimes.”63 
The neo-irredentist campaign against Tito’s visit and its detrimental effect on Italian 
territorial claims over the ex-zone B was echoed elsewhere. For example, in one of its articles, the 
conservative Roman newspaper Il Tempo associated Tito's visit with the existence of ongoing 
negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia over the definitive settlement of the Eastern border. This 
news was widely advertised by the émigré press as well as media, political parties, and movements 
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of the center-right. The Istrian Union in particular, mobilized against any territorial concession to 
Tito’s regime by actively coordinating its propaganda both at home and abroad in countries such as 
the United States, Australia, and Argentina. The association, while sending telegrams and letters to 
both national and local authorities, also established committees for the defense of the zone B and 
Istria.
64
 The émigré campaign proved successful and the national secretary of the Christian 
Democrats, Arnaldo Forlani, promised the President of the Istrian Union, Sardos Albertini, to 
exercise political pressure on the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs to reassert Italian claims to 
sovereignty over the ex-zone B.
65
   
In their public campaign for the ex-zone B, the Istrian émigrés were strongly supported by 
right-wing political parties and movements, in particular the neo-Fascist Party (MSI) and the 
National Italian Irredentist Association (ANII).
66
 In Trieste, they were also supported by the local 
newspaper, Il Piccolo, which opposed any change to the status quo in the ex-zone B.
67
 In 
anticipating Tito's visit, the ANII planned to prepare about 50 to 60 thousand flyers with a quotation 
from Gianni Bartoli which described the possibility of Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-zone B as 
an "offense to those who live and an outrage to those who have died." The association also planned 
to distribute 5-10 thousand postcards as well as 25,000 stamps with images recalling the Italian past 
of Istria. In addition, it intended to send a series of letters to national media and relevant political 
personalities to advertise widespread popular opposition in Trieste toward Tito’s visit.68 Aware of 
the widespread distrust for nationalist movements by significant segments of national public 
opinion and considering the positive views and international credibility acquired by Tito, the 
association decided to carefully control its protests. Above all, it attempted to prevent political 
violence by pre-emptively condemning it, as incidents would further jeopardize its already 
crumbling popularity.   
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Meanwhile, in Trieste, émigré and patriotic associations organized demonstrations against 
Tito's visit. Although these associations had over time manufactured a sense of threat to resist any 
change to the status quo over the ex-zone B, they were generally moderate in their tactics and 
opposed the instrumental use of the ex-zone B to legitimize outbursts of neo-fascist violence.
69
 
Nonetheless, during the Triestine rally which was attended by about 2,000 people, the local protests 
quickly escalated into violence in which neo-fascists targeted both members of the Slovene 
minority and leftist organizations.
70
  
Following the Triestine demonstration, Corrado Belci, the leading voice of the “Morotea” 
faction of the Triestine Christian Democrats, criticized the conservative views of local as well as 
national political leaders who proved unable to understand the positive effects of Tito’s visit on 
both Italy’s international credibility and national economic policies toward the Adriatic.71 These 
views, however, were firmly opposed by figures like Gianni Bartoli who identified with the 
conservative faction of the Triestine Christian Democrats and shared the views of figures such as 
Amintore Fanfani or Giacomo Bologna. In his letter to local Christian Democrat GiorgioTombesi, 
Bartoli emphasized that “eight years of failing Christian Democratic policies had resulted in both 
the rise of Slav and socialist political parties as well as an excessive acquiescence toward Tito.”72 
As these statements suggest, opposition in Trieste to the progressive experiment of the center-left 
and closer relations with Yugoslavia certainly fed into popular animosity toward Rome.  
A few days before Tito's visit, President Moro, eager to minimize both popular and political 
protests, restated the unchanged judicial status of the ex-zone B.
73
 This statement, while responding 
to the wishes of the émigrés and also decisively appeasing the most conservative factions of both 
local and national public opinion, clashed with the views of leftist parties which had long 
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recognized Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-zone B.
74
 Above all, Moro’s statement provoked 
Tito.
75
 Indeed, the Yugoslav President reiterated his personal criticism of Italy’s inconceivable 
irredentist ambitions toward the ex-zone B and, consequently, decided to cancel his visit.
76
  
A study of the main responses from the Italian newspapers to this news show the highly 
politicized nature of the issue which had become a powerful tool in the hands of the political 
opposition to dispute the acquiescence of the government toward mounting communism or 
resurgent neo-fascism. This news was indeed celebrated by the nationalist fringes of the Italian 
press which praised the pivotal role of the neo-fascist party rather than the pro-leftist government in 
defending Italian claims to the eastern border.
77
 The communist press, for its part, accused neo-
fascists and the most conservative segments of the Christian Democrats of having forced Prime 
Minister Moro to proclaim the unchangeable nature of the border, despite the fact that both 
governments had been negotiating the border issue since 1969.
78
 Among these interpretations, 
which were driven by irreconcilable ideological views, moderate and progressive segments of 
national public opinion interpreted the cancellation of Tito's visit as the result of a mutual 
misunderstanding and greatly related it to the problematic nationality issue inside Yugoslavia.
79
  
Meanwhile, Italians in Trieste responded to Tito's prospective visit in different ways. 
Triestine residents of progressive views, for example, responded to the appeal of local center-left 
parties and associations by condemning recent neo-fascist violence in the city with a mass 
demonstration that took place on December 14, 1970 and was attended by 15,000 people, a number 
that greatly surpassed the anti-Tito demonstration.
80
 While proving that post-war Trieste had moved 
forward in the process of democratization, the December 14 gathering also revealed local 
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antagonism toward forms of resurgent Fascism, a fact that was also positively received in 
Yugoslavia.
81
  
At the same time, émigré associations in Trieste, while receiving Tito’s decision to cancel 
his visit to Italy positively, also exposed their concerns for the temporary success that still left 
future changes to claims of Italian sovereignty over the ex-zone B possible. Thus, the President of 
the Istrian Union, Sardos Albertini, argued that the national Istrian committees would continue to 
strictly monitor the actions and statements of both Italian and Yugoslav governments.
82
 In 1971, the 
Istrian Union created the “Centro Nazionale di Coordinamento per la Difesa Zona B e Istria” 
(National Center for the Coordination of the Defense of Zone B and Istria, hereafter C.N.C.).
83
 This 
new organization, whose members came from right-wing and Catholic political orientations, 
coordinated the efforts of the neo-irredentist network against any formal renunciation of Italian 
sovereignty over the ex-zone B.
84
 For example, the C.N.C. directly sent letters and telegrams to 
Italian politicians, calling upon them to defend the country's territorial claims. Such letters also 
denounced the Italian Foreign Ministry for its presumed complacency with the annexationist goals 
of the Yugoslav government.
85
  
Following Tito’s cancelled visit, local fears of a possible renunciation of Italian sovereignty 
to the Istrian region was again heightened by the controversial declaration of local judge Alberto 
Mayer.
86
 In his claims that “the foibe represented an act of revenge against years of fascist 
violence,” Mayer implicitly justified Yugoslav war-time violence. His statement elicited a 
vehement and outraged reaction from many public figures in Trieste.
87
 In a series of letters to the 
national government, Bartoli also condemned the declaration which he believed derived from a 
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broader and unacceptable national campaign against Trieste.
88
 In addition, Bartoli noted, the issue 
of the ex-zone B further reinvigorated local concern about the pace and depth of commercial 
agreements with Yugoslavia. According to Bartoli, the government's strategy, which claimed to 
integrate Trieste into the European market, had gradually strengthened the competitiveness of both 
Fiume and Capodistria, a situation that ran against the Trieste port’s economic interests.89 These 
economic concerns, as cited by Bartoli, had over time reinforced local negative attitudes toward 
both the process of Adriatic friendship and center-left coalition governments. In addition, it 
facilitated the rise of the "Fanfaniani" faction of the Triestine Christian Democrats which, according 
to local state authorities, further strained relations between Triestine and Roman political governing 
elites.
90
  
Despite the intensity of the local political debate that followed the cancellation of Tito's 
visit, political parties and public opinion outside Trieste increasingly considered the issue of the ex-
zone B as anachronistic. Indeed, many observers viewed West Germany's formal recognition of the 
Oder-Neisse line as a political decision that further reinforced Moro's aspiration of an Italian 
"Ostpolitik" toward Yugoslavia. In addition, the fact that in 1971 also the Vatican established 
diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, a socialist country, decisively enhanced the image of Tito's 
regime.
91
 Thus, in the early 1970s, crucial changes in international politics and the prospective 
inclusion of the Italian Communist Party into the coalition government further pressured the 
Christian Democrats to remove the issue of the ex-zone B from the international agenda.
92
  
At this point, even the most progressive and moderate fringes of the local Italian community 
in Trieste increasingly understood the London Memorandum as a permanent rather than provisional 
agreement. In the words of Triestine poet Umberto Saba, the London Memorandum had served as 
an antidote to ethnic passion in a frontier region where, “patriotism, nationalism, and racism are 
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related like health, neurosis, and craziness.”93 From this perspective, the transformation of the 
demarcation line between Trieste and the ex-zone B into a state border appeared a mere matter of 
time. The Venice meeting of 1971 between Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro and Yugoslav 
Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac removed the last obstacle that had stood in the way of Italian and 
Yugoslav diplomatic relations. During this meeting, Moro confirmed the territorial status 
established by the London Memorandum and, although local public opinion was not yet willing to 
accept a definitive renunciation, agreed to begin secret negotiations; an agreement on the ex-zone B 
would be announced at a more appropriate moment in the future.
 94
  
During the meeting Moro also suggested that Tito visit make a state visit to Italy, and in 
March 1971 the Yugoslav leader came to Rome. Sardos Albertini invited his fellow Istrians to 
accept Tito’s visit yet part of the émigré community were still opposed to the idea of an official visit 
by the Yugoslav dictator as they considered him most responsible for the drama of the exodus and 
the “foibe.”95 In an exchange of letters with Bishop  Santin, who will later retired in 1975, Albertini 
requested the Triestine Bishop to prepare a specific memorandum calling for the defense of Italian 
territorial rights over the ex-zone B.
96
 While granting his support and contribution to both émigré 
and patriotic associations, Santin also revealed deep distrust toward the defeatist attitudes of the 
Italian authorities by stating that the government was giving Yugoslavia “what does not belong to 
it.”97   
Meanwhile, foreign newspapers such as The New York Times, described Tito's March 1971 
visit the act as an example of  socio-political reconciliation and fruitful economic relations between 
countries with a conflicted past.
98
 This interpretation, which coincided with that of Italian 
progressive media, strictly contrasted with the views of right-wing newspapers which rather 
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emphasized popular hostility toward Tito and described in great detail the brutality and suffering 
that the victims of the “foibe” had experienced. Further condemning the meeting, it also labeled the 
Yugoslav dictator as “a butcher of Italians.”99 Rightist magazines also claimed that Tito’s visit was 
attended by “more policemen than bystanders,” a statement that clearly aimed to highlight the 
general public’s apathy and indifference toward the Yugoslav leader.100 Moro, eager to minimize 
parliamentary opposition, therefore removed territorial issues from the agenda of his meeting with 
Tito and, throughout February and March, publicly stressed Italy's unwillingness to changes in the 
geo-political status of the border.  
Despite these official statements, right-wing groups continued to exploit the fear and anxiety 
resulting from Trieste’s geo-political proximity to Yugoslav Communism.101 In Trieste, 
organizations such as “Ordine Nuovo” (New Order) and “Avanguardia Nazionale” (National 
Avanguard), for example, intensified their anti-Slav propaganda against the Slovene minority and 
its institutions.
102
 The previously mentioned discovery of weapons and munitions in the Carso hills 
as well as the death of police officers who were killed in a terrorist attack by members of "Ordine 
Nuovo" discredited these organizations of the Italian radical right along with neo-fascist youth 
groups, such as "Giovane Italia" (Young Italy).
103
 These and other episodes of right-wing political 
extremism were widely advertised by the local Communist Party in the pamphlet “Il Calendario 
Nero” (The Black calendar) with the hope of undermining popular support for the neo-Fascist Party 
in the upcoming national elections.
104
 In Trieste, however, the neo-Fascist Party responded to 
communist propaganda by distancing itself from extremist formations and centering its campaign 
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on its traditional role in the defense of Italian rights on the ex-zone B, a strategy that gained 
supporters at this time.
105
 
Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia were slowly proceeding 
and, looking retrospectively, the Christian Democrats' plans toward the ex-zone B clearly pointed to 
a forthcoming resolution of the border dispute. For example, Social Democrat Mauro Ferri’s 
statements that it was now time “to recognize the current demarcation line as the frontier between 
Italy and Yugoslavia” vividly exposed the views of the center-left coalition government in the 
spring of 1971. From their perspective, in order to end Trieste’s economic crisis and the paternalist 
policy of the central state, it was necessary to resolve all contentious issues with the Yugoslav 
neighbor. In a city in which approximately 30,000 out of 270,000 people were Slovenes, this goal 
could be attained only by abandoning the intransigent defense of Italian former claims to the ex-
zone B.
106
  
Parties and associations of conservative orientations harshly responded to Ferri’s 
declarations. One such response was from the Istrian Union which sent formal complaints to the 
leading figures of the central government.
107
 The émigré journal L'Esule (The Exiled) also 
published an open letter to Ferri in which it stressed the unconvincing nature of his arguments and 
accused the Social Democrat of secretly plotting with Tito’s regime at the expense of the Julian 
population.
108
 Other Italian newspapers, however, suggested that Ferri’s declarations should be read 
in parallel with West German chancellor Willi Brandt’s Ostpolitik, especially its strategy of a quick 
resolution of border disputes to advance political relaxation with the Socialist bloc.
109
  
 Ferri’s declarations anticipated the upcoming trip of American President Nixon to Belgrade 
by a few weeks, which further exacerbated the apprehension of the émigrés. Indeed, they feared that 
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the American President would pressure both Rome and Belgrade to definitively settle the issue.
110
 
Thus, the Istrian Union, which still had the support of approximately 24,000 members, asked Nixon 
to disregard Tito’s territorial goals for the ex-zone B and uphold Italian sovereignty.111 The 
National Italian Irredentist Association also addressed a telegram to President Nixon.
112
 It reported 
that any territorial concession over the ex-zone B to the Yugoslav Federation, a country affected by 
socio-political instability, would direct the Yugoslav imperialist gaze toward the Italian border and 
eventually lead to the communist takeover of the Italian peninsula.
113
 Bartoli instead, more 
concerned about the Italian minority under Yugoslav authority, called upon the American President 
to ask Tito about the Italians imprisoned in Yugoslavia as well as the protection of the Italian 
minority in the ex-zone B.
114
  
These letters revealed the deep concerns that local personalities and neo-irredentist 
associations still harbored toward any compromise over the Istrian region in the early 1970s.
115
 
Their apprehensions were also shared by the National League, which attempted to win public 
attention in Trieste by arranging a set of cultural events to celebrate the epic trajectory of Adriatic 
irredentism. The Communist Party condemned this initiative as an expression of revanchist neo-
irredentism. In particular, it attacked the central government for providing financial support to the 
National League which it regarded as a nationalist and reactionary organization that had been highly 
compromised by Bruno Coceani, whom the communists had often had portrayed as a “Quisling” 
due to his role as Trieste’s Prefect after September 1943. Fully aware of the influential role that the 
National League played in Triestine politics, the central government responded to these accusations 
by depicting Coceani as a "respectable figure."
116
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When considering the Christian Democratic financial support to associations and figures of 
patriotic and anti-communist sentiments, this affirmation of Coceani was certainly informed by 
reasons of political opportunism. More than any other post-war personality, Coceani embodied the 
nationalist ideals of irredentist intellectual Attilio Tamaro. In upholding the idea of Italian territorial 
sovereignty not only over the ex-zone B but also over Fiume and Dalmatia, Coceani refused to 
recognize both the anachronism of post-war irredentism as well as the strength of the new Cold 
War’s logic of détente. In such a context of international and domestic political changes, neo-
irredentist ambitions unavoidably vanished from Italian politics.
117
   
 
Confronting Detente 
After the Venice meeting between Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro and Yugoslav 
Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac in February 1971, Italian and Yugoslav bilateral relations 
decisively improved. Later that year representatives of Italian veteran associations also made an 
official visit to Yugoslavia for the first time ever. During this visit, spokesmen reasserted the 
inviolability of existing frontiers and the principle of national independence. Led by ex-partisans 
who had failed to notify the Italian Embassy of their intentions, the visit caused embarrassment and 
disappointment among leading political personalities as well as the Foreign Service.
118
 Any 
reference to the inviolability of the borders indeed would have been understood as recognition of 
Yugoslavia's provisional or definitive sovereignty over the ex-zone B. In the government’s view, 
this unauthorized visit could ultimately disturb the ongoing negotiations over an issue that, 
regardless of its minimization within national public opinion, remained politically significant in 
Trieste. 
In early 1972, in response to public concern over possible changes of the geo-political status 
of the ex-zone B, Triestine members of the local Christian Democrats asked Rome to respond to the 
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rumors. Members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied by stating that, despite friendly 
relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, both states mutually recognized each other’s independence 
and territorial sovereignty within national borders. Although this response did not specify which 
Italian and Yugoslav borders were mutually recognized, a subsequent note by the national head of 
the Christian Democrat Committee for Foreign Policy confirmed the on-going validity of the 
London Memorandum.
119
   
Meanwhile, the Istrian Union identified Fanfani as a champion for the Istrian cause and 
hoped his appointment as the head of government would block possible secret negotiations over the 
fate of the Istrian region.
120
 However, despite his public persona, Fanfani had already recognized 
that Yugoslav sovereignty was indisputable and had privately abandoned the cause. By the early 
1970s, the Christian Democrats’ commitment to dispute Yugoslavia over of the ex-zone B had also 
dwindled, not only among its center-left factions but also its most conservative leaders outside 
Trieste. As Giorgio Tombesi recalls, conservative politicians such as Christian Democrat Giulio 
Andreotti would say, "You all forgot that we were the losers. Tito was the winner."
121
 This 
statement, directed at local patriotic rhetoric, reveals a sense of political realism that inevitably 
undermined irredentist dreams toward the eastern border.  
At the time, however, the party’s deceptive statements were being positively received by the 
émigrés whom, while still dreaming of an unlikely return of the ex-zone B to Italy, proved even 
more concerned about preserving Italian culture inside the Istrian region. Indeed, multiple reports 
from Italian organizations in Yugoslavia emphasized that the Italian minority was still subjected to 
discrimination in the fields of education and language as well as in public offices.
122
 These issues 
were also intertwined with the issue of the citizenship of the Italian residents in the ex-zone B, a 
problem that had been formally resolved by the Paris Peace Treaty and later confirmed in the 
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London Memorandum.
123
 The Italian border community, which was discouraged by the Italian 
state’s ineffective response to Yugoslav violations, sought support from other institutions, in 
particular the Popular University of Trieste and the General Consulate of Capodistria. 
In the early 1970s these institutions effectively replaced the Association of Istrian 
Communities (formerly Istrian CLN) which had witnessed a gradual and steady cut in governmental 
contributions and only survived with the support of the local Triestine authorities and the Office of 
Border Zones. While the former provided a financial contribution  of three million lira for the 1972-
1973 year, the latter provided extraordinary contributions to the former CLN Istria that were 
categorized under the broader frame of “expenses for the defense of Italianità” in 1972.124 This 
concession suggests that, in line with the post-1954 strategy toward the border, the central 
government still considered the preservation of Italian culture in the ex-zone B an important factor 
in minimizing possible criticism toward its policy of Adriatic detente from the political opposition 
but especially from the émigré associational network.
125
  
 A few months after Turin’s newspaper La Stampa stated that “Italian and Yugoslav 
cooperation requires the sacrifice of the zone B,” the French right-wing magazine Combat claimed 
that the Italian government had definitively recognized Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-zone B.
126
 
Indeed, in April 1972 it reported on the secret negotiations in great detail and claimed that the final 
agreement had been achieved between February 28
 
and 29 as part of a broader agreement between 
Italian Social Democrats and German Socialists in support of Brandt’s “Ostpolitik.”127 Foreign 
Minister Moro reacted to the article by promptly writing to Bartoli and insisting that the claims of 
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Combat were completely unfounded.
128
 While admitting that the principles of Brandt’s Ostpolitik 
effectively threatened the judicial status of the ex-zone B, Andreotti also tried to reassure the 
émigrés.
129
 
Throughout 1972 rumors about the ex-zone B were rife and the émigré associations naively 
sought political reassurance from the central government.
130
 During the summer, for example, the 
vice-President of the Slovene government claimed that the territorial border with Italy had been 
definitively set in 1954. The President of the Istrian Union, Sardos Albertini, wrote Prime Minister 
Andreotti to ask for personal clarifications.
131
 In his letter, Albertini also called for an official 
declaration from the Italian government, which indeed he received.
132
 In discussing the 
governments’ response, Bartoli expressed his personal appreciation to President Moro for his 
heartfelt defense of the émigrés' rights.
133
 Although the duplicitous statements of the government 
temporarily strengthened the émigrés' confidence and trust in the central authorities, they would 
later arouse popular animosity and anger. More important, the government's claims about the ex-
zone B became statements for public consumption which, in a border city like Trieste, enhanced 
popular support for the Christian Democrats and their fictitious politics of identity. 
Within national public discourse, however, the issue of the ex-zone B was discussed in 
pragmatic terms and became increasingly connected to the broader process of Adriatic detente. 
Thus, in an article of Il Corriere della Sera from December 1972, Dino Frescobaldi argued that the 
“ex-zone B was the right price to pay for a successful and credible Italian Ostpolitik.”134 The Istrian 
Union responded to Frescobaldi’s article by claiming that the preservation of Italian formal rights 
over the ex-zone B stemmed from recurrent governmental reassurances about Istria’s unchanged 
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sovereignty and was intended to compensate for the Italian territorial renunciations after 1947 as 
well as the continuous discrimination against the Italian minority in Yugoslavia.  
This conflicting dialectic between émigrés' associations and progressive segments of 
national public opinion demonstrated the complexity of reconciling Italy’s national and 
international interests. Indeed, in the context of international détente, past irredentist claims became 
untenable and further divided the neo-irredentist network itself. For example, during the summer of 
1972, Renzo Migliorini, a leading member of the National Venetia Julia and Dalmatia Association 
(ANVGD) harshly criticized other émigré associations for their propaganda and support of Moro’s 
center-left strategy. Migliorini accused these associations of pandering to Moro’s policy toward 
Tito in exchange for financial support from both the central government and Trieste's mayor, the 
Christian Democrat Marcello Spaccini. This behavior, Migliorini argued, clashed with the desires of 
the Julian population and weakened Italian claims over the ex-zone B.
135
 Not to be outdone, the 
neo-fascist Renzo De Vidovich argued that an internal coup in the Triestine branch of the ANVGD 
had resulted in the appointment of Christian Democrats who leaned toward Fanfani’s leadership. 
Contrary to De Vidovich’s arguments, however, the appointment of Paolo Barbi as President of the 
ANVGD aimed to minimize tension between the most moderate and radical factions of the 
association. In addition, the gradual reduction of governmental contributions to the ANVGD 
confirmed that the Christian Democrats only partially trusted its leadership and wished to minimize 
any resistance to the Adriatic detente.
136
 
The political context of détente weakened not only Italy's former irredentist claims but it 
also aroused Yugoslav expectations for a quick resolution of the disputed border. In December 
1972, during his visit to Montenegro, Tito harshly criticized the orthodox views of the Italian 
émigré associations which openly displayed their unrepentant irredentist nature. In contesting 
Yugoslav rule over the ex-zone B, Tito continued, the émigrés detrimentally affected the credibility 
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and international reputation of the Italian national government. In one of his last public statements 
before dying in April 1973, Bartoli promptly responded to Tito. He emphasized the sober political 
conduct of both émigré and patriotic associations as well as the numerous manifestations of 
solidarity and appreciation for their cause from both national and international public opinion. In 
addition, Bartoli argued that Tito’s words insulted the memory of the Italian victims of Yugoslav 
violence and could be interpreted as a sign of renewed Yugoslav rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union. Bartoli concluded by writing that “when comparing the privileged treatment of the Slovene 
minority in Trieste to that of the Italian minority in Yugoslavia, the grievances of the Yugoslav 
dictator appear foolish.”137   
The émigré associations responded to Tito’s declarations of December 1972 and not only 
sought political reassurance from both members of the government and the Christian Democrats but 
also from other conservative parties. In response, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti confirmed that 
“the Italian government considered its territorial rights over the ex-zone B indisputable.”138 
Similarly, Giorgio La Malfa, the Secretary of the Republican Party, confirmed that Foreign Minister 
Giuseppe Medici would firmly protest against Yugoslav claims.
139
 Furthermore, the central 
government also decided to publicly protest against the decision of the Yugoslav government to 
nationalize all of the property of the Italian citizens who had previously left the ex-zone B. This 
provision indeed clashed with former promises to respect the right of Italain émigrés to the 
properties that had been abandoned during the exodus.
140
  
Thus, throughout 1973, while repeatedly contesting the Yugoslav administration’s unilateral 
violations of the London agreements, the Italian government pursued the amendment of such unfair 
provisions.
141
 The firmness of the Italian government, however, barely affected Yugoslav legislative 
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provisions toward the ex-zone B. Indeed, the Republic of Slovenia had come to consider the ex-
zone B as an integral part of its territory. Mail that was sent from Trieste to the ex-zone B and 
addressed only with the Italian names of the cities was regularly returned. Both parliamentary 
representatives and émigré associations formally protested and the Italian government, after 
discussing the issue with the Yugoslav authorities, stated that it was merely a problem of 
mismanagement. It also added that the bilingual place names had already been agreed upon by the 
Yugoslav authorities yet, by March 1973, the only names used by the postal service were those in 
the Slovenian language.
142
         
As shown, in the early 1970s, the territorial dispute over the ex-zone B, although minimized 
in national political discourse, remained a contested issue between the émigrés in Trieste and the 
Italian state. At the same time and regardless of rhetorical claims of the Italian and Yugoslav 
frontier as "the most open border in Europe," the Istrian problem continued to plague bilateral 
relations between Belgrade and Rome.
143
 Within the climate of international relaxation of the 1970s 
any delay in Italy's formal recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-zone B could no longer 
be postponed. Thus, between March 19 and 20, 1973, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Miloš Minic and 
Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Medici met in Dubrovnik, Croatia.
144
 As demonstrated by Italian 
scholar Massimo Bucarelli, during this meeting the two Foreign Ministers agreed on eighteen points 
to resolve the border dispute and to continue its secret negotiations which on the Italian side were 
entrusted to an official of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce Eugenio Carbone and Foreign 
Economic Relations Committee Chairman Boris Snurdel.
145
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The Signage Dispute of 1974: the Last Crisis across the Border 
After the Dubrovnik meeting, the distrust and suspicion of local as well as national neo-
irredentist associations toward the Italian government exponentially increased.
146
 In May 1973, 
Giusto Muratti, the President of the National League sent a letter to the President of the Istrian 
Union Sardos Albertini in which he cited the existence of a confidential document stating that Italy 
and Yugoslavia had been carrying out secret negotiations for the final territorial settlement of the 
border. According to this document, the results of the clandestine meetings would be formally 
announced after the regional elections of 1973.
147
 Muratti also reported that he was informed about 
this document by a member of the office of Foreign Affairs. Although the letter does not provide 
any further information about Muratti's informer or any additional details to verify the content of 
this confidential document, the events of the following months confirmed the behind-the -scenes 
actions of the Christian Democrats.  
After receiving Muratti's letter, Albertini wrote to Minister of Interior Rumor to denounce 
Moro's assurances to Yugoslavia in Venice in 1971 as well as those of Medici at the meeting in 
Dubrovnik (which he referenced with the Italian name Ragusa). In his letter, Albertini also accused 
the Christian Democrats of weakening Italian claims and facilitating the transformation of the 
demarcation line into the Adriatic frontier. These actions, he argued, not only violated Italy's rights 
of sovereignty but also threatened Trieste’s economy, as they would have extended Yugoslav 
territorial waters to its port. To prevent such a scenario, Albertini asked Rumor to support the 
appointment of a personality other than Moro or Medici as Minister of Foreign Affairs: a non-
partisan representative who had not taken part in former talks with the Yugoslav neighbor.
148
 
Furthermore, Albertini asked Bishop Santin to “directly approach the national Christian Democratic 
governing elites and advertise the defense of the Italianess of the Istrian region within the pages of 
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the Catholic magazine Vita Nuova.
149
 As these examples suggest, the émigré network exerted 
increasing pressure on political and religious figures who over time had proved sympathetic toward 
the Istrian problem.  
Consequently, when Andreotti left office in the summer of 1973, the émigrés perceived the 
appointment of Rumor as head of the center-left coalition government and, especially, Aldo Moro 
as Minister of Foreign Affairs as proof of the Christian Democratic intentions to formally settle the 
issue of the ex-zone B.
150
 In the views of the émigrés, Andreotti had avoided  any concession to the 
Yugoslav government over the Istrian region and, therefore,  had often been depicted as a defender 
of Italian interests on the eastern border.
151
 This view, however, was significantly skewed. The 
Triestine Christian Democrat Sergio Coloni’s private papers show that before the fall of his 
government, Andreotti had metaphorically signed a “blank check” to concede Yugoslav sovereignty 
over the ex-zone B. Indeed, during the regional elections of June 1973, Andreotti met with Christian 
Democrats Belci, Coloni, and Rinaldi whom, with the support of local experts, had prepared a plan 
for a package deal with Yugoslavia. The plan covered the main issues related to the frontier 
economy, the territorial borders, the minorities, and the abandoned property. After discussing 
aspects of the border dispute with the local Christian Democrats, Andreotti approved the plan.
152
 
Thus, the year 1973 marked the end of a political process that, beginning in the early 1960s with the 
support of the most progressive fringes of the Christian Democratic Party, had gradually met the 
consensus of conservative figures like Andreotti.  
At that time, however, Triestine conservatives looked with great confidence to the Christian 
Democrats who generally identified with Fanfani's leadership and largely distrusted progressive 
leaders like Moro. After his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moro, aware of widespread 
local opposition, reiterated that all news reporting the on-going negotiations toward a final 
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settlement between the two governments were not only untrue but also harmful to their diplomatic 
relations.
153
  
Throughout 1973, not only political but also military considerations affected the decisions of 
the Italian government to quickly end the border dispute. Italian military analysts stressed that 
Yugoslavia’s deep economic crisis had exacerbated phenomena of local ethno-nationalism and, 
while undermining its domestic stability, also threatened Italian security. In envisioning a post-Tito 
Yugoslavia, the 1973 report of the Italian intelligence agency (Defense Information Service, SID) 
emphasized the possibility of an intervention in Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union. Despite the 
positive status of Italian and Yugoslav diplomatic relations, military analysts concluded, “a local 
conflict between the Adriatic neighbors remained a possible scenario.”154 Thus, the report 
confirmed that the Italian government could simultaneously strengthen its security and Yugoslav 
stability by recognizing the territorial provisions of the London Memorandum as a definitive 
solution and establishing the Italian southeastern border along the demarcation line.   
Political and military factors, therefore, played an especially important role in the 
acceleration of the final settlement of the Adriatic border yet it still required an external catalyst. In 
the summer of 1973, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereafter CSCE) 
provided the ideal context within which the Italian government could legitimize the recognition of 
Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-zone B as both a consequence of the unchangeable nature of 
Europe’s post-war borders and an example of Italy’s major contribution to international peace.155  
While the Italian government saw the climate of international relaxation between opposing 
blocs as a unique opportunity to advance Adriatic friendship, the National Center for the 
Coordination of the Defense of Zone B and Istria (C.N.C.) understood it as an impending threat 
which expedited the formal annexation of the Istrian region by Yugoslavia.
156
 In an attempt to gain 
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popular support, the C.N.C. conducted a public campaign whose ultimate goal was to draw national 
and international public attention to the problem of the ex-zone B and its émigrés. Its campaign was 
particularly successful in Australia, a continent that had experienced mass immigration from the 
city and its surrounding territory during the post-war years.
157
 Julian émigrés who had permanently 
settled in Australia, United States, or South America, indeed, continued to support the Italian claims 
to their native Istria by occasionally making financial contributions to the émigré associational 
network.
158
    
At the same time, however, major international consensus toward the Helsinki principle of 
the inviolability of the frontiers and Moro's strategy of including the Italian Communist Party 
within  the center-left coalition government created a growing sense of powerless among the 
émigrés. Disillusionment and discouragement also pervaded the most intransigent fringes of the 
neo-irredentist movement. Istrian war veterans like Giorgio Cobolli, who received the WWII gold 
medal of military service, argued that, although he personally believed in the need to carry on the 
defense of Italian claims to Istria, the prolonged silence of the national government on the issue 
“represented a clear sign of the defeatist attitudes of the current political class.”159  
Likewise, the correspondence between the C.N.C. and the Istrian Union confirmed that the 
national government was perceived, especially among the few Italians residents of the ex-zone B, to 
have come to terms with Tito. Nonetheless, phrases such as “Down with Tito" or "We are Triestines 
not Slavs" could still occasionally be found on the walls of cities in the ex-zone B along the 
demarcation line such as Buie.
160
 These demonstrations of a continued Italian existence in Istria 
were widely praised by the émigrés, patriotic, and right-wing press and were taken very seriously 
by the Yugoslav administration. In reading such graffiti as symptoms of Fascism on the border, the 
Yugoslav authorities mistakenly believed  that an Italian center-right government in Rome would 
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have a better chance at settling the issue of the zone B rather than a center-left government; the 
latter it believed would require at least an additional ten years.
161
  
As this statement suggests, the Yugoslav authorities were aware of the complexity of the 
issue as well as Trieste's hostility to any change in the judicial status quo of the ex-zone B. Despite 
this and within the favorable context of the Helsinki talks, Yugoslavia publicized its intentions to  
definitively close the border dispute. Thus, in January 1974, the Yugoslav government erected signs 
approximately thirty meters from the demarcation line that stated "S.F.R Jugoslavija-S.R. 
Slovenija."
162
 Upon learning of the decision, the C.N.C. sent a note of formal protest to both the 
CSCE and leading personalities of the Italian government, among them Christian Democrats 
Rumor, Moro, and Fanfani. In its message, the C.N.C. stressed that “Yugoslav annexationist 
ambitions violated the spirit of the London Memorandum and contradicted the Helsinki principles 
that underscored contemporary European territorial agreements.”163 The  claims of the C.N.C. were 
interestingly supported by a Serbian committee of popular defense which, criticizing Yugoslav 
communism for the steady repression and discrimination toward the Italian minority of the ex-zone 
B and Dalmatia, drew a parallel between Italian and Serbian resistance to Yugoslav assimilation 
policies.
164
   
Both in February and March the Italian government sent two notes of formal protest to 
Belgrade in which it stressed that Yugoslav sovereignty had never extended over the ex-zone B.
165
 
Condemning the fascist and irredentist tones of the Italian complaints, the Yugoslav government 
unsuccessfully requested that the Italian government withdraw them. On March 15, 1974, the 
Yugoslav authorities sent a new letter in which it reiterated that the London Memorandum 
sanctioned the partition of the former Free Territory of Trieste and therefore recognized Yugoslav 
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territorial sovereignty over the zone B. From a Yugoslav perspective, “if the territorial status of the 
zone B had to be questioned, the same had to be done for Trieste.”166  
Although the London Memorandum did not invalidate Italy’s formal territorial sovereignty 
over the ex-zone B, external observers believed that the Italian position was strongly influenced by 
national irredentist circles.
167
 Years of Italian and Yugoslav rule over the two halves of the former 
FTT indeed made any revisionist proposal untenable for both governments. At the same time, 
however, revisionist statements still evoked popular responses on both sides of the border, further 
confirming the strength of a politics of identity inside Trieste and its territory. Indeed, in an article 
entitled "Disdain and Perplexities among the Adriatic Émigrés,” the C.N.C. labeled the protest of 
10,000 Slovenes in Capodistria and their anti-Italian slogans as clear expressions of Yugoslav 
annexationist ambitions and called for a firm response from the Italian government. Italian national 
and local newspapers also highlighted the illegitimacy of Tito’s claims and condemned the 
aggressive expressions of anti-Italian sentiments that had transpired from the Slovenian 
demonstration.  
On March 24, 1974, the Yugoslav government undertook military exercises and mobilized 
its forces along the demarcation line. While this move provoked the harsh criticism of conservative 
elements of Italian public opinion, progressive newspapers such as Il Corriere della Sera depicted 
the exercises as a clear sign of rising Yugoslav fears of Soviet threats to its territorial integrity. In 
definitively recognizing Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-zone B, the newspapers suggested, the 
Italian government would ultimately consolidate international peace, an argument that had been 
repeatedly advanced by the Christian Democrats and its center-left coalition government.
168
  
While already coping with mounting local criticism for its weak response to Belgrade's 
aggressiveness, Rome was also harshly criticized by the émigré associations for its decision to first 
suspend in early 1974 and then, in the summer, restore its contributions to the Italian associations in 
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the ex-zone B. As discussed above, governmental contributions had indeed been drastically reduced 
from L.5.000.000 in early 1971 to L. 1.700.000 in 1974.
169
 In local views, these measures stood in 
stark contrast to the state's financial contributions to the Slovene minority in Trieste. By March 
1974, Slovene associations had experienced an impressive increase in state support from about five 
to one hundred million lira in state contributions. Between 1963 and 1973, the regional government 
had also exponentially increased its support, from 2 to 85 million lira. Among the émigrés, 
economic support for the Slovene minority was therefore largely understood as symptomatic of the 
government’s intentions to finally resolve the border dispute.170  
External observers, however, hardly believed in a quick end to this dispute. While closely 
following the events, for example, American Intelligence (C.I.A.) reports predicted that the current 
dispute over the zone B would "probably continue to be noisy and sharply worded” and that Tito 
wouldn’t compromise in fear that it would “encourage other neighbors to raise similar irredentist 
claims.”171 Indeed, the report stated, members of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs would 
be willing to publicly reveal information about the secret talks that could embarrass the Italian 
government. Tito, the report concluded, would also publicly use NATO military training in the 
Adriatic as a threat to Yugoslav security and provoke an outburst of domestic nationalism which 
would further postpone a definitive settlement over the ex-zone B.
172
  
The Yugoslav sign controversy and military exercises had certainly drawn national and 
international attention toward the border dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia.
173
 Both the C.I.A. 
and the Italian Foreign Ministry agreed that the unyielding behavior of the Yugoslav authorities was 
ultimately motivated by the belief that the border dispute was part of a Soviet plan aiming to further 
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destabilize Tito’s regime and facilitate its overthrow.174 The Yugoslav press had effectively 
criticized the Soviet Union for its lack of support of Tito during the border dispute with Italy and 
had harshly criticized Western anti-Yugoslav propaganda.
175
 As in the past, the Yugoslav behavior 
exposed a sense of endangerment and self-encirclement that was strongly informed by the regime’s 
views of the external world. Although Italian and Yugoslav governing elites had rhetorically 
portrayed the Triestine territory as the “most open border” of Europe, mutual political distrust 
remained regrettably strong along the frontier.
176
   
In April 1974, Tito’s speech in Sarajevo decisively reiterated former accusations against the 
imperialist intentions of the Italian government and its Atlantic allies toward the Yugoslav 
Federation.
177
 These statements were further echoed by the Yugoslav press which reinvigorated the 
strong campaign against the supposedly revanchist and proto-fascist fringes of the Italian 
government, which were unwilling to renounce Italy’s territorial claims.178 These declarations 
provoked the harsh response of the Istrian Union which, in its correspondence with leading 
members of the government, claimed the “illegitimate nature of the Yugoslav occupation of the ex-
zone B and called for a future plebiscite under the protection of the UN.”179  
In response, Andreotti, now Minister of Defense, claimed that the “Italian government 
would irrepressibly defend Italian national rights.”180 Differently from former occasions, however, 
his letter did not firmly reassert Italian sovereignty over the ex-zone B, a detail that was hardly 
noticeable yet exposed his compromising attitude toward Tito’s requests. Meanwhile, the C.N.C. 
enthusiastically praised the initiative of a few Christian Democrats whose parliamentary request for 
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the firm defense of the London Memorandum was rhetorically portrayed as an appeal to end the 
Yugoslav occupation of the Istrian region.
181
 Consequently, Moro’s response, which reiterated 
Italian commitment to fully apply the Memorandum’s clauses, boosted the expectations of the neo-
irredentist movement.  
Meanwhile, Tito again proclaimed Yugoslav sovereignty over the Istrian region during the 
Tenth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Tito argued that, at a moment in which the 
unchangeable nature of Europe’s post-war borders had become the hallmark of both the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe and a blueprint for international peace, Italian territorial 
claims were merely distortions. Tito’s position was generally shared by the heads of the different 
Yugoslav regional communist parties which additionally emphasized that, under Allied pressure, 
“the Yugoslav regime had already paid for international peace by renouncing Trieste after 1945.”182 
Thus, the views of Rome and Belgrade appeared irreconcilable. Although the executive 
committees of the émigré associations continued to look with confidence to the central government, 
a sense of anxiety and disillusionment pervaded its popular base. In a letter to the Istrian Union, an 
ex-Army officer wrote that “for thirty years the democratic and corrupted national elites have 
shown a defeatist and subservient attitude toward Tito.”183 This behavior, the letter continued, had 
sanctioned the death of national patriotism and produced nationwide apathy and indifference toward 
the fate of the Istrian region. While the national government had paid considerable attention to 
international issues such as Vietnam, Chile, Greece, or Spain, the issue of the ex-zone B had been 
forgotten. Thus, he concluded, the émigré association should resort to political violence and terror, 
imitating extremist groups such as Fedayeen in Palestine, South-Tyrol irredentists, and the IRA.  
The majority of patriotic and émigré associations members, however, were increasingly 
suspicious of political extremism and entrusted the defense of the ex-zone B to the Christian 
Democrats. Trieste itself had expressed its opposition to any renunciation over the ex-zone B firmly 
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yet civilly.
184
 While political right-wing formations had traditionally embraced the radical revision 
of the Paris Peace Treaty and the reincorporation of Istria, Dalmatia, and Fiume within national 
borders, the right-wing of the Christian Democrats had, over time, simply espoused the maintenance 
of the status quo as “an act of justice toward the Istrian community.”185  
In addition, by the early 1970s generational change had significantly reduced both the 
strength and popularity of intransigent views among the émigrés.
186
 In 1966, for example, émigré 
associations in Fiume counted approximately 13,000 members and monthly distributed 6,000 copies 
of the journal La Voce di Fiume (The Fiume Voice) whereas by 1974 its membership and 
distribution had dropped to a few thousand.
187
 Moreover, since the first experiment of the center-left 
government in 1963, mutual suspicions and latent tensions had weakened the cohesion of the neo-
irredentist associational network. Indeed, after its moderate turn in the early 1970s, the ANVGD 
had been often accused of misrepresenting the views of the Adriatic community and working 
toward a compromise on the ex-zone B.
188
    
In retrospect, neo-irredentist protests only impeded a quick resolution to the border dispute 
in 1974. Although significant key elements of the Triestine population and moderate fringes of the 
neo-irredentist movement increasingly understood the anachronistic nature of their struggle, they 
refused to comply with the logic of detente and accept the formal recognition of Yugoslav 
sovereignty over the ex-zone B. For Italians outside Trieste, however, the London Memorandum of 
1954 had ended the border dispute with Yugoslavia and its sovereignty over the ex-zone B could be 
hardly disputed. These views had been greatly promoted by the most progressive fringes of the 
Christian Democrats, who, at the same time, wished to remove any sign of diplomatic tension with 
Tito's regime, consolidate the Adriatic friendship, contribute to the process of international political 
                                                 
184R.M., “Il volto del nuovo irredentismo,” Difesa Adriatica (October 28-November 11, 1972).  
185
AST, Fondo Tombesi, Busta 18, "Speech at Duino-Aurisina", April 22, 1974. 
186
AUS, Fondo Luigi Papo, Busta 5, fasc.47, "Ritagli stampa sul Trattato di Osimo", November 25, 1974. 
187
ACS, MI, Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza, Cat. G, Associazioni 1944-1986, B.292, Folder Libero Comune di 
Fiume in Esilio,"Confidential Note from Prefect of Padua," June 20, 1974. 
188
ALN, Folder 1974, Segreteria 1974, "Unione degli Istriani, Italia Centro Meridionale," July 16, 1974. 
287 
 
relaxation between blocs, and accelerate the inclusion of the Italian Communist Party while 
minimizing its local political cost.
189
  
 
And then, Osimo... 
“Tito’s regime did the foibe and forced the émigrés to flee from the Istrian region."190 With 
these words, Triestine Christian Democratic Giorgio Tombesi bluntly explained Trieste's opposition 
to the Osimo Treaty. According to Tombesi, this agreement, whose ambiguous economic benefits 
became a bone of contention between the city and the Christian Democratic-led government in 
Rome, certainly sanctioned the postwar borders between Italy and Yugoslavia; at the same time, 
however, it morally offended majority opinion in the city and eliminated residual hope for the return 
of the ex-zone B.       
As discussed above, the making of the Osimo Treaty significantly accelerated in the early 
1970s, especially after the Dubrovnik meeting of 1973. Bucarelli argues that, following the sign 
dispute and under the pressure of American Secretary Kissinger, Italian and Yugoslav diplomats 
entered the final stage of their secret diplomatic negotiations for official Italian recognition of 
Yugoslav sovereignty over the ex-zone B in the last few months of 1974.
191
 At this time, the Italian 
Ambassador to Belgrade Walter Maccotta sent an interesting telegram to the Director of Political 
Affairs in the Foreign Ministry Roberto Ducci in which he stated that Italian national public opinion 
would look positively at the end of the border dispute. Maccotta also added that “Yugoslav 
concerns toward Fanfani’s former statements in support of Italian sovereignty of the ex-zone B 
were completely unfounded.”192 Indeed, the secrecy and good standing of the negotiations made 
any external interference from Italian opponents to a final territorial settlement highly unlikely.    
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In his personal notes from 1975, Sergio Coloni also anticipated a significant change within 
Triestine local public opinion and stated that “people’s political orientations in Trieste were 
gradually shifting from a traditional Christian Democrat to a Socialist and Communist majority.”193 
The local Christian Democrats, therefore, now needed to undertake an increasingly vigorous shift to 
the left, in line with the sharp turn that national politics had experienced throughout the 1960s. For 
Trieste, this shift meant the government's abandonment of the defense of the provisional status of 
the demarcation line and recognition of its permanent character. However, Coloni noted, this step 
was greatly complicated by the large presence of the émigrés, who were unwilling to passively 
witness the end of an Italian Istria. 
Despite the émigrés' wishes, this process appeared inevitable. As outlined above, even the 
most conservative factions of the Christian Democrats had agreed to settle the border dispute to 
prevent, among other factors,  threats to Italy's eastern border such as a possible implosion of the 
Yugoslav Federation.
194
 Concerns for post-Tito Yugoslavia were indeed widespread within the 
Italian establishment. For example, in their reports of 1975, military analysts reiterated the 
potentially dangerous effects of Tito's death and foresaw a possible Yugoslav return within the 
Soviet sphere.
195
 Interestingly enough, in a letter to Communist secretary Enrico Berlinguer, local 
communist leader VittorioVidali drew the party’s attention to Yugoslavia’s rising internal 
instability. Vidali reported that Tito, facing a chronic domestic economic crisis, was conducting a 
new anti-Cominformist campaign to silence political opposition. In addition, Vidali added, 
mounting Bulgarian and Greek threats to Yugoslav sovereignty and territorial integrity had 
strengthened the nationalist orientation of the Slovenian Communist Party in Ljubljana and, 
consequentially, that of the Slovene minority inside Trieste.
196
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Thus, during its 1975 regional convention, the Triestine Communist Party claimed that “the 
national government needed to settle the border issue definitively by formally recognizing the status 
quo” and by aleviating Yugoslav apprehension about its territorial integrity.197 More important, its 
spokesmen implicitly suggested that any further delay in settling the issue could discredit Italy's 
international reputation and interfere with the historical compromise between Communists and 
Christian Democrats in national politics.
198
 In his unfinished manuscript on Osimo, Tombesi 
confirmed that, in his last meeting with Christian Democratic parliamentary groups of February 28, 
1978, Moro confirmed that the definitive renunciation to Italian formal rights over the ex-zone B 
was dictated by the necessity to safeguard the prospective inclusion of the Communist party in a 
governing coalition.
199
 
As these examples show, the national government, under both international and domestic 
pressure, could no longer postpone the final resolution of the border dispute any longer. Although 
the émigré community strongly opposed any change to the geo-political status of the ex-zone B, it 
appears that Triestines were more likely to tolerate the renunciation of the ex-zone B if it brought 
significant economic compensation. A positive trade-off between territorial renunciation and 
economic gains could indeed minimize Trieste’s emotional response to the definitive lost of the ex-
zone B. 
The Italian government, however, had continually denied the existence of any negotiations 
over the ex-zone B and had never publicly revealed its economic aspect; rather, rumors of secret 
negotiations had significantly strained relations between the neo-irredentist network and the central 
government.
200
 Thus, any initiative aiming to enhance Italian and Slovene cooperation was 
perceived by local irredentists as a threat to Trieste’s Italian identity. For instance, in February 
1975, the creation of an Italian-Yugoslav association that aimed to intensify cultural relations 
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between the Adriatic neighbors was believed to facilitate Yugoslav plans to annihilate the Italian 
culture inside the Istrian region.
201
 Such arguments were advertised by the right-wing press and 
were shared by local nationalists whose numbers had steadily increased also inside the National 
League. Even though its leadership remained overwhelmingly Christian Democratic, the National 
League also refused to abide by party policy and endorse the renunciation of the ex-zone B.
202
  
Local resistance against Osimo, however, proved futile. In the summer of 1975, the 
Vatican’s decision to separate the dioceses of Trieste and Capodistria marked a first step toward the 
official recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty of the ex-zone B.
203
 In addition, the signing of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the resignation of an Italian member of the Mixed Yugoslav-Italian 
Committee over personal differences with the foreign policy of Moro’s government, also signaled 
the coming of Osimo.
204
 In such a context, the reconstruction of the C.N.C., which had been 
disbanded in 1974, represented a last desperate attempt to save the ex-zone B.
205
 For their part, the 
émigré associations, perhaps aware of the weakness of neo-irredentist arguments, increasingly 
stressed the unbearable economic damage that the Italian recognition of the border would have on 
the Triestine economy.
206
  
A few days before its announcement in the national Parliament, the Triestine newspaper Il 
Piccolo, labeled the imminent Italian-Yugoslav agreement as a “lie lasting for twenty long years,” 
and described what Moro would later explain as a decision that was “dictated by reasons of state 
above any emotional consideration” in detail.207 The communist press, for its part, welcomed the 
prospective resolution of the Adriatic dispute which abided by the Helsinki principle and removed a 
visible legacy of the fascist war.
208
 Inside the Parliament, however, right-wing representatives 
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accused the government of severing the historical borders of the nation. Meanwhile, groups of neo-
fascists gathered outside the residence of the President of the Republic to chant “Tito's 
executioner.”209 These symbolic protests, however, were small in size and went generally ignored 
within national public discourse. 
In a speech on October 4, 1975, Foreign Minister Mariano Rumor presented the Osimo 
Treaty as an opportunity to restore Trieste's traditional role as a crossroads between people and 
cultures.
210
 Although Rumor claimed that the Treaty with Yugoslavia was “painful yet 
unavoidable,” he stated that Osimo had facilitated the definitive return of Trieste to Italy, had 
included a favorable border adjustment and had ended any residual issues with Yugoslavia.
211
 The 
Treaty also opened the door to new agreements on the creation of a free trade zone, a more efficient 
use of Adriatic resources, and an improvement in the mobility of people and goods throughout the 
border region.
212
  
International public opinion, while praising Italy for making a great sacrifice to consolidate 
Yugoslav geo-political stability, presented the agreement as “a worthy example of genuine 
statesmanship to resolve international problems with patience, goodwill, and a pinch of political 
courage.”213 The leftist press welcomed the agreement as “a proof of political realism which healed 
a wound of the fascist war, advanced security and cooperation in Europe, and weakened the petty 
nationalism of right-wing propaganda.”214 By contrast, the Italian right vehemently attacked the 
Treaty which was depicted as the outcome of American and Soviet pressure on the Italian 
government.
215
 Neo-fascist representatives echoed these arguments and during the parliamentary 
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debate labeled Osimo as “an ignominy that was used to remove a bureaucratic burden from Moro’s 
agenda.”216  
Whereas the London agreements of 1954 had boosted popular enthusiasm both inside and 
outside Trieste, Osimo went almost unnoticed in national public opinion.
217
 In Trieste, however, the 
Treaty was received with a mix of anger and resignation from the émigré associations which 
portrayed it as a “dirty business.”218 They also took part in symbolic actions that were filled with 
nationalist rhetoric. In one such instance, disgruntled irredentists like Prince Hardouin, who had 
been inspired by D’Annunzio's flight over Vienna of 1918, flew over the ex-zone B to distribute 
leaflets that claimed the “Italianissima” nature of the Istrian region.219 Meanwhile, Father Flaminio 
Rocchi, the spiritual leader of the émigrés, wrote a pamphlet that harshly attacked the secrecy of the 
negotiations and the content of the agreement. Rocchi highlighted Osimo’s violations of 
international law, recalled the drama of the “foibe” and the Istrian exodus, exposed the contrasting 
views of different national political parties, and concluded that the “only zone B that was known in 
Italy was in the soccer.”220 This last statement aptly summarizes the atmosphere of apathy and 
indifference that encompassed the issue outside Trieste.
221
  
Above all, the Osimo Treaty led to political consequences that were neither unpredictable 
nor unexpected and fostered an upsurge in political localism.
222
 Indeed, the Triestine city council 
experienced a significant fragmentation among the parties of the governmental coalition whose 
irreconcilable views on the nature and terms of Osimo later led to the emergence of the "Lista per 
Trieste" (List for Trieste, LPT).
223
 During the political debate inside the Triestine municipal 
council, Christian Democratic mayor Marcello Spaccini presented the Italian-Yugoslav agreement 
as the continuation of the historical and political compromise that began with the London 
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Memorandum of 1954. Furthermore, he stated, this agreement was the result of the foolishness of 
the fascist war, the true cause of the loss of Istria. 
Spaccini’s speech well summarized the main arguments of the political forces that supported 
Osimo and identified with the center-left coalition. According to Spaccini, Osimo definitively 
reasserted Italian sovereignty over Trieste and reinforced the long-standing friendship of the 
Adriatic populations. While strengthening Yugoslav security and defense against Soviet 
Communism, Spaccini added that the agreement also restored Trieste's traditional role as a city of 
"indisputable Italian culture and sentiments but with a European vocation."
224
 In addition, Osimo 
formalized Yugoslav sovereignty which had been informally granted twenty-one years earlier and 
finally eradicated any possible future tensions over Trieste.  
On the other hand, right-wing political parties attributed the post-war configuration of the 
border to the fallacious behavior of the national resistance and the cowardly actions of the national 
government that had signed the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. Thereafter, rightist representatives 
argued, the FTT immediately became unfeasible and the London Memorandum, which was 
fictitiously presented as provisional, could still be rejected by the national Parliament. The 
renunciation of Italian sovereignty over the ex-zone B was therefore depicted by right-wing parties 
as a dangerous political act that not only insulted the memory of both the martyrs of November 
1953 and recently deceased former mayor Bartoli, but also shocked those who had undoubtedly 
believed in the government’s commitment to safeguarding Italian sovereignty of the eastern border. 
Osimo's dubious benefits and the extension of Yugoslav territorial waters, the right claimed, would 
ultimately inflict a deadly blow to the Triestine economy. For its part, the Independence Movement, 
while highlighting Osimo’s violation of the principle of self-determination and mobilizing about a 
thousand people in Trieste’s square, also claimed that Trieste’s economy would suffer.225 
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These opposing and irreconcilable views were also debated within a partially empty Italian 
Parliament that “sanctioned the definitive exile of the émigrés from their native Istria.”226 Prime 
Minister Moro received numerous letters from Istrian groups which were filled with 
disillusionment, anger, and disdain toward a national political class which, in their views, had 
repeatedly lied and ignored the fate of the nation’s natural borders.227 For the émigrés, in particular, 
the signing of Osimo transformed the national government form a “mother into a wicked 
stepmother, deserving now and forever only the contempt of the Istrian community and the 
Redipuglia’s dead.”228 Although the National League harshly criticized the Treaty, it also  argued 
that the despicable agreement provided the associational network an opportunity to remove Julian 
patriotism from its demonized nationalist past and contribute to the forging of a new European 
identity.
229
   
On November 10, 1975, Italian Foreign Minister Mariano Rumor and Yugoslav Foreign 
Minister Milos Minic signed the Osimo Treaty at Villa Leopardi in Ancona.
230
 The Triestine 
newspaper Il Piccolo portrayed Osimo as “an agreement that unifies rather than divides people 
across the Adriatic frontier."
231
 Meanwhile, members of the local conservative factions of the 
Christian Democrats advanced both pragmatic and emotional arguments to oppose the Treaty. 
Among them, Giorgio Tombesi played a pivotal role in opposing the terms of Osimo, citing its 
moral injustice and unclear economic benefits. Aware that the Italian cultural and linguistic identity 
of Trieste had long coexisted with its multinational entrepreneurial foundation, Tombesi used 
Osimo’s economic drawbacks to expose the fallacy of the governmental policy toward the city.232 
Distancing himself from fascist and revanchist claims, the Triestine Christian Democrat portrayed 
his opposition to Osimo as a choice of political and moral conscience. In resigning Italian  
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Map VII: the State Frontier  between Italy and Yugoslavia after Osimo   
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sovereignty over a tiny strip of land that had formally remained under international jurisdiction for 
the previous thirty years, Tombesi argued, the Italian government ultimately weakened rather than 
strengthened Italian security along the eastern border.
233
    
In Tombesi’s views, not only pressure from NATO allies but also Moro’s defeatism and 
personal belief in a political future with the Left had paved the way to Osimo. The “Morotea” 
faction of the Christian Democrats had indeed prepared for the renunciation of Italian rights to the 
ex-zone B while simultaneously searching for a compromise with the left.
234
 In addition, the 
detractors of Osimo were fined by the Christian Democrat secretary for violating party discipline, a 
fact that only fostered more animosity toward the national party and the state institutions that it 
dominated. Relying on widespread popular opposition to the economic terms of the treaty, Osimo’s 
detractors in Trieste were able to collect 65,000 signatures in support of the creation of a full free 
trade zone and administrative autonomy for Trieste.
235
  
The Italian government, however, appeared unconcerned about popular disillusionment in 
Trieste.
236
 Indeed, in multiple reports from the meetings of the Council of Ministers between 
October 1975 and July 1976, the most heated phase of the protests against Osimo in Trieste, not one 
reference was made about the border settlement.
237
 Moreover, the parliamentary discussions that 
anticipated the ratification of the Treaty hardly saw more than twenty to twenty-five representatives 
participating in the debate, which further confirms its marginalization in Italian national politics.
238
  
In Trieste, by contrast, religious figures like Bishop Santin continued to harshly criticize the 
Christian Democratic Party which, supported by Socialists and Communists, had disregarded the 
injustice of the Istrian exodus and agreed to the “the sordid barter.”239 Meanwhile, the National 
Italian Irredentist Association also led a public campaign against an agreement which they claimed 
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had “violated the moral duty of the Italian people to accomplish the geo-political unification of the 
nation.”240 In their views, Osimo was nothing but “an infamous barter.”241 
The political and popular debate sparked by the Osimo Treaty affected Trieste's loyalty to 
and identification with the Italian state.
242
 On April 13,1976, in an effort to oppose the prospective 
creation of a custom zone across the border that would economically benefit Yugoslav companies, 
local socialist, liberal, republican and pro-independence leaders decided to create a committee 
named “Il Comitato dei Dieci” (The Ten People Committee). 243 This committee represented the 
nucleus of the future "Lista per Trieste" (LPT) movement and proposed the creation of an integral 
free trade zone to oppose the one foreseen by Osimo.
244
 Most important, the LPT used economic 
rather than irredentist arguments to demonstrate the wrongful nature of the Osimo Treaty and 
stressed its detrimental effects on Trieste.
245
 This new movement of political protest represented not 
only a strong response to national partitocracy but also a reawakening of civic consciousness for a 
city that was not nationalist but still Italian under a secularly-oriented majority.
246
 Its symbol, the 
watermelon, which was previously used by the independence front in 1966, symbolized a simple 
and common man who opposed the intrigues of a corrupt and inefficient political system.
247
  
Despite local protests, however, the Triestine city council formally approved the Osimo 
Treaty and depicted it as a “bridge between West and East” in 1976.248 During the political debate, 
neo-fascist, liberal, and pro-independence political representatives opposed the center-left 
coalition.
249
 Although the base of the local Republican Party condemned the ignominy of the treaty, 
the party approved Osimo.
250
 This decision, motivated by the party leadership's support for the 
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process of Adriatic friendship and opposition to neo-fascist propaganda, consequently shattered the 
party’s unity in Trieste. In 1977, the Osimo Treaty was also ratified by the national Parliament. 
Moro began his speech in Parliament stating that the Yugoslav administration in zone B "was 
neither alterable with force nor with negotiation."
251
 Thus, Moro added, the agreement was a 
valuable instrument which, even though painful and understandably opposed by the Julian 
community, finally buried the residual tension that had remained from the Second World War and 
fostered international peace.  
Similar to Italy's signature of the London Memorandum in 1954, Moro attempted to 
minimize the government’s responsibility by presenting the agreement as the outcome of external 
factors that forced the Christian Democrats to accept a de facto situation that had lasted for thirty 
years. Moro's parliamentary opponents, for their part, reiterated their criticism of the incredibly 
secretive nature of the agreement, the lack of significant economic benefits, and its contribution to 
the advancement of international Communism.
252
 All of these arguments were certainly filled with 
nationalist rhetoric yet also highlighted some of the main flaws of the Osimo Treaty. 
These flaws were also noted by conservative Christian Democratic figures, among them 
Triestine representative Giacomo Bologna. Bologna opposed the treaty stating that Osimo was 
“avoidable, unnecessary and useless.”253 Bologna argued that the London Memorandum had 
fostered mutual cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia over time and had created the most open 
border in Europe. The formal recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty, while finally dashing the 
aspirations of the émigrés and violating the Helsinki spirit, he continued, stemmed from the 
increasing political pressure that Tito exercised on the Italian government. In Bologna’s words, 
“while the London Memorandum was comprehensible, Osimo was suicidal and unacceptable.”254 
These views were also echoed by the C.N.C. in 1977. Indeed, while arguing that the Italian-
Yugoslav agreement was constitutionally illegitimate and violated international law, the Committee 
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appealed to Italian President Giovanni Leone, urging him to not sign the Osimo Treaty.
255
 The 
treaty, however, was formally ratified and, outside of Trieste, was perceived for the most part as a 
constructive model for an Adriatic bridge.
256
 Within public discourse, the political opposition 
sought to exploit the sentimental value of the ex-zone B and accused the Christian Democrats of 
betraying national interests. Local political conservative groups also stressed that Osimo had 
created an irreparable fracture between the Triestine people and the state.  
This argument became central to the propaganda of the LPT. The movement, which was led 
by local social-democratic and liberal political representatives who were former members of the 
Triestine center-left coalition government, opposed the Christian Democratic Party in Trieste. Their 
protest against Osimo won increasing popular support and culminated in the election of its leader, 
liberal Manlio Cecovini, to the position of mayor of Trieste in 1978.
257
 The LPT identified itself 
with Trieste's past municipal tradition and advocated the protection of the city's cultural and 
economic interests over those of the Italian nation-state. In particular, the LPT became the political 
voice of the diverse Italian, cosmopolitan, and municipal identities that coexisted in the city.
258
 The 
movement ultimately prevented a possible new escalation of dangerous nationalist feelings and 
enhanced sentiments of local identity or “Triestinità.”259   
As Tombesi effectively summarized in his 1978 parliamentary speech, the success of the 
LPT not only exposed local animosity against the ambiguous economic benefits of Osimo but it 
also revealed Trieste’s hostility toward the Christian Democratic governing elites, whom over the 
years had not been able to respond to Trieste’s needs.260 Indeed, years of ineffective state 
administration ultimately fuelled local nostalgia for past forms of administrative autonomy and, at 
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the same time, weakened local allegiance to the Italian state idea."
261
 While championing the city’s 
former role as a gate to the East as well as crucible of Italian, German, and Slovene civilizations, 
the political phenomenon of the  LPT represented the fervent response of the border’s community to 
the state's perceived violation of both its Italian and commercial identity.
262
 These two specific 
features united Socialists, Republicans, Liberals, and Democrats who felt unrepresented in Rome.   
One of its main figures, Socialist representative Gianni Giuricin, argued that Osimo was 
hardly disputable in rational terms yet was unacceptable on the basis of morality, justice, and 
political conscience. Due to Osimo's violation of self-determination Giuricin had decided to abstain 
from voting on the Treaty in the Triestine city council.
263
 Meanwhile, Giuricin also proposed a 
demonstration of Trieste’s opposition to the Treaty through the closure of the city council for a day 
and the flying of the Italian flag at half staff. In rallying together multiple political formations 
whose ideological views appeared to be irreconcilable, Osimo effectively deepened the existing 
political fracture between Roman and Triestine political elites.  
To contain the detrimental effects that the local campaign against Osimo could potentially 
have on the regional elections of 1978, the Christian Democrats imposed strict discipline on the 
local party and replaced local candidates who had shown their hostility to the Italian-Yugoslav 
agreement.
264
 The party also increased its support for pro-Osimo candidates and cut financial 
support to its detractors. In spite of this, the LPT won the Triestine elections with 51,561 votes 
(27.5%). In addition, at the national elections of 1979, Christian Democratic candidates like Giorgio 
Tombesi, who counted on the support of the émigré community, received more votes that Corrado 
Belci, a strong supporter of Osimo in Trieste.
265
 Both the 1978 victory of the LPT and Tombesi's 
election in 1979 proved the widespread hostility toward the center-left majority of the Christian 
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Democratic Party whose policies were perceived as subservient to advancing socialism and 
offensive to the moral, political, and historical values of the city and its émigrés.   
 
Ending the Istrian Question 
This chapter has stressed that the Osimo Treaty was the conclusion of a long-term 
diplomatic process that decisively accelerated after the Prague Spring and ultimately sanctioned the 
definitive partition between Trieste and its Istrian region.
266
 The Treaty also represented the end of 
residual popular irredentist ambitions that had survived the territorial agreements of both 1947 and 
1954. In the views of the local Italian community and, especially, the émigrés, the creation of the 
state frontier broke the historical, cultural, and economic foundation that made Trieste and Istria a 
"unique entity within the nation’s imagined community.”267  
After 1954 Triestine and Istrian dreams of territorial reunification had indeed gradually 
diminished and perceptions of Trieste frontier’s identity decisively changed. Although local 
conservatives and intransigent nationalists firmly opposed any change to the geo-political status of 
the ex-zone B, the most progressive segments of the Triestines population increasingly assessed the 
border’s relationship to the Italian nation-state through the lenses of both the survival of Italian 
language and culture across the demarcation line and Trieste’s economic prosperity. 
Thus, in 1975, years of negotiations culminated in Italian recognition of Yugoslav 
sovereignty over the ex-zone B; however, Trieste's disillusionment with the deceptive behavior of 
the Christian Democratic governing elites and the economic terms of the agreement sparked an 
unparalleled revival of local identity.
268
 From the Triestine perspective, after years of promises and 
lies, not only did the national elites sell out Istrian martyr Nazario Sauro’s dreams but they also 
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imposed an artificial border which, located in a tiny and historically borderless region, further 
threatened Trieste’s economy.269  
Outside Trieste, however, Osimo was the final step to complete the partition of a border that 
faced a Communist threat, had already been lost, and would finally remove the ghosts of past 
nationalism.
270
 Indeed, for the Christian Democratic elites, Osimo offered Trieste an outstanding 
opportunity to play a pivotal role in the Danubian economy.
271
 The emotional reasoning of the neo-
irredentist associations, however, strongly clashed with the pragmatism of the central 
government.
272
 Above all, these divergent understandings of the meaning and importance of Osimo 
marked the last chapter of the legacy of the "mutilated victory" which, in post-war Italy, ironically 
became a mutilated defeat, this time by means of diplomacy and politics rather than war and 
violence.
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Conclusion 
Although historians have extensively studied the Trieste question for the years from 1945 to 
1954, only a few have paid close attention to the prolonged dispute over the territory south of the 
city of Trieste, namely the zone B, the northern part of the Istrian region. In labeling this issue as 
less significant, the narrative of the Cold War dispute over Italy’s eastern border, therefore, has 
remained incomplete. This in-depth study of the border dispute over Trieste and its territory has 
shown that the northern area of the Adriatic region, located on the southern point of the “Iron 
Curtain,” actually remained an object of contention between the Italian and Yugoslav governments 
within the broader context of the Cold War until the 1970s.  
In discussing the problem of Trieste and its territory, this work has broadened the historical 
understanding of the political process that led to the definition of the Italian and Yugoslav frontier, 
almost thirty years after the Paris Peace Treaty. It has proven that the post-war Republic 
underscored the image of the Triestine territory as the geo-political extension of both the Italian 
nation and Western democracy. As in the past, Trieste and its territory were used by a variety of 
political actors to promote national unity and, above all, redefine the new political identity of a 
shattered nation as an anti-thesis to Yugoslav Communism. Once more, Italy's eastern border 
became the defining force of Italian nationhood after 1945.  
In investigating the post-war dispute over Trieste and its territory, this study has made two 
main contributions. First, it has provided valuable insight into the politics of identity and the fluid 
nature of borders during the Cold War. Second, it has demonstrated that, in a context of post-war 
reconstruction, border disputes significantly affected both local and national politics, ultimately 
strengthening or weakening people’s loyalty toward state institutions.  
From World War Two to the Osimo Treaty, the territorial dispute over Italy’s eastern border 
was greatly affected by both the dynamic logic of the Cold War and changes in national politics. As 
Italian central authorities, mainly Christian Democrats, attempted to maximize political and 
economic interests, they were also determined to shape the image of Italy’s Yugoslav neighbor, 
304 
 
initially in hostile terms, but subsequently in conciliatory terms. To achieve this goal, they 
employed a wide network of newspapers, political groups, and state agencies. The border dispute, 
therefore, became a powerful political resource to shape both local as well as national views toward 
Tito's regime either as a threat to the young Italian democracy or a bastion against Soviet imperialist 
goals. 
Consequently, the boundary between Trieste and its territory transformed from a wall into a 
bridge within public discourse. Until 1954, the Cold War’s ideology of containment made the 
Adriatic city a stronghold of Western civilization and barrier to Slav-Communism. Housing the 
ideological confrontation between supporters of the Western and the Eastern world, Trieste also 
experience episodes of urban violence and became the “Berlin of the Adriatic.” This perspective, 
which relates to the arguments outlined in the previous chapters, offers an interesting key to better 
understand the impact of the Cold War on urban communities.
1
 Indeed, both cities became the 
object of a war-time “race” between the Allied and the communist forces, resulting in weeks of 
prolonged Communist occupation which left an indelible mark on the cities’ memories. After the 
end of war, both Trieste and West Berlin experienced Allied occupation and greatly benefited from 
the massive financial support of the Marshall Plan to accelerate the reconstruction of their post-war 
economies and sustain their processes of democratization.  
Despite this, the cities’ experiences and trajectories also significantly differed from one 
other. The Triestine territory was disputed between the Cold War’s junior powers and never 
witnessed Allied and Soviet troops confronting each other across the Adriatic. In addition, the 
Trieste question was characterized by an ethno-political dimension that did not apply to Berlin; the 
German city, instead, was divided along ideological lines which separated Germans in the West 
from Germans in the East. Although Italian residents did not experience physical separation inside 
Trieste, the majority of the population living inside the Triestine territory was ethnically Italian. 
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Thus, Italy and Yugoslavia competed to affirm their ideologies and assert their territorial rule over a 
border which they believed was Italian or Slav in its essence.  
Moreover, while Berliners were physically separated by a wall, both Italians and Slovenes 
inside the Triestine territory were separated by an extremely porous demarcation line. Although 
political tension, military incidents, and restrictions on the movement of people and goods applied 
to the boundary between Trieste and its territory, it ultimately became the most open border of the 
Cold War, a condition that did not apply to Berlin. Finally, the territorial dispute over Trieste ended 
with a diplomatic agreement in 1954 while the dispute over Berlin lasted until 1989 and marked the 
end of the Cold War.  
Nonetheless, in both cities the political language and representation of their respective 
neighbors emphasized the stark contrast between democracy and Communism, ultimately 
reinforcing Cold War stereotypes that would crystallize in public views and re-emerge after the end 
of the bi-polar confrontation. In Trieste, for example, local Slovenes were portrayed as an extension 
of Tito’s Communism and the medium to achieve Trieste’s Balkanization. This perceived threat 
remained central to the propaganda of a variety of political groups, movements, and associations 
that, aligning or diverging from the official rhetoric of the central government, accentuated or 
debilitated the peril of Yugoslav Communism. 
Most importantly, both Trieste and Berlin became barometers of the Cold War in Europe, 
witnessing political tensions that brought states with opposing ideologies to the brink of military 
confrontation. While Trieste was marred by conflict in the immediate post-war years, it later greatly 
benefited from political relaxation. Indeed, as this study has shown, 1954 marked a watershed for 
Trieste. After returning under Italian sovereignty, Trieste was portrayed as an invaluable bridge 
toward the Socialist world. The Italian government, therefore, while hoping to restore Trieste’s port 
economy and prove the advantages of democracy, firmly pursued a Cold War strategy of détente 
toward Yugoslavia. Although the Istrian problem continued to pollute the diplomatic relationships 
between Rome and Belgrade, the Italian establishment pursued a new understanding with Tito and, 
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greatly anticipating future developments in international politics, minimized national interests in 
favor of  “habits of mutual restraint, coexistence, and ultimately cooperation.”2  
In addition, studying the Italian and Yugoslav dispute over the border has offered a unique 
opportunity to further deepen our understanding of the political relationship between national 
governments and frontier cities during the Cold War. What emerges from this study is the image of 
Trieste as a city that, located at the forefront of the Cold War, experienced a sense of gradual 
isolation, decadence, and abandonment. In recent years, literary works such as Jan Morris’s “Trieste 
and the Meaning of Nowhere” have magnificently exposed this distinct character of the city and its 
population. In furthering Morris’ perspective, this study has depicted post-war Trieste as a city that, 
while being crossed by political uncertainty and fear, was in search of its past prosperity and well 
being. 
Thus, in the immediate post-war years, multiple political actors elaborated a wide set of 
political allegiances which firmly supported the extension of Italian statehood to the city and its 
territory. Local and central governing elites, which were dominated by the Christian Democrats, 
indeed, worked together to maximize territorial ambitions that were best served by the logic of the 
early Cold War in the Adriatic. Although their original goals coincided with each other and 
mirrored the expectations of the local population, their strategies gradually diverged, ultimately 
producing tension, misunderstanding, and incidents of political violence. 
This complex legacy also affected the relationship between Trieste and Rome after 1954. 
The Italian government, firmly distancing itself from its past nationalist outbursts and 
confrontational politics, opened to the political forces on the left of the Italian political spectrum. 
When dealing with the border, therefore, it gradually downplayed its previous anti-communist 
rhetoric in favor of a new and fruitful political relationship with Tito’s regime. Thus, the search for 
a new progressive policy toward leftist political forces transposed from the realm of domestic to 
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foreign policy, significantly proving the existence of mutual influence and interaction between 
national and international politics in the age of the Cold War. 
The dissertation has stressed that this political process, greatly facilitated by the political 
pragmatism of a new progressive leadership, the practice of secret negotiations, and an international 
consensus on the unchangeable nature of post-war borders, led to the final settlement of the border 
dispute, the Osimo Treaty. This agreement, however, strained political relations between local and 
central governing elites and, more importantly, challenged Trieste’s loyalty toward the Italian state. 
The result was the aftermath of a historical process that began after 1945 and eroded Trieste’s 
reservoir of confidence toward the Italian state and its institutions. Above all, while undermining 
the identification of local Italians in Trieste with state institutions, Osimo also exposed the 
inescapable connection between local, national, and international politics.  
Not only has the study of this border dispute highlighted the complex interaction between 
multiple political layers, but it has also provided insight into the invaluable role that the politics of 
identity played in the most heated days of the Triestine problem. Indeed, until 1954, the strong anti-
Communist and nationalist rhetoric of the central government projected the image of a border that 
was both ethnically and territorially Italian and located on the southern frontier of the “Iron 
Curtain.” In making the geographical extension of Italy’s eastern border the territorial frontier of 
Western democracy, it also greatly reinforced local political loyalty toward the state.  
Trieste’s return to Italian sovereignty, however, marked the end of Italy’s residual 
nationalist ambitions toward the territory under Yugoslav administration. Above all, it forced the 
Italian government to re-think its politics of identity according to the new imperatives of the Cold 
War. Consequently, while the zone B became a political issue for public consumption, the Italian 
state attempted to project a new image of Trieste that highlighted the city’s role as a point of contact 
rather than conflict with the East. Trieste, therefore, was defined in European and cosmopolitan 
terms, as a radiating center of Western modernity and opulence.  
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While this new image best responded to changes in international and national politics, it 
only partially accounted for local political views. Indeed, the wartime memories of the city, the 
legacy of the Allied occupation, and years of Cold War propaganda reinforced negative views 
toward Tito's Yugoslavia. Consequently, years of nationalist and anti-Communist rhetoric 
combined with a seemingly relentless economic decline which, while discrediting the efforts of the 
Italian administration, ultimately consolidated local views of a state which proved indifferent to the 
city’s needs. As a result, local ambitions for home rule gradually re-emerged and, following the 
public debate on Osimo, Trieste witnessed the success of autonomist movements. Thus, the 
Triestine case has proven that while the new course of Cold War politics might have decisively 
molded former political views, peripheral communities continued to view their lives  through the 
lenses of their past and reacted accordingly to it.     
 In sum, this intensive study of Trieste has demonstrated that the complex “Pax Adriatica” of 
the 1960s anticipated international détente, was accompanied by the rise of progressive views in 
Italian politics, and produced public acquiescence as well as resilience to the state's representation 
of the communist neighbor. This process of re-conceptualization of the “other” was centered upon 
political practices of cooperation and dialogue which, over time, changed and strongly affected the 
post-war rhetoric of nationhood. In frontier cities such as Trieste, the politicization of its acclaimed 
Italian identity or “Italianità” furthered the goals of the early Cold War. At the same time, it also 
significantly impaired the process of socio-political rapprochement with Yugoslavia and the local 
Slavic community, ultimately unleashing local expressions of hostility against the Italian 
establishment once it turned to a new friendly policy toward Yugoslavia.  
Above all, the Triestine and Istrian question has shown the fluidity of the Cold War’s 
Adriatic border, its changing representation within public discourse, and its malleable nature. While 
this region became a theatre of ideological confrontation until 1954, it then transformed into a space 
of negotiation that best exemplified the policy of peaceful co-existence. Years of political tensions 
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between Rome and Belgrade that were concealed under the rhetoric of Adriatic friendship, 
however, left a turbulent legacy that re-emerged after 1989.  
Following the collapse of Yugoslavia's communist regime, the atrocities of the Yugoslav 
wars of succession and its related phenomena of mass migration were used by both right-wing 
Italian political parties and the Italian press to draw parallels with the suffering of the Adriatic 
émigrés and re-open the heated question of their abandoned properties. In particular, the right-wing 
coalition government retrieved the tragedy of the “foibe” from years of silence and publicly used it 
to reinforce Italian sentiments of national unity. From this perspective, the Day of National 
Remembrance, originally intended to commemorate the victims of the “foibe,” became the object of 
political manipulation and highlighted the detrimental effects of the public use of history. 
Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War also offered Trieste a unique opportunity to play its past role 
of a cosmopolitan and entrepreneurial maritime city.  
From this perspective, the accession of the Republic of Slovenia and other Eastern European 
countries to the European Union in 2004 marked a decisive step in the political process of European 
enlargement toward the East. Europe, which experienced the disruptive effects of competing 
nationalisms and Cold War ideology, furthered its process of political unity across what was once 
known as the Iron Curtain. For Trieste and its former territory this meant the return to its Habsburg 
past, a time in which the north-eastern part of the Adriatic was a unique and borderless region. 
Thus, this multilingual and multicultural space, which thrived as a wealthy Habsburg municipality, 
and symbolized both the madness of twentieth-century nationalism and the political dialectic of 
anti-Communism, has again become a crossing point of different cultures and people who now may 
fulfill Tommaseo's dreams of unity within diversity.       
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